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Note on Cover: 
 
In the United States, Germany and Korea the scales of justice are frequently 
used as an image for law and justice. The equities of each case are weighed. 
In Germany the section sign from law codes (§) is also used. Sometimes they 
appear together. Juxtaposing the two here makes the point that civil justice in 
the United States would be furthered were Americans to pay more attention 
to drafting statutes and deciding cases according to written law. 
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Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too 
inefficient for a truly civilized people. 
 
Warren E. Burger 
Chief Justice of the United States (1984)1
 
 
 
[T]he United States in its judicial procedure is many 
decades behind every other civilized Government in the 
world, and I say that it is an immediate and an imperative 
call upon us to rectify that, because the speediness of 
justice, the inexpensiveness of justice, the ready access to 
justice, is the greater part of justice itself. 
 
Woodrow W. Wilson (1915) 
President of the United States2
  
 
                                                 
1 The State of Justice, Annual Report of the Chief Justice of the United States to the Midyear 
Meeting of the American Bar Association, Las Vegas, Address, February 12, 1984, 70 A.B.A. J. 
62, 66 (1984). 
2 Jackson Day Address at Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, reprinted in PRESIDENT WILSON’S 
STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES, INTRODUCTION BY ALBERT SHAW 80 (1917). 
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Summary:  
Civilizing American Civil Justice 
 
In 1776, when Americans declared independence from 
Britain, they also declared their rights. Their declarations of 
rights count “open courts” as among the best means for 
constitutional development. Open courts should secure to every 
man, without regard to wealth, a just remedy for every wrong 
suffered, according to the law of the land, by fair and speedy 
procedure.  
Since 1776 Americans have invested heavily in creating 
open courts. They have been disappointed by returns that fall 
“far short of perfection” (Maurice Rosenberg). They have found 
reform to be an “unending effort to perfect the imperfect” (Jay 
Tidmarsh).  
That Americans have built on the imperfect, i.e., that they 
have looked only to the system that they have, explains their 
disappointing results. Contemporary critics can diagnose 
disorders, but cannot contribute cures known to work. 
Reformers must imagine how proposed new methods might 
work; they have no guide to ways proven to work. 
Elsewhere in the world there are civil justice systems that 
work better. American reformers need not imagine the 
unproven; they can study the proven. Yet contemporary 
reformers have not done so. They have foregone international 
insights. Why? Those better-functioning foreign systems are in 
non-English speaking countries. Their civil law methods seem 
distant from American common law practices.  
This book is intended to make our three systems of civil 
justice, the German and the Korean, more familiar and less 
foreign to each other. It demonstrates that civil processes in 
Germany and in Korea are closer to American understanding 
than Americans assume. German and Korean civil justice values 
are familiar; their means of implementing those values are 
known and often practiced in America. Far from fearing foreign 
6   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
processes, American reformers should find them fonts of tested 
ideas. 
 
 
 
Ten Points for Civil Procedure Reform  
that Promote Justice that is Civilized3
 
 
1) Legal rules seek justice through statutes. 
2) Civil justice is accessible independent of wealth.  
3) Those in right are not burdened with high litigation 
expenses.   
4) Judges are professionals.  
5) Trusted institutions coordinate civil justice. 
6) Jurisdiction is determined without litigation.  
7) Parties tell courts about their disputes.  
8) Judges work with parties to prepare cases for decisions 
according to law. 
9) Judges oversee taking evidence. 
10) Courts base their judgments on law and explain them. 
                                                 
3 Cf. MAURICE ROSENBERG, DEVISING PROCEDURES THAT ARE CIVIL TO PROMOTE JUSTICE 
THAT IS CIVILIZED (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, 1971), reprinted in 69 Mich. L. Rev. 797 
(1971); See also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE: TOO MUCH FIGHT? TOO LITTLE 
TRUTH? EQUAL JUSTICE?, 101 (“Chapter 8. For Procedures More Civil”); Ernst C. Stiefel & 
James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States: Opportunity for Learning from 
Civilized European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation? in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL 
BEUSCH, 853 (1993), reprinted in 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 167 (1994)..  
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Preface 
 
 
Why don’t you take advantage of what has been done by 
the civil law, that governs at least twice as many people as 
the common law, is two thousand years older, and 
embodies a much greater amount of human experience? 
 
Pierre Lepaulle (1929)  
Pioneering French international lawyer,  
on judicial procedure in America,  
as quoted by Edson R. Sunderland4
 
 
 
Litigation is merely a means to an end, like transportation, 
and the same tests should apply to both. No American 
objects to the use of the Diesel engine because it is of 
German origin, nor to the radio because it is Italian, and 
the victims of rabies make no protest against the 
employment of Pasteur’s treatment because it was 
developed in France. In every field of human activity 
outside of the law men are constantly searching for new 
and better methods, overcoming the barriers of language 
and forgetting the prejudices of nationality and race. 
 
Professor Edson R. Sunderland (1929)5
 
  
 
It may be the oldest use of comparative law: you want to fix something 
at home that does not work. You look next door to see how your neighbor 
does it.6
In our book the subject of neighborly inquiry is civil justice. That 
American civil justice does not work well is recognized worldwide. Those 
subject to it were among the first to complain, but today many American 
lawyers, law professors and judges will tell you the same thing. 
 
Professor Jay Tidmarsh of Notre Dame Law School and co-author of a 
leading introductory work on civil procedure7
                                                 
4 Edson R. Sunderland, Current Legal Literature, 15 A.B.A. J. 35 (1929). Professor Sunderland 
was co-drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and principal drafter of its pretrial 
provisions. 
 has stated the magnitude and 
persistence of the problem: “our civil justice system is broken. … The 
5 Id. 
6 See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign 
Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361 (I977).  
7 SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSENTIALS (2007). 
12   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
history of Anglo-American procedure has been an unending effort to perfect 
the imperfect. … Our system is not sustainable in the long run.”8 He is not 
alone in his assessment.9
We are not first to urge comparative inquiry as route to American law 
reform. For generations foreigners, and Americans, have been telling 
Americans of virtues of the Roman-law based legal systems of the European 
continent (known as “civil law” in contrast to Anglo-American “common 
law” systems). Jeremy Bentham was among the first.
 
10 The molders of 
American law were keenly aware of civil law virtues and sought to adopt 
many of them.11
Nor are we first to bring civil law insights specifically to American civil 
justice. The four Americans most important in development of American 
civil procedure, Joseph Story, David Dudley Field, Jr., Edson R. Sunderland, 
and Charles C. Clark, appreciated foreign civil justice systems.
  
12 Yet 
American law reformers today pay civil law systems little mind.13
Today both need and opportunity for foreign insights to inform 
American civil justice are greater than ever. Need arises from the 
dysfunctional performance of American civil justice and from the long 
history of ignoring Continental systems. Opportunity springs from the dearth 
of domestic ideas which parochialism has produced and from the wealth of 
ideas that globalization is revealing. Today, Americans have available in 
good number treatises in English on specific foreign systems together with 
 We hope 
to help change that. 
                                                 
8 Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases on the Merits, 87 DENVER L. REV. 407 (2010). 
9 See the list of over 150 titles in the Bibliographic Notes. 
10 See JEREMY BENTHAM, PAPERS RELATIVE TO CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION: 
INCLUDING CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE RUSSIAN EMPEROR, AND DIVERS CONSTITUTE 
AUTHORITIES IN THE AMERICAN UNITED STATES, reprinted in JEREMY BENTHAM, COLLECTED 
WORKS, ‘LEGILSATOR OF THE WORLD’: WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW, AND EDUCATION 1 
(Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris, eds., 1998). 
11 See The RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD, 1820-1920 
(Matthias Reimann, ed., 1993). 
12 See text at notes ** infra.  
13 John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 545 (1995); John H. Langbein, The Influence of German Émigrés on American Law: 
The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUSS DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN 
AUF DIE RECHTS ENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 321 (Marcus Lutter, Ernst 
Stiefel, & Michael H. Hoeflich, eds. 1993); Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay: Putting 
American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005) 
(“American proceduralists have not been comparativists.); Linda Mullinex, American 
Exceptionalism and Convergence Theory, in COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF 
CATEGORIES 41, 45 (Janet Walker & Oscar G. Chase, eds. 2010) (“the one common 
characteristic among American law reform projects is the lack of reference to foreign law”). See 
also Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States—
Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147  (1994), originally published in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL BEUSCH ZUM 
68. GEBURTSTAG 853 (1993); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why are U.S. Lawyers not 
Learning from Comparative Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 213 (Nedim 
Vogt, et al., eds., 1997). 
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supporting literature such as not been seen before. The success of the 
European Union portends still more opportunities for Americans to learn 
how civil law systems work. 
Yet these books and articles alone will not be sufficient to induce 
Americans to learn about civil law civil justice systems. Many are 
descriptive of foreign systems and are couched in those systems’ own terms. 
They do not relate foreign solutions to American problems. They are written 
by non-Americans with non-American audiences in mind. 
For Americans the civil law is different and exotic;14 civil justice in civil 
law countries is mysterious and unfamiliar. Common law jurists have for 
centuries been suspicious of continental procedures. They assume that the 
civil law has a “different moral and legal framework;”15 its adoption in the 
United States is an “absolutely foreign” notion.16 This suspicion has blocked 
meaningful learning about foreign alternatives. It must be cleared way and 
knowledge substituted if Americans are to benefit from foreign experiences. 
For when it is cleared away, one can see that a particular civil law institution 
is “hardly exotic” and that its elements may be “equally applicable to our 
own.”17
Professor Kevin M. Clermont, an author of a leading introduction to 
American civil procedure,
 
18 demurs to borrowing, not because of suspicion, 
but because “foreign practice is not sufficiently familiar to most lawyers for 
the comparison to serve the practical purpose of a guiding hand.”19 The 
knowledge deficit is, indeed, great. Few Americans scholars have seriously 
studied even one civil law system. American law schools pay civil law 
systems little mind. Sometimes, what they do teach is simplistic at best and 
misleading at worst; a generation ago one critic spoke of “a smattering of 
ignorance.”20
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 190 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J. for 
Court, quoting prior decision describing Puerto Rican sociedad en comandita form of business 
organization as “an exotic creation of the civil law”). Some would avoid comparison by the 
moniker of “American exceptionalism.” See Appendix. 
 Thanks to neglect, today most Americans, if they have any 
knowledge of civil justice abroad, have a comic book picture of “the 
inquisitorial system.”  
15 Antonin Scalia in Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin 
Scalia and Stephen Breyer, American University, Washington College of Law, January 13, 
2005. 
16 Antonin Scalia, Address, January 4, 2010, Jackson Mississippi, sponsored by Mississippi 
College School of Law, quoted saynsumthn.wordpress.com/.../supreme-court-justice-antonin-
scalia-on-abortion-and-international-law/. 
17 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. at 208 (O’Conner, Brennan, Marshall and Blakmun, JJ., 
dissenting).  
18 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONCISE HORNBOOK (2nd ed. 2008). 
19 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, THREE MYTHS ABOUT TWOMBLY-IQBAL 8 (May 22, 2010, Cornell 
Legal Studies Research Paper) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1613327. 
20 Benjamin Aaron, Labor Courts: Western European Models and Their Significance for the 
United States, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 847, 851 (1969). 
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It is our purpose in writing this book to help make civil justice in 
Germany and Korea more familiar and less frightening to Americans. So we 
have written a book that is not a treatise for specialists, but is an introductory 
textbook for civil justice in the United States, Germany and Korea.21 We 
intend for it to be accessible to people with an educated layman’s knowledge 
of a modern legal system. We do not limit our audience to Americans. We 
want this book to help introduce Germans and Koreans to American civil 
justice. We want it to work for readers from all lands interested in civil 
procedure. Non-Americans need, too, to find familiarity and not only fear in 
the American system.22
To present three entire systems of civil justice, even at an introductory 
level, is a daunting task which we do not undertake. We have a more modest 
approach that we believe is sufficient to achieve our goal of making each of 
our systems a little less foreign to readers from other systems. 
 
 
Familiarizing Foreign Civil Justice:  
The Biography of a Lawsuit in Three Countries 
  
We present our three systems by looking at a particular dispute as it 
would develop differently in each. We present, in effect, a biography of a 
lawsuit. This is a genre with a long tradition in the United States and before 
that in England.23 What makes our biography unusual is that it is a biography 
of the same lawsuit in three different systems.24
                                                 
21 In this book we use “American” to describe the United States of America and do not include 
Canada, Mexico, or other parts of the Americas. We use “Korean” to describe the Republic of 
Korea, i.e., South Korea and do not include the People’s Republic of Korea, i.e., North Korea. 
 By using a particular case 
we can focus on those aspects of our systems of civil justice that are most 
relevant to understanding without being diverted by consideration of matters 
22 Foreigners are no less frightened of the prospect of an American lawsuit: it gives them 
nightmares! See James R. Maxeiner, Book Review, 23 INT’L LAWYER 321 (1989); ROLF 
STÜRNER, WHY ARE EUROPEANS AFRAID TO LITIGATE IN THE UNITED STATES (2001). 
23 Compare ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
TENNESSEE: ADDRESSED TO A LAW STUDENT (1st ed. 1852; 6th ed. by Sam B. Gilreath 1937) 
with MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE BIOGRAPHY OF A LEGAL DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1968); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, 
LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 59 (2006) (“Chapter 4. An American 
Civil Litigation From Beginning To End”). See also RICHARD BOOTE, AN HISTORICAL 
TREATISE OF AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW: AND OF THE PROCEEDINGS USED IN THE KING'S 
BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS FROM THE ORIGINAL PROCESSES TO THE JUDGMENTS IN BOTH 
COURTS (1781); JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, AN ELEMENTARY VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN AN 
ACTION AT LAW, AMERICAN EDITION FROM THE THIRD LONDON EDITION BY DAVID 
BABINGTON RING (1848). 
24 This is not the first such biography. Catalyst for this book and the first such biography is 
ANDREW J. MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU & LUIS EDUARDO SPROVIERI, PRACTICAL GLOBAL 
TORT LITIGATION: UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND ARGENTINA (2007). 
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not germane to that case. The particular case gives a “contextual anchor” so 
that readers can move from one system to another without being cast adrift.25
We present all three systems of civil justice in their daily workings. We 
avoid the technical, the unusual and the abuses. By focusing on the usual, we 
hope to make all three systems more familiar. In the usual we see common 
cause in working to realize common values.
  
26
To keep our book focused on the goal of American law reform, we have 
limited it to three systems of civil justice. We chose the German system 
because throughout world the German system is rightly viewed as a success 
story. Perhaps more than any other, it has been the principal counterpoint to 
American civil justice. Among civil law systems, only the French system is a 
competitor. While we might have chosen the French system as a second 
system, that would introduce a different world of legal concepts while 
remaining a Euro-centric comparison. We have instead chosen the Korean 
system. Korea is a non-Western society that has been greatly influenced in 
its law by both the German and the American systems. The Korean system 
of civil justice straddles the German/American divide. It provides an 
example of a system choosing between our two principal competing 
approaches. 
 To address the technical or the 
usual or the abuses would accent differences among our systems; it would 
make difficult appreciation of what all three systems have in common. The 
unusual do not appear across all systems, at least, not in the same way.  
As American readers know, we have also had to make a choice from 
among the civil justice systems of the fifty United States. We chose the 
federal system. Focusing on the federal system is a common convention in 
American works on civil procedure. Practically, one can present only one 
American system. The federal system is the closest that there is to a model 
for all systems. While there is no better choice as model for lawsuits, it has 
an important deficiency: the federal system focuses on cases that are large 
cases in most systems of civil justice, i.e., where the amount in controversy 
is in excess of $75,000.27
We have also chosen not to address “alternative dispute resolution” or 
“ADR” as it is known. ADR is a way that parties, by agreement before a 
dispute arises, often in a standard form agreement, or after a dispute arises, 
by special agreement, arrange to have a private body resolve their dispute. It 
is particularly popular in the United States, in part, because the alternative, 
ordinary civil justice, is less palatable in the United States than elsewhere. 
 
                                                 
25 See Andrew J. McClurg, Preface xii, in MCCLURG ET AL., supra note 24; cf. Markesinis, infra 
note 29, at 30.  
26 While we assert common values and common cause, we are not injecting our book into what 
comparative scholars speak of as a search for a “common core” of legal systems. 
27 See Oscar G. Chase, Reflections on Civil Procedure Reform in the United States: What has 
been learned? What has been accomplished? in THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 163, 164 (Nicolò Trocker & Vincenzo Varano, eds. 2005). 
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We choose not to address it, because our point in this book is to provoke 
making American civil justice more palatable.28
 
 
The Provocative in Our Book 
 
Lay readers may think that our book is provocative because we see 
American civil justice as flawed.29 To observe that American civil justice is 
flawed, however, is not provocative. It is conventional wisdom; others have 
said that for a long time.30 What makes our book provocative is that we urge 
Americans to look abroad for insights for improving their system of civil 
justice.31 Here are five objections that we expect to locating insights in 
foreign law in general and in German law in particular:32
1. American civil justice is the best in the world (“not invented here”).
 
33
2. German civil justice is not as good as we assert (“not so good 
there”).
 
34
                                                 
28 Cf. Langbein, The Influence of German Émigrés, supra note 13, at 323-324 (“Rather than 
confront the problem directly and undertake to solve it, we escape the problem by encouraging 
propertied persons to buy their way out, which leaves the poor and the unsophisticated to bear 
the main burden of victimization.”). 
 
29 See Basil Markesinis, Ways and Means of Teaching Foreign Law, 23 TULANE EUR. & CIVIL 
L. FORUM 175, 204-206 (2008). 
30 We list in the Bibliographic Notes more than 150 such critiques. The most famous such 
critique is: Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 29 ABA REP. 395 (1906).  
31 Common law systems are found in those countries where English is a national language and 
where Englishmen are either native or colonized the land. Civil law systems are found in most 
other modern countries. 
32 We need not be good soothsayers to foresee it: similar objections greeted John H. Langbein, 
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) and recent references 
by United States Supreme Court justices to foreign law.  
33 E.g., Gerald Walpin, America's Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 175-176 (2003) (drawing a parallel to Churchill’s famous 
aphorism about democracy). See generally Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice 
Reform in the United States—Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European Procedure 
Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147  (1994), originally published in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL BEUSCH ZUM 68. GEBURTSTAG 853 (1993); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. 
Maxeiner, Why are U.S. Lawyers not Learning from Comparative Law?, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 213 (Nedim Vogt, et al., eds., 1997). See also, Schlesinger, 
supra note 6, at 363 (noting the same xenophobia for criminal procedure). 
34 Professor Allen of Northwestern University Law School is Professor Langbein’s principal 
protagonist on this point. See Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: 
A Plea for Fewer Generalities and Greater Detail in Comparative Law Scholarship, 82 NW. U. 
L. REV. 705 (1988). For Professor Langbein’s response, see John H. Langbein, Trashing "The 
German Advantage," 82 NW. U. L. REV. 763 (1988). While Professor Allen questions the 
factual claims made for German civil justice, Professor Cappalli of Temple University School of 
Law argues the positive case that American common law methods are better. See RICHARD B. 
CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD (1997); Richard B. Cappalli, Richard B. 
Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's. Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 
TEMPLE INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 87 (1998). See also Robert Adriansen, At the Edges of the Law: 
Civil Law v. Common Law: A Response to Professor Richard B. Cappalli, 12 TEMP. INT'L & 
COMP. L.J. 107 (1998). 
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3. American institutions of dispute resolution embody American cultural 
values that are incompatible with cultural values embodied in German 
dispute resolution institutions (“American exceptionalism”).35
4. American civil justice serves public law functions that German and 
Korean civil justice do not and which limits the value of international 
insights.
  
36
5. Practically, for the foregoing reasons, and because of the self-interest 
of those who preside over the system, it is foolish to think that Americans 
would ever adopt foreign models of civil justice (“real reform is 
hopeless”).
 
37
We do not in this book answer these objections directly. Instead, we 
present information that we hope will enable readers to reach their own 
conclusions.
 
38
With respect to one of these objections—the asserted exceptional public 
law functions of American civil justice—our pedagogic approach of looking 
at how our respective systems handle a single hypothetical case necessarily 
 We want first to help overcome the knowledge deficit. 
Throughout the book we point to factors that bear on these questions. We 
seek to provide helps to readers in pursuing these issues on their own.  
                                                 
35 Professor Oscar G. Chase of New York University School of Law is the eloquent proponent 
of this view. His argument is that it is the general culture itself and not the legal culture that 
determines these differences. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and 
Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002); Oscar G. Chase, Culture and 
Disputing, 7 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L.  81 (1999); OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND 
RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005); Oscar G. Chase, Legal 
Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1997); Oscar G. Chase, 
Reflections on Civil Procedure Reform in the United States: What has been learned? What has 
been accomplished? in THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 163 
(Nicolò Trocker & Vincenzo Varano, eds. 2005). For Professor Langbein’s response to one of 
these, see John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 41 (1997). In as similar direction, see Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The 
Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987). Professor Chase is not, however, 
the first proponent of the view. See already Samuel Tyler, Introduction, in HENRY JOHN 
STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (Samuel Tyler ed., 
3d Am. ed., 2d London ed. 1871). We cannot resist commenting on Professor Chase’s selection 
of four features that demonstrate the influence of American culutre on civil procedure: the civil 
jury, pretrial discovery, the role of the judge, and the role of the expert witness. “American 
Exceptionalism,” supra at 287-301. Only the third would support not making changes in 
contemporary civil justice. As we show below the civil jury has practically disappeared. On the 
other hand, pretrial discovery as we know it today originates only in 1938 and in the present 
form later, so that we cannot see it as an immutable part of American culture. We cannot easily 
imagine that culture has much to say about expert testimony.  
36 See Appendix 
37 Professor Langbein reports that Max Rheinstein, the dean of the generation of émigré German 
scholars from the 1930s, thought the vested interests of those who run the defective legal 
machinery make reform of procedure “hopeless.” See Langbein, The Influence of German 
Émigrés on American Law, supra note 13, at 322-323, 326-327. See also John C. Reitz, Why We 
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 
(1990). 
38 See Basil Markesinis, Book Review Essay: Ways and Means of Teaching Foreign Law, 23 
TULANE EUR. & CIVIL L. FORUM 175, 206 (2008). 
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means that we do not consider that argument in our principal discussion. So 
as not to leave it unaddressed, se summarize it in the Appendix and explain 
why we believe that it does not undercut the utility of comparative 
examination.  
 
* * * 
 
Finally, a word on responsibilities: while we share the conclusions 
stated, our experiences and knowledge on which those conclusions are 
stated, vary. Professor Maxeiner bears primary responsibility for the work as 
a whole and, in particular, for comparative conclusions.  
. 
James R. Maxeiner 
Bronxville NY USA 
 
Gyooho Lee (이규호) 
Seoul Korea 
 
Armin Weber 
Munich Germany EU 
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C H A P T E R  1 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N:  
T H E  P U R P O S E  O F  C I V I L  J U S T I C E  
T H E  T H E M E  O F  T H I S  B O O K  
T H E  S T R U C T U R E  O F  T H I S  B O O K  
T H E  F A C T S  O F  T H E  H Y P O T H E T I C A L  C A S E  
 
 
 
 
THE YOUNG AMERICAN (popular schoolbook, 1844)39
 
 
Civil justice describes the system of the administration of justice in civil 
matters. The law of civil procedure is the law that governs lawsuits, i.e., civil 
actions, among private parties.  
                                                 
39 S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING 
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY. FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS 23 (4th ed., 1844). 
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Whether in the United States, Germany or Korea, the course of a 
civil action is simply stated and similar in outline. One person feels 
aggrieved by another person. Usually before bringing a lawsuit, the 
aggrieved person asks the other to make the matter right. Only if the 
latter fails to make the matter right does the aggrieved person take the 
matter to court.  
The aggrieved person, i.e., the plaintiff, commences a civil action 
with a formal complaint. The complaint declares a claim against one 
or more defendants. It asserts the plaintiff’s right or defendant’s duty 
or both and asks the court to recognize and enforce the rights or 
duties claimed. Upon officially receiving the complaint, the defendant 
has three principal alternatives: comply with the claim, ignore the 
claim and accept a judgment by default, or contest the claim.  
Together, complaint and any written answer or subsequent reply 
to such an answer, constitute pleadings. Pleadings define the subject 
matter of the lawsuit; they begin a process of applying law to fact. 
Subsequent proceedings find facts that are then judged according to 
law. At the end of that process, if parties do not themselves otherwise 
resolve the dispute, the court issues a judgment that concludes the 
matter. A party dissatisfied with that judgment ordinarily may appeal 
to a higher court. After all appeals are exhausted, there is a final 
decision according to law. 
 
The Purpose of Civil Justice 
 
The purpose of civil justice is determination of rights and duties 
among private parties according to law. Determining rights and duties 
of parties resolves their disputes.  
If there were no civil justice, private parties might use self-help 
to realize rights and to resolve disputes. The stronger, rather than the 
righteous, would prevail. To preserve peace and right, modern legal 
systems prohibit self-help except in a few cases.  
Primitive legal systems worked differently. They emphasized 
dispute resolution over right determination. Process—not substantive 
law—resolved disputes. Resolving the dispute determined the right 
rather than determining the right resolved the dispute. Primitive 
systems used methods of decision, such as trial by ordeal or trial by 
battle, which were unrelated to parties’ rights. At least since the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment, however, modern systems of civil 
procedure have rested on the idea that rights of parties as set forth in 
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law and not the skills of the parties or of their representatives should 
determine outcomes of disputes.40
Realizing rights and resolving disputes are essential purposes of modern 
systems of civil justice. They lie at the heart of American law. Sir William 
Blackstone, whose famous Commentaries once were the Bible of American 
lawyers, began his third book on Private Wrongs: “The more effectually to 
accomplish the redress of private injuries, courts of justice are instituted in 
every civilized society, in order to protect the weak from the insults of the 
stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws, by which rights are 
defined, and wrongs prohibited.”
  
41 Nearly two-and-one half centuries later, a 
report of a committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers echoes 
Blackstone: “Our civil justice system is critical to our way of life. In good 
times or bad, we must all believe that the courts are available to us to enforce 
rights and resolve disputes – and to do so in a fair and cost-effective way.”42
Civil procedure is more important than the lawsuits it governs. Civil 
procedure implements substantive law. Thomas W. Shelton, a founding 
father of modern American civil procedure, likened procedure to the arteries 
through which our blood flows: “so surely as the human heart connected 
with clogged arteries must eventually cease to beat, so certainly will a 
government retarded by clogged judicial procedure surely decay.”
  
43
Civil justice makes civil society possible. People comply with law 
because they know what it requires and because they believe that it applies 
to everyone. Most people most of the time observe most laws. They apply 
laws to themselves. Effective civil justice is essential if law is to provide 
guidance that makes self-application possible. For every instance of 
application of law in a lawsuit, there are millions of instances of individuals 
applying law to themselves without lawsuits.
  
44
 
  
The Theme of This Book:  
Civil Justice that is Just, Speedy, Inexpensive and Accessible to All 
 
We take the theme of our book from the “open courts” clause of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights of November 3, 1776. The Declaration of 
Rights is intended to be “the best means of establishing a good constitution 
                                                 
40 Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1522-1523 (1998). Professor Carrington was Reporter, Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 1985-1992. 
41 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1768; 1st Am. ed., 
Philadelphia, 1772). 
42 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 23 (2009). If one doubts this judgment, 
one need only examine conditions in countries where this is not the case. 
43 THOMAS W. SHELTON, THE SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 17 (1918). 
44 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the 
Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 517, 523-524 (2006). 
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in this state, for the surer foundation, and more permanent security thereof.” 
The open courts clause promises a civil justice system that works well 
routinely: 
 
17. That every freeman, for any injury done to him in his 
person, or property, ought to have remedy by the course of 
the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right, 
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily 
without delay, according to the law of the land.45
  
 
In this book we present our three systems of civil justice in comparative 
perspective; we examine the methods that each system uses to pursue those 
goals. In the clause we find four promises:  
 
(1) Substantive accuracy: does the system work to decide disputes 
correctly, that is, accurately according to substantive law and consistent 
with justice? (Does the system provide “justice and right … according 
to the law of the land?”) 
  
(2) Procedural fairness: does the system work to decide disputes 
fairly, that is, does it secure the right to be heard, that is, a “day in 
court,” as the right to be heard is known in the United States? (Does the 
system decide “by the course of the law of the land?”)  
 
(3) Access to justice: does the system assure access to courts to all? 
(Does the system make justice available to all persons “freely without 
sale [and] fully without any denial?”)   
 
(4) Efficiency: does the system decide disputes efficiently and 
timely? (Does the system decide “speedily without delay?”)   
 
We adopt these promises from the Maryland Declaration of Rights as 
our theme because they are timeless and universal in modern legal systems. 
They are not limited to the eighteenth century; they speak to our time.46 
They are not peculiar to the American legal system; they are fundamental to 
the German and Korean legal systems.47 The promises of accuracy, fairness, 
access and efficiency are elementary legal learning.48
                                                 
45 Maryland Declaration of Rights of Nov. 3, 1776, in THE DECISIVE BLOW IS STRUCK, A 
FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION OF 1776 AND 
THE FIRST MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (1977).  
 We return to these 
46 E.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable 
Justice, 87 DENVER U.L. REV. 437, 442 (2010). 
47 See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47. 2000/C O.J. 364/01. 
48 See JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM 90-91 (2000). 
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promises throughout the book, for these promises are ideals of every modern 
system of civil justice. 
The open courts clause goes back to the earliest days of Anglo-
American law. Its origin is Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta of English law. 
Chapter 40 found resonance in colonial America. Maryland was not alone in 
adopting it; most states followed suit. Article XI of the 1780 Declaration of 
the Rights of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is similar. Another close 
relative was proposed by Virginia for inclusion in the federal Bill of 
Rights.49 Today the open courts clause is in force in Maryland as part of the 
state constitution. Most states of the United States of America have similar 
or related provisions in their constitutions.50
The ideals of the open courts clause are fundamental to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 on which modern American civil 
procedure is based. The Federal Rules “seek the costless application of 
substantive law onto specific disputes in the form of judicial decisions.”
   
51 
Rule 1 provides that the Rules are to “be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.” When the drafters formally unveiled the Rules to the legal 
profession at the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association in 1936, the Secretary of the drafting committee blessed them by 
reading from Magna Carta Chapter 40: “To none will we sell, to no one will 
we deny, or delay, right or justice.”52 He explained the need for the then new 
rules: “What is the matter with present methods of the trial of cases? Every 
one, I think, will agree that our methods of procedure have three major 
faults. First, delay; second, expense; third, uncertainty.”53
 
 The then new rules 
were to remedy these maladies. They were to fulfill the promises of open 
courts: accuracy, fairness, access and efficiency.  
Making Civil Justice Just, Speedy, Inexpensive and Accessible to All 
 
In this book we ask how our respective systems work to make civil 
justice just, speedy, inexpensive and accessible. We engage in a comparative 
examination because we believe that that is one way to indentify those 
methods that work better than other methods. We are not conducting a 
contest over which is better.54
                                                 
49 See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 284-297 (overview), 458 (Massachusetts), 464 (Virginia), 
483-487 (cataloging state constitutional provisions (1968).  
 Each system has its unique properties. Each 
50 See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1311 
(2003). 
51 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2nd ed. 2009). 
52 Edgar B. Tolman, Statement, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61 ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 423, 432, 433 (1936). 
53 Id. at 437. 
54 See, e.g., DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (The International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2004); Benedicte  Favuarque-Cosson & 
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system has its successes and its failures. None is perfect. Our search is for 
better ways for each system.55
While our intention is not to judge one system better than the other, we 
cannot avoid a seemingly competitive observation: the consensus judgment 
of Americans of their own system of civil justice is that it fails to achieve the 
goals that it sets out for itself. It does not deliver justice justly, quickly and 
inexpensively to all.
 Necessarily each solution will be different; 
but each system can profit from experiences of the others. 
56
A natural consequence of these different judgments is that we give 
attention to those aspects of the American system that undermine and to 
those aspects of the German and Korean systems that promote realization of 
a civil justice system that is just, quick, inexpensive and accessible. We turn 
now to consider the states of civil justice in our countries. 
 The consensus judgment of Germans of their own 
system of civil justice, in contrast, is that it does do these things well, if not 
perfectly. The consensus judgment of Korean jurists is that their system—
still in historical terms a relatively new one—is on its way to achieving these 
goals and that their job is to win the confidence of a skeptical public by 
making sure that it does achieve them.  
 
The State of American Civil Justice 
 
That American civil justice did not work well until the 1938 Federal 
Rules—that it was expensive, time-consuming and even incoherent—has 
become an “organizing perspective” for law school classes.57
That the Federal Rules, despite great hopes, have led to ever more 
expensive and time-consuming lawsuits has become a commonplace of our 
  
                                                                                                        
Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business 
World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2009). 
 ;  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 76 (1996) 
(asking that question of England and America). 
55 See, e.g., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way,” Litigation, Alternatives, 
and Accommodation, Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L.J. 811; LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE 
OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, infra note 99.   
56 Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENVER U.L. REV., 407 (2010) (“I start 
from the premise that our civil justice system is broken. ... [O]ur system is not sustainable in the 
long run.”) The perception of failure to satisfy open courts values is not limited to the United 
States. According to Justice Ronald Sackville civil justice systems in common law countries 
generally are thought “unable to meet basic objectives of fairness, affordability and efficiency.” 
Ronald Sackville, Reforming the Civil Justice System: The Case for a Considered Approach, in 
BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM (Helen Stacy & Michael Levarch, eds., 1999). With these 
hopes in mind, England and Wales changed their civil justice system. See LORD WOOLF, 
MASTER OF THE ROLLS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996). 
57 John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, ed., 1999). Cf. 
Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy?, supra note 57, at 932 (“nineteenth century civil 
procedure was a sport of chance in which the substantive merits of claims and defenses played a 
minor role.” [citations omitted]). 
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generation.58 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 have not lived up 
to the hopes of their drafters. While few jurists doubt the continued validity 
of the drafters’ ideals,59 many question their system’s fidelity to them.60
In 2009 a committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers reported 
that the civil justice system “is in serious need of repair. In many 
jurisdictions, today’s system takes too long and costs too much.”
 
61 A survey 
of the members of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association 
found general agreement that it is not cost-effective to litigate cases for less 
than $100,000.62 That amount is nearly double the median American 
household income.63
Criticisms of American civil justice are legion. The history of American 
civil procedure is said to be “an unending effort to perfect the imperfect.”
 Thirty-seven percent of litigating lawyers responding 
said the Federal Rules are not conducive to attaining the Rules’ goals of just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of all suits.  
64 
While in the last generation criticisms have swelled,65 there has scarcely 
been a time in American history when there was not substantial criticism. 
Already Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack of 1733 included a 
satirical poem on the “Benefit of Going to Law.”66
In finding the American system as in need of fixing, we are not being 
unduly critical or fair in our comparison. So that no reasonable reader shall 
doubt whether we are even-handed, we list in a bibliographic note more than 
150 mostly separately published critiques; many make more dire judgments 
than ours. We begin our list with titles that predate Jesse Higgins’ 1805 
pamphlet, Sampson against the Philistines, or the Reformation of Lawsuits; 
and Justice made Cheap, Speedy, and Brought Home to Every Man’s Door, 
and conclude with titles that postdate Al Sampson’s 2004 book, Lawyers 
Under Fire: What a Mess Lawyers Have Made of the Law! We note Chief 
  
                                                 
58 Leubsdorf, supra note 58 at 53. 
59 But see Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENVER 
U.L. REV. 287, 288 (2010).at 288 (asserting that Rule ‘s statement of them is “misleading and 
counterproductive” and has three assumptions that “make little sense for modern litigation ....”). 
60 E.g., Steven S. Gensler, Justice! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to the Revolution of 1938 
Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 273 (2008) (“the 
future of federal rule making depends not on finding new ideals but on fidelity to the ones we 
have.”). 
61 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 2. 
62 Id. at 6. 
63 In 2008 the median household income was $52,029. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County 
Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.  
64 Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” supra note 56, at 407. 
65 One of the first and best of the new wave is MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1976). 
It was reviewed by the then director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Private Law in Hamburg. Hein Kötz, The Reform of the Adversary Process, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 
478 (1981). Kötz concluded his review with the exhortation: “If there is a desire to reform 
American civil procedure, either by making changes within the adversary system or by 
developing alternative methods of dispute resolution, the Continental experience may be well 
worth studying.” Id. at 486. 
66 Quoted below in the Bibliographic Notes. 
26   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
Justices of the United States (e.g., Taft, Warren and Burger) and presidents 
(e.g., Taft, Wilson and Bush) who have joined in the clamor for civil justice 
reform.  
 
The State of German Civil Justice 
 
According to the German Minister of Justice, German civil justice 
approximates the ideals of the open court’s clauses. It “is predictable, 
affordable and enforceable. [German] legislation balances the various 
interests in a fair and equitable manner, ensuring just solutions. Everyone 
has access to law and justice, independent of their financial means. ... 
German courts decide without delay ....”67 While to a skeptic this can only be 
political puffery, the minister’s claim is credible. Legal aid is available to 
most people who need it. The system is not limited to large claims, but 
handles them all. While in the United States only cases in excess of 
$100,000 are considered viable, in Germany, few cases are that large.68 
Courts deal with most cases with dispatch: in 2009 the courts of general 
jurisdiction in first instance concluded 56.9% within 6 months and 80.1 % 
within a year.69
We explain in the Appendix that the present day German civil justice 
system is the system established in the first twenty-five years following 
German unification in 1871 in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877, the 
Court Organization Law of 1877 and the Civil Code of 1896. That system 
worked well then and does today. It has long been admired in the world,
  
70 
including in the Common Law world.71
                                                 
67 LAW—MADE IN GERMANY; GLOBAL–EFFEKTIV–KOSTENGÜNSTIG 3 (2008), available at 
 At home it has long been held in 
high regard; it has been subject to no criticism remotely comparable to that 
of its American counterpart. As we shall discuss it is the task of the Federal 
www.lawmadeingermany.de.  
68 About 20% exceed about €50,000 (about $62,500). 
69 STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RECHTSPFLEGE, ZIVILGERICHTE, JUSTIZSTATISTIK DER ZIVIL-
GERICHTE (FACHSERIE 10 REIHE 2.1) Table 5, 50-51 (2009), available at www.destatis.de. 
70 See DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEßRECHT UND SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTS-
ORDNUNGEN (Walther J. Habscheid, ed. 1991). In Bavaria, the numbers were still better, 60.7% 
within six months and 83.2% within a year. 
71 See Frederick William Maitland, The Making of the German Civil Code in 3 THE COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 484 (Fisher, ed., 1911); Roscoe Pound, The Causes 
of the Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 397 
(1906) (“the wonderful mechanism of modern German judicial administration”); FREDERICK 
FRANK BLACHLY & MIRIAM EULALIE OATMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
GERMANY (Brookings Institution 1928); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985). Langbein’s article created a stir in the American 
legal community. For reviews of that stir, see Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage 
Revisited: An Inside View of German Civil Procedure in the Nineties, 13 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 
25, 33 (1998); Bradley Bryan, Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein’s 
Conception of Comparative Law and Procedural Justice in Question, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 521, 523 (2004).  
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Ministry of Justice to watch over that system to assure that it continues to 
work well.72
The principal problem that the system has had to cope with in recent 
years has been resources: demand for civil justice continues to rise, but 
financial means available to meet the demand have not kept pace. To keep 
costs within bounds, many first instance cases that were formerly would 
have been handled by three judges are now handled by one. Appeals that 
formerly would have conducted as proceedings de novo now concentrate on 
correction of incorrect decisions.  
  
 
The State of Korean Civil Justice 
 
Korea today has a modern legal system that in structure and methods 
differs little from western legal systems. The goals of civil justice in modern 
Korea are the same as they are in the United States and in Germany. 
Conditions are, however, different. As we explain in the Appendix, due to 
thirty-five years of foreign occupation (1910-1945), when judicial 
administration was part and parcel of repressive government and the legal 
system was seen as a means of obliterating national identity, and thanks to 
another forty-two years of authoritarian rule (1945-1987), the Korean system 
is a newcomer to the rule of law. In the last quarter century, however, Korea 
has had success in building a firm and sound system suitable to support its 
modern economic and social systems. So great has been that success that 
Korea is often seen as a model for other developing countries.73
Korean jurists recognize that they are still overcoming a deep alienation 
to law that developed in those dark years.
 
74
                                                 
72 For example, although the system handles most cases expeditiously, to meet claims that it is 
too slow in some instances, the Ministry has proposed a law that would give litigants subject to 
undue delay a modest monetary claim for damages. See, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: 
Gesetz über den Rechtsschutz bei überlangen Gerichtsverfahren und strafrechtlichen 
Ermittlungsverfahren (12. August 2010). 
 The long-tradition of faith in 
institutions found in the United States and the similar tradition of faith in law 
found in Germany are both under construction in Korea. Korean jurists 
cannot count on the benefit of doubt that long traditions bring; more than 
their counterparts in the United States and in Germany, they must prove the 
virtues of their institutions and rules.  
73 See Youngjoon Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap between Korean substance and Western 
form, in LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND 
INNOVATIONS 151, 152 (Ann Black & Gary F. Boll, eds., 2011); Won-Ho Lee, Kurzer Abriss 
über Koreanisches Recht in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD 
GROßFELD ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG at 687 (Ulrich Huber & Werner Ebke, eds., 1999).  
74 Id. See Chang-Rok Kim Where is the Korean Legal System Going?, in LAW IN A CHANGING 
WORLD - ASIAN ALTERNATIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH KOBE LECTURES BEING THE 
FIRST ASIA SYMPOSIUM IN JURISPRUDENCE, TOKYO AND KYOTO, 10 AND 12TH OCTOBER 1996, 
11, at 14-16 (Yasutomo Morigiwa, ed., 1998). 
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Among the greatest challenges to modern Korean civil justice is 
improving public confidence in the legal professions. Surveys find public 
confidence in the judiciary at a low level (only 50% in one). In Chapter 3 we 
discuss some of the possible sources for this lack of confidence. One is a 
civil service system for judges that finds ex-judges representing clients 
before former colleagues. Another is a lawyer licensing system that until 
recently allowed only a very few people to become lawyers and which meant 
that most parties in civil cases represent themselves. 
In building the rule of law Korean jurists have taken profound interest in 
foreign legal systems and, in particular, in the Japanese system (which they 
inherited from the occupation), in the German system (on which the 
Japanese system is based) and in the American system (thanks to the 
overwhelming economic and political presence of the United States and of 
English in Korea). Many Korean jurists have journeyed abroad looking for 
optimal solutions for their civil justice system. As we shall see below, in 
civil justice, while Korean jurists have flirted with American innovations, 
they have largely gravitated toward modern German methods.  
 
Structure of this Book  
  
This book is a comparative introduction to civil procedure in the United 
States, Germany and Korea.75 We present civil procedure in three countries 
using the medium of examination of a particular factual situation as it might 
develop differently in each. We present, in effect, a biography of a lawsuit. 
This is a genre with a long tradition in the United States and before that in 
England.76 What makes our biography unusual is that it is a biography of the 
same lawsuit in three different jurisdictions.77
The idea is that placing rules of foreign law in context of their 
application facilitates their learning and appreciation. By using a particular 
case we can present rules against the context of those aspects of the systems 
that are most relevant for understanding, without being diverted by 
consideration of matters not germane to that case.
 
78
                                                 
75 In this book we use “American” to describe the United States of America and do not include 
Canada, Mexico, or other parts of the Americas. We use “Korean” to describe the Republic of 
Korea, i.e., South Korea and do not include the People’s Republic of Korea, i.e., North Korea. 
 The particular case gives 
76 Compare ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
TENNESSEE: ADDRESSED TO A LAW STUDENT (1st ed. 1852; 6th ed. by Sam B. Gilreath 1937) 
with MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE BIOGRAPHY OF A LEGAL DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1968). See also JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, AN ELEMENTARY VIEW 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION AT LAW, American Edition from the Third London Edition 
by David Babington Ring (1848). 
77 Professor Andrew J. McClurg, whose own book was catalyst to this one, deserves credit for 
the idea. See ANDREW J. MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU & LUIS EDUARDO SPROVIERI, PRACTICAL 
GLOBAL TORT LITIGATION: UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND ARGENTINA (2007).   
78 For example, we discuss jurisdiction in general and as it applies to the case, but do not 
consider other than with a passing mention jurisdiction over things (i.e., in rem jurisdiction). 
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readers a “contextual anchor” for what they are learning.79 Thus we do not 
give comprehensive introductions to our three systems. We chosen a simple 
case to show how ordinary cases develop. Our case is Mary Roh v. John Doh, 
Jr.80
 
 
The Facts of the Hypothetical Case81
 
 
Mary Roh and John Doh, Sr. have been personal friends and business 
associates for decades. Their two children, Rosa Roh and John Doh, Jr., fell 
in love in college and were engaged to get married.  
Mary Roh has a Honda dealership in the nation’s capital; John Doh, Sr. 
holds the regional Honda distributorship, Honda Capital Area 
Distributorship, Inc., that supplies the dealership. The Distributorship is 
located in Second City. John Doh, Sr., intends for his son John Doh, Jr. to 
take over the family business. To foster that goal, in January he set up his 
son as manager of a new Honda dealership, DohSon Honda, LLC, in Second 
City.  
In April 2011 Mary Roh and John Doh, Jr. attended the annual spring 
party of the national Honda dealers’ association. The meeting was sponsored 
by Capital Honda Distributorship Inc. and held in the nation’s capital. John 
Doh, Sr. was not there. John Doh, Jr. and Roh disagree about what was said 
between them at the party, but they agree that the next day Roh transferred 
[$75,000—€60,000—₩75 million] to the account of DohSon Honda LLC.  
In June the Roh-Doh engagement fell apart acrimoniously. 
Later Roh said that John Doh, Jr. had come to her with an urgent request 
for cash. DohSon Honda LLC, suddenly had a shortfall. It didn’t need 
much—just [$75,000—€60,000—₩75 million]—but Doh, Jr. did not want 
to go to his father for it, since that would shake his father’s faith that he 
could handle the dealership. He wanted a short-term loan—four months at 
the longest. 
John Doh, Jr.’s version of events was different. He said that Roh’s 
version was nonsense: if he had needed money, he had personal credit lines 
of [$75,000—€60,000—₩75 million]. He said that the money was a gift. 
Roh denied that the money was gift: if the money had been a gift, it would 
have been motivated by Doh, Jr.’s announced marriage to her daughter Roh. 
                                                 
79 See Andrew J. McClurg, Preface, in MCLURG et al., supra note 77, at xii; Basil Markesinis, 
Ways and Means of Teaching Foreign Law, 23 TULANE EUR. & CIVIL L. FORUM 1, 30 (2008). 
80 John & Jane Doe and Richard & Mary Roe are names used for fictitious or anonymous parties 
in the United States. E.g., Mary Roe v. John Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971); Joan Roe v. Jane Doe, 
420 U.S. 307 (1975). To give the names a more international flavor and names more familiar in 
Germany and Korea, we have made them Roh and Doh. 
81 The case facts find inspiration in:Armin Weber & Harriet Weber, “Geldsegen,” material 
distributed at the Richterfortbildung seminar of the Bavarian State Ministry of Justice, 
December 2006;  2 E.J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 191-97 (1971); and Ver Bryck v. Ver 
Bryck, 379 Md. 669, 843 A.2d 758 (2004), affirming in part, reversing in part, 150 Md. App. 
623, 822 A.2d 1226 (2003).  
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A broken engagement wasn’t the only problem the two families had. 
Both parties’ automotive businesses experienced unexpected industry-wide 
crises. At a summit of Honda dealerships held in early September to address 
the problem, Mary Roh asked Doh, Jr., when was he going to pay the loan 
back. It had been due, she said, August 15. She demanded that he pay it back 
immediately. Doh, Jr. looked surprised and asked why she was asking. 
Hadn’t she always intended it as a gift? If you want your money back, he 
asked sarcastically, why don’t you ask your daughter for it? Roh was 
speechless.  
When Doh, Jr. paid nothing, Roh asked Doh, Sr., to intercede with his 
son. She told him that the money was a loan, but even if it had been a gift, 
now that the engagement was off, Doh, Jr. should give it back. When Doh, 
Sr. could not persuade his son to repay the money, Roh decided to bring a 
lawsuit to get back the money that she now desperately needed.  
The Dohs and the Rohs live in three incarnations: in Maryland/Virginia, 
United States; Bavaria/Berlin Germany; and Busan/Seoul, Korea. The 
American Dohs live in Baltimore, Maryland, while the Rohs live in 
Alexandria, Virginia, in suburban Washington, DC. The German Dohs live 
in Munich, Bavaria, while the Rohs live in Berlin. The Korean Dohs live in 
Busan, while the Rohs live in Seoul.  
 
 United 
States 
Germany Korea 
Plaintiff Mary Roh Virginia Berlin Seoul 
Defendant John Doh, Jr. Maryland Bavaria Busan 
DohSon LLC Maryland Bavaria Busan 
John Doh, Sr. Maryland Bavaria Busan 
Location of meetings D.C. Berlin Seoul 
 
Our book consists of this introductory chapter, six topical chapters, a 
concluding chapter, an appendix of historical notes and an appendix of 
bibliographic notes. The subsequent chapters are: 
 
Chapter 2. Thinking Like a Lawyer 
Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice  
Chapter 4. The Court: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law  
Chapter 5. Pleading: Structuring the Matter in Controversy 
Chapter 6. Process: The Right to Be Heard 
Chapter 7. Judgments, Appeals & Outcomes: Decisions According to Law  
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Lessons 
Appendix—Historical Notes 
Bibliographic Notes 
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C H A P T E R  2 
 
L E G A L  M E T H O D 
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 
   
 
 
 
Contemporary Korean Lawyer 
 
Before we discuss our lawsuit in three systems, we address basic legal 
methods. What we say may seem obvious, but our experience suggests that 
that which is obvious in one legal system, may not be in another.82
Deciding according to law requires determining applicable rules, finding 
facts, and applying rules to facts. This is considerably more difficult than is 
generally supposed. The legal rule cannot always be read from a single 
statute or precedent. It often is necessary to search statutes and precedents, 
analyze them, compare them to facts, revisit statutes and precedents in light 
of the facts, and again examine facts in light of the law. The end result is to 
bring facts and law together. 
 We 
consider what it means to think like a lawyer and we look at sources of law, 
i.e., principally statutes and court decisions.  
Substantive law, as distinguished from procedural law, determines rights 
and duties abstractly. Civil procedure translates those abstract statements of 
rights and duties into determinations of rights and duties in individual cases. 
Its method is legal reasoning. Some form of legal reasoning is universal 
among modern legal systems. Legal reasoning is familiar to anyone who has 
studied in law school for only a single term. In America, it is known as 
                                                 
82 See, e.g. James R. Maxeiner, Law without Justice? Do the Right Thing and Reform Legal 
Reasoning, forthcoming (comparing two discussions of thinking like a lawyer). 
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“thinking like a lawyer.”83 In Germany and Korea it is called “legal 
thinking.”84
One introductory text provides a concise definition of legal reasoning in 
the United States. Legal reasoning requires that one: 
  
 
1. identify the applicable sources of law, usually statutes and 
judicial decisions;  
2. analyze these sources of law to determine the applicable rules 
of law and the policies underlying those rules;  
3. synthesize the applicable rules of law into a current structure in 
which the more specific rules are grouped under the more 
general ones; 
4. research the available facts; and 
5. apply the structure of the rules to the facts to ascertain the 
rights or duties created by the facts, using the policies 
underlying the rules to resolve difficult cases.85
 
 
This formulation is not the only one found in the United States. Other 
formulations emphasize legal argument more and law application less. But it 
is within the American mainstream. It is a theory of legal reasoning that 
relies principally on syllogisms for application of law.86
There is nothing mystical about syllogistic reasoning. Justice Antonin 
Scalia of the United States Supreme Court and his co-author rhetorician 
Byron A. Garner wryly observe that even though we may have never studied 
logic, all of us use syllogistic reasoning.
 The classic 
syllogism consists of a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion. A 
famous example is: “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, 
Socrates is mortal.”  
87
                                                 
83 See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING (1996). 
 A legal rule typically states that 
whenever a generally described prerequisite (P) exists, a certain consequence 
(C) applies. The rule thus takes the form of a syllogism: whenever the rule’s 
prerequisite (P) is realized in a factual situation (F), then the consequence 
(C) applies. This is the major premise. The minor premise is that this factual 
84 See, e.g., KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN (9th ed. 1997); Ok-Tae 
Chung, Eine Einführung in die koreanische Rechtskultur und in die Grundzüge des koreani-
schen Rechtsdenkens, http://www.dkjg.de/download/online1_1.pdf (1989) (Deutsch-Koreani-
sche Juristische Gesellschaft e.V.). 
85 VANDEVELDE, supra note 83, at 2. 
86 Id. at 19-20, 67-70. 
87 ANTONIN SCALIA & BYRON A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING 
JUDGES 41 (2008). Accord, DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 4 (2001) (“We use 
syllogistic every day in our thinking ….”). 
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situation (F) fulfills the prerequisite (P), that is, F is a case of P.88
 
 The 
conclusion then logically follows that for the factual situation F, 
consequence C applies. Schematically: 
P → C (For P—that is, for every case P—C applies) 
F =  P (F is a case of P) 
F → C (For F, C applies). 
 
Typically a rule’s prerequisite consists of more than one element. 
Each element may itself require application of other rules to 
determine if the prerequisite is satisfied. Only if all elements are 
present in a particular case, does the rule apply.89
The process of rule application thus requires finding substantive 
law governing the case (law-finding), finding facts that fulfill a 
governing substantive rule (fact-finding) and applying the rule to the 
case to produce the consequence mandated by it (law-applying). Thus 
rule application brings facts and law together to produce a legal 
consequence (often a right or duty). It presupposes that someone has 
already made the laws to be applied (lawmaking).  
  
The quoted definition of legal reasoning in the United States is 
sufficiently general that we may use it as a reference point for 
considering legal reasoning in Germany and Korea as well. There, 
too, legal reasoning relies principally, although not exclusively, on 
syllogisms for application of law. In German civil procedure the method 
for applying law to facts is called the “Relationstechnik,” that is, in English, 
literally “relationship technique.”90
Thinking like a lawyer, i.e., syllogistic law application, is not 
universally approved. It bewilders some laymen. A recent report on legal 
education by the Carnegie Foundation can stand for the general skepticism.
 Korean civil procedure has comparable 
methods. 
91
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237, 248 (1866) (“Every action at law to 
redress a wrong or enforce a right, if properly instituted, is a syllogism, of which the major 
premise is the proposition of law involved, and the minor premise the proposition of fact, and 
the judgment the conclusion.”) 
 
Its objection is that legal reasoning “consists in the abstraction of the legally 
relevant aspects of situations and persons from their everyday contexts.” The 
Report laments that “the rich complexity of actual situations that involves 
full dimensional people, let alone the job of thinking through the social 
89 See VANDEVELDE supra note 83, at 19; James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A 
European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 542, 556 (2007). 
90 See James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 113 PENN 
STATE L. REV. 469 (2009). 
91 See CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
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consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusion, remains outside the 
method.”92
Even American professionals are skeptical of thinking like a lawyer. 
Professor Frederick Schauer, in a book intended to support rules, observes 
that: “every one of the dominant characteristics of legal reasoning and legal 
argument can be seen as a route toward reaching a decision other than the 
best all-things considered decision for the matter at hand.”
  
93 In Germany it is 
otherwise. The Latin maxim, justice is the cornerstone of the state: Justitia 
est fundamentum regnorum, prevails. Professor Reinhold Zippelius, in a 
classic that is counterpart to Schauer’s book, describes justice as an essential 
element of laws and legal methods applying law.94
There should be no need to apologize for thinking like a lawyer. 
Thinking like a lawyer helps reach just solutions to legal problems.
  
95
 
 It is 
what makes positive law a constraint on law’s abuse. Those charged with 
applying the law, including those subject to the law and applying it in their 
daily lives to themselves or to others, cannot easily escape it or bend it to 
their own needs when they are required to apply law syllogistically.  
A. Sources of Law Generally 
 
In legal reasoning the law provides the major premise, while the facts 
furnish the minor one. When the law is self-evident, as ideally it would be all 
of the time, legal reasoning can and does revolve around establishing that 
minor premise, the facts of the case. Lawyers around the world recognize 
that most cases turn on facts.  
The principal sources of law in modern legal systems are statutes and 
precedents. Statute law consists of rules promulgated by legislatures or by 
their delegates (such as regulations adopted by administrative bodies). 
Sometimes statutes are integrated together in the form of codes. Precedents 
are the legal grounds for decision stated by courts or court-like bodies in 
their decisions of individual cases. Precedents as a group constitute case law. 
 
Statute Law 
 
Statutes are designed to govern a multitude of cases. They are of general 
application. They are written as rules. They are designed for legal 
syllogisms. They are written in abstract terms to cover some classes of cases 
and to leave uncovered other classes. They originate in a legislative process. 
They are enacted by persons who are politically responsible. They are 
                                                 
92 Id. at 187. 
93 FREDERICK SCHAUER: THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 7 (2009). See Maxeiner, Law without Justice? supra note 82.  
94 See REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 13 (2008); see also 
Maxeiner, Law without Justice?, supra note 82. 
95 Id. 
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promulgated to provide for the common good. They are to govern the 
people. And, they are to apply generally and equally to all. 
Well-drafted statutes have many benefits. They legitimate political 
decisions. They create comprehensive and effective legal solutions to social 
problems. They provide predictability and impose uniformity. They facilitate 
their application by drawing bright lines. They prescribe the elements for 
rules that they create. They state when they may be invoked, by whom, and 
with what consequences. They are published in conveniently accessible and 
understandable form. When they coordinate well with each other, they bring 
coherence and consistency to the legal system as whole. In short, statutes 
inform people of what is expected of them. They should provide legal 
certainty. 
 
Precedents (Case Law) 
 
Precedents are decisions of courts that are followed by courts in 
deciding later cases. While every precedent is a court decision, not every 
court decision is cited as a precedent. Most are not. 
Precedents originate not in legislative but in judicial process. Judicial 
process determines individual rights in specific cases. Only exceptionally do 
precedents arise out of that process. In ordinary cases, beginning with the 
court of first instance and continuing to the first appellate level, judicial 
decisions are concerned principally with correct application of existing law. 
Commonly an appellate court determines that a lower court was right or 
wrong in its determination of a question of substantive law or was right or 
wrong in its use of existing procedures. Creation of new law or of new 
procedures is exceptional and incidental to decisions of particular cases.96
Appreciation of this distinction—generality versus particularity—helps 
understand the respective benefits and detriments of statutes and precedents. 
Basically, judicial process is backward looking; legislative process is 
forward looking. When, in judicial process, new law is being made, the 
effect on future cases assumes importance.
  
97
A virtue of finding law in precedents is that a precedent can provide a 
specific answer to a particular question, while leaving free for later 
consideration those issues not then before the court. Precedents can 
maximize freedom of future decision while eschewing regulation. They can 
permit law to change with time; they can facilitate dealing with changing 
social and economic circumstances. They are able to do this thanks to the 
 Yet even then the law created is 
particularist rather than systematic. The new law may address some element 
of a syllogism, but rarely does it create new rights requiring totally new 
syllogisms. The law created is said to be “interstitial,” that is, it fills in gaps. 
                                                 
96 See Paul D. Carrington, A Critical Assessment of the Cultural and Institutional Roles of 
Appellate Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 233-237 (2007). 
97 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 155. 
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process of “distinguishing” precedents. That is, each precedent is an example 
of a legal rule announced being applied to specific facts; when those facts 
change, the reason and the applicability of the rule applied in the 
precedential case may no longer apply. This flexibility, however, also makes 
difficult and time-consuming consulting precedents. The statement of law 
found in a precedent alone is not enough; an ideal precedent should also be 
based on facts similar to those in the case to which its application is under 
consideration. It should reach a similar application.  
Even well-crafted precedents cannot provide the benefits that less well-
drafted statutes provide. Only exceptionally can precedents legitimate 
political decisions. Judges are not expected to make political decisions; they 
should not “legislate from the bench.” Even if judges had the expertise and 
time available to drafters of legislation, precedents could not create 
comprehensive legal solutions to social and economic problems. Precedents 
are created by ad hoc resolution of specific issues in particular disputes 
before the court. They are not well suited to drawing bright lines or to 
prescribing precise elements for norms. Rooted as they are in decisions of 
individual controversies, precedents are by their nature uncoordinated. This 
is all the more so when they emanate from many courts of many judges 
instead of from one court with few judges. Today’s world does not permit of 
the small number of courts and of judges that characterized the glory days of 
the English common law.  
 
Statutes versus Precedents  
 
There was a time when it was commonplace to see in different sources 
of law a principal difference between two great families of systems of law in 
the world, i.e., between English-law based common law and Roman-law 
based civil law systems. According to this view, common law countries were 
governed by precedents, while civil law countries were governed by codes. 
Common law judges were bound to decide according to precedents, while 
civil judges were required to decide according to codes.  
This cliché was never entirely true. Today it has little application to the 
three legal systems that we are discussing. In the United States, Germany 
and Korea alike, statutes and precedents are  recognized sources of law. In 
all three statute law is primary and case law is secondary. Differences in 
theory drawn from different sources of law are less important in practice 
than is commonly supposed. The differences that matter lie less in what are 
the sources of law than in how the sources of law are created and utilized in 
legal reasoning. These differences we turn to momentarily. 
A legal system that relied exclusively on either statutes or precedents 
would be incomplete. Societies and economies are constantly changing. 
They are changing faster than legislatures can legislate and faster than courts 
can decide. While statutes have the virtue of generalizing rules, precedents 
have the benefit of particularizing them. Even if societies and economies 
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were not changing, human imperfections would require precedents to fill in 
statutes. Legislatures cannot foresee and determine all possible cases 
beforehand. They cannot abstractly govern all foreseen cases so that none is 
overlooked. They cannot use language so precisely that they correctly 
classify all cases that they do abstractly decide. Statutes draw outer 
boundaries; precedents guide decisions in particular cases. Statutes and 
precedents are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.98
All three of our systems follow precedents in practice despite 
differences in theory. In the American system, theory says that precedents 
are binding. In the German and Korean systems, theory says that precedents 
are not binding. In practice, however, the three systems give most precedents 
similar binding effect: precedents are followed, unless there is a good reason 
to depart from them. An appellate court is not bound by its own precedents, 
but ordinarily follows them. A lower court is expected to and does ordinarily 
follow precedents of those courts to which it is subordinated, but is not 
required to follow precedents of coordinate courts or of other courts to which 
it is not subordinate. Those latter precedents are merely “persuasive” 
authority.
  
99
 
 We now examine these two principal sources of law in each of 
our three countries. 
 
B. United States 
 
In the fact that no man knows what the law is, lie two 
thirds of the evil of despotism. 
 
New York Times (1858)100
 
 
Statutes in the United States 
 
Although Americans revere common law, they live in “the Age of 
Statutes.”101
                                                 
98 See JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 26-31, 157 n. 109 (1986). 
 Few practicing lawyers spend much of their time finding cases 
and distinguishing precedents. They leave such “legal research”—if they 
99 See VANDEVELDE, supra note at 33; REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 82 
(8th ed., 2003), 10th ed., 2006, in English translation, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL 
METHODS (Kirk Junker & P. Matthew Roy, transl. 2008) § 13 II; GYOOHO LEE, IN SEARCH OF 
THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM: REFLECTIONS ON KOREA’S CIVIL PROCEDURE 
THROUGH INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 152 (J.S.D. dissertation, Washington 
University in St. Louis, 1998), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656205. 
100 Editorial, Our Judiciary—Conflict of the Judges and Uncertainty of the Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov, 10, 1858, at 4.  
101 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). See also Peter L. 
Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 229 (1998); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (2000). 
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need it—to neophyte lawyers. Practicing lawyers have better things to do 
with their billable hours. Their day-to-day job consists of finding facts and 
applying existing rules—be they rules of statute law or of case law—to those 
facts. Clients pay a premium for senior lawyers because senior lawyers 
already know the law and are experts in finding facts and applying law to 
those facts. 
American statutes are uneven in quality. Some federal statutes and some 
state statutes, particularly uniform state statutes, are carefully crafted. They 
achieve clarity and consistency of content and coordinate well with other 
statutes. But many American statutes, perhaps most, do not achieve even a 
minimal level of efficacy. “Carefully prepared legislation,” writes Professor 
Peter L. Strauss, “is a rarity.”102 American legislation, he says, instead of 
being systematic rules for the population at large, sometimes is just another 
way of resolving private disputes or of achieving private goals.103
In well-functioning legal systems the pieces fit well together. Individual 
rules do not contradict each other. One definition serves for most purposes. 
Conflicting rights and duties are reduced or ideally avoided altogether. That 
American legislation often fails this test was stunningly proven by the 2000 
election. A constitutional crisis was created because two statutes of the state of 
Florida commanded inconsistent ways of counting votes.   
  
 
Precedents in the United States 
 
Precedents are little systematized when they are not based on statutes. 
They are thousands of points of light; every year many thousands of new 
ones are added to the inventory. Thanks to the ingenuity of American 
publishers, beginning even before the index-digest systems of the nineteenth 
century and continuing well into today’s computer-assisted searching, it has 
been easy to find not just one, but many precedents on just about any point. 
The numerosity of precedents results in the importance of any one precedent 
being determined less by the strength of the precedent’s reasoning and more 
by the place of the rendering court in the judicial hierarchy relative to the 
court considering it. A lower court is bound by a decision of appellate courts 
that review its decisions, especially when those decisions are recent. It is less 
bound by older decisions or by decisions of courts that do not review its 
cases.104
The uncertainty that results from so many precedents of so many courts 
is exacerbated by the form of federalism practiced in the United States. In 
most areas of American law, state law controls. This means that courts of 
fifty different states generate precedents. If a particular question is not 
  
                                                 
102 Strauss, supra note 101, at 231. 
103 Id. at 243. 
104 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 53. (discussing how to “master the relative weight 
of precedent.”). 
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resolved in the law of the state where a lawsuit is pending, lawyers are 
expected to examine the law in other states to help determine how the state 
where the law is unsettled would resolve the issue.  
 
Preeminence of Statutes  
 
Statutes have had preeminence in American law for over a century. In 
the nineteenth century the United States debated codification, that is, 
systematizing all law into codes. The two principal protagonists were David 
Dudley Field, Jr., author of New York’s Code of Civil Procedure or 1848, 
and James C. Carter.105 Carter defeated Field’s codes, but he could not defeat 
statutes. Over Carter’s objection and at Field’s insistence the American Bar 
Association resolved in 1886: “The law itself should be reduced, so far as its 
substantive principles are settled, to the form of a statute.”106  When Carter’s 
book, Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function appeared in 1907, Roscoe 
Pound dismissed it as out of touch with a day in which “legislation is the 
source, the form and the formulating agency ....” of our rules.107 Today 
Americans live in “an Age of Statutes.”108 They debate how much room 
statutes leave for judicial lawmaking.109 They still pine for the common 
law.110 Many legal educators remain wedded to common law methods and 
give statutes short shrift.111 Despite a century of domination of statutes, 
American lawyers still do not know how to “deal with statutes.”112
 
   
 
B. Germany 
 
The statute is the friend of the weak. 
 
Friedrich Schiller (1803)113
                                                 
105 Field’s writings, other than the codes themselves, are collected in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS 
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (3 vols., 1884, 1890). Carter’s classic 
contemporary challenges to codification are THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON 
LAW (1884); THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW (1889); and THE 
IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL IN THE LAW (1890), reprinted in 13 A.B.A. REP. 305 (1890) and in 24 
AM. L. REV. 752 (1890).  
  
106 REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 74 (1886).  
107 Roscoe Pound, Review, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 317, 320 (1909). 
108 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
109 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 15 (2008). 
110 See RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD (1997). 
111 See, e.g., FREDERICK C. SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING (2009). See also James R. Maxeiner, Law Without Justice, Do the Right 
Thing and Reform Legal Reasoning, forthcoming (2010-2011). 
112 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982). See also James R. Maxeiner, 
Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 
VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 517, 527-534 (2006). 
113 DIE BRAUT VON MESSINA 51 (1803).  
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Statutes in Germany 
 
In Germany, the statute—das Gesetz—is the fundamental concept of all law. 
It is the central category of legal thinking. It is the primary source of law. It is the 
basis for legal certainty. The statute is a legal norm.  It is a rule of law. Taken 
together, rules form an abstract and objective legal order that governs behavior. 
Rules are interrelated; they form a system. While it may be that the ideal cannot 
be realized, the goal is a system organized as if a single plan governed. Different 
laws should mesh with each other—none should command contrary action. 
Inconsistency among norms should be avoided.114
A preconception common among American lawyers is a belief that civil law 
judges apply law mechanically without giving thought to whether results are just 
or accord with purposes of the statutes that they apply. This prejudice is 
fallacious; the German constitution commands the contrary. Its Article 20 binds 
judges to law and justice (Gesetz und Recht).
 Among statutes, the national 
code has first place, subject, of course to the German constitution (Grundgesetz, 
Basic Law) and European Union law. 
115 In German understanding, in a 
democracy, statutes are followed, or at least tolerated, only if they are consistent 
with ideas of justice. Formal adoption by parliament is not enough. Every statute, 
therefore, must have a minimum connection to justice. At the very least, it must 
not contradict basic ideas of justice. Because statutes are binding on the 
executive and the judiciary, it is essential that they mirror justice in substance and 
in application as much as is reasonably possible. Judges, in applying statutes, are 
responsible for assuring that results are in accordance with statutory purposes 
and justice.116
In Germany drafting of legislation is subject to quality control. A 
commonplace in the United States—that a third party drafts a law and finds a 
lone legislator to introduce it in the legislature—cannot happen in Germany. 
German parliamentary procedure requires that at least five percent of legislators 
join in proposing legislation.
 
117
 
  
Precedents in Germany 
 
                                                 
114 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 556-558 (2007).  
115 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20(1). The translation “law and justice” is that of 
Christian Tomuschat and David Kurrie as revised by Christian Tomuschat and David P. 
Kommers in cooperation with the Language Service of the German Bundestag and published by 
the German Federal Ministry of Justice in 2010, available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#GGengl_000P20. Gesetz might be translated “statute” 
and Recht “law.” 
116 See Maxeiner, Law without Justice?, supra note 82. 
117 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 542, 562-567 (2007).  
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Long ago the German legal system abandoned the ideal of a gap-free 
statutory legal order. There is no question whether there are precedents, there is 
only a question of their extent. Within an existing framework of statutes, judges 
may and do fill gaps. “The judicial decision then fills this gap according to the 
standards of practical reason and the ‘community’s well-founded general ideas of 
justice.’”118
 
  
 
C. Korea 
 
In Korea there has been enormous progress toward a 
consolidation of the Rule of Law. … The existing regime of 
law had to be transformed to meet the rising needs of the 
people for a renovated, rational system of governance.  The 
changes took place basically in three directions: (1) legislative 
innovations propelled by the government; (2) development of 
case law through vitalized law-finding activities of the courts; 
and (3) growing demand and pressure from the people for 
Rule of Law in Public Administration. 
 
Professor Dr. jur.  (Göttingen) Joon-Hyung Hong119
 
 
Statutes in Korea  
 
Korea, like Germany, has a civil law tradition; statutes are the primary 
source of law. The judge’s role is to interpret those statutes and to apply them 
to concrete cases.120
Korean treatment of statutes is between the untidy American treatment 
and the more systematic German approach. In traditional Korean law, 
statutes concerned principally punishment. During the Japanese occupation 
statutes were edicts of Japanese occupiers. Only in the 1960s did Korean 
laws become subject to academic analysis. As a result, to this day in Korea 
there is less attention to abstract theories and less predictability in judicial 
interpretation of statutes than in Germany.  
 
Korean civil procedure is less subject to criticism for mechanical 
judging than is German procedure. The Korean constitution’s counterpart to 
                                                 
118 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 14 February 1973 (“Soraya”), BVerfGE 34, 
269, 287, as translated in Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Statutory Interpretation in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 73, 80 (D. Neil 
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). 
119 The Rule of Law and Its Acceptance in Asia: A View from Korea, in THE RULE OF LAW: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM (Mansfield Center for Public Affairs, 2000), available at 
http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/rol/rol_perspectives.htm, 
120 § 1 Korean Civil Code. See Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 156-162, 165; 
LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 152-153. 
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Article 20 of the German constitution (binding judges to statute and justice), 
Article 103, binds judges to statute and conscience: “Judges shall rule 
independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the 
Constitution and Act.”121 Korean judicial practice is mindful of what is termed 
“appropriateness in the concrete.” Put simply, judges are required “to think 
of who must win apart from the superficial logic.”122
 
 Korean jurists are more 
likely to apologize for uncertainty of law’s application than for it being 
overly mechanical. 
Precedents in Korea  
 
 As in Germany, while Korean courts are not bound to follow 
interpretations of other courts, generally they do. Lower courts are loath to 
deviate from precedents of appellate courts to which they are subordinated, for 
fear that they may be reversed. Even where they need not fear reversal, in 
common law and civil law countries alike lower courts often follow decisions of 
other courts. Economic efficiency explains why. The principal role of judges is 
finding and interpreting law and applying that law to facts in particular cases. 
Following precedents serves legal systems generally through reducing caseloads 
that judges must hear by making legal decisions foreseeable. Following 
precedents serves judges individually by reducing their own costs of decision 
and of judicial administration.123
                                                 
121 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, translation of the Constitutional Court of Korea, 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/. 
  
122 Chaewong Lim, A Study on the Target of Avoidance in Korean Bankruptcy Law: When There 
is No Debtor’s Action, 7 J. KOREAN L. 333, 344-345 n. 24 (2008). 
123 See Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 162; LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL 
TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 152. 
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C H A P T E R  3 
 
L AW Y E R S AND L E GAL  SY ST E M S:  
A C C E S S  T O  J U S T I C E  
 
 
 
Early American Christian Tract (1827)124
 
 
Deciding to bring a lawsuit is a difficult decision. One should make 
every effort to avoid going to court. Even someone who “wins” a lawsuit, as 
measured by legal outcome, may lose more in time, energy and in damaged 
personal relations than the victory is worth. In all three of our legal systems 
lawyers advise: sue only if a lawsuit cannot be avoided. 
Mary Roh has reached that point. She has decided to sue. Most likely, 
that means she needs to find a lawyer. While a lay person might present a 
small case to a court without being represented by a lawyer, in a civil case of 
consequence, such as we have here, a lawyer is a practical necessity; in 
Germany, it is a legal requirement. In this chapter we consider when one 
needs a lawyer and how one goes about finding and engaging one. We then 
consider the legal systems within which they operate. 
                                                 
124 Simon Greenleaf (attributed), To a Person Engaged in a Lawsuit, 6 PUBS. AM. TRACT SOC. 
No. 168 (1827). Greenleaf was the leading authority on evidence law in nineteenth century 
America and professor at Harvard Law School. 
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Even before Roh decides to sue, she may find a lawyer helpful to 
negotiate a settlement. Ordinarily parties try to settle disputes without suing. 
Introducing the right lawyer may make John Doh, Jr. realize that Roh is 
serious about the dispute and is thinking about suing. On the other hand, 
introducing the wrong lawyer could undermine settlement. Roh will decide 
whether and when to use a lawyer based on convenience, cost and other 
personal considerations. 
Once Roh decides to use a lawyer, whether in the United States, 
Germany or Korea, she is likely to follow a similar approach to finding one. 
Most likely, she will speak first with friends and business contacts that have 
used lawyers. If she is sophisticated, she will look for someone who has 
experience with lawyers in lawsuits. She might consult listings of lawyers 
maintained by local or national bar associations, i.e., associations of lawyers 
themselves. She might do her own hunting through visits to the Internet sites 
of possible lawyers. She is not likely to rely on media advertising. While in 
the United States there is much lawyer advertising, most of that is for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking high-award personal injury, contingent-fee 
litigation. Below we discuss contingent fee (i.e., success-based) 
arrangements. 
In finding a lawyer Roh has an advantage that other potential litigants do 
not have: she already has had dealings with lawyers, or at least the company 
that she controls has. In the United States, where litigation practice is usually 
separate from corporate counseling, the company’s lawyer is not likely to 
take on lawsuit representation personally, but if the lawyer is part of 
corporate law firm, the firm almost certainly will. The firm’s corporate 
clients are an essential source of business for lawyers who handle lawsuits. If 
the lawyer is independent of a firm, the lawyer will feel a responsibility to 
find suitable counsel. In Germany and Korea, Roh Honda’s regular lawyer 
might personally take on Roh’s case. Usually there is no conflict of interest 
in the company’s lawyer taking on responsibilities for a company executive, 
particularly in a small “closely-held” company where management and share 
owners are the same. In our hypothetical, Mary Roh has as her lawyer, Harry 
Hahn, whose firm regularly represents Roh Honda. 
Specialization in law, as in other fields of human endeavor, can be 
desirable. The specialist is familiar with the tasks involved. Experience can 
contribute to handling those tasks more efficiently and more effectively. 
Specialization among lawyers has proceeded farther in the United States than 
it has in either Germany or Korea. In the United States conducting lawsuits 
(“litigation”) is a specialty. General corporate lawyers might handle smaller 
matters (say less than $100,000) in their initial stages, but are not likely to 
take sole responsibility for larger matters or for taking even smaller matters 
to court. In Germany and Korea, where judges have greater responsibility for 
conduct of proceedings and opportunities for lawyer-missteps are fewer, 
there is less specialization in litigation, although even still, there are trends 
toward greater specialization in practice. This trend is particularly evident in 
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criminal procedure, where most criminal work is done by criminal law 
specialists in all three of our countries.  
What will lawyer Hahn do for Roh? Before commencing litigation, 
Hahn will evaluate the case to help Roh decide whether bringing the lawsuit 
is worth it. That involves not only evaluating its legal merits, but also 
predicting the likelihood of success and estimating the costs and risks. 
Assuming that Roh decides that it is worth bringing a lawsuit, Hahn will help 
her decide in which court to bring the case and against which parties. Hahn 
will make a tentative application of law to the facts as they are known to 
Roh. That requires that Hahn determine which law is likely to govern the 
case, and which defendant(s) are likely to be liable to Roh. Hahn will explain 
the process and the litigation risks. In the court proceedings the lawyer will 
represent Roh to the court and to the other parties to the proceedings. The 
lawyer will help present Roh’s case to the court. 
In this chapter we describe the diversity of personnel that handle the 
machinery of justice. These differences profoundly affect fulfillment of the 
promises of the open courts clause: decisions according to law, with access 
for all, reached efficiently and without delay. 
What is the principal difference among our legal professions? In short 
form: the American legal system is organized by the bar, that is, by private 
lawyers. The bar largely determines the structures of court procedures. It 
runs the legal system as a service for clients who have particular needs. The 
German and the Korean legal systems, on the other hand, are run, by German 
state and federal ministries of justice, and by the Korean Supreme Court. 
These government bodies treat provision of justice as a public service that 
should be available to all members of the public. One might say that the 
American bar runs a taxi service, while the German and Korean governments 
run public transit systems. 
 
 
A. United States 
 
The machinery by which justice is wrought out has 
always been, and must forever remain, the creation of 
the profession. … No one thinks of challenging the 
right of the bar to determine the methods of which 
the remedies affecting the profoundest concerns of 
life shall be administered.  
 
Charles M. Wilds, 
Address Before the Vermont State Bar Association 
(1894)125
                                                 
125 AN ADDRESS ON COMMON LAW PLEADINGS, BEFORE THE VERMONT BAR ASSOCIATION, 
OCTOBER 9, 1894 (1894). 
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1. Access to Justice in the United States 
 
Pro Se Representation 
 
In the United States and in Korea, Roh is not required to use a lawyer to 
bring her lawsuit. By law she is required to do so in Germany. In the United 
States and in Korea Roh could represent herself and proceed, as it is termed, 
pro se. Federal law, first adopted in section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
permits her in federal court to “plead and conduct [her] own case[] 
personally.”126 While the right to proceed pro se is said to be “a basic right 
of a free people,”127
In the United States, with limited exceptions, there is no right to court-
provided lawyers in civil cases.
 and is constitutionally protected in criminal cases, its 
rationale today is more pragmatic: to provide theoretical access to justice. 
128
If the right to be heard is to be meaningful, and if legal aid is not 
provided, then the legal system should be so fashioned as to be usable to 
parties without lawyers. To compensate for a lack of civil legal aid and to 
promote access to courts, there have been efforts in the United States to 
facilitate pro se representation. Some federal courts provide clinics and 
websites to assist pro se litigants. Well intentioned that those projects are, 
they are destined to fail unless the system is reconfigured to anticipate pro se 
litigation. Lawyer-free litigation is not likely to work in any but the most 
mundane of American lawsuits. Complex cases call for competent legal 
counsel if only because procedures are complicated. 
 The right to proceed alone, without a 
lawyer, i.e. pro se, is thus essential to participating in legal proceedings. 
Were there no right to pro se representation, the United States would either 
have to provide indigent parties with legal representation as Germany does 
(civil legal aid), or deny people the right to be heard. As it is, without a right 
to civil legal aid, the indigent are left to public or private charity; only a few 
get lawyers. Most have only the choice to proceed pro se or not at all.  
Relying on pro se representation to increase access to justice challenges 
fulfillment of other promises of the open courts clause. While parties 
ordinarily have the best knowledge of the facts, they have little knowledge of 
law and no experience in the system’s process for applying law to facts. If 
self-representation is to be successful in American courts, it practically 
requires that courts assist pro se litigants in ways that they have not 
previously assisted parties; it pushes courts to provide new services to such 
parties.129
                                                 
126 28 U.S.C. § 1654. 
 
127 O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (Friendly, C.J.).   
128 Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
129 See generally THE FUTURE OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION: REPORT FROM THE MARCH 
2005 SUMMIT (National Center for State Courts, 2005), available at www.ncsc.org. 
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Permitting parties to represent themselves burdens, rather than assists 
judges in applying law to facts.130 It denies judges the assistance of trained 
counsel while it practically compels them to be active in litigation to assure 
that justice is done. Otherwise the side represented by a lawyer will prevail 
over the party without one. The American Poet Laureate Robert Frost is 
supposed to have said “A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide 
who has the better lawyer.”131
While American litigants are not legally required to use lawyers, the 
passive role of the judge practically compels them to do so. Few plaintiffs in 
the position of Mary Roh represent themselves: it is too difficult, it distracts 
too much from daily life, and it puts too much at risk, not just in asserting 
claims, but in resisting counterclaims. In the American federal courts about 
10% of civil non-prisoner cases are brought pro se.
 
132
 
  
Civil Legal Aid  
 
Civil legal aid in litigation is the provision of a lawyer or other legal 
professional to a party who is unable to provide for his or her own lawyer. 
Around the world civil legal aid takes many forms. The legal aid lawyer or 
legal professional may be from a legal aid office that exclusively conducts 
legal aid cases, a law student from a legal aid clinic, a lawyer from private 
practice chosen by the party but paid by the court, or a lawyer from private 
practice chosen by the party or appointed by the court to work for no fee 
(pro bono). In the United States, all forms of civil legal aid combined 
support only a small percentage of those in need.  
The United States is said to stand almost alone among modern states in 
its near total failure to provide civil legal aid.133
Americans have long recognized that legal aid is important for access to 
justice. In 1876 German immigrants founded America’s first  organization 
dedicated to using private resources to provide legal aid.
 Other countries recognize 
that legal aid is fundamental to realizing equal justice under law. Equal 
justice under law is compromised when financial considerations compel 
parties to forgo legal rights. 
134
                                                 
130 See Drew A. Swank, In Defense Of Rules and Roles: the Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro 
Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1547-1548 (2005). 
 In the early 
131 JURIES: WEBSTER'S QUOTATIONS, FACTS AND PHRASES 1 (ICON Group Int’l 2008). 
132 Table S-23. Civil Pro Se And Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period 
Ending September 30, 2009, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR JAMES C. DUFF, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S23Sep09.pdf . 
133 Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with the Rest 
of the Developed World 2006 Edward V. Sparer Symposium: Civil Gideon: Creating a 
Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769 
(2006). 
134 Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein. Inc. See HARRISON TWEED, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY: 
NEW YORK CITY, 1876-1951 (1954).  
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twentieth century legal aid began to achieve political recognition. In 1908 
William Howard Taft, the only person ever to serve both as President of the 
United States and as Chief Justice of the United States, pointed to the ill 
effects that the costs of litigation were having for the poor.135
In the 1960s proponents of a legal right to legal aid achieved success 
when the United States Supreme Court found a constitutional right to legal 
aid in criminal prosecutions in the iconic case of Gideon v. Wainright.
 In 1919 
Reginald Heber Smith published what remains the legal aid classic: Justice 
and the Poor. In 1920 the American Bar Association established a Standing 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants” and named  Charles 
Evans Hughes, later Supreme Court Justice, as its first chair. 
136 
Today Americans speak of a comparable right in civil matters as “civil 
Gideon.”137 Civil Gideon still eludes the United States despite repeated 
efforts to achieve it. Litigation based on the open courts clause has failed to 
achieve recognition of a constitutional right to counsel.138 Legislation 
recognizing a limited right may be making headway. In 2006 the American 
Bar Association resolved that legislatures should adopt statutes mandating 
legal aid in a small class of cases “where basic human needs are at stake ….” 
In 2010 it adopted a Model Access Act and Basic Principles of a Right to 
Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings providing for a legal right to counsel so 
limited.139
Among principal obstacles to substantial legal aid in the United States 
have been (1) fear and (2) cost. 
 For the Association’s proposals to be effective, legislatures must 
adopt them.  
Fear. Legislators are not anxious to give money to anyone, but they fear 
giving legal aid to the poor particularly. They worry that the poor will make 
instrumental uses of the American legal system. Their fear manifests itself in 
restrictions that they impose on such legal aid as they do provide. One 
                                                 
135 William Howard Taft, The Administration of Justice—Its Speeding and Cheapening, 21 
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supporter of legal aid observes that countries that provide extensive legal aid 
do not rely on courts for law reform.140
Cost. Cost may be a still more important obstacle to a legal right to legal 
aid.
  
141
Mary Roh is too well-off to qualify for the limited legal aid available in 
America. She, like most people in the middle class, must pay the ordinary 
charges. We turn now to those fees. 
 The costs of American litigation are high: beyond what even the well-
off can afford. American law, both litigation and counseling, is time-
consuming. Clients pay for the inefficiencies of the system. To fund legal aid 
completely could cause, as it is reported to have done in England, an 
overhaul of the system of civil justice.   
 
2. The Cost of Lawyer Representation in the United States 
 
If the American Mary Roh uses a lawyer in her lawsuit, she will pay a 
price that her counterparts in Germany and Korea will not pay. That price 
does not stop with higher fees. Unless she is able to obtain contingent fee 
representation, she will have to pay the fees all herself, even if she wins the 
case. The practice that each party must bear his or her own attorneys’ fees is 
usually called the “American rule.” Since it is based on no rule, but is only a 
practice, we refer to it as the “no indemnity practice.”142
 
 In Germany and in 
Korea (and in most modern systems), plaintiffs who bring claims that courts 
affirm are right, are entitled to some indemnity for their attorneys’ fees from 
the losers who resisted their rightful claims. Here we refer to this rule as the 
“loser pays rule.”  
American No Indemnity Practice 
 
The American practice of no indemnity means that the American Mary 
Roh, even if she “wins” her lawsuit, after paying lawyers’ fees, will take 
home less—perhaps much less—than $75,000. How much less no one can 
say with certainty. In the best case, she might end up with $70,000 if Doh 
does not resist the claim. If she manages to use a lawyer who agrees to a 
contingent fee, but Doh contests, she might end up with as much as $40,000. 
                                                 
140 Lidman, supra note 133, at 778. See generally William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law 
Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 
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to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501-800 (2006). On pro 
bono representation, see Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing 
Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357 (2010). 
142 See James R. Maxeiner, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
SUPP. 195, 197 (2010). 
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In the worst of cases, if Doh vigorously defends the action and uses all the 
tools the system places at his disposal, Mary Roh might end up owing her 
lawyer more money than the $75,000 she wins. As we shall see in Chapter 6, 
the American system puts lawyers in charge of litigation and allows them to 
determine just how much time (and fees) they put into the case. Without 
control of costs, and in the absence of a loser pays system, defense counsel, 
through a vigorous defense, can render a $75,000 claim valueless. In Chapter 
8 we compare likely outcomes in the United States, Germany and Korea. 
To a foreign jurist the American result is “incredible, strange, terrible 
and intolerable.” One eminent émigré, Albert A. Ehrenzweig, lamented that 
the United States “which has taken it on itself to play the decisive role in 
building the Rule of Law throughout the world, has forgotten the little man 
in his struggle for civil justice.”143
Ehrenzweig, an Austrian judge who became a law professor in the 
United States, spoke out “in sorrow and in anger” because the loser pays rule 
has the logic of right on its side. A plaintiff begins a lawsuit because a 
defendant, the plaintiff alleges, has failed to pay an obligation that is owed as 
right. If the court finds the plaintiff right, then justice requires that the 
defendant pay those expenses which defendant in effect imposed on plaintiff 
by refusing the justified demand. Otherwise, plaintiff gets back less than the 
right claimed. 
  
The founders of American civil procedure recognized this logic of 
right.144 Loser pays provided the rule in parts of the United States through 
the nineteenth century.145
How can it be that the United States is almost alone among modern 
nations in not having a loser-pays rule for lawyers’ fees as well?
 It continues unquestioned to provide the rule when 
court costs, and not attorneys’ fees, are assessed. Loser pays, if the loser is 
defendant, is the rule under many statutes. But today as a general rule 
applicable to plaintiffs and defendants alike it survives only in Alaska.  
146
One explanation for the absence of the loser pays rule is that United 
States has no ministry of justice (as in Germany) or no supreme court (as in 
 
                                                 
143 Reimbursement of Counsel Fees in the Great Society: In sorrow and in anger—and in hope, 
54 CAL. L. REV. 792, 793 (1966). 
144 Theodore Sedgwick, America’s first authority on damages and one of more influential jurists, 
endorsed a loser pays rule. THEODORE SEDGWICK, HOW SHALL THE LAWYERS BE PAID? OF 
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146 See Matthias Reimann, General Report of Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure, 
forthcoming. 
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Korean) that looks out for the interests of parties to lawsuits. The bar, quite 
naturally, tends first to its own interests. Only long after no indemnity 
became routine practice, did American lawyers offer the rationalization that 
no indemnity facilitates access to justice.147 Legal rights, these lawyers say, 
are uncertain; no one should be penalized for asking a court what those 
rights are.148
Such access to courts that the American practice of no indemnity 
facilitates is inefficient and unfair to those with righteous claims. It denies 
full compensation to all parties in order to benefit only a few parties with 
“plausible” claims. By most accounts the American practice encourages 
parties to bring marginal or even frivolous lawsuits, since parties suffer little 
risk in suing.
  
149
Replacing the American practice with a loser-pays rule would face 
practical and political obstacles. Loser pay rules work when fees shifted are 
modest and are proportionate to amounts in dispute. In Germany, as we shall 
see, total legal fees for both sides of a lawsuit are usually well below the fees 
for one side in the United States. To maintain modest levels German civil 
justice imposes statutory limits on total fees that may be recovered. In the 
United States, the practicing bar is politically powerful: it opposes the 
occasional proposal to bring back loser-pays.
 
150
 
 
Calculating Lawyers’ Fees 
 
In the United States payment arrangements are private contracts 
between lawyers and their clients. While there are some legal limitations on 
legal fees, there are no statutory fee schedules such as one finds in Germany 
and Korea.  
In American litigation two approaches to payment predominate: 
contingent fee and hourly billing. Sometimes the two are combined. In 
contingent fee arrangements plaintiffs pay little or nothing—sometimes not 
even court fees and out-of-pocket expenses—but then grant to lawyers a 
percentage of the amounts recovered. Typically those percentages are 
between 33% and 50%. In some states statutes or professional regulations 
limit these percentages. In hourly billing arrangements plaintiffs and 
defendants pay their lawyers charges that typically range from $150 to $500 
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or more per hour depending on market factors. Flat-rate billing—used in 
some areas of legal services in the United States and the norm in litigation in 
Germany and Korea—is unusual in civil cases. 
Contingent fees. By their nature self-funding contingent fee 
arrangements are available only to plaintiffs, since defendants ordinarily 
recover no damages from which they could compensate their lawyers. 
Defendants can, of course, make their payment of fees incurred in defense 
contingent on success.  
Practically contingent fee arrangements are not available to all plaintiffs. 
Most plaintiffs are not attractive contingent fee clients: their cases are too 
uncertain, potential costs are too high, or the relief sought will not generate 
money (e.g., an order for child custody). Most lawyers are loath to take on 
contingent fee clients except in high-value cases for individuals (e.g., severe 
personal injury cases) or in extremely simple commercial cases (e.g., 
uncontested unpaid invoices). Their reluctance to represent means that 
parties unable to pay high-hourly charges and accept the risk of loss, 
practically are prevented from bringing lawsuits at all. 
Roh has an ordinary case that is neither high value nor as simple as an 
unpaid invoice. Particularly in a high-cost urban area, she may have 
difficulty finding a lawyer willing to work on a contingent fee basis. The 
potential lawyer will assess her as a possible witness and evaluate the 
complexity of the case (to estimate how much time it might require). Her 
company’s corporate law firm is unlikely to represent her on a contingent fee 
basis. If she is lucky, Hahn might accept a mixed form of representation, i.e., 
a lower-hourly rate in exchange for a percentage fee contingent on any 
recovery.  
Retainer fees and hourly rates. If Roh is unable to obtain contingent 
fee representation, her lawyer is likely to require her to make what is called a 
“retainer” payment of typically around $5,000 to $10,000. Depending upon 
their representation agreement, the lawyer might deduct his or her charges as 
incurred from the retainer, or might hold it in reserve just in case Roh fails to 
pay the lawyer’s bills when they come due.  
Legal expenses insurance. While there have been attempts to provide 
legal insurance in the United States, these have found little application in 
providing insurance to plaintiffs. What may be the largest provider of legal 
expenses insurance in the United States is ARAG Legal Solutions, a 
subsidiary of the German firm Allgemeine Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs 
Aktien Gesellschaft.151
 
  
3. R epresenting R oh in the United States:  I s a L awsuit Worth it for R oh? 
 
Inevitably Roh will get around to talking with her lawyer Hahn about 
the expense of representation. He will remind her of all of the collateral costs 
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of the lawsuit in terms of her lost time, possible lost time of employees, 
frustrations and so on. Then he will be sure to establish his fee arrangement 
with her. They might have a conversation such as the following one found in 
a teaching text for law practice and slightly modified to meet our case: 
 
Hahn: We’ll file a complaint and thereafter prosecute this suit vigorously through trial, 
correct? 
  
Roh: Exactly. 
 
Hahn: I’ll want to meet with you at least once more before we file any papers with the 
court to talk more specifically about how I think we ought to proceed. But earlier you 
asked about my fees, and I think I know enough now to five you a general estimate 
based on what I know at this point. I’ll handle this on an hourly basis; my fee is $300.00 
an hour. Some of the work can be handled by my paralegal assistant, whose hourly 
rate is $100.00 an hour. I estimate that I’ll need to spend about 70 to 100 hours to get 
ready for a possible trial, though it could go higher if the other side is obstinate and I 
have to get court orders requiring them to give me material that they should turn over 
voluntarily. My estimate includes taking or attending 3-4 depositions. Other fees will be 
court costs, costs of the deposition transcripts, and a few other miscellaneous costs for 
a pretrial total of $4,000. If the court decides in our favor, as I suspect it will, we will be 
able to recoup those [court] costs from the other side. In light of all this, I suggest an 
initial retainer of $10,000.00. I’ll bill you monthly if and when the retainer is used up. 
Does that sound OK? 
 
Roh: I guess so. Of course, I wish it weren’t so expensive but I guess that’s the way 
things go these days. This a probably a dumb question, but I assume that if the case 
settles in just a few hours, I’d get the unused part of the retainer back? 
 
Hahn: Of course. You only pay for the time I actually spend. At the same time, 
remember that if he does take the case to trial, the number of hours that I have to 
spend may go way up. If that starts to happen, I’ll let you know. One other thing that I’m 
ethically required to inform you of is that should you fall too far behind in your 
payments, I may have to withdraw as your counsel. I’m sure that won’t happen, but it’s 
something you should be aware of. Do you have any other questions?152
 
 
The client in the text cited had no further questions, but our Mary Roh does. 
We add them here: 
 
Roh: Yes. I have two questions. First of all, what will your total fee be? At $300 an hour 
and seventy hours, we are talking $21,000, and that doesn’t count—you said—
paralegal time or trial or trial preparation time?  
 
Hahn: Oh, I am sorry. I should have mentioned that you will also have to pay the 
court’s filing fee. It’s $350, no matter how big or small your claim is. But at least you will 
get that back if you win. 
 
Roh: That’s no big deal. But can’t you give me at least an approximation of what your 
fee will be, say, something between $15,000 and $18,000? 
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Hahn: I am sorry, but I cannot tell you what my total fee will be. I will do all that I can do 
to keep my fee down. I won’t take any depositions more than are absolutely necessary: 
I think we can get by with just taking John Doh, Jr.’s deposition, although, depending 
upon how the facts turn out, we may have to take the deposition of his father, John 
Doh., St., or of someone at DohSon Honda LL.C. Unfortunately in contested litigation, it 
is impossible to predict beforehand how much work will be needed. It all depends on 
how the case develops and how John Doh, Jr. and his lawyer pursue the case. We 
don’t know what claims they will make. It would not be fair to either of us were I to 
charge you a flat rate. I might take less time; I might take more than I predict. 
 
Roh: That’s troubling you cannot give me at least an approximate figure on the total, 
but, you said that if we win, we get the costs back. That includes your fee, right? 
 
Hahn: No.  
 
Roh: No? What do you mean, then, that your fee depends upon how the case 
develops? Can’t you see to it that we don’t waste time? Isn’t this case basically just a 
question whether the judge believes me or John, Jr.? Can’t you fast forward the 
process? 
 
Hahn: You may be right and you may ultimately prevail, but the process does not allow 
us to “fast forward” to the end game. You will be forced to bear the cost and burden of 
litigation until you have an opportunity—at the trial—to present the evidence that will 
show Doh is liable. And if you win, although Doh will owe you $75,000, you will have no 
ability to recover from anyone what you have spent in lawyers’ fees.153
 
 
As a plaintiff, though, you are better off, we lawyers believe, with this American 
practice. If we did what they do in other countries, if you lost, you would have to pay not 
only my fee, but also the fee of the lawyer.  
 
Roh: Better off? I am not so sure. It sounds like, that at the end of the day, from the 
$75,000 that John Jr. owes me, I will be lucky to end up with only $50,000; if I am 
unlucky, it might get only $25,000 or nothing at all. 
                         
Hahn: I am afraid so. That is why, if he makes a settlement offer after the complaint for 
as little as $10,000, we should give it consideration. For the moment, go ahead and fill 
out the information sheet that I gave you to prepare for our next meeting. That is 
Wednesday at 2:00. You don’t have to give me the retainer until then. Take the time to 
think about whether you want to go ahead. 
 
Roh: I will. 
 
We now consider the people who make up the American legal system. 
4. Legal Professions in the United States 
 
Americans lawyers and judges by and large value the legal system, and 
their roles in it, instrumentally, that is, as a means for resolving concrete 
disputes and achieving specific goals. It is the role of the judge in the 
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American system to preside over a clash of competing interests and to clarify 
what is the law that governs the dispute’s resolution. The role of the 
advocate is to find a way to the client’s desired resolution through shaping of 
the law, the facts, and the judgment of the dispute. American lawyers like to 
think of themselves as “social engineers” and as “problem solvers”; judges 
revel in the role of making political decisions. 
The trial lawyer embodies this public persona of the jurist in the United 
States. The lawyer-advocate is both hero and scourge: hero as champion of 
the underdog doing justice, scourge as the “hired gun” of the rich or as the 
“shyster” promoting frivolous lawsuits.154
 
  
Lawyers 
 
The practicing bar dominates the professions of law in the United States. 
It measures jurists largely by the practical results that they as lawyers 
achieve for their clients and for themselves. Leading lawyers are typically 
high-powered litigation lawyers in smaller litigation boutiques (fifty or fewer 
lawyers) or business lawyers in huge law firms (many hundreds of lawyers). 
These lawyers, while the best remunerated, are only a small fraction of the 
more than one million lawyers in the United States. The United States has 
among the highest per capita number of lawyers of all legal systems. 
Although the bar oversees the professions of law, it takes little direct 
care for the development of lawyers and judges. Unlike the bars in other 
countries, it provides no formal apprentice training to aspiring lawyers. 
While its role in legal education is limited, it is a controlling one. The 
accrediting body for law schools is the Council of the Section of Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association. State 
attorneys general and education departments have little say over legal 
education. State Supreme Courts have more. 
While bar associations supervise practice, they are ill-suited to bring 
about substantive changes. They lack the political clout or the continuity of 
leadership of a German state or federal ministry of justice or of the Korean 
Supreme Court. Of course they are outside the government; many leadership 
positions are for only one year. For example, the Constitution of the 
American Bar Association permits a President in his or life to serve only a 
one year term. It is not surprising that American bar associations produce 
progressive position papers but often have difficulty realizing them. 
American lawyers are advocates for their clients. Robert W. Gordon, a 
long-time student of the legal profession, has stated comparative perspective 
the extent of that devotion in a manner that many American lawyers might 
find objectionable:  
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57   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
Compared to other nations’ legal professions, the American legal 
profession has always stressed lawyers’ duties to their clients over 
duties to the courts, legal system, third parties or the public interest. 
As late as the 1980s, lawyers’ rhetoric continued to celebrate the 
contrasting ideal of the lawyer as a high minded independent 
counselor as well as an adversary or hired gun who steers his client 
in the paths of legality and warns of adverse consequences if the 
client strays. Yet as a practical matter the bar’s ethics rules and 
informal norms aligned lawyers’ interests almost entirely with those 
of clients and—most of all—other lawyers. Successive revisions of 
the bar’s ethics codes, such as the ABA’s Model Code of 1969 and 
Model Rules of 1983, made fidelity to clients mandatory; lawyers 
should keep quiet even if the client were about to commit crime or 
fraud, unless they believed the criminal act was ‘likely to result in 
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.’155 Duties to the courts 
remained vague and mostly unenforced; duties to the public were 
hortatory and optional.156
 
  
Judges  
 
In the United States, as in other common law countries, judges do not 
begin their careers as judges. Typically they come from the practicing bar in 
mid-career. They begin judicial service without any formal training as 
judges. They are not subject to probationary appointments. Some are 
appointed for life: others are appointed for a term of years and are subject to 
re-election or confirmation in office. After appointment few must undergo 
judicial training or are subject to continuing judicial training requirements. 
Some voluntarily participate in training programs lasting a few days. None 
undergo professional training comparable to that required of their 
counterparts in Germany or Korea.157
In American legal lore, judges are heroes. The heroes among judges are 
not judges who conduct trials, but judges who make law in appellate courts. 
In recent years, as federal constitutional law has achieved ascendency, these 
heroes are invariably federal appellate judges and most of them are justices 
of the United States Supreme Court.  
 Those German and Korean programs 
resemble the residency programs all American physicians undergo. 
The focus on lawmaking and on federal judges has effects for ordinary 
cases. It has long been an adage of American law: “don’t make a federal case 
of it.” Some federal judges disdain the routine of applying law to facts and 
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yearn for the novelty of path-breaking, society-shaping decisions. Many 
federal judges do not welcome additions to their ranks, even though more 
judges would assist in lightening their workloads, for they fear that more 
judges will dilute their status.  
Federal judges enjoy material support shared by few judges elsewhere in 
the world. Not only are their salaries among the highest for judges in the 
world, the accouterments of their offices, in terms of support staff and office 
facilities, for judges of the lowest courts, exceed those of justices of some of 
the world’s supreme courts.  
The practicing bar has embedded its measures of lawyer quality into 
selection standards for judges. In federal appointments historically a 
committee of the American Bar Association has rated judicial nominees. The 
committee prefers nominees who are successful litigation lawyers (trial 
lawyers are too rare to insist on) and successful business lawyers. The bar’s 
success is remarkably revealed in the Annual Report of the Chief Justice of 
the United States for 2006. 
In the 2006 report the Chief Justice of the United States worried that the 
nature of the federal judiciary is changing, because federal judges “are no 
longer drawn primarily from among the best lawyers in the practicing bar.” 
While a half century ago, he noted, two-thirds of new federal judges came 
from private practice, today only 40% do. Ominously, he reported, some 
50% of new federal judges come from prior work as judges (as magistrates 
or as state judges, presumably), while another 10% come from some other 
form of federal service.  
The Chief Justice attributed the shift from relying on the practicing bar 
to relying on people experienced in the public sector to a “dramatic erosion 
of judicial compensation” that “will inevitably result in a decline in the 
quality of persons willing to accept lifetime appointment as a federal judge.” 
The situation, he observed, has reached a “level of crisis.” Federal judges, he 
noted, have not been treated fairly. The sacrifice that they must make is too 
great.158 The thousand judges of the District Courts have salaries of about 
$170,000 a year, the same as Congressmen receive, while the three hundred 
judges of the Courts of Appeal receive salaries of about $180,000 a year. 
The eight Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court have 
salaries of about $210,000, while the Chief Justice himself gets paid a bit 
more.159
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Judicial selection is everywhere by political process. In some systems 
judges are appointed by the governor (e.g., Maryland) or by the legislature 
(e.g., Virginia); in other states they are elected (e.g., New York). In the 
federal system judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. The confirmation role of the Senate gives the senator from the state 
of appointment a de facto veto on the appointment. The term and manner of 
retention likewise varies from state-to-state. In the federal system the 
appointment is for life, so there is no retention issue.  
Throughout American history reformers have sought to remove judicial 
selection from politics. In particular, many have seen judicial elections, such 
as is common in the state courts, as anathema. Reformers’ successes have 
been limited. The American Judicature Society, founded in 1913, has 
spearheaded the effort. Its internet site tracks the methods of selection in 
each state.160
Once selected federal judges are free of almost all control; state judges, 
on the other hand, usually are subject to popular votes or reappointment. 
Contrary to the organization of the German and Korean judiciaries, 
American judges are not subject to the administration of a ministry of justice 
or of a supreme court. 
  
 
Law Professors 
 
American law professors are closely tied to American judges.  In recent 
years an increasing percentage of American law professors have begun their 
professional careers as law clerks for federal judges. Today a federal 
clerkship is almost a necessary condition to appointment as law professor at 
a leading law school. The preferred clerkship is with the highest federal 
court and most renowned judge possible. A clerkship with a justice of the 
United States Supreme Court is the most desired of all clerkships. Service as 
a clerk gives the clerk a fascinating window into the law and policy making 
role of America’s highest appellate courts. That service is distant, however, 
                                                 
160 See http://www.judicialselection.us/. On judicial selection see generally: JUSTICE IN 
JEOPARDY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY 
JUDICIARY (2003) (approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in August 
2003); STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION, REPORT OF THE ABA STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION 
STANDARDS (2001) (approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates July 2000), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/downloads/reformat.pdf; JUDICIAL ROULETTE: 
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION [AND] 
BACKGROUND PAPER BY DAVID M. O’BRIEN (1988). Specifically on judicial elections, see 
generally: Melinda Gann Hall, The Controversy Over Electing Judges and Advocacy in Political 
Science, 30 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 284 (2009); RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, 
FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb, ed., 2007). For a 
rare scholars’ defense of judicial elections, see CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL: 
IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009). 
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from the vast majority of ordinary cases, many of which, owing to the 
deficiencies of the system, never make it into any American court at all. 
American law professors differ from their German and Korean 
counterparts is two important respects. When at the beginning of their 
careers aspiring American law professors are clerking for judges, their 
German and Korean counterparts are working on dissertations. Those 
dissertations deepen their knowledge of law and contribute to legal science. 
Many of those German and Korean law professors-to-be study law abroad. 
Few American law professors have done either. Non-Americans are typically 
surprised to learn that American law professors do not meet the usual 
scholarly requirements, i.e., dissertation in field, of university appointments. 
 
Legal Education 
 
In the United States all legal professionals are trained to be advocates. 
The system of legal education was established to train lawyers for 
practice.161
Someone who wishes to become a lawyer must successfully graduate 
from an undergraduate college with a degree in any subject. That 
presupposes twelve years of primary and secondary education and four years 
of undergraduate college education. Students apply to one or more of nearly 
two hundred accredited law schools. Most are colleges of law within 
universities, either public or private. A significant number, however, are 
private law schools independent of any university.  
  
The system of university legal education began as a private substitute 
for an existing informal private system of apprenticeship training conducted 
by practicing lawyers. That system was generally one of easy admission. The 
apprenticeship system continued to exist alongside the university system 
throughout the nineteenth century.  
In the twentieth century the apprenticeship system disappeared as an 
independent route to bar admission. Law school training became a necessary 
condition for bar admission. Remarkably, although for a time apprenticeship 
survived as a necessary complement to law school training, it has 
disappeared in that form too. The United States is virtually alone among 
modern legal systems in not requiring post law-school practical training.  
Law school study consists of three years of academic work. Since 
tuitions are high, students rarely take more than time or more courses than 
the required minimum. Because there is no post-graduation practical 
training, most American law schools offer “clinical legal education” courses 
where students act as lawyers under the direction of a faculty member. Few 
law schools require students to take these courses and the majority of 
students do not. Upon graduation from law school, a student receives the 
Juris Doctor degree. This is not a true doctorate, in that no dissertation is 
                                                 
161 See MAXEINER, EDUCATING LAWYERS NOW AND THEN, supra note 91. 
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required. Upon graduation from law school, a student may take a bar 
examination in one of the fifty states. Admission to practice is by state. 
In most states the bar examination consists of a one-day multiple-choice 
test and of a one-day essay test. Most students (65% to 90%, depending upon 
the state) pass a bar examination on the first try. Without further training 
they are legally qualified to practice law.  
Relatively few graduates begin work as independent lawyers. More 
commonly they begin their careers as junior lawyers in law firms 
(associates) or otherwise as junior lawyers in larger organizations. Most get 
their practical training in on the job work.162
 
  
Attorneys General 
 
The Attorney General of the United States is the head of the United 
States Department of Justice. The attorney general of each state is the chief 
legal officer of the state. The offices of the attorneys general are not 
American counterparts of ministries of justice in Germany and Korea. The 
attorneys general in the United States are principally lawyers for the heads of 
state. They do not administer courts. They have limited or no authority to 
direct public prosecutors, who are largely independent of attorneys general. 
Attorneys general do not have major responsibilities for drafting or 
application of the laws of the land other than those directly related to their 
responsibilities for executing the law (e.g., criminal prosecution).  
The United States Department of Justice is not well-suited in its present 
form to assume the role of a ministry of justice. Much like the professional 
organization of the bar, its leadership lacks continuity. Moreover, its top 
leaders are political appointees. Typically they remain in office for only two 
to three years.163
 
 Repeatedly presidents have sought to control politically not 
only the top dozen officials but lawyers in the Department generally. 
 
B. Germany 
 
We are the ministry responsible for upholding justice, 
rights and democracy. 
 
Federal Minister of Justice 
Ministry Website Homepage164
                                                 
162 See James R. Maxeiner, Integrating Practical Training and Professional Legal Education, 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION (J. Klabbers & M. Sellers, ed.), 
2 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAW AND JUSTICE 37 (2008). 
 
163 See JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 109-115 (1986). 
164 http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/321939d8df2a18f97991fdcf94afdeaa,0/aktuelles_13h.html. 
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1. Access to Justice in Germany 
 
Mandatory Legal Representation 
 
In Germany Roh is required to use a lawyer to bring a lawsuit in the 
Landgericht. § 78 ZPO. The Landgericht is the ordinary court of general 
jurisdiction for civil claims that exceed € 5000. If Roh’s claim were for less 
than that, she could sue in the Amtsgericht, a civil court of limited 
jurisdiction, without a lawyer, either pro se, or represented by another person 
who is not necessarily a lawyer. § 79 ZPO. In other courts, such as the labor 
courts, pro se representation is routine. 
In Germany mandatory representation is thought to contribute to a 
productive process. Lawyers filter cases and prepare them for court 
determination.165
 
 Lawyers facilitate the judicial job of applying law to facts. 
They protect clients against judicial overreaching. Having legally qualified 
lawyers on each side assures a level of comparable skill in conduct of the 
lawsuit (“equality of arms” Waffengleichheit). Whether these benefits justify 
mandatory representation, or whether lawyer self-interest should be seen as 
the motivator of the requirement, is debated. Mandatory representation 
impels the state to take responsibility for the quality of the legal 
representation and, pursuant to the equal protection guarantee of the German 
constitution, to assure that representation is available. The requirement of 
mandatory representation does not discourage many lawsuits, since fees for 
lawsuits are modest and awarded to winners and because, as we now discuss, 
civil legal aid and legal services insurance are widely available. 
Civil Legal Aid  
 
Parties who sue in the Landgericht are required to be represented by a 
lawyer admitted to practice, but that requirement does not preclude many 
parties from suing as it might in the United States. In Germany, if a party is 
unable to afford representation or other costs of litigation because of 
personal or commercial circumstances, the party has a statutory right to 
financial support.166 The right extends to legal persons, such as DohSon 
Honda, LLC.167
Civil legal aid is designed to assure that no one is forced to forego his or 
her rights for financial grounds; it serves to realize the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection under law. Already the German Code of Civil 
Procedure of 1877 recognized a right to legal aid. Its drafters saw that the 
  
                                                 
165 See Judgment of 6 May 2008, German Supreme Court (BGH), File X ZR 28/07. 
166 § 114 ZPO. 
167 § 116 ZPO. 
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rule of law, to be worthy of the name, is meaningful only if the poor as well 
as the rich have access to legal protection.168
In Germany a party asserts the right to legal aid by making application 
to the court stating the requisite circumstances. The court is to grant the 
application, at a level and upon terms (e.g., possibly repayment) 
commensurate with the circumstances shown, provided that it determines 
that the claim has a sufficient prospect (hinreichende Aussicht) of success 
and that it appears not to be brought spitefully (mutwillig). Courts regularly 
receive and routinely grant legal aid applications, which are commonly 
prepared by lawyers that the applicants have already consulted. Parties are 
not limited in their choice of lawyers, but may use any lawyer willing to 
accept representation for statutory fees. While not all lawyers accept 
statutory fees, most do and rarely are parties unable to secure competent 
representation. If a party entitled to legal aid is unable to find a lawyer, on 
application the court is to order representation.
  
169
 
  
2. The Cost of Lawyer Representation in Germany 
 
 “Loser pays”  
 
In the German civil justice system the loser in a lawsuit pays the 
winner’s lawyers’ fees and court costs. The justification for this rule is that 
the lawsuit determines which party has right on his or her side. The other 
party should have paid the claim of right without a lawsuit; it is unfair to 
burden the righteous party with the costs of the lawsuit.  
The loser pays rule discourages frivolous lawsuits. It also discourages 
excessive damage claims in well-founded lawsuits, since determination of 
which party wins depends on whether the amount claimed is recovered.  
Although the “loser pays” rule is colloquially known in the United 
States as the “English rule,” some variation of it prevails in most modern 
legal systems. England has modified its rule to incorporate aspects of the 
German rules.170
The loser pays rule discourages some meritorious lawsuits of uncertain 
prospects for success. We surmise that the number is not great. Legal 
services insurance, discussed below, reduces the risk for many cases. In 
other cases, claim-splitting does. A party with a large claim of uncertain 
  
                                                 
168 See 1 BERNHARD WIECZOREK & ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG UND 
NEBENGESETZE: GROSSKOMMENTAR, vorb § 114, 2049 (3rd ed., 1994) (citing to legislative 
history of the CPO). 
169 § 121(5) ZPO. 
170 See John Peysner, Learned in Germany: Applied in England in THE RECEPTION AND 
TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY, LEGISLATIVE AND 
LEGAL EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN PROCEDURAL LAW 339 (Masahisa 
Deguchi & Marcel Storme, eds. 2008). 
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success may test the waters by bringing one small claim first. Finally, at least 
compared to American fees, German fees that are shifted to losers are 
modest. Often in German litigation, fees for both sides combined are less 
than fees for one side would be in the United States. 
 
Calculating Lawyers’ Fees 
 
Fee regulation. The requirement that losers pay winner’s lawyers’ fees 
practically requires regulating the amount of the fees that may be recovered. 
It would be unfair to burden losers with whatever fees winners might choose 
to incur. Such a system would permit powerful parties to spend their 
opponents to death.  
While charges in excess of statutory fees may not be recovered, 
powerful parties, such as large corporations may and do agree with their 
lawyers to pay higher fees. Most parties, however, pay and most lawyers 
work at statutory rates. The system of regulated fees helps keep the costs of 
lawsuits proportionate to the amounts in dispute. 
The Lawyers’ Compensation Statute (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz) 
sets the rates. It uses a fee system in which lawyers earn fee-units for 
accomplishing specific tasks. The statute bases the size of each fee-unit on 
the amount in controversy. In the ordinary case the statute provides that 
lawyers receive one-fee unit for each of three tasks: preparing a case, filing a 
complaint, and attending court. The statute provides for additional fee-units 
for cases that settle or are appealed. 
The statutory fee schedule does not adjust fees to account for time 
actually required. Consequently, the statute encourages lawyers to 
accomplish tasks efficiently and discourages wasting time. Of course, it 
similarly discourages them from thoroughly handling these tasks if the time 
spent promises little gain. The statutory system can encourage lawyers to let 
courts take the lead in difficult issues.171
The statutory system results in fees that, in comparison to their 
American counterparts, are modest. For example, in Roh v. Doh, since the 
amount in controversy is €60,000, Hahn’s fee would be three fee-units, or a 
total of €3536. In the United States, if Hahn won the case, a ⅓ contingent fee 
would be $25,000, but nothing if he lost. If he took the case on an hourly 
basis, if the time required were 70 hours, then @ $300 per hour, his fee 
would be $21,000. 
  
Legal expenses insurance. While Mary Roh is not likely to qualify for 
legal aid, she may have legal services insurance, which is readily available in 
Germany at moderate cost. Unlike liability insurance, which commonly 
covers only legal services for defense of claims, legal services insurance 
covers lawyers’ fees for prosecution of claims. It contributes to access to 
courts for persons of modest means, for it both supports bringing lawsuits as 
                                                 
171 See PETER MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 115 (2004). 
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well as relieves plaintiffs of the burden of having to pay the other sides costs 
and lawyers’ fees in the event of loss. 
Contingent fees and similar arrangements. Until 2006 contingent fees 
(i.e., fees conditional on success in the lawsuit) were illegal. It was, and 
remains possible, to obtain third party financing of large litigation. 
Following a decision of December 12, 2006 of the German Constitutional 
Court, and a federal law of April 25, 2008 implementing that decision, 
contingent fee arrangements are now permitted, provided that the 
prospective party is otherwise financially unable to bring the lawsuit. The 
law would not likely permit Roh to reach a contingent fee arrangement.  
 
3. Representing Roh in Germany: Is a Lawsuit Worth it for Roh? 
 
Inevitably in Germany too Roh will get around to talking with her 
lawyer Hahn about the expense of representation. He will remind her of all 
of the collateral costs of the lawsuit in terms of her lost time, lost time of 
employees, frustrations and so on. Then he will be sure to establish his fee 
arrangement with her. They might have a conversation such as the following 
one: 
 
Hahn: We’ll file a complaint and thereafter prosecute this suit vigorously through to 
judgment, correct? 
 
Roh: Exactly. 
 
Hahn: I’ll want to meet with you at least once more before we file any papers with the 
court to talk more specifically about how I think we ought to proceed. But earlier you 
asked about my fees, and I think I know enough now to tell you what the fees will be. 
While we could agree that you pay me a different fee, I usually do my job for the fee set 
by law. That is the maximum fee that you get back from the other side if you win the 
case. The fees for lawyers are determined by the amount in controversy: here €60,000, 
i.e., the amount of the loan claimed without interest or additional fees. You can actually 
go to a website to calculate your fees. It is www.rechtanwaltsgebuehren.de. For work 
opening the case and preparing to bring it, my intake fee is €729. I need you to pay that 
today if you want me to go ahead and prepare a complaint. I will count it toward your 
total process fee of €2807. On filing with the court, you will have to pay the court fee of 
€1668, and I will want you to pay the balance of my fee, i.e., €2078. 
       If you win, assuming that Mr. Doh has the money, he will have to pay you both my 
process fee and the court fee. If either of you decides not to accept the decision of the 
court, then there will be fees for the appeal. Whoever loses the appeal will have to pay 
all of the lawyers’ fees and all of the court costs for both proceedings from the start. Is 
everything clear? 
 
Roh: I guess so. Of course, I wish it weren’t so expensive but I guess that’s the way 
things go these days. This a probably a dumb question, but I assume that if the case 
settles in just a few hours after we file it, I’d get most of the €4475 back? 
 
Hahn: Not if we have begun the lawsuit. If we settle before we begin the lawsuit, then 
you will get back most of it. But once the lawsuit is underway, even if we settle nearly 
immediately, while you will get back €1112 of the court fee, you will then, by law, have 
to pay me a settlement fee of €1123. The idea is that will encourage me to help bring 
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about a settlement. Of course, in the case of a settlement, we will have to apportion the 
lawyers’ fees. Usually the parties pay their own lawyer’s fees. Shall we meet again on 
Wednesday at 2:00 to discuss the complaint? You can approve it then and I will file it. 
 
Roh: Sure. I am good to go.  
 
We turn now to consider the people who make up the German legal 
profession. 
 
4. The German Legal Professions 
 
American lawyers in their focus on the instrumental role of achieving 
specific results can easily overlook that a legal system measured by the ends 
that the system produces for society as a whole. Civil justice is a public 
good, just as are national defense, public highways and public education. 
Nowhere is that recognition stronger than in Germany than in the institution 
of the ministry of justice. 
 
The Ministries of Justice 
 
There are in Germany one federal and sixteen state ministries of justice. 
Their responsibility is to minister to and provide for the peoples’ needs for 
civil and criminal justice. Some of the most revered of American jurists, 
including long-time Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound and the iconic 
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, have pointed enviously to 
foreign ministries of justice.172
In Germany federal and state ministries of justice coordinate among 
themselves along lines typical for German federalism: the Federal Ministry 
provides for a uniform national structure, while the state ministries carry it 
out. The employment figures given on the ministries’ websites demonstrate 
the division of responsibilities: the Federal Ministry has fewer than 1,000 
employees, while the Bavarian Ministry, which is just one of sixteen state 
ministries, has more than 19,000 employees. 
  
The Federal Ministry of Justice is principally responsible for 
maintaining a codified and rational body of laws and for overseeing the 
administration of the federal courts.  
The state ministries of justice are responsible for state legislation and, 
above all, for the full range of the administration of justice. Their tasks 
include: 
 
• administration of the civil and criminal courts; 
                                                 
172 Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921) (citing two 
contemporary works by Roscoe Pound); ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 736-37 (1959); see 
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 14-15 (6th ed. 
1998). 
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• administration of the offices of public prosecution; 
• administration of the system of legal aid in criminal, civil and 
counseling cases; 
• administration of the prisons; 
• administration of post-incarceration supervision; 
• crime victim programs; 
• witness assistance; 
• employment of judges, prosecutors and prison employees to 
staff the forgoing; 
• admission of applicants to legal practice, including prescribing 
the required course of their preparatory studies; 
• practical training of apprentice lawyers in the courts; and  
• supervision of practical training by the bar of apprentice 
lawyers.  
 
Judges 
 
Where once German judges may have had a uniform self-image as 
appliers of the law, today there is no single self-image, but a plurality of 
images. These images range from strict law-appliers to equity judges; from 
political judges through people protectors to public service providers. On the 
one hand, one former President of the German Supreme Court called upon 
judges to place first the need for predictability and accountability 
(Berechenbarkeit) for the sake of business; another to place in the forefront 
protection of the weak.173
Germany has among the highest, possibly the highest, number of judges 
per capita of any modern country. There are over 20,000 German judges; 
The United States with more than three times the population, does not have 
30,000 judges. 
  
Judicial selection for the state courts in Germany is not political. Almost 
all new judges are chosen within a few years of completion of their legal 
education when they are twenty-five to thirty-five years old. The principal 
basis for selection is high performance on the two state examinations in law. 
For many years most applicants have scored in about the top 10% of those 
taking the examinations. 
Typically new judges begin their careers in one of the two courts of first 
instance, the Landgericht, the court of general jurisdiction, or the 
Amtsgericht, the principal court of limited jurisdiction. About one half of 
German judges are judges of an Amtsgericht. New judges in a Landgericht 
are assigned to multi-judge chambers. Before 2002 these chambers usually 
                                                 
173 See Peter Kauffmann, Richterbilder heute—Eine rechtssoziologische Betrachtung, 
DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG (DRIZ) 2008, 194; PETER KAUFFMANN, ZUR KONSTRUKTION DES 
RICHTERBERUFS DURCH RICHTERLEITBILDER: EINE EMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG (2003). 
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decided in panels of three; today mostly they decide as single judges. 
Nevertheless, Landgericht judges typically work together. Junior judges may 
share offices, while experienced judges usually have offices in suites or 
otherwise close together. Since Amtsgericht judges have long decided alone, 
they historically have acted more on their own and, for this reason, some 
judges prefer to work there.  
Judicial compensation is little different between Landgericht and 
Amtsgericht, so many judges have no difficulty staying with the formally 
lower courts for their careers. Supervisory judges in an Amtsgericht can earn 
more than judges in a Landgericht. This pattern continues even to the courts 
of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte). Judicial salaries are based principally on 
years of service, age, family status and supervisory responsibilities. Typical 
annual salaries run from about €40,000 to €70,000.  
Appointment to the federal courts, on the other hand, does have a 
political element. Appointment to the Constitutional Court is deliberately 
political and is so provided in the Constitution (Basic Law). In the case of 
the other federal courts, appointments are not overtly political, but since they 
originate in the state ministries of justice, they have a non-partisan, yet not 
entirely merit-based component.174
In Germany, almost all federal judges are appellate judges. They are 
paid annual salaries of about €90,000 to €130,000, most at the lower rate. 
Fourteen of the sixteen justices of the Constitutional Court are paid at 
roughly the higher of these rates; the President and Vice President are paid 
somewhat more. Almost all federal judges, except Constitutional Court 
judges, were state court judges before they become federal judges. Few have 
any post-bar admission private practice experience. Justices of the 
Constitutional Court often are former law professors. 
 
 
Lawyers 
 
More than its American counterpart, the German bar is in the shadow of 
the judicial profession. In Germany, the system of legal education was 
established to train civil servants for the State. All persons who wish to 
become legal professionals, whether as lawyers or as judges or otherwise, 
are trained as judges. The bar has sought to escape from the judicial 
                                                 
174 On selection to the federal courts other than the Constitutional Court (which has its own 
constitutionally-mandated political procedures), see David P. Kommers, American Courts and 
Democracy; A Comparative Perspective, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 200, 207-208 (Kermit L. 
Hall & Kevin T. McGuire, eds. 2005). On selection to all courts, see MARTINA KÜNNECKE, 
TRADITION AND CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANGLO-GERMAN COMPARISON 56-60 
(Constitutional Court), 63-69 (state and other federal courts) (2007). 
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domination of education as education for judges, but so far, without 
success.175
The image of the judge has colored the historical ideal of the legal 
professional. Judges have the leading roles among all legal professionals: it 
is judges who apply law to facts of cases to decide them.
  
176 Lawyers and 
other legal professionals play supporting roles in helping judges apply law. 
The classic model of German lawyers is as “independent organ of the system 
of the justice system” (unabhängiges Organ der Rechtspflege177
In the past generation the German bar has experienced great growth and 
terrific turbulence. In the middle of the twentieth century, the bar was still 
relatively small and relatively homogenous. Through most of the century it 
was sheltered from competition by professional rules that limited law firms 
to practice in one city and lawyers to practice before one court. Lawyers 
practiced alone or in firms with fewer than ten members. Lawyers did not 
vastly outnumber judges.  
). Within 
that system, lawyers are independent advocates (freie Advokatur).  
The idyllic picture—for lawyers, anyway—changed in the last decade of 
the twentieth century. The number of attorneys sky-rocketed while protective 
limitations on practice were undone (by courts applying European Union and 
constitutional law.) While in 1959, there were 16,000 lawyers authorized to 
practice law in Germany, in 2009 there were nearly 150,000, or almost ten 
times as many with little population growth. As late as 1973 there were only 
two lawyers for every judge (25,000 lawyers to 13,000 judges).178 By 2005 
there were seven (150,000 lawyers to 20,000 judges). German lawyers now 
may practice German law throughout Germany and throughout the European 
Union. Law firms of ten or fifty lawyers are common. Still larger firms lead 
in international practice; most of the ten largest law firms in Germany are 
branches of law firms headquartered in England or in the United States. In 
today’s global world of free competition, German lawyers are looking for a 
new professional model.179
 
  
Legal Education 
 
In Germany all legal professionals are trained to be judges. People who 
wish to become lawyers must successfully graduate from an academic high 
school with the Abitur degree. This requires 12 years of study and usually 
                                                 
175 See, e.g., Hartmut Kilger, Wie der angehende Anwalt ausgebildet sein muss, 2007 ANWALTS-
BLATT 1; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung einer Spartenausbildung in der 
juristenausbildung, 2007 ANWALTSBLATT 45. 
176 See ALFRED RINKIN, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE STUDIUM 134-149 (1977). 
177 BRAO [Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, Federal Law on Lawyers) § 1. 
178 Id. at 142. 
179 See Hans-Jürgen Hellwig, Anwaltsethos—Lehren aus der Finzanzkrise, 2009 ANWALTS-
BLATT 465; Hans-Jürgen Hellwig, Das Konzept des anwaltlichen Berufsbilds, 2008 ANWALTS-
BLATT 844. 
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occurs at age 18. With a single exception, law faculties are all faculties in 
public universities. There is minimal or no tuition at public universities, so 
students may and do spend more than the required seven or eight semesters 
of study. When students feel ready, they take the first state examination. 
About two-thirds of all students are successful in passing this examination. 
These examinations are more challenging and longer (they take longer than a 
week) than their American counterparts. Students who fail the first time, 
usually may retake the exam only once. 
Students that pass the first state examination are admitted to a two-year 
period of practical training sponsored by the courts of the different states. In 
that training program they called in German, Referendare, or in English, 
legal interns. Referendare are paid a small stipend that helps cover basic 
living costs. Upon successful completion of this period, Referendare take a 
second state exam. If successful they are qualified to become lawyers or 
judges.  
In the practice training period after the first state examination  
prospective lawyers learn practical skills needed by for legal practice as 
judges, lawyers or government officials. They do internships with courts, 
lawyers and government agencies. They begin their practical training at the 
courts and, although only a few become judges, all are required to learn 
judicial skills. Of greatest importance is the Relationstechnik of relating facts 
to law and of crafting judgments. Judges as classroom teachers didactically 
teach classes that lay out the fundamentals of this technique, while other 
judges are assigned to tutor the aspiring legal professionals, the Referendare 
or interns, as apprentice judges. The interns learn how to take the substance 
of the law they learned at the university, how to conduct legal proceedings to 
determine facts, and how to justify in legal judgments their correct 
determinations of how law applies to particular cases. In short, they learn to 
do what a judge has to do. And it is the mastery of the techniques of 
applying law to facts (Relationstechnik) that defines the judge.180
 
 
Qualification as judges (Befähigung zum Richteramt) is the necessary 
prerequisite to admission to practice as lawyers.  
C. Korea 
 
We must continue to devote our time to ensure that justice 
becomes a part of the national reality, and not simply an 
ideal. To this end, our courts will undergo significant 
changes. These efforts will allow the court to listen to even 
the smallest voices from the public and to resolve their 
deepest concerns. 
 
                                                 
180 ALFRED RINKEN, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE STUDIUM 135 (1977). See James R. 
Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law, 114 PENN STATE L. REV 469 (2009). 
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Yong-hoon Lee,  
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Korea (2007)181
 
 
1. Access to Justice in Korea 
 
Pro se Representation (본인소송) 
 
Korea has a higher incidence of pro se participation than do either the 
United States or Germany. Even in substantial cases it is common that one or 
both parties is without a lawyer. Even leaving small claims to one side 
(jurisdictional amount below ₩100,000,000), in fewer than 20% of all cases 
are both sides represented by lawyers. Here are the figures for 2008 for the 
number of cases where a party or parties were represented by lawyers before 
a district court (or branch court) of original jurisdiction in civil meritorious 
cases (민사본안사건) in Korea: 
 
Collegiate Division Single Judge Division 
Number 
of 
Disposit
ions 
Plaintiff 
only 
Defend
ant 
only 
Both 
Parties 
Number 
of 
Disposit
ions 
Plaintiff 
only 
Defend
ant only 
Both 
Parties 
48,880 12,213 
25.0% 
3,042 
6.2% 
22,991 
47.0% 
283,011 111,414 
39.4% 
10,181 
3.6% 
29,021 
10.3% 
182
Because judges in Korea take more responsibility for proceedings than 
do their counterparts in America, it is easier for the Korean system to accept 
unrepresented parties than it is for the American. When parties are not 
represented by lawyers, judges proactively direct procedures and explain 
relevant legal principles to help unrepresented parties participate. Frequently 
judges direct lay parties to material points in dispute and away from personal 
attacks on opponents. Without a study comparing per se to lawyer 
representation in Korea, we are not able to evaluate reliably whether these 
measures are sufficient to overcome the inequality of arms that inevitably 
results when one side is represented by a lawyer and the other it not. 
 
 
Civil Legal Aid183
                                                 
181Quoted in THE SUPREME COURT OF KOREA at 5 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2007) available as 
2008 INTRODUCTORY BOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF KOREA at 
http://eng.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/introduction.jsp. 
  
182 Office of Court Administration, Annual Judicial Report for Year 2008,   
http://www.scourt.go.kr/justicesta/JusticestaListAction.work?gubun=10.  
183 See generally Gyooho Lee, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure in Korea, 
forthcoming, temporarily available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/events/2010congress/reports/National_Reports/II_C_1_Cost_and
_Fee_Allocations/Korea.pdf?rd=1 
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The Korean Civil Procedure Act allows, but does not require, courts to 
provide civil legal aid. The legal aid provided is usually in the form of 
deferment of payment rather than provision of free services.184
 
 While the 
German system delivers civil legal aid through the ordinary bar, the small 
number of lawyers in Korea makes that approach difficult. In Korea, such 
legal aid as there is, is largely provided by the Korea Legal Aid Corporation. 
Established pursuant to the Legal Aid Act enacted in 1987, it is a public 
interest organization under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. Korean 
scholars criticize government support for legal aid by private organizations 
as trivial. Where the amount in controversy in less than ₩ 50 million (about 
$50,000), with permission of the court, parties may choose to be represented 
by someone who is not qualified to practice law. 
2. Cost of Legal Representation in Korea 
 
 “Loser pays”185
 
  
Korea follows the international norm and shifts litigation expenses, 
including legal fees, to losing parties. The system is less effective in Korea 
than in Germany, however, because the relatively small bar is less willing to 
work for statutory fees. Parties often have to pay their lawyers at rates in 
excess of the statutory fees. 186
The Korean Civil Procedure Act authorizes the Supreme Court of Korea to 
set legal fees for indemnification in litigation.
 
187
The Rules limit only reimbursable fees and not the fees that lawyers charge 
their clients. Party autonomy prevails so that parties may agree to pay their 
lawyers more. Typically parties and lawyers agree on a two part fee that consists 
of a non-refundable initiation fee and an additional fee contingent on success in 
the action. In 1983 the Korean Bar Association recommended fees, but withdrew 
these recommendations in 2000 when they were questioned as competition law 
violations. 
 The Supreme Court’ Rules 
Regarding Lawyers’ Fees, when first issued in 1981, were unsatisfactory in that 
they did not account adequately for economic growth and the increase in 
amounts in controversy. After study of the American no indemnity practice and 
the international “loser-pays” standard, the Supreme Court reissued the Rules.  
 
Calculating Legal Fees in Korea 
 
                                                 
184 KPCA §§ 128, 129. 
185 This section follows Lee, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure in Korea, supra note 
183. 
186 See Kap-You (Kevin) Kim, Dispute Resolution in Korea, http://www.fernuni-
hagen.de/JAPANRECHT/Streitbeilegung.pdf;  
187 KPCA § 109(1). 
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The reissued Rules Regarding Lawyers’ Fees provide for a reimbursable fee 
of a designated percentage of the amount in dispute. That amount begins at 8% 
for an amount in dispute of ₩10 million (roughly $10,000) and drops for 
additional amounts in 1% increments until it is only 1% for amounts in excess of 
₩100 million but below ₩200 million, and ½ % for amounts in excess of ₩500 
million.188
The statutory system results in fees that, in comparison to their 
American counterparts, are modest, but are in line with their German 
counterparts. For example, in Roh v. Doh, since the amount in controversy is 
₩75 million, the fee would be ₩4,050,000 (roughly $4000). As we saw in 
Germany, based on an amount in controversy of €60,000, Hahn’s fee would 
be €3536.  
  
Initiation Fees (Retainers). Initiation fees normally range from ₩2 
million to ₩5 million (roughly $2000 to $5000). Typically they are 
refundable only in the event of breach of duty by the lawyer.  
Contingent fees. Contingent fees are common in Korea.  Their use was 
subject to limits recommended by the Korean Bar Association’s rules that 
were abolished in 2000. Today they are not controlled. Proposed legislation 
to limit their use in criminal cases was defeated in 2007 by a coalition of 
former judges and prosecutors who saw the legislation as interfering with 
their ability to take full advantage of their former status. 
Contingent fees in civil cases are usually determined on a case-by-case 
basis and typically range between 5% and 10% of the amount recovered. 
They usually take into account the importance and difficulty of the case, the 
amount in controversy, where the case occurred and where the parties reside. 
Often contingent fees are waived if the case is resolved quickly in the course 
of provisional proceedings.  
Fee competition. Korean lawyers compete for clients based on fees. 
LawMarketAsia is an internet site that offers an auction service where 
lawyers bid on cases. It asserts that it saves clients 20% to 50% on fees. The 
site also provides support for parties who represent themselves.  
Legal expenses insurance.  The Korean public has long sought legal 
event insurance. In 2009 D.A.S., a subsidiary of Munich Re Group in 
Germany, began to offer such insurance. It covers legal costs, such as 
lawyers’ fees, stamp fee, fees on service of process, up to ₩50 million.   
 
3. Representing Roh in Korea: Is a Lawsuit Worth it for Roh? 
 
Hahn: We’ll file a complaint and thereafter prosecute this suit vigorously through to 
judgment, correct? 
 
Roh: Exactly. 
 
                                                 
188 Supreme Court Rules No. 2116, amended on November 28, 2007, effective on January 1, 
2008. 
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Hahn: I’ll want to meet with you at least once more before we file any papers with the 
court to talk more specifically about how I think we ought to proceed. But earlier you 
asked about my fees, and I think I know enough now to tell you what the fees will be.  
The initiation fee generally ranges from ₩3 million to ₩5 million [$3000 to $5000] 
irrespective of how much the amount in controversy will be. Besides the initiation fee, I 
will be paid for contingency fees amounting to 5% to 10% of the amount of settlement 
or judgment if you settle or win the case.  We can negotiate how much you will pay 
initiation fee for me, taking into account several factors such as the difficulty of the case 
or the length of disposition of the case. In this case, I would like to propose ₩4 million 
for the initiation fee.  How do you think it is reasonable?  Also, I want to be paid for 7% 
of the amount of settlement or judgment if you settle or win the case. If that is ₩75 
million exactly, then my fee contingent fee would be ₩5.25 million additional.  If you 
accept my offer for the attorney fee arrangement, why don’t you sign this retainer 
agreement?  
 
Roh: I agree.  I will sign it. 
 
Hahn: Here you are. O.K. It’s done. Before we file the court, I want you to pay both of 
my initiation fees and the court fee including stamp fee.  On filing, you will have to pay 
the stamp fee of ₩342,500 because the amount in controversy is ₩75 million and, in 
accordance with Art. 2 sec. 1 (2) of the Stamp Fees Act, the stamp fee is computed by 
the formula, “(amount in controversy multiplied by 45/10,000) + ₩5,000” when amount 
in controversy is ₩10 million or more and less than ₩100 million. 
 
Roh: I would like to inquire whether I get the costs back if we win.  That includes your 
fee, right? 
 
Hahn: Not quite. Let me explain. If you win, John Doh, Jr. will be required to pay the 
court costs and most of my contingent fees. The general rule is that the losing party 
has to pay the court costs and the legal fees for the winning party. That is stated in 
Article 98 of the Korean Civil Procedure Law. Article 109 (1) of the Act tells us how 
much of my contingent fee Doh has to pay. It’s somewhat less. In this case, it would be 
₩4.05 million because the amount in controversy is ₩75 million. Of course, that 
assumes that Roh has the money to pay your claim.  
 
            Also, I have to tell you, that if he wins, then you will have to pay his court costs 
and ₩4.05 million KW of his lawyer’s fees. While it seems unlikely in this case, if the 
court were to find that he owes you something less than ₩75 million, then, depending 
upon how that court finds, you would end up getting less or perhaps even owing Doh 
money. 
 
Roh: Now, I got it.  When can I meet you to discuss the complaint?  Recently, I am very 
busy.  
 
Hahn: You do not need to come by my office because I fully understand how this case 
will go. As soon as you remit the initiation fees to my law firm’s bank account, I will file 
the complaint. Afterwards, I will let you know as soon as the date for early hearing is 
set.  
 
Roh: Thank you.  I will remit the initiation fees to you right away. I am sure that you will 
do your best to win the case. Still, I would feel better if we meet one more time before 
you file the complaint. I can review it and ask you questions about what to expect in the 
proceedings. How about Wednesday next week at 2:00 PM 
 
Hahn: OK with me. See you then. 
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4. Korean Legal Professions 
 
Lawyers (변호사) 
 
The Korean legal professions shares features of the Japanese legal 
professions out of which they grew. Historically the legal professions in both 
countries had very few lawyers; the number of lawyers was limited to 
artificially low levels. Even today, the Ministry of Justice, after consulting 
with the Supreme Court of Korea and the Korean Bar Association, sets the 
total number of successful applicants. Until 1978 that number of successes 
was below one hundred; until 1995 it was below three hundred. The 
percentage of successful takers was three percent or lower. While the 
number admitted has increased, it remains subject to government control. 
This contrasts to the open bar admissions of Germany and the United States, 
where everyone who demonstrates minimal legal competency on the bar 
examination is eligible to practice law. 
Joining the legal profession has been a symbol of fulfilling the “Korean 
dream.”189 The limited number of bar admissions has led some Koreans to 
regard lawyers as an exclusive social caste. In the course of recent reforms, 
the organized bar has sought to gain influence over the number of students 
admitted to study law and thereby to retain influence over the number of 
persons eventually admitted to practice law.190
The Korean bar historically has been closely-knit and grouped into three 
types of legal practice: relatively large international business firms, medium 
size domestic firms, and courthouse area lawyers mostly practicing on their 
own or in small groups in individual litigation. The international firms 
typically have fifty to two hundred-fifty lawyers and focus on international 
transactions such as mergers; the domestic business firms usually have 
around ten lawyers.
  
191
Whether the closely-knit bar will survive the rapid increase in number of 
lawyers is an open question. Not only will numbers increase, but future 
lawyers are also likely to have more diverse experiences. The common 
experience of training at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, in a 
few years time, may become a thing of the past. 
 Roh’s lawyer Hahn in Korea likely would come from 
that group of firms. 
 
                                                 
189 Kyong-Whan Ahn, Law Reform in Korea and the Agenda of Graduate law School, 24 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 223, 227 (2006)   
190 Chang Rok Kim, The National Bar Examination in Korea, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 252 
(2006). 
191 Hyung Tae Kim, Legal Market Liberalization in South Korea: Preparations for Change, 15 
PAC. RIM L. & POLICY J. 199, 204 (2006). 
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The Supreme Court of Korea (대법원) 
 
From its sixteen story, 66,500 square meter building in southern Seoul 
the Supreme Court of Korea literally towers over the Korean legal system. 
Its American and German counterparts sit in smaller buildings and have 
nowhere near the influence over their respective legal systems. And yet the 
Court consists of only one Chief Justice (대법원장)—appointed to a single, 
non-renewable six year term by the President of Korea with the consent of 
the National Assembly—and thirteen justices—similarly appointed, but to 
renewable six year terms. One of the Justices is the Minister of National 
Court Administration and is not allowed to participate in judgments rendered 
by the Court. 
The Supreme Court has the following responsibilities: 
• It is the court of last resort for all courts, civil, criminal, 
administrative, patent, except for the Constitutional Court; 
• The Chief Justice designates three of the nine justices appointed by 
the President of Korea to the Constitutional Court; 
• The Chief Justice has general control over judicial administrative 
affairs, and appoints and directs the officials charged with judicial 
administration, including the Minster and the Vice Minister of 
National Court Administration;  
o Other courts, i.e., the High Courts, the District Courts, the 
Patent Court, the Family Court and the Administrative 
Court are administrative subdivisions of the Supreme 
Court of Korea; 
• The Chief Justice with the consent of the other Justices (대법관) 
sitting in the Council of Supreme Court Justices appoints all judges; 
o The Chief Justice can evaluate service of judges and affect 
their personnel record. 
• The Chief Justice appoints and supervises the President of the 
Judicial Research and Training Institute; 
o All Korean judges and lawyers are trained by the Judicial 
Research and Training Institute; 
• The Chief Justice appoints and supervises the President of the 
Training Institute for Court Officials; 
• The Chief Justice appoints the Chairman and Commissioners of the 
Sentencing Commission; 
• The Supreme Court establishes the Supreme Court Rules and 
Regulations and other rules and regulations concerning judicial 
proceedings, discipline and management; 
• The Chief Justice has the right to present his or her opinion to the 
National Assembly on matters related to the administration of 
justice;  
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• The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputed 
presidential and parliamentary elections; 
• The Supreme Court reviews the constitutionality or legality of 
orders, rules, regulations and actions taken by administrative 
entities; 
• The Supreme Court’s Judicial Disciplinary Committee is 
responsible for disciplining judges.192
 
 
The Ministry of Justice (법무부) 
 
The Korean Ministry of Justice functions more like the United States 
Department of Justice than like the German ministries of justice. Its principal 
tasks are acting as legal counsel for the government and directing and 
supervising criminal law enforcement, corrections and immigration. In 
recent years it has taken on some legal system responsibilities: in 2002 it 
took over administration of the National Bar Examination; since 2005 
through what is now the Commercial Affairs Division it reviews commercial 
legislation. The Office of Legal Counsel is responsible for updating and 
improving the Korean Civil Procedure Act. It also provides legal advice to 
the President, Prime Minister and Ministers, and authoritative interpretations 
of laws to government bodies. 
 
The Ministry of Government Legislation (법제처) 
 
The Korean Ministry of Government Legislation corresponds to the 
German Federal Ministry of Justice. Its primary duties are the 
comprehensive control and coordination of the government's legislative 
affairs, statutory examination, statutory interpretation, and statutory 
improvement. 
 
Judges (법관) 
 
The Chief Justice and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Korea are 
appointed by the President with the confirmation of the National Assembly. 
The Chief Justice with the consent of the Council of Supreme Court Justices 
appoints all other judges. They also determine the number of judges 
appointed to each court. There is no age requirement for judges.193
                                                 
192 See THE SUPREME COURT OF KOREA (published by the Court, August 2007) and available at 
 
http://eng.scourt.go.kr/eng/main/Main.work as 2008 INTRODUCTORY BOOK OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF KOREA. 
 
193 See Woo-young Rhee, Judicial Appointment in the Republic of Korea from Democracy 
Perspectives, 9 J. KOREAN L. 53, 60-62 (2009). 
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Korean judges have all passed the difficult National Bar Examination 
and studied for two years at the Judicial Research and Training Institute. 
While outwardly similar in organization and careers to German judges, 
Korean judges are subject to greater career pressures. Initially they are given 
ten-year appointments. But in practice an up-or-out system prevails. The 
Chief Justice can evaluate the service of judges and the result is reflected in 
their promotion. In this regard, the judges in Korea are likely to be 
encouraged to settle the cases in question. While German judicial 
organization is essentially flat and there is little pressure to advance, in the 
Korean system there are ten or more promotional steps which every judge is 
expected to climb. Those that fail to do so in a reasonable period are 
expected to resign. Indeed, if ever someone junior is promoted over a more 
senior judge, the more senior judge is expected to resign.  
The early severance system has contributed to low levels of public 
confidence in the Korean judiciary. On the one hand, judges and prosecutors 
who separate from service prior to retirement may register as lawyers and 
represent clients before the courts and agencies with which they formally 
served. The public believes that these former judges and prosecutors turned 
lawyers have a higher rate of success than do other lawyers. They pay them 
better. Newspaper studies of statistical data lend credence to those beliefs.194
On the other hand, judges, so long as they remain in service, are 
vulnerable to adverse performance evaluations. This puts their independence 
at risk. That control can come directly from the top: from the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court. 
 
The practice is known in Korean as Jeon-gwan ye-u (전관예우 ). 
The introduction of the law school system (discussed in the next 
subsection) makes uncertain what will be the background of future judges. 
The Judicial Research and Training Institute in the future will only train 
judges. There is to be increased emphasis on recruiting as future judges 
lawyers from the practicing bar in mid-career.  
 
Legal Education 
 
In 2009 Korea followed the example of Japan of five years earlier and 
introduced a law school system to replace partly the former law faculties.195
                                                 
194 See Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIAN-
PACIFIC L. & POLICY J. 45, 50-53 (2001); Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 
172-173, 179. 
  
195 See generally Ahn, Law Reform, supra note 189; Young-Cheol K. Jeong, Korean Legal 
Education for the Age of Professionalism: Suggestions for More Concerted Curricula, 5 EAST 
ASIA L. REV. 155 (2010); Chang Rok Kim, The National Bar Examination in Korea, 24 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 243 (2006); Jasper Kim, Socrates v. Confucius: An Analysis of South Korea's 
Implementation of the American Law School Model, 10 ASIAN PACIFIC L. & POLICY J. 322 
(2009); Kwon, Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 173-175. For Japan see James R. Maxeiner & 
Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law Schools, 13 PACIFIC RIM L. & POLICY J. 303 (2004).  
79   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
In the former system, university law faculties provided undergraduates 
with non-professional education in law. Nearly all students who were 
interested in becoming lawyers, studied as well at cram schools to prepare 
for the National Bar Examination. Applicants could, if they wished, forego 
university studies altogether, for the bar exam itself had no prerequisites. 
The deleterious effect such a system had on the legal education of successful 
takers and on the lives of unsuccessful applicants was widely decried. 
In the old system, all students who passed the National Bar Examination 
were admitted to a two year period of theoretical and practical studies at the 
Judicial Research and Training Institute to be prepared to become judges, 
prosecutors or lawyers. That institute is a branch of the Supreme Court of 
Korea. Under the new system the study period is reduced to one year and 
only those students selected to be judges will study at the Institute. 
Under the new system, students who have an undergraduate education 
are admitted to law schools to study law professionally. The government 
controls the number of law schools and the number of law students. As of 
2009 the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology certified only 
twenty-five law schools with a total approved enrollment of only two 
thousand. The new system permits only graduates of law schools to take the 
National Bar Examination. The government continues to set quotas on the 
number of applicants allowed to pass the examination. That quota is 
expected to be substantially higher than the historic quota; at least more than 
half of all applicants and perhaps as high as four-fifths.  
 
D. Comparative Statistics 
 
These statistics are for approximate comparisons only. Any proper 
detailing would require discussion of classifying legal professionals as 
lawyers, judges or other personnel. 
 
Statistics United States Germany Korea196
Approximate population 
 
308 million 82 million 50 million 
Lawyers  1,162,124197 146,910 198 7,007  
Lawyers per 100,000 386 179 14 
Judges—total  28,723 20,138199 2,008  
                                                 
196 Chang Rok Kim, The National Bar Examination in Korea, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 259 
(2006). The statistics are for 2005. 
197 American Bar Association, National Lawyer Population by State, as of December 31, 2007. 
http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2008_NATL_LAWYER_by_State.pdf. 
198 Bundesrechtanwaltskammer, Großer Mitgliederstatistik, as of January 1, 2008, at  
http://www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/Statistiken/2008/MGgross2008.pdf 
199 Bundesamt für Justiz, Referat III 3, 3110/6 - B7 17/2007, available at, 
http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/3f68e11a4fd244d6b92a2c3833dc885e/1196/Gesamtsttistik_Anza
hl_Richter_Staatsanw%C3%A4lte_Vertreter_des_%C3%B6ffentlichen_Interesses_04.11.2006.
pdf. Statistics as of December 31, 2006. 
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Judges per 100,000  9 ½  24 ½       4 
Lawyers per judge 40 ½ 7 ¼ 3 ½ 
Judges—federal courts  862200 455  na 
Judges—state courts 27,861201 19,683  na 
 
                                                 
200 Authorized Article III judges, appellate 28 U.S.C. § 44(a), district court 28 U.S. C. §133(a), 
and U.S. Supreme Court. Does not include magistrate judges or bankruptcy judges. 
201 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: State Court Organization, 1987-2004, at 3 
(2006), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE COURT 
JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 
 
 
 
THE YOUNG AMERICAN 
(popular schoolbook, 1844)202
 
 
Mary Roh now has a lawyer. She still has no lawsuit.  
What does Roh want from a lawsuit? She, like most litigants not bearing 
grudges, wants her money back. She cares all about result and not at all 
about process. The faster and cheaper she gets result she wants, the happier 
she will be.  
At her first meeting with her lawyer Harry Hahn, Roh asks: “when do 
we go to court?” Hahn answers: “Not so fast. The first thing that we have to 
consider is in which court we can bring a lawsuit. We need a court that has 
what lawyers call ‘jurisdiction.’ The court must have jurisdiction both over 
the subject matter of the lawsuit and over the parties. Lawyers call the first 
type ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ and the second type ‘personal jurisdiction.’  
                                                 
202 S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING 
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY. FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS 23 (4th ed., 1844). 
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If more than one court has both subject matter and personal, we will have to 
choose among them. In the United States, the American Hahn is likely to 
add, “I will look for the court that I think will get you the best result based 
on the law of the court and its personnel.” American lawyers call the practice 
of looking for the most favorable court “forum-shopping.” 
Roh does not care how Hahn answers these questions, so long as the 
court chosen gives her what she wants. To Roh jurisdiction is legal 
nitpicking. All she just wants to hear from Hahn is that there is a court that 
can give her the result she wants and is likely do so soon.  
While Roh understandably sees jurisdiction as mere detail—it has little 
to do with her claim of right—in all three of our systems it is an essential 
detail. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is not enforceable; it is no 
judgment at all.  
In this chapter we begin with a section that addresses jurisdiction 
generally. We continue with three national sections, each of which considers 
for the relevant system: the system’s courts, the system’s rules of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the system’s rules of personal jurisdiction and applicable 
law. The United States section includes an historical note on personal 
jurisdiction. Finally we conclude the chapter with a section on forum-
shopping.  
 
Jurisdiction 
 
The two types of jurisdiction we have just identified, personal 
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, are different. Subject matter 
jurisdiction is concerned with the relationship between the court and the 
subject matter of the controversy. Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the relationship between court and parties. We consider the 
two seriatim. Questions of jurisdiction should be easily and quickly 
answered. Answering them should not delay lawsuits materially. Answers in 
ordinary cases should be mere details that are answered quickly. The 
German and Korean systems achieve this goal; the American system does 
not. While concepts and goals of all three systems are similar, the German 
and Korean systems are efficient, while the American is not. Their efficiency 
promotes justice and fairness, while the American piles on costs.  
 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with which courts within a 
national court system is or are competent to decide particular cases. For 
examples, a criminal court is not competent to decide civil controversies; a 
small claims court is not competent to decide large claims. If subject matter 
jurisdiction is a complicated issue, it is because within a given national 
system, it has been poorly governed.  
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As we shall see, compared to the German system, the American and 
Korean legal systems make less use of courts of special competencies. We 
might expect that the more courts of special competency there are, the more 
complicated are issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Yet subject matter 
jurisdiction questions figure prominently in American civil justice, where 
there are few specialized courts, and rarely arise in Germany, where there are 
many.  
The reasons for this are three: (1) the German system offers litigants less 
choice. While different courts may have subject jurisdiction, plaintiffs rarely 
get to choose among them. (2) Where there is choice, as we discuss in the 
section on forum shopping, the choice makes little difference for the 
outcome. (3) Whatever questions may arise, are resolved quickly and 
conclusively at the outset of lawsuits.  
 
Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Personal jurisdiction is concerned with whether a court has authority 
over all parties to a lawsuit. As we discuss below in the Historical Note, 
originally personal jurisdiction was concerned with whether a court had 
physical power over all participants. Today authority suffices. 
German and Korean systems of civil justice resolve questions of 
personal jurisdiction using a handful of bright line rules most of which both 
systems share. The principal rule is that plaintiffs should sue defendants 
where defendants are at home. This is consistent with the underlying 
principle of civil procedure that plaintiffs have the burden of persuading 
courts to intervene in defendants’ lives. This principle that plaintiffs must 
sue where defendants are at home is modified in certain classes of cases 
where that is deemed to be unfair to plaintiffs. In these cases, plaintiffs may 
choose to sue where defendants are at home, i.e., the defendants’ court of 
general jurisdiction, or in some other jurisdiction which a statute deems fair. 
These latter courts have “special jurisdiction.” Three of the most common 
cases are: (1) when plaintiff accuses defendant of a civil wrong, plaintiff may 
sue in the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred; (2) when plaintiff is a 
consumer, plaintiff may sue in the jurisdiction the transaction took place; 
and, (3) when plaintiff dealt with defendant through a local branch of 
defendant, plaintiff may sue in the jurisdiction of the branch. In certain other 
classes of cases, based on the nature of the subject of the dispute, the law 
requires that plaintiffs sue in a particular court’s jurisdiction. For example 
the law may require that disputes over title to real estate be brought in the 
jurisdiction where the real estate is located.   
The American approach is different. It is not based on clear rules but on 
a more “textured” or “nuanced” test of fairness in individual cases. That is to 
say, the American approach eschews bright line tests and prefers to examine 
each case on its own to determine whether it should be heard in that court.  
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A. United States 
 
[J]urisdictional questions do not arise naturally and inevitably. 
Rather, they arise because one of the lawyers—typically the 
plaintiff’s lawyer—has brought the case to a certain court to 
obtain an advantage. 
 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Colin C. Tait,. William A. Fletcher & 
Stephen McG. Bundy  (2007)  
from their casebook’s teacher’s manual203
 
 
1. American Courts 
 
There is no one American system of courts. There are fifty-one 
American court systems: one federal system and one state system for each 
state. Each of these systems is separate one from the other: each has its own 
rules of jurisdiction; each has its own rules of civil procedure; and each has 
its own substantive laws, i.e., the laws that determine the parties’ rights.  
The fifty-one different systems of courts, while different in detail, are 
mostly similar in outline. Most have multi-tiered systems of courts of general 
jurisdiction. Typically they consist of: 
 
(1) “courts of limited jurisdiction,” i.e., entry level courts for specific—
usually smaller—cases; 
(2) “courts of general jurisdiction,” i.e., entry level courts for legal 
disputes generally; 
(3) “intermediate appellate courts,” i.e., courts that review decisions of 
entry level courts; and 
(4) “courts of last resort,” i.e., courts having final appellate jurisdiction 
to maintain integrity of law.  
 
Roh’s lawyer Hahn will consider only (1) courts of limited jurisdiction and 
(2) courts of general jurisdiction, since only these courts are “courts of first 
instance,” i.e., courts where lawsuits can be begun. Courts of limited 
jurisdiction (1) have specifically-assigned areas of competence and are 
commonly limited to cases where amounts in dispute are below fixed levels; 
courts of general jurisdiction (2) have responsibility for everything else. 
Appellate courts review decisions of other courts and do not act as entry 
level courts. One difference among American states is that some of the 
smaller states by population do not have an intermediate appellate court. 
 
State Courts 
                                                 
203 TEACHER’S MANUAL, CASES AND MATERIALS PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND 
FEDERAL 12 (9th ed. 2007) (quoted with permission).  
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American state systems vary in detail, but all have a similar structure of 
courts. In the Maryland system, for example, there are twenty-four District 
Courts of limited jurisdiction and twenty-four Circuit Courts of general 
jurisdiction. The District Courts handle small civil claims (below $5000 in 
controversy) as well as certain other mostly minor matters; the Circuit 
Courts handle larger matters, as well as all matters not handled by the 
District Courts or by other special courts. In other states, there are similar 
courts with similar functions, although they may have different names and 
different jurisdictional amounts. In Maryland courts of first instance are 
subject to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals, an 
intermediate appellate court, and to that of the Court of Appeals, Maryland’s 
court of last resort. In most states the courts of last resort are termed 
“supreme courts.”  
 
Federal Courts 
 
Existing alongside the state courts in every state is a parallel system of 
federal courts. Federal courts in the United States are courts of limited 
jurisdiction; they are competent to decide only certain types of cases 
specifically assigned them. The cases are an eclectic mix of about three 
dozen matters most of which have some connection to the federal system.204 
Exceptionally federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases 
unrelated to the federal system that are based on state law but which involve 
parties from different states, provided that the matter in controversy exceeds 
$75,000.205
In Maryland the federal court of first instance is the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland, which is located in Baltimore and 
in Greenbelt, Maryland; it is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which is in Richmond 
in the adjacent state of Virginia, and to the final appellate jurisdiction of the 
United States Supreme Court in the District of Columbia, coincidentally and 
conveniently located between Maryland and Virginia.  
 
Plaintiffs are not required to bring diversity cases in federal court and 
most do not. When plaintiffs could sue in federal court but do not, 
defendants may have the case transferred to federal court (“removal”).206 
Ordinarily, once a party properly brings a case into federal court, that court 
is required to decide the case and cannot transfer it to a state court. The court 
can, however, transfer the case to another federal court.207
                                                 
204 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1389 (listing bases of federal jurisdiction). 
 Exceptionally it 
205 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“diversity jurisdiction”). 
206 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 
207 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 
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may, under the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismiss the 
case to permit parties to bring it in a different court.208
 
  
Federal Courts & Federalism 
 
Many Americans assume that existence of parallel state and federal 
court systems is a necessary feature of federalism, but as German readers 
know, it is not. Germany is a federal state, but there state courts carry out 
federal law. German federal courts are, with one minor exception, not courts 
of first instance, but appellate courts that oversee decisions of state courts in 
applying federal law.  
The United States Constitution mandates “one Supreme Court;” it 
allows, but does not require “such inferior courts as Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.” Section 1, Art. III. When in 1789 Congress 
chose to create inferior federal courts, consistent with the Constitution, it 
could just as well have chosen not to; it could have relied on state courts to 
apply federal law. That possibility was discussed in the course of ratification 
of the Constitution. Federalists created lower federal courts because they 
feared that state courts might not carry out federal law.  
 
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
In the United States, since most courts are not specialized, questions of 
subject-matter jurisdiction are uncommon. They arise most frequently in 
connection with whether federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over 
disputes between parties from different states, i.e., under diversity 
jurisdiction 
 
Diversity Jurisdiction  
 
The First Congress, in creating separate federal courts, bestowed on 
those courts diversity jurisdiction. The rationale was that state courts might 
not be “wholly without state prejudice, or state feelings” in deciding matters 
concerning parties from other states. Even in those early years, however, that 
fear was seen to be overstated.209 It was, as Professor Carrington notes, a 
product of eighteenth century compromise that “no sensible person” with a 
choice would design.210
                                                 
208 See Elizabeth Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on 
the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IA. L. REV. 1147 (2006). 
 
209 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1684, at 
561-562, 368 (1833). 
210 Paul D. Carrington, Moths to the Light: The Dubious Attractions of American Law, 46 
KANSAS L . REV. 673, 674 (1998), also in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD GROßFELD ZUM 65. 
GEBURTSTAG 129, (Ulrich Hübner & Werner Ebke, eds. 1999). 
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Today, diversity jurisdiction has few friends, but the friends that it does 
have are powerful. The original and only rationale for existence—the idea 
that state courts are or might appear to be biased against parties from out-of-
state—is not seriously maintained. In-state parties are as likely to use 
diversity jurisdiction as are the out-of-state parties that diversity jurisdiction 
supposedly protects. Despite repeated calls to eliminate it, diversity 
jurisdiction survives, it is predicted to survive well into the future because 
the organized bar supports it.211
In its present form diversity jurisdiction requires that plaintiffs show two 
elements to establish jurisdiction: (1) complete diversity of citizenship 
between all plaintiffs and all defendants; and (2) that the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000.  
  
Diversity of Citizenship. Plaintiffs must establish complete diversity of 
citizenship, that is, that no plaintiff shares the same citizenship with any 
defendant. Often determining citizenship for diversity purposes of a 
particular party can be problematic. The United States has no civil 
registration requirement for individuals and no commercial register for 
corporations, so there is no convenient way to establish state citizenship.  
Jurisdictional Amount. To spare federal courts the burden of handling 
small cases, today, as always, diversity cases must meet high minimums. 
Today a diversity case must claim more than $75,000 in damages. The 
minimum requirement is an incentive for plaintiffs to inflate and even to 
create damage claims. An easy way to meet the threshold is to include a 
claim that is not easily measured, e.g., for emotional damage, for pain and 
suffering or for punitive damages. As we saw in Chapter 3, there is little risk 
to asserting higher claims, since losing parties do not indemnify winning 
parties for legal fees. Federal courts take a tolerant view of claims made to 
establish diversity jurisdiction. They reject claims based on insufficient 
amounts only if they conclude “to a legal certainty” that recovery of the 
jurisdictional amount is not possible.  
 
3. Personal Jurisdiction 
  
American law provides a variety of bases for personal jurisdiction. 
Some, such as domicile, i.e., the place where a defendant has his or her 
home, are familiar to non-Americans. Others, such as serving papers on a 
person while in the state (“personal service,” colloquially called “tag 
jurisdiction,” after the children’s game, or “catching jurisdiction”), seem 
exorbitant to non-Americans. Later in our discussion of Roh v. Doh we 
discuss some of these other bases of jurisdiction. 
One form of jurisdiction that is ubiquitous in American proceedings and 
yet in other countries is considered exorbitant is “minimum contacts” 
                                                 
211 STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE 
IN CONTEXT 89-90 (2006). 
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jurisdiction. In the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945)212
What makes the minimum contacts test complicated and time-
consuming for Americans and exorbitant for non-Americans is that it is 
applied on a case-by-case basis. The decision in International Shoe could 
have been the basis for simplification of American law of personal 
jurisdiction. It could have been the basis of national rules authorizing 
particular special bases of jurisdiction as known in Germany and Korea, e.g., 
jurisdictions where a civil wrong occurred, where a consumer bought a 
product or where a defendant maintained an office. It did not turn out that 
way. 
 
the United States Supreme Court held that American courts may decide 
cases concerning defendants over whom they do not have physical power, 
provided that “certain minimum contacts” exist with the state of the original 
court “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  
Congress did not legislate national rules; it allowed the individual states 
to write their own rules. Legislate the states have done, but not in 
coordination with one another. Instead of one uniform national rule, the 
states have created fifty non-uniform state rules. While some of these rules 
created special bases of jurisdiction, almost all have general clauses that 
operate on a case-by-case basis to extend the state’s jurisdiction to the 
uncertain constitutional limit.  
State jurisdiction statutes take three principal forms: (1) statutes that 
assert jurisdiction only in cases of certain enumerated situations; (3) statutes 
that assert jurisdiction in cases of certain enumerated acts and in other cases 
to the limits of due process; and (3) statutes that assert jurisdiction to the 
“limits of due process” without enumeration of any specific cases. These 
statutes vary materially one from another.213
This multiplicity of vague and competing state statutes means that there 
is no authoritative statutory solution. There is only the amorphous Supreme 
Court minimum contacts standard that is applied ad hoc in individual cases. 
It takes a charitable German observer to credit the argument that “[t]his 
enables the judge to focus on achieving justice in individual cases even if it 
hampers predictability for the parties.”
  
214 A more perspicacious German 
observer is not misled: “[J]urisdiction needs certainty and predictability. The 
minimum contacts test as presently applied does not meet this goal. Courts in 
their exaggerated concern for justice in individual cases drown themselves 
and the legal profession in an ever swelling flood of case-by-case 
adjudication.”215
                                                 
212 326 U.S. 310, 316. 
 A critical American professor puts it plainly: the reality is 
213 See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended To The 
Limits Of Due Process,  84 B.U.L. REV. 491 (2004) (inventory of the different types). 
214 Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1008 (2006). 
215 HAIMO SCHACK, JURISDICTIONAL MINIMUM CONTACTS SCRUTINIZED 1 (1983). 
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an American test that “really makes first-year law students crazy.”216
How did the American system get to this point? 
 We 
may add that it impoverishes litigants. It can make personal jurisdiction a 
complicated issue even in minor cases, and the most significant issue in 
high-stakes cases. It benefits lawyers, who can keep cases to themselves 
rather than refer those cases to colleagues in distant cities.  
 
4. Historical Note: Jurisdiction from Power to Authority 
 
In the past personal jurisdiction was an issue of power over all parties to 
a lawsuit; today, in civil matters, it is an issue of authority.217
In ordinary lawsuits, personal jurisdiction is not an issue. Neighbor sues 
neighbor. Together they go to their local court. The neighbors are from the 
same place. The court has power (and authority) over both of them. Both 
must do as the court directs.  
  
Personal jurisdiction becomes an issue when a party comes from outside 
the court’s jurisdiction. When parties come from different jurisdictions, it 
may be that no one court has power over both of them. That used to be a big 
problem; today usually it is not.  
 
Personal Jurisdiction in the Past—A Matter of Power 
 
In the eighteenth century a court had to have physical power over all 
parties to a lawsuit because, without that power, it could not enforce its 
judgments. Parties not subject to its power could ignore the court with 
impunity. Hence English common law courts did not entertain lawsuits until 
plaintiff could demonstrate power over defendant. Well into the nineteenth 
century American courts sought to obtain physical power over distant 
defendants either directly, through physically arresting them while within the 
court’s jurisdiction, or indirectly, through taking control of their property. 
Another way to deal with distant defendants is to require plaintiffs to go 
to courts where defendants are at home. Those distant courts ipso facto have 
power, and therefore personal jurisdiction, over defendants living within 
their jurisdiction; they gain power over plaintiffs when plaintiffs subject 
themselves to the courts’ personal jurisdiction by suing there. But it is not 
always fair to require plaintiffs to litigate in courts at defendants’ homes. 
Today, one might chose not to require impecunious consumers to sue 
mammoth corporations doing business worldwide in the courts of the 
corporations’ home offices. 
 
                                                 
216 JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN LAW 96 
(2005). 
217 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and 
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1981). 
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Personal Jurisdiction in the Present—A Matter of Authority 
 
A court that decides a lawsuit need not have power over a party if some 
court somewhere has such power and that court will enforce the former 
court’s judgment. In such cases the latter court “recognizes” and “enforces” 
the judgment of the former. There are three principal ways that this happens: 
(1) pursuant to federal law, courts in one state of a federal entity are required 
to recognize and enforce judgments of courts of other states; (2) pursuant to 
international treaty one country commits to another country that its courts 
will recognize and enforce judgments of courts of the other provided that 
those judgments satisfy specific criteria; and, (3)  unilaterally courts in one 
state recognize and enforce decisions of courts of other states out of respect 
for those courts and their processes (international “comity”).  
All three of these approaches assume that the courts that recognize and 
enforce judgments of other states’ courts are prepared to assume that the 
original judgments are legally correct and that those judgments were reached 
by fair process.  
(1) Federal law. In both respects, of these three approaches, least 
problematic are judgments of other courts within federal entities. Then the 
quality of the original judgments, both substantively and procedurally, is 
better known and presumed of equal quality; federal law can establish 
specific criteria that qualify judgments for recognition and enforcement.  
(2) International treaty. More problematic are judgments recognized 
and enforced pursuant to international treaty. Then the quality of original 
judgments and of their process are less well-known, even at the time of 
treaty adoption, and cannot be easily changed after treaty adoption. Treaties 
can set specific criteria that qualify judgments for recognition and 
enforcement.  
(3) International comity. Most problematic is unilateral recognition 
and enforcement pursuant to comity. Then the original court must assume 
that a later court will grant comity; the later court has to make ad hoc 
judgments about the substantive and procedural qualities of the first court 
and may have no statutory guidelines to direct it when to do that. 
 
Statutory Simplicity—German and Korean Solutions in Interstate Cases 
 
In the nineteenth century commerce increased greatly. More and more 
people interacted with people from distant places. More contacts meant more 
disputes among people from different jurisdictions. More interstate disputes 
meant more disputes where no local court had jurisdiction over all parties. 
Requiring all plaintiffs all of the time to pursue defendants in their home 
states became unacceptable.  
In federal states, such as Germany and the United States, the issue of 
jurisdiction was felt more acutely than in unitary states. A major purpose of 
federation in both Germany and the United States was to increase commerce 
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among constituent states. In both Germany and in the United States, personal 
jurisdiction was subject of decisive action in the 1870s. 
Action came a little earlier in Germany; it was simple, and resolved the 
issue to this day. German unification in one federal state occurred in 1871. In 
1874 the federal constitution was amended to give the federal legislature 
authority to adopt a national Code of Civil Procedure. Such a code was 
adopted and became effective January 10, 1877. As we discuss in the section 
on Germany, the German solution sets clear criteria for when courts have 
personal jurisdiction, provides that such judgments are enforceable in all 
states of the federation, and provides for expeditious and inexpensive 
resolution of any jurisdiction questions that do arise. German courts spend 
little time or energy on issues of jurisdiction. 
The German statutory solution of 1877 is a time-tested success. Without 
fundamental changes it prevails in Germany today, where it justly, fairly and 
quickly determines personal jurisdiction issues. The Korean solution is 
essentially similar. So, too, is the rule for personal jurisdiction in the twenty-
seven member states of the European Union.218
   
  
Case Law Complexity—American Indeterminacy 
 
Supreme Court precedent and Congressional inaction are principally 
productive of perplexity. In Pennoyer v. Neff,219 decided just one year after 
the successful statutory solution of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
went into force, the Court held that courts in one state of the United States 
are powerless to decide cases governing litigants outside their states unless 
they have acquired power over the out-of-state parties or their property.220
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution was in 1789 a 
prescient provision for integrating a nation that was only then coming into 
being. Justice Robert H. Jackson said that it is the “foundation of any hope 
for a truly national system of justice.”
 
The Court rejected arguments that the “Full Faith and Credit” clause of 
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution always required recognition 
and enforcement by one state court of judgments of another state’s courts. 
221
                                                 
218 See Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (“The Brussels 
Regulation”). 
 It requires “Full faith and credit 
219 95 U.S. 711 (1878). 
220 95 U.S. at 720. 
221 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COL. 
L. REV. 1, 34 (1945), reprinted in 1 THE BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO MEMORIAL LECTURES, 
DELIVERED BEFORE THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1941-1970, 
125,169 (1970). Jackson despaired: “nowhere else in the modern world is judicial authority so 
dispersed among disjointed and insular units, nowhere else is the choice of trial so much 
regulated as a by-product of territorial limits on jurisdiction, an nowhere else does litigation 
present such a multitude and complexity of controversies over conflict of laws.” Id. at 23, 
reprint at 155. See also Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for 
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shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of every other State.” It authorizes Congress to make general 
laws “to prescribe ... the effects thereof.” It allows Congress to allocate 
jurisdiction in interstate cases through general venue rules much as Germany 
and Korea do. It provides, according to Justice Jackson, “legislative power 
better to integrate our legal systems.”222
While the Constitutional Convention of 1787 seems to have expected 
that Congress would flesh out details of this clause,
 
223 and while judges in 
the early Republic awaited such instruction,224 other than prescribing rules 
for proving judicial proceedings from other states, Congress has never 
adopted a general law prescribing prerequisites and effects for Full-Faith-
and-Credit treatment of jurisdiction. Why not? Justice Jackson answered: 
“we are so accustomed to the delays, expense, and frustrations of our system 
that it seldom occurs to us to inquire whether these are wise or 
constitutionally necessary.” Relevant to this book, he continued, “[p]erhaps 
the best perspective for judging whether our society is being well served ... is 
by the comparative study of the methods and degree of integration employed 
by other peoples ....”225 Since Justice Jackson spoke in 1944, the European 
Union has come into being and has integrated twenty-seven separate legal 
systems that are more disparate in language and in culture than are 
America’s fifty state systems.226
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v. Neff did not slow creation 
of a national market. Requiring courts to obtain physical power over all 
parties soon proved inconvenient in a world where interactions among 
people in different jurisdictions occurred with ever greater frequency and 
complexity. Through legal fictions lawyers sought to avoid the effect of 
 
                                                                                                        
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991). See also Walter Wheeler Cook, The 
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919) (noting 
the success of another federal common law country, Australia, with an act based on a similar 
clause and proposing such an act for the United States). The issue of same sex marriages has 
created new interest in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS &  
WILLIAM RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2005); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early 
Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201 (2009). That interest has not, however, spilled over to efforts to 
integrate American courts. 
222 Id. at 21, reprint at 151. 
223 See James D. Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause—Its History and Purpose, 34 
OR. L. REV. 224 (1954). 
224 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1367, 
at 181-182 n.1 (1833). 
225 Jackson, supra note 221, at 18, reprint at 147-148. 
226 See Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December on jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, Official Journal No. L 012, 16/01/2001 at 1-23; 
BRUSSELS I REGULATION (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski, eds. 2007); Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I), OFFICIAL JOURNAL L 177, 04.7.2008, at 6-16; ROME I 
REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPE (Franco 
Ferrari & Stefan Leible, eds., 2009). 
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Pennoyer v. Neff. By 1945 the Supreme Court stepped back from it. As we 
have seen, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,227 the Supreme Court 
held that American courts may decide cases concerning defendants over 
whom they do not have physical power, provided that “certain minimum 
contacts” exist. The United States has not yet, however, sought to move from 
state jurisdiction to interstate venue.228
 
 
5. Applicable Law in American Courts 
 
Applicable law refers to the jurisdiction whose laws govern a case (e.g., 
Korean law), as well as to the particular laws of that jurisdiction that govern 
(e.g., Civil Code). While a court must always decide which country’s laws to 
apply, usually it does so without thinking; it applies its own laws. Where a 
case has connections to more than one country, a court may consider and 
decide to apply the law of country different than its own. It might do that to 
protect the parties’ expectations where that other country has a closer 
connection to the case. The process of deciding which country’s law governs 
is called “choice of law;” the body of law that governs that choice of law is 
called the “law of conflicts of law” (or in some countries “private 
international law.”)  
Since our case touches only one country, it concerns the laws of only 
one country. In Korea and in Germany, choice of law is not an issue, because 
in both countries, no choice of law is needed. Korea is a unitary, i.e., not 
federal state, and hence it has only one set of laws. While Germany is a 
federal and not a unitary state, and has separate state laws, most private law 
matters are governed by nationally applicable federal law, most commonly, 
the Civil Code. 
In the United States, on the other hand, applicable law is an issue in 
domestic cases that touch more than one state. Each state has its own 
substantive law and that law, rather than a national code, usually applies. 
Those different state laws mean courts frequently decide which state’s law 
applies. To help courts decide which state’s law applies, each state has its 
own (and different) law of conflicts of law. 
So far we have just been speaking of a choice of substantive law. If a 
plaintiff sues under diversity jurisdiction in federal court, however, choice of 
law gets more (!) complicated. In federal court in diversity cases, while 
federal law of civil procedure applies, state substantive law governs. It is not, 
however, always clear when a rule should be regarded as a procedural law 
and when as a substantive one. The federal courts led by the Supreme Court 
have developed a complicated jurisprudence stating when a rule is 
considered substantive and then must be the state rule.  
                                                 
227 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
228 Albert A. Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. REV. 103 
(1971). 
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6. Forum Shopping 
 
Forum shopping refers to parties choosing the court in which to bring a 
lawsuit from among more than one possible court. Forum shopping is routine 
in international litigation, but except in the United States, it is uncommon in 
domestic litigation. Forum shopping has a pejorative connotation, since its 
aim is to gain an advantage in process. Outside the United States, although 
not unknown (choice is explicitly recognized as the plaintiff’s prerogative in 
§ 35 ZPO), it is offensive to some. 
Forum shopping is seen negatively because it accents the contest aspect 
of civil procedure. Through choice of forum, one seeks a location that is 
convenient for the plaintiff, inconvenient for the defendant, procedural rules 
that favor the plaintiff, or a court that is likely to be more favorably disposed 
toward the plaintiff. The sporting analogy is apt: the plaintiff aspires to a 
“home-court” advantage. 
Laymen think that law is simply “there;” when one has a dispute, one 
turns to the neighborhood court. Law is, or at least should be, a matter of 
one’s right and not of one’s power. Civil procedure is, or should be, the 
process by which that right is determined. If these lay propositions are true, 
then forum selection should not be outcome determinative. Right is right. At 
most, choice of forum should concern convenience, but not determine 
outcome. German and Korean lawyers share this view. American lawyers do 
not. American trial lawyers in particular see choice of forum as one of the 
most significant factors in a case’s outcome; some say it is the most 
significant factor.229
That American lawyers are more oriented toward forum shopping than 
are their German and Korean counterparts is attributable more to practical 
than to philosophical differences. There are in the United States more 
reasons to engage in forum shopping, just as there are in Germany and Korea 
fewer opportunities to do so. The primary reason to forum shop is to get a 
better result; convenience is only a distant secondary reason. It is said one 
cares more whether one is hanged than where. Both reasons make forum-
shopping more attractive in the United States than in either Germany or 
Korea. 
  
 
Outcome Determinative 
 
There are three principal areas in which a choice of forum can advantage 
one party or disadvantage the other and thereby lead to am outcome the 
chooser prefers: (1) substantive law; (2) procedural law; and (3) personnel 
                                                 
229 CHARLES H. ROSE & JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, FUNDAMENTAL PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE LITIGATION 110 (2008) (quoting Professor Louis Muldrow at 
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and institutional conditions (e.g., faster, better). Of these three, only the last 
is a real consideration in most civil cases in Germany and Korea, but all 
three are important in American cases.  
More favorable substantive law. We have seen that in nearly all cases 
in Korea and in most cases in Germany, the substantive law applied is the 
same regardless of forum. In the United States substantive law varies from 
state-to-state. Moreover, since substantive law is often uncertain, it can vary 
from judge to judge.  
More favorable procedural law. We have also seen that all civil cases 
in Germany and Korea are subject to only one code of civil procedure. In the 
United States, on they other hand, procedure varies significantly from state-
to-state and from state to federal. While similarities in general are great, 
litigation is concerned with differences in particular, which in particular 
cases may be outcome determinative.  
More favorable personnel—Judges and Courts. Not all courts have 
personnel of the same quality. Not all courts are at the same level of efficacy. 
To get a better court or a court that decides faster, a plaintiff may choose one 
court over another. These variations are found everywhere, but are perceived 
to be of greater importance in the United States than in either Germany or 
Korea. 
Juries. Juries in one jurisdiction may be more generous than in another. 
Because federal courts draw their juries from larger geographic areas than do 
state courts, one side might prefer a more narrowly or a more broadly drawn 
jury. Since American communities are often de facto ethnically or 
economically segregated, a narrower or a broader source of jurors may be 
thought beneficial. While quality control of juries is more difficult than 
quality control of judges, here too institution of uniform standards for jurors 
and for their work could reduce the importance of forum selection. 
 
Whose convenience  
 
Party and witness convenience. Party convenience once was a 
motivating factor for forum shopping. Thanks to development of modern 
means of transportation and communication, beginning with the railroad and 
the telegraph and continuing to commercial air service and internet texting 
and conferencing—convenience has lost much importance. Insofar as 
differences remain, however, they are greater in the United States, where 
distances are much larger than either Germany or Korea. 
Lawyer convenience. This too has lost importance in a day of easy 
travel and free permission to act in other courts. Today lawyer convenience 
is most important in the comfort lawyers get from dealing repeatedly with 
the same courts, the same rules and the same judges.  
 
Opportunities to forum shop 
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In Germany and Korea there are relatively few courts to choose from. 
There are no parallel systems of courts. The principal choice is between 
defendant’s general Gerichtsstand or 보통재판적, usually defendant’s place 
of residence, and a special Gerichtsstand 특별재판적, such as the place of 
contract fulfillment or the place of a wrong. 
 
Diversity Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping:  
What the American Bar Likes About Diversity Jurisdiction  
 
Procedural options. The plaintiff’s bar, i.e., lawyers who represent 
individual plaintiffs in contingent fee personal injury and similar cases, like 
the options in procedural law that a choice of courts offers. One 
practitioner’s checklist identifies ten different procedural differences a 
litigator should consider. These range from the time generally spent in 
depositions to the location of the courthouses. 
Among options that the defense bar likes is ability to undercut the 
plaintiff’s attempts to get a favorable jury. State courts, because they serve 
small parts of states, draw jurors from smaller geographic areas. These may 
be areas that are homogenous economically and ethnically. By shifting a 
case to federal court, which has a larger geographic area, a defendant 
changes the make up of the potential jury.  
Familiarity. Litigators with big firms have cases that may be all over 
the country. They have a handful of large cases rather than a mountain of 
small ones. do not have many cases. For them, federal courts offer 
familiarity with rules and with judges. Rules are the same the nation over 
and judges are few in number in the local court.   
Better courts. The most frequently-voiced ground for preferring federal 
courts to state courts is a perception that federal courts are better. This 
perception is near universal, although it should be made on a state-by-state 
basis. Federal judges generally have more prestige than do state court judges. 
Their tenure is more secure. They are thought less subject to political 
pressure. They generally have lower volume caseloads. And they have more 
support staff than do state court judges.230
 
  
7. Jurisdiction in Roh v. Doh 
 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
In our case Roh filed suit in federal court. Why? We confess: because 
that is the only way that we can describe a procedural system applicable 
throughout the United States. Roh might have been better served to have 
filed in state court. 
                                                 
230 See Victor R. Flango, Litigant Choices Between State and Federal Courts, 46 S. CAR. L. 
REV. 961, 974 (1995). 
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In this case, there is no issue regarding diversity of citizenship. Roh is a 
Virginia citizen; all of the potential defendants, i.e., John Doh, Jr., John Doh, Sr., 
and DohSon Honda, LL.C., are Maryland citizens. That means that there will be 
complete diversity of citizenship. 
There is, however, a possible issue regarding the amount in controversy 
that the lawyer for John Doh, Jr. might raise and even more likely, that a 
lawyer for DohSon Honda, LLC, if made a defendant would raise. To 
qualify for diversity jurisdiction in federal court, Roh’s claim must exceed 
$75,000. It is, however, on its face exactly $75,000, i.e., one cent too low. If 
Roh’s claim is for a loan, then that claim is probably permissible, since the 
loan arguably assumed an interest payment or, in any case, John Doh, Jr.’s 
failure to repay it timely created incidental or consequential damages that 
would take the case over the jurisdictional minimum. But if Roh’s claim is 
only for unjust enrichment, which probably is the case in an action against 
DohSon Honda LLC, then it is does not exceed the magic amount. DohSon 
Honda LLC then might move to dismiss the case against it for failure to 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount.231
  
  
Personal Jurisdiction  
 
Since no national law determines personal jurisdiction, whether personal 
jurisdiction exists is a matter of the law of each separate state. As we have 
seen, there is national constitutional law that sets limits to the state exercise 
of personal jurisdiction but does not determine by class when it does. 
Four different systems of American courts potentially have personal 
jurisdiction over Doh and DohSon Honda LLC: the federal, that of the State 
of Maryland, that of the Commonwealth of Virginia and that of the federal 
District of Columbia. Since the federal system adopts the jurisdictional rules 
of the district court of the state in which the federal court sits, Hahn has to 
consult “only” three sets of personal jurisdiction rules: those of Maryland, 
Virginia and the District of Columbia and no additional federal rules. 
While the jurisdictional rules of Maryland, Virginia and the District of 
Columbia are substantially similar in general terms, the differ materially in 
what can be critical details. All three have variations of the same three basic 
approaches to personal jurisdiction: domicile, “tag” (or “catching”) and 
“long-arm” (or “minimum contacts”). 
Domicile. Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia assert 
personal jurisdiction over defendants “domiciled” in their respective 
territories. While domicile has a technical legal definition, for purposes of 
the book, it is sufficient to regard it as meaning the place of a natural 
                                                 
231 See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, The Amount In Controversy: Understanding The Rules Of 
Aggregation, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 925 (1994). 
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person’s habitual residence and the place where a legal entity is organized as 
a legal entity. 
Based on domicile, Maryland has jurisdiction over all of the three 
possible Doh defendants: John Doh, Jr., and John Doh, Sr. both live there; 
DohSon Honda LLC is incorporated there. Virginia has jurisdiction based on 
domicile over Roh. The District of Columbia has no jurisdiction based on 
domicile over any party. 
 “Tag” or “Catching” Jurisdiction. Maryland, Virginia and the 
District of Columbia all permit their courts to assert jurisdiction over persons 
found within their territory, if they are personally given (“served”) the 
summons and complaint in a lawsuit. It is a relic of the power orientation of 
personal jurisdiction.  
Catching does not meet the minimum contracts requirement of the 
International Shoe case, yet the Supreme Court in more recent case upheld it 
as basis for personal jurisdiction, even when the party served was only 
temporarily in the state on grounds unrelated to the lawsuit. The Court 
upheld catching for no better reason than that the United States has always 
done it that way: “… it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system 
….”232
Since the Doh parties are all domiciled in Maryland, there is no need to 
tag them there. Tagging them in Virginia or the District of Columbia is 
possible. Were that desired, Roh’s lawyer Hahn could employ a private 
investigator to follow them around and tag any of them the moment they step 
into the desired jurisdiction. As bizarre as it may seem, American plaintiffs 
have tagged defendants as they fly in planes over the desired jurisdictions.  
 {This is a reminder that the American legal system is built more on 
history than on system.}  
Minimum Contacts Jurisdiction. Hahn will consider whether there 
may be personal jurisdiction in either the District of Columbia or Virginia 
under minimum contacts jurisdiction. In Roh’s case, arguably the event that 
gave rise to the cause of action was the meeting in the District of Columbia 
that led to the transfer of the money. That act could satisfy the jurisdictional 
prerequisite of District of Columbia Code § 13-423(a)(1) for a claim to relief 
arising out of “transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” This 
provision raises questions, however. With respect to a suit against Doh for 
breach of contract, the claim probably arises out of transacting business in 
the District. But what if the claim is for unjust enrichment? If Roh is seeking 
return of a gift, is that sufficient to constitute “transacting” business? On the 
other hand, if obtaining of the gift were characterized as fraud, then it might 
come under (3) as a claim for relief arising from the person’s “causing 
tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the 
District of Columbia.” But is that true? While the causal act took place in the 
District of Columbia, where did the tortious injury occur?  
                                                 
232 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 645 (1990). 
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But wait. There are other issues with the District of Columbia’s 
minimum contact law. Hahn might like to include DohSon Honda, LL.C., as 
defendant. In that case, if Roh sues in the District, she will need to show that 
Doh acted as agent of DohSon Honda, LLC. 
The courts of Virginia are another possible place to bring suit. There, 
however, the only contact to the state is Roh’s domicile. However, that 
conceivably could provide the basis for jurisdiction. Virginia Code § 901.-
328.1(A)(1) allows for jurisdiction over a non-resident who transacts 
business in the state. Obligating oneself to repay a loan to someone residing 
in the state might constitute “transacting business.” Alternately, if a fraud 
claim is viable, then possibly Roh could assert jurisdiction based on 
subsection (4): “Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or 
omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits 
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in 
this Commonwealth.” This provision might also support jurisdiction over 
DohSon Honda LLC, since it sells many automobiles to Virginia residents, 
but is of less certain applicability to Doh himself.  
 
B. Germany 
 
Disputes about jurisdiction should delay the consideration 
and decision of lawsuits as little as possible. 
 
Professor Dr. jur. Kurt Kuchinke (1969)233
 
 
1. German Courts 
 
Germany has five separate systems of courts: the courts of general 
jurisdiction and the administrative, labor, social, and tax courts. As we shall 
see, conflicts among the five court systems are not common; choices for 
litigants to make among them are few, are easily made, and are ratified or 
rejected expeditiously without great expense or severe adverse 
consequences. 
Although Germany is a federal state, its federal courts do not parallel 
state courts. Federal courts are (with exception of a Patent Court), appellate 
courts that oversee separate systems of state courts. So there is a Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof responsible for civil and criminal justice) 
a Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), a Federal Labor 
Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), a Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) 
and a Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof). Unlike the United States 
Supreme Court, the German Supreme Court is not responsible for issues of 
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constitutional law. Instead, there is a Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).  
Each of the sixteen German states has its own court system. Although 
each state is responsible for administration of its own courts, state courts are 
all built on the same model provided by federal statute (the 
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz). The court of first instance in civil matters of 
general jurisdiction is the Landgericht (state district court; plural 
Landgerichte). Inferior to the Landgerichte is a court of first instance of 
limited jurisdiction, the Amtsgericht (county court; plural, Amtsgerichte). 
The Amtsgerichte are competent for family law matters and for civil matters 
where the amount in controversy is less than €5,000. From an Amtsgericht, 
except in family law matters and in certain international cases, an appeal is 
taken to the competent Landgericht. For a matter begun in a Landgericht, 
appeal is taken to the competent Oberlandesgericht (state appellate court; 
plural Oberlandesgerichte). Because some states have more than one such 
appellate court, there are in all twenty-four Oberlandesgerichte. For most 
cases, the Landgerichte (for appeals from the Amtsgerichte) and the 
Oberlandesgerichte (for appeals from the Landegerichte) are the courts of 
last resort. Further appeal is to the Federal Supreme Court, mostly, as in the 
United States, in the discretion of that court upon determination that a case 
raises new questions of law or if there is a divergence of authority in the 
lower appellate courts. 
Characteristic of German courts generally is specialization of judges by 
subject matter. The Federal Supreme Court itself has more than one hundred 
judges. It usually sits in panels of five. Each panel is assigned specific areas 
of law for internal competence.  
 
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
German law distinguishes two types of subject matter jurisdiction: 
between German court systems (Rechtswegzuständigkeit) and within court 
systems (sachliche Zuständigkeit). Here we refer to the former as inter-court 
system subject matter jurisdiction and to the latter as intra-court system 
subject matter jurisdiction. Inter-court system issues in the German judicial 
system are not between court systems of different countries or states, but 
between different court systems within the same state. Each state has 
ordinary, administrative, finance, social and labor courts, from which final 
appeals lie to corresponding federal courts in matters applying federal law.  
Although the German system provides five systems of courts (seven if 
one adds the Federal Patent Court and the Federal and State Constitutional 
Courts), these neither compete with one another nor do they share 
jurisdiction. Which system is competent depends on the “nature of the 
disputed claim, i.e., legal relationship” as defined by statute. Section 13 of 
the Court Organization Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG) assigns to the 
ordinary courts all criminal cases and most private law disputes, with the 
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principal exceptions of employment-related disputes and social law, i.e., 
pension and medical insurance, disputes, which it assigns to labor courts and 
to social Courts. It assigns public law disputes either to those two courts in 
their fields, or to administrative or tax courts. In addition, the Federal Patent 
Court, the Federal Constitutional Court and the state constitutional courts 
have special competencies. Despite the cornucopia of courts, inter-system 
subject matter jurisdiction issues in ordinary civil disputes are not common. 
When they occur they are usually between civil courts and either 
administrative or labor courts. 
In any case, choice of the wrong court system has minimal adverse 
consequences. The judge on the judge’s own motion, after giving parties 
opportunity to take a position, but without necessarily holding a hearing, is 
to decide whether plaintiff has brought suit in the correct court. If the judge 
finds that the court is without jurisdiction, the judge is to transfer the case to 
the correct system. The decision to transfer is binding on the transferee court. 
In either case, the transferor court’s decision binds all other courts once it is 
final. Before it is final, parties may take an interlocutory appeal 
(Beschwerde).234
Intra-court system subject matter jurisdiction is likewise no big deal. In 
the civil courts, the Landgericht has general subject matter jurisdiction. The 
other possible courts of first instance are only the Amtsgerichte, which have 
jurisdiction over landlord tenant and family law matters without regard to the 
amount in controversy.  
 The only adverse consequence for plaintiffs who chooses 
the wrong court is imposition of modest costs of transfer. The case continues 
in the transferee court as if it had been begun there. For statute of limitations 
purposes, commencement of the suit is dated from the original filing.  
  
3. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Personal jurisdiction is straight-forward in Germany. Although 
Germany is a federal state, the national Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) 
provides rules for personal jurisdiction that govern in all Länder. So when 
Hahn in Berlin considers which court has jurisdiction, he looks at the same 
rules for Bavaria as for Berlin. Rules do not vary from state to state; they are 
the same in Bavaria and in Berlin. Those rules today are fundamentally the 
same as they were when the Code of Civil Procedure first went into force in 
1877. The German system provides plaintiffs with few choices; it makes 
consequences of most wrong choices inexpensive and not outcome 
determinative.  
General jurisdiction. The key concept for personal jurisdiction is 
Gerichtsstand, which is a place where suit may be brought (plural 
Gerichtsstände). The Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes among three 
types of Gerichtsstand: general (allgemeiner), specific (besonderer) and 
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exclusive (ausschließlicher). It defines the general Gerichtsstand as the court 
which has jurisdiction over all claims against a person, except for those 
claims for which another provision of the code or a another law designates 
an exclusive Gerichtsstand. § 12 ZPO. For natural persons the code 
designates as the general Gerichtsstand the place of permanent residence 
(Wohnsitz) (§ 13 ZPO), i.e., domicile in American law for natural persons, 
assuming they have one, and for legal persons, their seat, which is ordinarily 
their place of their administration. § 17 ZPO. The code has other provisions 
that designate a general Gerichtsstand for Germans abroad (§ 15 ZPO), for 
persons without permanent homes (§ 16 ZPO) and for various government 
authorities (§§ 18-19a ZPO).  
German law imposes a general registration of residence requirement on 
natural and legal persons. A party to a lawsuit or potential lawsuit may 
obtain from the relevant registration authority confirmation of registration 
and the address of a potential party or witness. Thus the Code of Civil 
Procedure assures that there is at least one court that has personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant domiciled in Germany. 
Specific jurisdiction; exclusive jurisdiction. In addition to providing a 
general jurisdiction for every person in Germany, the code establishes a 
series of specific Gerichtsstände that are available in addition to the general 
Gerichtsstand. Where one (or more) of these is available, and there is no 
exclusive Gerichtsstand, plaintiffs have free choice among them. § 35 ZPO. 
Among specific Gerichtstände the code establishes are: temporary residence 
(dauernder Aufenthalt) (§ 20 ZPO), place of a commercial branch (§ 21 
ZPO), place of contract performance (§ 29 ZPO) and place of commission of 
a legal wrong (tort) (§ 32 ZPO).  For each of these the code defines specific 
prerequisites and provides that there is personal jurisdiction specific to 
claims arising from those prerequisites. Likewise it defines a few exclusive 
Gerichtsstände, mostly involving realty and other immovables. E.g., § 24 
ZPO. It specifically authorizes, under detailed circumstances, merchants to 
agree upon a forum that would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction. § 38 
ZPO. Germany has its own exorbitant jurisdiction rule, but it can have no 
application to cases such as this book discusses, or indeed to any cases 
limited to parties within Germany or within the European Union. 
 
4. Applicable Law in Germany 
 
Although German states have substantial authority to make laws of their 
own, the federal government has authority to issue national laws for most 
aspects of civil law. All the potential claims discussed here are claims under 
the German Civil Code, which is a national law. 
 
C. Korea 
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[Summarizing Korean rules of jurisdiction:] Basically, the 
district court at the place of address of the defendant is a 
competent jurisdiction court. A civil lawsuit over real 
estate is under the jurisdiction of the district court in the 
place where the real estate is located and a civil lawsuit 
over a tort is under the jurisdiction of the district court 
where the tort is committed. 
 
The Supreme Court of Korea (2008)235
 
  
1. Korean Courts 
 
Korea is a unitary, rather than a federal state. There are no federal 
courts. Like the German system, which it in many respects resembles, the 
Korean court system has some, although not as many, separate court systems 
for specific areas of law. It has specialized branch courts for family 
(가정법원), patents and industrial property (특허법원) and administrative 
law (행정법원).236
The ordinary courts have three levels: the District Courts (지방법원), 
the High Courts (고등법원), and the Supreme Court (대법원). District 
Courts (as well as the Family Court) may establish Branch Courts and 
Municipal Courts and delegate some matters, including registration matters 
to them.  
  
The ordinary court of first instance of general jurisdiction is the District 
Court or one of its subsidiary Branch Courts. Presently there are eighteen 
District Courts with forty Branch Courts; the Family Court has three Branch 
Courts. Each court is competent for a specific geographic area. District 
Courts (or the Branch Courts) decide in panels of three when the amount in 
controversy exceeds ₩100 million (on the order of $100,000). When the 
amount in controversy is ₩100 million or less, the District Court or the 
Branch Court decides by one judge. In that case, an appeal is to a panel of 
three judges in the same court, if the amount in controversy does not exceed 
₩80 million. Municipal courts are responsible for cases where the amount in 
controversy is ₩20 million or less. Appeals from a District Court judgment 
by a three judge panel is to the competent High Court. There are five high 
courts: one in each of the countries’ major cities: Seoul (서울), Busan (부산), 
Daegu (대구), Gwangju (광주) and Daejon (대전). Judgments of the High 
                                                 
235 LEE JINMAN (Judge and Executive examiner of civil policy in Judicial Administration Office 
at Supreme Court), CIVIL PROCEDURE SYSTEM IN KOREA 2-3 (9 September 2008), available at  
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Courts, as well as judgments as Appellate Courts of the District Courts, may 
be appealed to the Supreme Court. For constitutional questions, there is a 
separate Constitutional Court (헌법재판소).237
 
  
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Since Korea does not have separate court systems, such as the United 
States (with federal and state courts) and Germany (with subject matter 
systems), strictly speaking, there are no subject matter jurisdiction issues. 
There is only the lesser issue of which court within a system with subject 
matter jurisdiction is the competent court to hear the claim. These issues are 
analogous in the system of the State of Maryland, discussed above, whether 
the District Court or the Circuit Court, is competent to hear the case, or in 
Germany whether the Amtsgericht or the Landegericht. Unless there is a 
possibility that an administrative or family court is competent, plaintiffs do 
not even need to think about the issue. In Korea, upon filing, the court will 
assign the case to the correct judge according to the rules of subject matter 
competence (사물관할; samul kwanhal) of the  Court Organization Act 
(법원조직법; bopwonjojik bop). The Court Organization Act mechanically 
assigns lawsuits by the amount claimed or other aspects of the case (e.g., 
promissory note, real property) to either a three-judge panel or to a single 
judge. Presently it provides that cases involving more than ₩100 are for 
three judge panels, while those for ₩100 million or less are for single judges. 
For our case that means that the court will assign it to a single judge panel.238
 
  
2. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Korean principles of personal jurisdiction are similar to the German 
ones on which Korean provisions are indirectly based. The court of the 
defendant’s domicile is the court of general jurisdiction (보통재판적) in 
cases where the defendant is a natural person. KCPA §§ 2 and 3. Unlike both 
Germany and the United States, domicile in Korean law does not require. 
The law provides rules where a party has no domicile in Korea. It further 
provides that the court of general jurisdiction for a legal person is the court 
where the entity has its principal place of business. KCPA § 5(1). The law 
provides for special jurisdiction In certain cases, other courts have special 
jurisdiction(특별재판적) in a number of cases, including, place of 
temporary residence, KCPA § 8, place of a commercial branch, KCPA § 12, 
                                                 
237 See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, TWENTY YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
OF KOREA (2008).  
238 See LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 131. 
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place of contract performance, KCPA § 8, and place of commission of a tort, 
KCPA § 18.239
 
  
4. Applicable Law in Korea 
 
Since Korea is a unitary state there is rarely a question of applicable law 
in domestic litigation.  
 
 
                                                 
239 See generally Kong-Woong Choe, Jurisdiction in Korean Conflict of Laws—A Comparison 
with American Rules of Jurisdiction, KOREAN J. COMP. L. 89, 103-113 (1977); Kwon, Litigating 
in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 124-126, reprint at 14-16. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PLEADING 
THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY 
 
 
 
Your Honor a day for me set/ 
On which I my right may get. 
 
16th Century German Codex240
 
 
Mary Roh has decided to sue. She has a lawyer; she has a court. Now 
she is ready to bring her case to court. Starting a lawsuit requires that she tell 
the court what it is that she wants. Otherwise, the court will not know which 
matters it is to decide and which remedies, if any, it is to order. What the 
court is to decide—the matter in controversy—is fundamental to all three of 
our systems of civil procedure.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In all three of our systems plaintiffs begin lawsuits by telling courts 
what they want from whom. They answer the classic question that law 
professors pose to first year American law students: who is suing whom for 
what? They do this in documents called complaints. Defendants are formally 
“served with process,” that is, they are informed of the lawsuit and are 
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formally given the complaint. Defendants are “summoned” to appear within 
a certain period of time (usually, less than a month) and, if they do not, they 
are deemed in default. They respond either in documents called answers, or 
in motions to the court. Plaintiffs may reply to these answers and motions. 
Collectively this written give-and-take between the parties at the beginning 
of the lawsuit constitutes the pleadings. 
Pleadings identify the controversy before the court; they determine who 
is party to the lawsuit (“party joinder”) and which events are before the court 
(“claim joinder”). They tell the court what the parties want by way of relief 
(“demand”).  
In all three of our systems pleadings are principally the work of the 
parties. In the American system, they are reviewed by the court only on 
request after they have been served. In the German and the Korean systems, 
on the other hand, complaints are reviewed by the court before they are 
served on defendants. 
In our case Roh will state in her complaint that she gave money to John 
Doh, Jr. She will demand that Doh give her back the money with interest. 
She may demand that someone else, perhaps Doh’s former firm, DohSon 
Honda LLC, or Doh’s father, John Doh, Sr., pay the money. Doh will answer 
that he is not required to pay the money. The court now knows who is suing 
whom for what. 
In this chapter we discuss pleadings generally and then turn to pleadings 
as used in our respective systems. 
 
A. Pleading Generally 
 
It is easy for lawyers to get wrapped up in the technicalities of their craft 
and to forget the mundane aspects of what they are doing in lawsuits. 
Looked at from a purely practical perspective, pleadings have all the 
romance of a car owner going to the shop and telling the mechanic what is 
wrong with the car or a patient going to the physician and telling the 
physician how it hurts. Both mechanic and physician will respond similarly: 
they will talk with the car owner or the patient and diagnose the problem 
before taking the car apart or prescribing treatment. Pleadings, and how they 
are handled, should be the counterpart of the first trip to the mechanic’s shop 
or to the physician’s office. 
For generations American lawyers began their study of civil procedure 
with the lesson that before a court decides, it must know what it is to decide. 
In American civil procedure one talks about framing an issue for decision. In 
German and Korean civil procedure one speaks of the subject of the lawsuit, 
the matter in controversy, the Streitgegenstand or 소송물 (sosongmul). As 
we shall see, behind that small difference in describing what is being done 
lie important differences in our systems and in their handling of pleadings. 
Nevertheless, in all of our systems, before a court can go to work to 
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determine who is right by determining law and finding facts, it needs to 
know what plaintiff thinks is wrong.  
 
1. Purposes of Pleadings 
 
Three purposes of pleading are: (1) establishing jurisdiction of the court 
to consider the controversy; (2) directing process to material issues that the 
parties dispute; and (3) bounding the controversy.241
Establishing jurisdiction to consider the controversy. In Chapter 4 
we examined jurisdiction. Pleading subject matter jurisdiction confirms that 
the court has responsibility for determining disputes of this type. Pleading 
personal jurisdiction confirms that this defendant is subject to the authority 
of this court, usually because the court’s jurisdiction is his or her home, or 
because the court’s jurisdiction is where the matter arose. In Chapter 4 we 
saw that German and Korean courts decide these issues quickly based on the 
pleadings. American courts, if presented with the issue, can require more 
time. We refer readers back to Chapter 4 for consideration of this purpose of 
pleading. 
  
Directing process to material issues in dispute. While establishing 
jurisdiction is a necessary part of every lawsuit, that finding is incidental to 
the purpose of the lawsuit: determination of parties’ rights. Ideally every step 
that parties and court take in the course of a lawsuit should contribute to the 
accurate, fair and prompt determination of the parties’ rights. Since a lawsuit 
is about different views of what is right, pleadings can advance that eventual 
determination by setting out not only what one party thinks is wrong, but by 
informing the court of the factual basis for that claim and by setting out those 
matters about which the parties agree and those matters about which they 
disagree.   
Bounding the controversy. Deciding what to decide is essential to any 
legal decision; deciding what not to decide, i.e., bounding the controversy, is 
important for an efficient decision. Going off point not only delays final 
decision of right, it makes that decision more costly. Setting bounds to the 
controversy conserves party resources. Matters which are not raised in the 
pleadings, parties need not consider. Setting bounds to the controversy 
protects parties from surprise. Parties need prepare their cases only on 
matters before the court. 
Bounding the controversy has an importance that transcends process 
efficiency: protection of autonomy of parties and the privacy of the public. 
In all three of our systems of civil justice, while courts are required to decide 
all private disputes properly brought to them, they are prohibited from 
investigating on their own initiative matters not brought to them by the 
                                                 
241 Cf. Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common Law—
Codes—Federal Rules, 14 VANDERBILT L. REV. 399 (1961); FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (1965). 
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parties. Those matters not before the court, the court cannot properly 
examine or decide. 
 
2. Limits on Pleading—the Interdependency of Law and Facts  
 
Directing process to material points in dispute and bounding process 
from going off on unproductive paths are benefits that pleading can deliver. 
While essential to efficient process, directing and binding process are 
necessarily tentative if process is to achieve correct decisions according to 
law. It is a truism of lawsuits that no one can predict with certainty what the 
process will turn up in the way of facts and legal issues. An issue that may 
not have been apparent at the outset, may become central to decision.  
Civil procedure aims at correct application of all law to true facts. The 
process starts out, however, with imperfect knowledge of which rules are 
applicable and of which alleged facts are true. Applying law to facts thus 
requires determining the rules that are applicable to the facts and finding the 
facts that are material to the applicable rules.  
Determining applicable rules and finding material facts are 
interdependent inquiries: until one knows which rules are applicable, one 
cannot know which facts are material. Until one knows the facts, one cannot 
know which rules are applicable. Settle the applicable rules too soon, and 
facts may be overlooked which would change results were other rules 
applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules soon enough and the process may 
detour to find facts that are not material under the rules actually applied. This 
process of going back and forth was identified in the first part of the 
twentieth century, but to this day is only occasionally noted. 242
                                                 
242 In contemporary American civil procedure the question, when it is discussed at all, is seen 
from the lawyer’s perspective as one of case theory development. See, e.g., THOMAS A. 
MANUET, PRETRIAL 21 (7th ed. 2008) (“This process, going back and forth between 
investigating the facts and researching the law, is ongoing and is how you will develop your 
‘theory of the case’ ….”). But American practitioners saw it as a practical problem before case 
theory took over. See JESSE FRANKLIN BRUMBAUGH, LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING: LOGIC 
APPLIED TO THE PREPARATION, TRIAL AND APPEAL OF CASES, WITH ILLUSTRATIVE BRIEFS AND 
FORMS 364-367 (1917). American academics Hart & Sacks noted it in their iconic work on legal 
process. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 351 (1958 Tentative Edition published 1994) (“the law 
determines which facts are relevant while at the same time the facts determine what law is 
relevant.”) They concluded, as German practice does, that “[w]hat comes last, however, is 
always the job of law application.” But they had no more to say about it. Comparativists seem to 
have seen the issue most clearly. Arthur T. von Mehren conceived of the problem in terms of 
concentration and surprise at trial. See Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural 
Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, 2 EUROPÄISCHES 
RECHTSDENKENS IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT COING ZUM 70. 
GEBURTSTAG 361 et seq. (Norbert Horn, ed. 1982), relevant parts substantially reprinted in 
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, & PETER L. MURRAY, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed, 2007). 
The German comparativist, Oskar Hartweig, saw the issue in his studies of English pleading. 
See Dieter Stauder with David Llewellyn, Oskar Hartwieg’s Thoughts on the English Legal 
System,  in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
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B. United States 
 
In the course of administering justice between litigating 
parties, there are two successive objects,—to ascertain the 
subject for decision, and to decide. 
 
Henry John Stephen (1824) 
In nineteenth  century’s leading book on pleading243
 
  
One might think that such a mundane matter as informing the court what 
the case is all about would be non-controversial. Yet again and again over 
the two century long history of American civil procedure, pleading and its 
consequences have been at the heart of controversy. Points of procedure end 
up dominating the work of the appellate courts. Today, pleading is again 
center stage in American debate over civil procedure.  
In this section we discuss contemporary American pleading in general, 
then examine historical pleading, issues of joinder and turn finally to how 
pleading would be handled in Roh v. Doh. 
1. Contemporary American Pleading 
 
Modern American pleading is termed “notice pleading.” That is because 
it serves principally to give the other party notice of the proceedings. As we 
shall shortly discuss, earlier approaches to pleading forced the parties to 
develop specific issues for trial. The result, in view of the back-and-forth 
nature of law applying just discussed, was to deny meritorious claims. The 
notice pleading system seeks to avoid those problems by making less of the 
former issue narrowing role of pleadings.  
Some legal scholars nevertheless assert that American pleadings “define 
the issues presented in a legal dispute.”244
                                                                                                        
WILLIAM R. CORNISH  47, 51 (D. Vaver and L. Bently, eds.  2004). Hartwieg brought the 
problem and its relevance to the German system to the attention of a wider circle of German 
readers in a challenging introductory book. OSKAR HARTWIEG & H.A. HESSE, DIE 
ENTSCHEIDUNG IM ZIVILPROZEß: EIN STUDIENBUCH ÜBER METHODE, RECHTSGEFÜHL UND 
ROUTINE IN GUTACHTEN UND URTEIL at 78-79 (1981). See OSKAR HARTWIEG, 
SACHVERHALTSARBEIT ALS STEUERUNGSINSTRUMENT IM ZIVILPROZESS (Stephan Meder, ed., 
2010). Already the idea is discussed in a doctoral dissertation done under Prof. Dr. Reinhold 
Zippelius in 1971. HERBERT SCHÖPF, DIE WECHSELBEZIEHUNG ZWISCHEN SACHVERHALT UND 
NORMENORDNUNG BEI DER RECHTSANWENDUNG (Diss. Erlangen 1971). See generally James 
R. Maxeiner, It's the Law—The Missing Measure of Civil Law/Common Law Convergence 49 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 469 (2010) reprinted in COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF 
CATEGORIES (Janet Walker and Oscar G. Chase, eds., 2010). 
 In modern notice pleading, 
243 HENRY STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS  1 (1824). 
244 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN 
INTRODUCTION 108 (1993) 
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however, they do not do much to direct the court to what the dispute is 
about. They barely begin to direct the case toward material points in dispute; 
they hardly bound the scope of process. Serving the complaint corresponds 
to dropping the starter’s flag at the beginning of a race. A complaint may be 
sufficient even though it has no “legally relevant allegations at all.”245 In 
theory, structuring the case in order to decide it is in “the bailiwick of 
discovery and motion practice.”246 In practice, that is seen as myth.247
 
 We 
discuss discovery and motion practice in Chapter 6. 
Formal Requirements of Complaints 
 
The building block of notice pleading is the “claim.” The claim is the 
legal basis for relief required by Rule 8(a)(2); it is the legal cause of action. 
Under Rule 26(b)(1) the claim in theory determines the scope of pretrial 
discovery discussed in Chapter 6; in theory it facilitates the eventual 
subsumption of facts of the case under law. 
The formal requirements of American complaints are few. Rule 8(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets them out. Besides a statement of 
the ground for federal jurisdiction (1) and a demand for relief (3), all that it 
requires is “(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”248 For money lent it is sufficient to state: “The 
defendant owes the plaintiff $ _______ for money lent by the plaintiff to the 
defendant on date.”249
Lazy lawyers can make short work of a complaint: it is said less than 
thirty minutes on their way to the golf course. The best lawyers take more 
time. They draft complaints that take into account secondary objectives such 
as impressing opposing counsel with their attention to the case and using the 
complaint to begin to tell a story. 
 Only if the complaint asserts fraud or mistake must it, 
under Rule 9(b), “state with particularity the circumstances constituting 
fraud of mistake.”  
250
Rule 8(a) does not require that plaintiffs identify in the complaint 
“specific facts;” plaintiffs need only “give the defendant fair notice of what 
the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
  
251 The Rule does not 
require that parties choose a single claim, let alone a single issue, to present 
to the court.252
                                                 
245 Geoffrey C. Hazard, From Whom No Secrets are Hid, 76 TEX L. REV. 1665 (1998). 
 The Rule does not require that a party plead all the elements 
246 THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 117 (7th ed., 2008). 
247 Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 
DENVER U. L. REV. 245, 247 (2010). 
248 FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(a). 
249 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10(d). 
250 CHARLES H. ROSE & JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, FUNDAMENTAL PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE LITIGATION 144, 158-159 (2008). 
251 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
252 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1000 
(2003). 
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of any cause of action.253 The Rule does not normally require that parties 
even state facts that support the claims they make.254
 
 The Rule imposes no 
requirement similar to the German requirement that matters asserted must be 
substantiated by naming the proof to be used to prove them. In the American 
system all that is unnecessary.  
Contemporary Controversy 
 
Pleading is again a hot topic in spirited debate in the United States about 
civil justice. In 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,255
Some scholars find the Twombly decision startling. It means, they 
believe, that notice pleading is dead—to be replaced by plausibility pleading. 
In the view of other critics of Twombly, however, access to justice means 
that plaintiffs should have access to a particular form of process that permits 
discovery or even creation of legal rights that they are not able to state when 
they plead. Plaintiffs, according to this view, should be allowed to assert 
claims that to some may appear “tenuous,” to initiate their claims without 
“full and complete information,” and to have ability “to investigate their 
claims under the aegis of the courts,” and only after that, to have tested the 
factual sufficiency of their claims.
 the United States 
Supreme Court, with an eye to the high cost of the discovery phase that 
follows pleading in the United States (discussed in Chapter 6), tightened up 
pleading standards with the goal of sparing innocent defendants those costs. 
The Court interpreted the “short and plain” standard of Federal Rule 8(a)(2) 
to require that plaintiffs allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” The Twombly decision reversed (or as the Court more 
gently said, “retired”) “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).” The Twombly 
decision focuses on the function of pleadings as gate-keeper or bounding 
device; it does not give much attention to pleading as device to direct 
process. 
256
                                                 
253 See Swierkiewicsz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). 
 Others scholars are less surprised; they 
see only a modest departure from past practice. From historic and 
comparative perspectives, the change—if there is one—is slight. Plaintiffs 
254 Cf. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted 
Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 1987 (2004). 
255 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
256 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 
at 355 (2010). 
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still are not required to plead evidence or even to allege facts that would 
fulfill all of the elements of an applicable legal rule.257
 
 
2. American Pleading in Historical Perspective 
 
After over two hundred years of failed attempts, it is obvious that 
American pleading has failed. It has failed, we believe, because American 
civil procedure leaves to the parties’ lawyers principal control of the process 
of applying law to facts, starting already with pleading.  
In permitting the parties’ lawyers to control application of law to fact, 
American civil procedure has vacillated between extremes in how it uses 
pleading. At both extremes it reserves only a modest supporting role to 
courts and directs the parties’ lawyers to share the leading role. It expects the 
parties’ lawyers to cooperate among themselves, not only to advance 
applying law to fact, but to carry out nearly the entire job beginning with 
determining of law, continuing through finding of fact, and ending with 
subsuming found facts under determined law. At the one extreme, pleading 
was to accomplish all that; at the other extreme, pleading was to accomplish 
none of it and all was to be left to post-pleading, pre-trial procedure or to 
trial itself.  
Common law special pleading was the extreme where pleading was to 
do it all. Common law pleading required that plaintiffs choose one specific 
legal claim (the form of action) on which to base their claims and to force 
facts into that form. To do that often required that plaintiffs plead false or 
fictitious facts. Defendants had to respond to plaintiffs’ pleadings with the 
object of reaching one material issue, of law or of fact, the determination of 
which disposed of the case. That precise issue the parties put on the record 
without any action on the part of the court. When laweyrs got law and facts 
right, special pleading made for efficient process. Pleadings directed the 
court to the issue and pleadings bounded the process. When lawyers got it 
wrong, however, and chose the wrong rule, or facts turned out to be other 
than expected, the righteous were punished for their wrong procedural 
choice. Hence common law pleading was overthrown and code pleading 
substituted.258
Code pleading occupied a middle ground between common law special 
pleading and modern notice pleading. In code pleading plaintiffs’ lawyers no 
longer selected a single form of action under which they had to subsume 
their cases. They were to plead facts and not law. Those facts, however, had 
to constitute a “cause of action,” or multiple causes of action. In code 
  
                                                 
257 See generally James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure:  Historical and 
Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, A Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN 
STATE L. REV.  No. 4 (2010). 
258 See Knowles v. Gee, 8 Barb. 300, 4 How. Pr. 316 (N.Y. S. Ct., 1850, opinion of Samuel L. 
Selden, later Chief Judge of the N.Y. Court of Appeals), quoted in EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CODE PLEADING INCLUDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES 6-7 (1940). 
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pleading defendants’ lawyers were no longer restricted to disputing one point 
of law or one point of fact, but could dispute multiple points of each.  
Code pleading was more like common law pleading or more like 
modern notice pleading depending upon the extent to which courts using it 
restricted the parties’ lawyers to the assertions that they made in their 
pleadings. Courts concerned with guiding and bounding process might 
review pleadings strictly. They were concerned with how plaintiffs’ lawyers 
were to present at trial all of the different possible causes of action and 
issues. They worried how practically defendants’ lawyers could prepare for 
all that plaintiffs’ lawyers might throw at them. Reformers underestimated 
the complexity of the problems that they created in pleading and in eventual 
application of law to fact at trial. The back-and-forth nature of law 
application defeated the reforms. Strict courts could and did make “fact 
pleading” every bit as onerous as the common law pleading that preceded it. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Edson R. Sunderland, drafter of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s pretrial provisions, considered the federal 
rules to be “in effect code pleading emancipated from the various technical 
requirements which a century of experience has shown to be 
unnecessary.”259 Sunderland’s vision for how pleading should work was not 
so very different from older forms and rather distant from the notice pleading 
we know today and described above. Shortly after adoption of the federal 
rules he wrote: “The purpose of pleading is to analyze controversies between 
parties, and to segregate and formulate the points in dispute, in such a 
manner that the parties may have sufficient information to enable them to 
properly prepare for trial and that the court may know exactly what questions 
are to be decided.”260 Pleading was still then, according to one 
contemporary, “absolutely essential to the orderly administration of justice.” 
Without some means to develop an issue for trial: “the proceedings would be 
a mere groping in the dark. An unknown point of difference could not be 
intelligently tried by the court; nor could the parties intelligently prepare for 
trial.”261 A dozen years after their adoption, however, another scholar feared 
that pleadings under the federal rules no longer had a rationale. They failed 
to fulfill their “ultimate objective”: “to advise the court, lawyers and parties 
prior to trial what questions are to be decided.”262
As we shall see in the Chapter 6, Sunderland provided or strengthened 
other means for developing material issues in dispute, namely pretrial 
conferences and summary judgment motions. Their nonuse, together with 
  
                                                 
259 EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CODE PLEADING INCLUDING THE NEW 
FEDERAL RULES 15 (1940). 
260 Id. at 172. 
261 SAM B. GILREATH, SIXTH EDITION OF ABRAHAM CARUTHERS, THE HISTORY OF  A LAWSUIT 
§ 94, at 1-3 (1937). 
262 James Alger Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
48 COLUM. L. REV. 491, 494 (1948). 
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the demise of pleading, has led to the other key development in American 
procedure discussed in that chapter, the vanishing of trials. 
 
3. Joinder of Claims and of Parties 
 
While formal requirements for American complaints are few, the 
practical consequences are sufficient to impel plaintiffs’ lawyers to evaluate 
their cases before filing them. In particular they need to decide which claims 
to raise (joinder of claims) and against which parties they will raise them 
(joinder of parties).  
In our case, should Roh sue only for an unpaid loan, or for other claims, 
such as for unjust enrichment or fraud? Should she sue only John Doh, Jr., or 
perhaps other parties, such as John Doh, Sr. or DohSon Honda, LL.C.? 
Decisions concerning both forms of joinder are largely for the parties 
and not for the court. They are reached as matters of litigation strategy. 
Usually they are made by the lawyers themselves and are influenced by their 
interests.263
 
  
Joinder of Claims 
 
The contemporary American system of pleading and discovery 
encourages rather than discourages adding claims. Here we speak both of 
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and those arising out 
of completely different events. There is no restriction on parties joining 
completely different claims against each other, although the court may order 
their severance.264
There is no price to pay for adding claims; plaintiffs can drop them at 
any time. Since a claim is a legal characterization of facts, caution suggests 
raising every conceivable legal claim in case the court prefers one 
characterization or another. Since a claim defines the scope of pretrial 
discovery, flexibility in discovery encourages raising every conceivable 
claim. Since different claims support different remedies, maximizing one’s 
options pushes one toward calling for all claims.  
 Free joinder is a change from common law pleading, 
which with its need to produce a single issue between the parties, was hostile 
to any form of joinder, be it of claims or of parties. 
In our case Roh’s lawyer, Harry Hahn, will write a complaint that 
asserts at least two different claims: repayment of a loan and unjust 
enrichment. For the first claim (styled variously “cause of action” or “count” 
in court papers), Roh will allege that she and defendant Doh, Jr. agreed to a 
loan of $75,000 which loan Doh, Jr., has failed to repay. For a second claim, 
she will assert, that were the court to find the payment a gift and not a loan, 
                                                 
263 HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 244, at 152 (1993).  
264 FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a). 
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it was a gift conditioned on the marriage of Doh, Jr. and Roh’s daughter 
Rosa, which condition failed and, therefore gives rise to a right to its return. 
Hahn will also consider other possible causes of action. In particular, he 
might for tactical reasons wish to add a claim of fraud. That might be that 
Doh, Jr. sought the money as a loan, but never intended to repay it, and now 
claims it as a gift. By adding a fraud claim, Roh could then also add a claim 
for punitive damages. Punitive damages are damages awarded not to 
compensate, but to punish. Although they thus serve a public function, they 
are paid to the plaintiff. They can be very high: commonly a multiple of the 
underlying compensatory damages claimed. Merely the presence of a claim 
for punitive damages can alarm defendants and can achieve for plaintiffs 
tactical benefits.  
The only limit to the number of claims that Hahn asserts are his 
imagination and his brazenness. The system permits him creativity in claim 
creation. He may properly make any claim that he can imagine, even if not 
supported by the law, provided that it is warranted “by a non-frivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law.”265
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that Hahn limits himself to two 
claims: (1) a contract claim for repayment of a loan; and (2) an unjust 
enrichment claim for repayment of a conditional gift. 
  
 
Joinder of Parties  
 
Just as today’s system of pleading encourages plaintiffs to add claims, 
so too does it encourage plaintiffs to add parties. Unlike in the days of 
common law pleading—which had complicated and convoluted rules when 
plaintiffs could or sometimes had to join parties—the present-day system 
does not discourage plaintiffs from adding parties; sometimes it requires that 
they do (“compulsory joinder”). It is generally easier to join parties at the 
outset of litigation than later. The system allows joinder of parties not yet 
known through the device of fictitious names, e.g., John Doe, Mary Doe or 
Richard Roe. The generous rules of personal jurisdiction allow joining many 
parties, while the elasticity of those rules encourages plaintiffs to join non-
obvious parties.  
Naming multiple parties confers many benefits on plaintiffs. Perhaps the 
most important of these is to draw into the lawsuit so-called “deep pockets,” 
that is, parties who are financially able to pay large judgments—or better 
yet—large settlements early on. If defendants are “jointly and severally 
liable,” as often is the case, plaintiff can collect the full amount of a 
judgment from any of them. Thus it is typical to name as party just about 
anyone in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Naming a third party 
as defendant offers the further benefit of the generous rules of party 
                                                 
265 FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 11(b)(2). 
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discovery to obtain information that may be in that party’s hands. It offers 
the possibility that in the course of litigation defendants may quarrel among 
themselves to the benefit of plaintiff. Finally, the third party may have clout 
over the real defendant and be willing to use that clout to “help” that party 
reach a settlement.  
Plaintiffs who chose to sue in federal court under federal diversity 
jurisdiction have special considerations. By adding or omitting parties they 
can make or destroy diversity, i.e., the basis for subject matter jurisdiction of 
the court. Federal courts assume diversity jurisdiction only when there is so-
called complete diversity, i.e., all the plaintiffs are from different states than 
are all defendants. The same technique can be used to create or destroy 
venue.266
In the case of Roh v. Doh, Roh is the only plaintiff on the scene, but 
John Doh, Jr. is not the only possible defendant. Hahn will give thought to 
adding DohSon Honda LLC or John Doh, Sr. as defendants. He might add 
DohSon Honda LLC as defendant, since Roh paid the money directly to it. 
Hahn might add John Doh, Sr. as defendant, even though the basis for such a 
claim is not presently clear. Perhaps Doh, Sr., explicitly or impliedly 
guaranteed loans to Doh, Jr. Or perhaps, discovery will show that Doh, Sr., 
so participated in the management of DohSon, LLC that a court would be 
justified in “piercing the corporate veil” and assessing liability against him 
for the actions of that legal entity. Hahn need have no present factual basis 
for these claims. It is sufficient if he believes that such factual assertions as 
are necessary to support such claims “will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”
  
267
To simplify our discussion, we assume that Hahn adds no additional 
defendants. 
  
 
4. Handling Complaints 
  
Once Hahn has prepared the complaint and obtained Roh’s approval of 
it, he will file it with the court. Roh will have to pay a filing fee. It is small. 
In federal court, the fee is the same whether one demands $100 or $100 
million (presently in Maryland the fee is $350).  It is no deterrent to lawsuits. 
In Germany and Korea, on the other hand, the filing fee depends on the 
amount in controversy; in Roh’s case it would be €1,668 (about $2000); in 
Korea ₩342,500 (about $350). The more plaintiffs ask for, the more they 
must pay into the court. As we shall see later in this chapter, this leads some 
plaintiffs in Germany to split claims. Claim-splitting is unusual in America. 
Upon filing the court assigns a judge to handle the case. In the federal 
courts, each district court individually decides how to assign judges to cases. 
In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, as in most 
                                                 
266 See, e.g., Payton-Henderson v. Evans, 949 A.2d 654 (Md. 2008). 
267 Rule 11(b)(3) FED. R. CIV. P. 
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federal district courts, assignment is random. The judge assigned is 
potentially any one of the judges in the court, without regard to subject 
matter of the case and without consideration of the expertises of the judge. 
Federal judges are assigned both civil and criminal matters at the same time. 
The assigned judge might be busy with a high profile criminal case. 
Filing and immediate assignment of a judge were not always federal 
practice and, to this day, are not the practice in all states. As late as 1992, in 
New York plaintiffs commenced civil actions by serving process on 
defendants rather than by filing with courts.268
Since 1992 plaintiffs in New York commence cases by filing. But still 
today the court does not assign a judge when filed. Still today New York 
courts await filing by parties of requests for judicial intervention. The idea of 
this system is that most cases can be worked out among parties without 
judges being involved. Courts should assign judges only when parties need 
judicial rulings, such as, the decision of motions, the setting of discovery 
deadlines (discussed in Chapter 6), or the setting of trial dates (discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
 They needed never file with 
the court, if they settled the lawsuit; if they did not settle, they could wait as 
late as until they wanted the court to summon a jury. The parties needed to 
contact the court only when they needed a judicial ruling; then they would 
file what is still called a “request for judicial intervention.” 
This belated assignment of a judge to the case is a vestige of a practice 
known as the calendar system that is still used in some states. While in an 
individual assignment system, one judge handles the entire case from 
beginning to end, in a calendar system, judges supervise specific stages of 
cases, e.g., motion practice, trials, etc. The calendar system was thought 
more efficient, particularly for routine cases, for then a matter could go 
forward without waiting for a particular judge to have time to hear it.  
 
Reviewing Complaints before Serving 
 
Unlike in Germany and Korea, American courts do not review 
complaints before they are served. Even after complaints are served, courts 
review them only on request. As we discuss below, courts leave it to 
defendants to object to sufficiency of plaintiffs’ complaints. Barring 
defendants’ motions, they do not concern themselves with whether plaintiffs 
have sufficiently stated legal claims or adequately alleged jurisdiction and 
other necessary procedural prerequisites. 
 
Serving Complaints 
 
Unlike in Germany and Korea, American courts usually do not serve 
complaints on defendants. That task falls on plaintiffs. Today, service is 
                                                 
268 The drafters of the Federal Rules considered, but eventually rejected, this approach. 
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simpler than in the past. Once service is accomplished, Hahn will, however, 
have to file proof of service with the court. 
As Hahn and Roh discussed in Chapter 3, Roh comes back to review the 
compliant and to discuss with Hahn what to expect from the process that she 
is bringing into life. In Chapter 6 we related part of that conversation. In this 
chapter we provide the a complaint such as her lawyer might bring. 
 
 
COMPLAINT 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Jane Roh,  
 
                                  Plaintiff 
 
                             v. 
 
John Doh, Jr. 
                                  Defendant 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 No. ________________ 
 
            Civil Action 
 
 
COMPLAINT 
 
1. The plaintiff is a citizen of Virginia. The defendant John Doe, Jr. is a citizen of Maryland. 
The amount in controversy, without interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value specified 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 [i.e., $75,000]. [Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Form 7(a).] 
 
COUNT I 
 
2. The defendant John Doh, Jr. owes the plaintiff $ 75,000 principal plus additional loan 
interest, for money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant on April 15, 2011. [Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
Form 10(d).] 
 
COUNT II 
 
3. Defendant John Doh, Jr. received from plaintiff $75,000 on the condition that John Doh, Jr. 
and plaintiff’s daughter, Rosa Roh, were engaged to marry.  
 
4. John Doh, Jr. and Rosa Roh have broken off their engagement and no longer plan to 
marry. 
 
5. For John Doh, Jr. to retain the $75,000 would be unjust enrichment. 
 
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against defendant John Doh, Jr. for $75,000, such 
loan interest as the Court may determine is applicable, plus interest and costs. [Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro. Form 10.]  
 
Date: November 15, 2011  
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Harry Hahn 
Hahn & Traurig 
1601 K Street NW 
Washington DC 20006 
Hahn@Hahntraurig.com 
202-555-5555 
 
 
 
 
Responding to Complaints 
 
Once John Doh, Jr. and DohSon Honda LLC are served with the 
complaint, the lawsuit begins in earnest. Defendants have four alternatives: 
acquiesce, default, move to dismiss, and answer on the merits. We address 
each in turn: 
Acquiesce. For a defendant to acquiesce is the simplest of all solutions. 
The defendant contacts the plaintiff, offers to accept plaintiff’s demand and 
requests that the plaintiff withdraw the lawsuit. Of course, in cases where 
plaintiffs have been diligent in letting potential defendants know of their 
intention to file suit, acquiescence is not likely, for if on demand the 
defendant refused to pay, why would he or she now pay? Still, defendant 
may have had a change of heart. Or, in the case of a corporate defendant, the 
lawsuit may have brought the case to attention of senior management. 
Default. If defendant does nothing, the court, after the period of time for 
answering the complaint expires, plaintiff may apply for entry of a judgment 
by default. If the plaintiff’s claim is for a “sum certain,” that is a determined 
amount, and if defendant is neither a minor (child under 18 years old) or 
mentally incompetent, the clerk of the court, without the involvement of a 
judge, and without review of legal sufficiency of the complaint, must enter 
judgment for plaintiff in that amount.269 If the claim is not for a sum certain, 
then plaintiff must apply to the court. The court may, but is not required, to 
hold a hearing or take evidence. It could conduct an accounting to determine 
the amount of damages, take evidence to establish the truth of any allegation, 
or investigate any matter.270
Move to dismiss. While courts do not without request review plaintiffs’ 
complaints for legal sufficiency or for procedural requirements, defendants’ 
lawyers should. With respect to certain defenses, defendants may choose 
between raising them as defenses in their answers, or presenting them by 
motion to the court before answering. The latter is known as motion 
 Evidence is mostly taken by affidavits without 
hearing.  
                                                 
269 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1). 
270 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). 
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practice.271 In the federal system these defenses are seven: “(1) lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper 
venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (7) failure to join a 
party under Rule 19.”272
Of these choices it seems defendants most often raise (1) to (3). If 
successful, these motions may lead to plaintiffs dropping their case or, at 
least, forcing them to bring them to go to different courts. Less often, it 
seems, but still not unusual, defendants raise other defenses. In challenges to 
process, i.e., (4) and (5), if there is no statute of limitations issue (that would 
bar the claim if served later than it was initially), if successful the motion at 
best gains for defendants a few weeks’ time. In case of (6), failure to state 
claim, and of (7), failure to join a party, tactical and strategic considerations 
come into play. For example, if plaintiffs have only novel claims not 
previously recognized in law, defendants may challenge those claims at this 
stage to avoid discovery expenses. If, on the other hand, plaintiffs have 
claims well recognized in law, but have not stated them well, defendants 
often choose not to challenge the claims at this stage for fear that the court 
would instruct plaintiffs on how better to formulate their claims and then 
permit them to do just that.  
  
When defendants raise any of these defenses by motion, then that is 
their only response until the motion is decided. If the motion does not end 
the lawsuit, defendants will have further time to answer the complaint. When 
defendants decide not to make motions to raise these issues, they may 
include them as affirmative defenses in their answers and then contest them 
later in pretrial and trial. Just as plaintiffs are encouraged to assert in their 
complaints a wide variety of claims, so too are defendants encouraged to 
raise in their answers all conceivable affirmative defenses (e.g., that an 
agreement should have been in writing, that the statute of limitations has 
run).  
Answer. Defendants who take none of these three steps must answer 
complaints timely (in the federal courts, usually within 20 days). With 
respect to each allegation of the complaint defendants must admit, deny or 
state that they have “no knowledge or belief” sufficient to answer the 
allegation. The assertion of lack of knowledge must be made in good faith, 
but is subject to no further limitation. A response is not in good faith if 
defendant could easily determine the matter. There is no obligation to give 
reasons why the defendant might deny the truth of the allegations.  
To limit the scope of admissions, defendants typically admit only one 
part of an allegation, but deny knowledge about the balance. For example, in 
                                                 
271 Motion practice at this stage also includes motions for judgment on the pleadings, for more 
definite statement, and to strike redundant and immaterial matter in complaints. FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(c), (e) & (f).We do not discuss these here. 
272 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
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an automobile accident case the allegation might be: “7. At 11:05 PM on 
May 10, 2011 Witness W had just left the Main Street liquor store with a 
pint of vodka and an open umbrella.” The response might be: “Admits that 
Witness W had just left the Main Street liquor store, but does not have 
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the 
other allegations in paragraph 7, and therefore denies them.”  
The answer must also set out all of the applicable 12(b) defenses not 
raised by motion as well as any affirmative defenses. An affirmative defense 
is defined in Rule 8(c) and amounts to any defense that admits the truth of 
the plaintiff’s assertion but gives a ground for defeating the defendant’s 
claims. An example might be a defense of fraud or duress to an otherwise 
valid contract claim. In the case of doubt whether a defense is an affirmative 
one, the prudent lawyer will include it in the answer. 
If defendant wants a jury trial, defendant in the answer must request one 
or forever waive that right.  
The answer is also where defendant should bring claims against plaintiff 
(counterclaims) and may bring claims against third parties (third party 
claims). Counterclaims and third party practice are beyond the scope of this 
book. 
Counterclaims. Counterclaims are of two types: compulsory and 
permissive. Compulsory counterclaims are governed by Rule 13(a); they are 
claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as that event 
alleged in the complaint. Permissive counterclaims are governed by Rule 
13(b); they are all other counterclaims. For tactical reasons alone, defendants 
will attempt to find some basis for a counterclaim if at all possible. Claims 
against third parties are governed by Rule 14 and are permissive. When a 
defendant makes counterclaims or third party claims, there are additional 
pleadings. 
 
Doh’s Answer 
 
John Doh, Jr. consulted his own lawyer, Betty Bahn. Upon advice from 
Bahn, in his answer he will deny both the claims that the money was a loan 
and that it was a gift in contemplation of marriage. Moreover, he will raise as 
affirmative defenses that if the payment was a loan, (1) it was a loan to 
DohSon Honda, Inc. and not to him; and (2) if it he was guarantor of that, it 
is not enforceable because it is not in writing. While he might make a third 
party claim for contribution or indemnity against DohSon Honda, Inc., for 
the sake of simplicity, in this case he will not. 
 
Directing further Proceedings 
 
Even after Roh has served Doh, unless Doh responds with a motion, the 
initiative remains with the parties. Rule 26 requires that the parties’ lawyers 
confer as soon as practicable, and in no event later than 89 days after the day 
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Doh is served or 69 days after he files an appearance or an answer with the 
court. The lawyers are to discuss the nature and basis of their clients’ claims 
and the possibilities for settlement, to disclose certain material and to make 
plans for discovery (discussed in Chapter 6).  The court has authority to 
order lawyers to confer in person or to direct that parties themselves 
personally participate, but since lawyers usually confer without informing 
the court, the court does not ordinarily make such orders. Within fourteen 
days of conferring, the parties are to submit a written report outlining a 
proposed discovery plan.273
After the lawyers for the parties have conferred and submitted their 
report, the court may order that the lawyers meet with the judge for a pretrial 
conference. The frequency of such early pre-trial conference varies from 
court-to-court and from judge-to-judge. In any case, within 120 days after 
Doh or any other defendant is served, or within 90 days after Doh or any 
other defendant appears or answers, the assigned judge is required to issue a 
scheduling order. That order must limit the time to join other parties, to 
amend pleadings, to complete discovery and to file motions. Typically it 
allows six to twelve months for discovery. It may set tentive dates for future 
conferences and for trial.
  
274
C. Germany 
  
 
da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius  
(“give me the facts; I will give you right”). 
 
Roman law maxim 
 
German pleading practice puts the goal of civil procedure—the judicial 
determination of the rights of the parties—front and center. It focuses the 
attention of the parties on the task at hand. It insists that parties state clearly 
why relief is, or is not, in order. German pleading practice facilitates the 
work of judges: the determination of competing claims of right. It helps 
judges clear out technical issues immediately. It permits them to direct 
proceedings to material points in dispute between the parties.  
 
1. Substantive Requirements of Complaints 
 
The complaint need make no mention of legal grounds for relief. The court 
knows the law (jura novit curia). The court needs no instruction on law. The 
parties may, in subsequent proceedings, suggest alternate legal grounds for 
recovery, but they are not required to. Their suggestions of which law might 
                                                 
273 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
274 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
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apply do not bind them in the evidence that they may present. The court is 
required to test the facts presented against all possible legal grounds for relief.  
While German pleading practice does not require that the complaint 
name legal claims, it does require that the facts alleged do fulfill some legal 
claim. The foundation of the complaint is the factual basis for the claim 
(Klagegrund). That is the concrete set of facts, i.e., the life events, from 
which plaintiff claims right to request a legal remedy.275 Thus the complaint 
must allege facts sufficient to fulfill all the elements of at least one legal 
claim. It is insufficient if it asserts merely a legal claim without alleging the 
factual elements. German pleading is thus similar to the fact pleading that 
applied under the Field and other American reform codes in the nineteenth 
century.276
In one respect, the pleading of evidence, German pleading practice 
imposes requirements that no American system has ever required. Not only 
must plaintiffs allege facts that they intend to prove, they must also identify 
evidence that they intend to rely on to prove those facts.  
 As we shall see, however, it is different in the practice of how it 
implements that pleading requirement. 
A German complaint determines “the matter in controversy” 
(Streitgegenstand). The matter in controversy is “the central concept” of 
German civil procedure.277
The matter in controversy is independent of the legal basis for relief.
 The court has no authority go beyond the matter 
in controversy, except as parties may appropriately raise additional claims. 
The matter in controversy determines not only the definiteness of the 
complaint, but also subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, joinder 
of claims and of parties, amendments of the complaint, and effect of the 
lawsuit for pending and future lawsuits. 
278 
It determines the scope of legal protection the court can award.279
A German complaint is a map for the dispute, but it is not an itinerary. It 
facilitates travel without constraining it. Only at its outer edges does it set 
boundaries. This sets it apart from the complaint of classic American 
common law pleading, which allowed only one route to the destination.  
 German 
pleading practice gives the complaint the ambitious function of beginning 
the structuring of the lawsuits by identifying material facts in dispute 
between the parties. A German complaint can be the most important 
submission the plaintiff makes to the court. 
                                                 
275 HEINZ THOMAS, HANS PUTZO, KLAUS REICHOLD & RAINER HÜßTEGE, ZIVILPROZESS-
ORDNUNG § 253, margin no. 10 (31st ed. 2010) [THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHOLD, ZPO, since we cite 
only to sections revised by Reichold]. 
276 See text at note **  infra. 
277 THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHOLD, ZPO Einl. II, margin no. 2. 
278 THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHOLD Einl. II, margin no. 5. 
279 See LEO ROSENBERG & KARL HEINZ SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT § 92, margin no. 22 
(17th ed. 2010). 
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As we discuss below, German courts review complaints for formal 
procedural requirements and substantive sufficiency before they, and not 
plaintiffs, serve complaints on defendants.  
 
Substantiation  
 
A German complaint must be “substantiated.” That means that it must 
state the facts on which it rests as well as identify the evidence to be used to 
establish those facts. The complaint must state facts so exactly that, based on 
the information provided, the court could determine that the legal relief 
sought should be granted, if the allegations are true. Thus the complaint must 
state all the facts that a legal norm requires for application. The complaint 
may, but need not, carry through the subsumption of the particular facts 
alleged under an applicable legal rule. If the plaintiff has more than one 
possible legal claim, the complaint should state facts that satisfy all the 
requisite elements of each claim. Facts that do not support one of the 
elements of a possible claim have no place in a complaint. It is a matter of 
tactic—disputed among experts—whether the complaint should assert facts 
that undercut defendant’s possible defenses.  
The degree of substantiation required for each fact alleged varies. When a 
fact is not seriously disputed, it can be stated in general terms. When it is 
disputed, it should be substantiated precisely. More detail is indicated if the legal 
concepts involved are indefinite (e.g., negligence). Proffering too little support in 
the initial complaint is ordinarily not fatal, but good practice is to err by 
substantiating too much rather than too little.  
Plaintiff’s complaint anticipates the court’s final judgment. One might 
describe the complaint as a draft—from the plaintiff’s perspective—of the 
judge’s final judgment, or as directions to the judge on how the judge might 
write the final judgment, or at the least, as the materials on which the judge 
may base the judgment.  
 
2. Formal Requirements of Complaints 
 
Under § 253 ¶ 2 ZPO (in connection with § 130 ZPO), a complaint must 
contain: 
1. Caption with subject matter and amount in controversy; 
2. Request(s) for legal relief; 
3. Position regarding invocation of single judge in Landgericht; 
4. Introductory sentence; 
5. Statement of facts (basis for claim) (Tatsachenvortrag 
(Klagegrund));  
6. Identification of proof; 
7. Legal evaluation of the case; and 
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8. Signature.280
 
 
A plaintiff takes the first step toward commencing a lawsuit by filing a 
complaint with the court. Here, since the amount in controversy is more than 
€5,000, the proper court is the District Court (Landgericht) where John Doh, Jr. 
lives in Munich (Munich I since he lives in the city, not Munich II in the area). 
The complaint must include all facts on which the claim rests, not merely what 
the claim is. Moreover, it must state the means of proof that are to prove the 
factual assertions, i.e., the complaint must be “substantiated.” Relevant 
documents in possession of the plaintiff are to be appended to the complaint. 
Documents in possession of others as well as expected witness testimony are 
indicated by designation.  
Below is a complaint in the case of Roh v. Doh. While the demands of the 
German complaint are particular, in a simple case such as this, the German 
complaint is not so greatly different from a fuller American complaint. 
 
 
COMPLAINT 
 
In the Matter Of Mary Roh v. John Doh, Jr. 
 
        
 Berlin, November 15, 2011 
 
To the 
District Court (Landgericht) Munich I 
Prielmayerstraße 7 
80335 Munich 
 
-Civil Chamber- 
 
C O M P L A I N T 
 
Of the merchant  Mary Roh, Bismarkstraße 11, 10400 Berlin 
 
-Represented by: Lawyer Harry Hahn,  
        
  - P l a i n t i f f - 
 
against 
 
 
the merchant John Doh, Jr.,  Kaiserplatz 11, 84471 Munich 
        
  - Defendant - 
 
For repayment of a loan 
                                                 
280 See MARIUS BREUCKER, ANWALTSSTRATEGIEN IM ZIVILPROZESS: AUßERGERICHTLICHE UND 
GERICHTLICHE MANDATSBEARBEITUNG 93 (2006).  
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Amount in controversy: €60,000. 
 
In the name of and on behalf of the Plaintiff I bring this Complaint and request 
scheduling of an oral hearing, in which I will petition, 
 
to adjuge the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff €60,000. 
together with  5 % interest over Prime Rate since April 
16, 2011. 
Justification: 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff and Defendant, whose father has been a friend of Plaintiff for many years, are 
both independent Honda Automobile dealers. 
 
At the traditional spring party of the regional Honda dealers on April 15, 2011 at the 
Hotel Kaiser Hof in Berlin Defendant asked Plaintiff for a loan in the amount of €60,000. 
 
At the time Defendant was engaged to be married to Plaintiff’s only daughter; his 
urgent request for money was a complete suprise to Plaintiff. Defendant justified it with 
the explanation that his company had a sudden cash shortfall. Since this problem was 
only temporary, he did not want to go to his father—the regional Honda distributor—
with it. He did not want his father to get the impression that he was having trouble 
managing his company. 
 
   Proof: Testimony of the Parties 
 
Since Plaintiff wanted to help Defendant, her friend’s son and her own prospective son-
in-law, she promised to transfer the requested sum of money as quickly as possible. 
Both agreed that Defendant would pay the money back as soon as the financial 
problem was overcome and in any case no later than August 15, last year. 
 
   Proof: Testimony of the Parties 
 
On the following day, April 16, 2011, Plaintiff transferred the money requested to 
Defendant’s company’s account at the Deutsche Bank, Munich, Account No. 22 38 40, 
Bank Identification No. 700 700 10. 
 
Proof:  in case of dispute, submission of the application 
for transfer and the account excerpt of the bank.  
 
Plaintiff has to this day not paid the money back. When the parties met at a meeting of 
dealers September 7, 2011 in Berlin, Plaintiff asked Defendant, why he had not yet 
paid the loan back as he had promised. She explicitly demanded that he immediately 
repay the loan. Defendant reacted astonished. He replied that there was nothing to 
repay; the transfer of €60,000 was clearly a gift. Plaintiff was speechless.  
 
   Proof: Testimony of the Parties 
 
II. 
 
A Complaint is required because Defendant not only has not repaid the money, he has 
expressly refused repayment. Pursuant to § 488(1) of the Civil Code (BGB) Plaintiff is 
obligated to repay the loan.  
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Under § 286(1) BGB Defendant has been in default on his repayment obligation since 
April 16, 2011. Because he has not repaid the loan, he must also pay default interest at 
the level provided in § 288(1) BGB. 
 
   Proof: Bank confirmation if disputed. 
 
Assignment of the case to a single judge is acceptable. 
 
Harry Hahn 
Lawyer for Plaintiff  
 
 
3. Joinder of Claims, Splitting of Claims and Joinder of Parties 
 
Joinder of Claims 
 
The German system of pleading facts makes raising different legal 
grounds for the same factual transaction unnecessary. Nevertheless, if 
lawyers have in mind different legal grounds, they need to allege facts 
sufficient to support each of those claims.  
In our case Hahn will write a complaint that alleges facts sufficient to 
support the basic claim of a loan by Roh to John Doh, Jr.: she and defendant 
Doh, Jr. agreed to a loan of €60,000 which loan, after due demand, Doh, Jr., 
has failed to repay. Hahn will take care, however, in the event that that claim 
fails and Doh, Jr. is successful in his assertion that the payment was gift, to 
allege facts that prove it was a gift conditioned on the marriage of Doh, Jr. to 
Roh’s daughter Rosa, and that that condition failed and, therefore gives rise 
to a right under principles of unjust enrichment to its return. 
The German system offers no incentive such as punitive damages to 
encourage Roh to add different legal grounds for the case against Doh, Jr. 
Roh can get her money back only once; so as long as she has a right to the 
money under either her or Doh, Jr.’s view of the facts, there is no point in 
stretching existing legal grounds or creating new ones. Such imagination 
would only serve to complicate her case and delay her recovery. 
As in the American system, Roh, if she has other claims against Doh, Jr. 
based on other facts, may raise those claims in this lawsuit, provided the 
court has jurisdiction over those claims. Adding different factual grounds for 
relief could create additional court and attorneys’ fees, but at a lower level as 
if Roh brought the claims as separate lawsuits. 
Here we assume that Hahn writes the complaint to allege facts 
supporting the contract claim and additional facts sufficient to support an 
unjust enrichment claim for repayment of a conditional gift. 
 
Claim Splitting Instead of Claim Joinder 
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Instead of joining claims to improve one’s negotiation position, the 
German system of loser-pays legal fees encourages splitting claims to reduce 
litigation risks. For example, if defendant failed to make payments when 
due, plaintiff may reduce litigation risks by suing only for one missed 
payment. Suit for the single payment will disclose, at lower risk, any defense 
defendant has. If plaintiff wins, defendant may pay all amounts due without 
further plaintiff having to bring another lawsuit. If defendant fails to pay, the 
earlier judgment in the first suit will not foreclose, but may facilitate, a later 
suit for the other missed payments. 
 
Joinder of Parties  
 
Joinder of parties is only exceptionally required, most commonly, “if the 
disputed legal relationship of all members of the suit group can only be 
determined on a unitary basis.”281
 
 In other cases, while joinder is possible, it 
rarely raises issues of litigation strategy comparable to those it presents in 
the United States, where it is frequently used to create or destroy federal 
diversity jurisdiction. The greater precision of the German system in 
determining liability and its extent, the lower costs of litigation in general, 
and the loser-pay allocation of expenses, discourages adding additional 
parties just to bring in more defendants who might contribute to a settlement. 
The greater control of proof-taking likewise strips joinder of advantages it 
might have in the United States in widening discovery (discussed in Chapter 
6).  
3. Handling Complaints 
 
As in the United States, in Germany plaintiffs commence lawsuits by filing 
complaints with courts. Unlike in the United States, the filing fees can be 
substantial and can themselves deter litigation. The fee is based on a percentage 
of the amount in controversy (Streitwert) and constitutes an advance on eventual 
court costs. In Roh’s case against Doh, with an amount in controversy of 
€60,000, the filing fee would be €1,668. If she prevails, Doh will be responsible 
for paying it. 
In Germany, once Roh has filed her complaint and paid the fee, the court 
will assign a judge or judges to the lawsuit. While formerly German district 
courts assigned three judges, today in cases such as this, they assign only one. To 
prevent corruption of civil justice, the court assigns a judge predetermined by the 
court’s organization plan. In Germany, litigants have a constitutional right to 
what is termed their “statutory judge” (gesetzlicher Richter). Each year the court 
issues a plan that abstractly assigns cases based on subject matter to specific 
chambers of judges within the court. 
                                                 
281 § 61 ZPO (as translated in MURRAY & STÜRNER,  supra 171, at 202. 
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In Roh v. Doh the judge assigned will be a member of a civil chamber. Each 
chamber has its own special competencies beyond just civil or criminal matters. 
Specific chambers handle specific types of case, e.g., construction cases. There 
are special commercial law chambers which may use lay judges alongside a 
professional judge.282
 
 Specialization facilitates judicial familiarity with particular 
areas of law and with the environments from which those cases come. In those 
cases where three judges are appropriate, all judges come from the same 
chamber. One of the chamber’s judges is the chairman of the chamber and has 
administrative responsibilities for the chamber and its personnel.  
Reviewing Complaints before Serving 
 
As in most American jurisdictions, in Germany plaintiffs file complaints 
with courts to commence lawsuits. While in America courts only 
exceptionally serve complaints, in Germany they always do. Moreover, 
while in America, courts never review complaints before they are filed, in 
Germany they always so 
In Germany the judge who is assigned the case on filing, reviews it 
before directing it to be served. The judge tests the complaint for procedural 
permissibility (Zulässigkeit) and for substantive soundness (Schlüssigkeit). 
Procedural permissibility refers to whether the complaint adequately alleges 
formal prerequisites for litigation (e.g., jurisdiction.); substantive soundness 
relates to whether the complaint alleges facts, which if true, and evidence 
which if credited, would support ordering a legal remedy.   
Procedural permissibility. The judge first reviews the complaint for 
procedural permissibility. If one or more procedural prerequisites is absent, the 
judge is to dismiss the complaint on the basis that is most easily and quickly 
determined. The procedural prerequisites of German civil procedure are familiar 
to American lawyers. Five correspond to requirements of the American Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), nos. (1) to (5): (1) subject matter 
jurisdiction, (2) personal jurisdiction, (3) venue, (4) process, and (5) service of 
process. In American federal civil procedure, however, these issues are 
reviewed—ordinarily only upon a party’s initial response to service of a 
complaint—if the defendant requests such a review.  
Substantive soundness. If the complaint is procedurally permissible, 
then the judge examines it for substantive soundness. The judge is required 
to examine all bases for the claim which seriously come into question. As 
with the review for permissibility, the judge is to conduct the review in the 
most economical order.  
In reviewing for substantive soundness the judge must examine whether 
the individual assertions of the plaintiff's submissions satisfy the abstract 
elements of the claim made. The judge is not to take into account factual 
allegations that are not substantiated.  
                                                 
282 §§ 93 et seq. GVG. 
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Responding to deficiencies. If the judge finds that a complaint is 
deficient on procedural grounds, the judge is not to dismiss the complaint 
immediately, but is to call the deficiency to the attention of the plaintiff and 
to request supplementation.283 If the judge finds that the complaint is 
deficient on substantive grounds, the judge is to serve the deficient 
complaint,284 but under the judge’s general duty of elucidation discussed 
below, it to notify plaintiff promptly of the deficiency.285
 
 
Challenging Sufficiency of Service and of Complaints 
 
That German courts review complaints before serving them, does not 
preclude defendants from challenging the sufficiency of either. If defendant 
makes a challenge—most commonly to procedural permissibility—the court 
may hold a hearing. If the court finds a complaint impermissible on grounds 
of no subject matter jurisdiction, or on grounds of improper venue, on 
application of plaintiff, it is to transfer the case to the correct court. Its 
decision to transfer cannot be appealed and binds the transferee court.286 If 
plaintiff fails to make such application, the court must dismiss the claim. If 
the court finds the complaint impermissible other grounds, it is to dismiss the 
case.287
 
 
Responding to Complaints 
 
As in the United States, once John Doh, Jr. is served with the complaint, the 
lawsuit begins in earnest. In Germany, defendants have the same four 
alternatives as in the United States: acquiesce, default, answer on the merits and 
challenge the sufficiency of the complaint.  
Acquiesce. Acquiescing is largely the same in Germany as in the United 
States, although in Germany, thanks to the cost system, defendants may be less 
likely than defendants in the United States to receive complaints that are not 
preceded by formal demand letters. 
Default. German law does not permit a clerk to enter a default judgment 
against a defendant who has failed to appear.288
Answer. Once the complaint is served, a defendant who chooses to 
 While the court is not required to 
hold a hearing, it must (again) review the plaintiff’s complaint for soundness to 
determine that the complaint sets forth the existence of all facts necessary to 
uphold a legal claim and make certain that the complaint does not itself set out 
facts that if proven would fulfill an affirmative defenses that would negate the 
claim.  
                                                 
283 THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHOLD, ZPO Vorbem. 253, margin no. 12, at 407. 
284 THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHOLD § 253 Margin No. 38. 
285 THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHOLD § 139 Margin Nos. 15ff. 
286 § 281 ZPO. 
287 § 280 ZPO. 
288 § 331(3) ZPO. 
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contest the case, must respond with an answer. The answer is subject to 
requirements similar to those governing complaints: it must be true, 
complete, specific, and substantiated. The court will then review the 
complaint and the answer for materiality, i.e., materiality to the relationship 
between assertions of the defendant and those of the plaintiff. 
 
Directing further Proceedings 
 
Coincident with preliminary review the judge determines how the case is to 
proceed further: whether the case will use additional written proceedings or will 
use a so-called early first hearing. The judge’s choice is purely pragmatic: the 
judge selects the method that the judge thinks is more likely in this case to be 
more efficient, i.e., is more likely to simplify and hasten framing of the material 
and disputed issues.  
Most German judges prefer early oral hearings in most routine, contested 
cases. They regard written proceedings as productive of complexity. They see the 
oral hearing as the means to move the case along expeditiously and dynamically. 
Most judges direct oral hearings as soon as possible. Through oral hearings 
points in dispute can be quickly clarified; events and dates can be mutually 
acknowledged. Routes to settlements can be developed 
Prior to the first hearing, or prior to the exchange of further written 
pleadings, as the case may be, the judge is required to prepare future 
proceedings. Preparations may include: (1) directing parties to supplement their 
pleadings, (2) directing government authorities to provide information and 
documents, (3) ordering the personal appearance of the parties, (4) summoning 
witnesses named by a party to the hearing, and (5) ordering production of 
documents or things and making premises and other things available for 
observation. In some cases, based on these preparations, the judge may be able to 
resolve the entire case at the first hearing. 
We consider the first hearing in Chapter 6. 
 
D. Korea 
 
Korean pleading practice parallels the practice of the German system on 
which it is based: plaintiff commences a lawsuit by filing with the court a 
complaint that sets out a claim of right and establishes the subject matter of 
the controversy, a judge reviews the complaint for procedural and 
substantive sufficiency, the court serves the complaint, the defendant 
responds to the complaint, and the judge uses the pleadings to narrow the 
case and take it in the direction of decision. As in Germany, pleadings define 
the boundaries of the lawsuit and facilitate reaching a final decision 
according to law. 
 
1. Substantive Requirements of Complaints 
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While Korean pleading practice in general outline parallels German 
practice, it differs in particular respects as to what it requires of complaints. 
While Korean practice is similarly concerned with setting out the matter in 
controversy, it does not follow the maxim da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius that 
makes unnecessary party identification of the legal basis of the claim. 
Korean practice requires plaintiffs state the applicable legal rule. In this 
respect, Korean practice resembles historic American common law pleading. 
In a further departure from German practice, Korean practice allows 
plaintiffs to state facts generally and does not require that they be 
substantiated. In this respect, it resembles modern American pleading. The 
difference is apparent in how differently Korean practice defines the matter 
in controversy. 
As we have seen, German practice is oriented toward a definition in fact 
of the matter in controversy. Korean practice draws a distinction—not 
always easily understood by non-Koreans, or even by Koreans—between the 
“gist of the claim” (청구취지, cheong gu chi ji) and the “grounds for the 
claim” (청구원인, cheong gu ₩in). Academic commentary defines the claim 
(청구, cheong gu) to be plaintiff’s assertion of a substantive right against 
defendant which he or she requires the court to adjudicate in the lawsuit. It 
sees the claim as defined both by its gist and by its grounds. The gist of the 
claim, which corresponds to the German Anspruch, addresses the legal basis, 
while the grounds, which correspond to the German Sachverhalt, concern the 
factual relationship. In common usage, the term claim (청구,  cheong gu) is 
used interchangeably with and as a synonym for “matter in controversy” 
(소송물, sosongmu), Streitgegenstand in German),  “subject of the action” 
(소송의 객체, sosong eo kaekche), and “subject of the adjudication” 
(심판의 대상,  sympal eo daesang).  
Alleging facts. The factual requirements that Korean complaints must 
satisfy tend toward the looser requirements of American notice pleading. 
Korean complaints do not have to state the ground for the claim in the broad 
sense of identifying facts that support every constituent element of the legal 
rule. They are sufficient if they identify facts that establish the claim in a 
narrow sense that permits court and defendant to distinguish this claim from 
other claims. Since Korean complaints are not required to allege all material 
elements, they likewise need not identify evidence necessary to prove those 
element, i.e., they need not be substantiated. These looser requirements 
notwithstanding, better lawyers usually state their clients’ claims in the 
broader sense. In this way they can give the court a better idea of their 
clients’ cases.  
Identifying the legal rule. While Korean procedure spares plaintiffs 
from identifying all material elements of the applicable rule and of 
substantiating the facts that they assert, it does require that they identify the 
legal rule relied on. It makes that requirement meaningful by limiting judges 
to ordering remedies only on the legal basis claimed. While the legal basis is 
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not invariably fixed finally in the complaint, usually it is. Once plaintiff 
finally fixes the basis of the claim, the plaintiff’s choice binds the court. 
Thus, for example, where plaintiff has claimed breach of contract, the court 
could not then find for plaintiff on a tort ground. This requirement is 
reminiscent of historic American common law pleading. While the Korean 
Supreme Court continues to insist on this approach, scholars criticize it. 
They see it as particularly inappropriate in pro se cases where laypersons are 
unlikely to appreciate or be able to make the choice.289
Comparing German and Korean complaints. While Korean practice 
requires plaintiffs to identify legal claims, otherwise it is less demanding of 
complaints than is German practice. As noted it requires stating facts only 
generally. It does not require stating all facts necessary to a claim or 
indentifying the evidence expected to be relied on. These looser 
requirements may be attributable to the high incidence of pro se 
representation in Korea. In Germany almost all complaints in the District 
Court are drafted by lawyers; in Korea, more than half are drafted by non-
lawyers.
  
290
 
 It would be impractical to hold lay-drafted complaints to the 
same technical standards as lawyer drafted complaints. Significantly in 
Germany, in the lowest courts, the Amtsgerichte), where parties are not 
required to use lawyers, complaints are more loosely drafted and are held to 
less rigorous standards.  
2. Formal Requirements of Complaints 
 
The formal requirements of complaints are set out in the Civil Practice 
Act: (i) identification, including name and address, of parties and their legal 
representative(s) if any; (ii) gist of the claim; and (iii) grounds for the claim 
in a narrow sense.291 Ordinarily the complaint also includes: (i) case title; (ii) 
documents to be attached; (iii) the date when the complaint was drawn up; 
(iv) the name of the court which has accepted the lawsuit; (v) allegations of 
facts satisfying procedural requisites including competence of the court of 
the suit; (vi) the factual allegation which the claim is based on, i.e., grounds 
for the claim in a broad sense; and (vii) special statement regarding evidence 
upon which the action is founded.292
 
  
3. Joinder of Claims and Joinder of Parties 
Joinder of Claims (소의 객관적 병합) 
                                                 
289 See Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 134-135, reprint at 10-11. 
290 See Hyun Seok Kim, Why do We Pursue “Oral Proceedings” in Our Legal System?, 7 J. 
KOREAN L. 51, 71-73 (2007), reprinted in LITIGATION IN KOREA 31, 48-50 (Kuk Cho, ed., 
2010)  (giving levels of participation by lawyers in proceedings). 
291 § 249 KCPA. 
292 § 254 (4) KCPA. 
135   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
 
Joinder of claims (소의 객관적 병합; so ui kaekgancheok byunghap) 
arising out of separate factual events is available when the following 
conditions are satisfied: (i) the adjudication of each of two or more claims 
can be subject to the same kind of proceedings; and (ii) the court is 
competent to adjudicate each of the claims.293 The claims, as a rule, need not 
be related to each other.294
The court, upon its own authority, reviews whether requirements for 
joinder of claims are met. When it believes the requirements are not 
satisfied, it may not dismiss the case but must adjudicate each claim 
independently as if it had been asserted in a separate action.
  
295
 
 However, it 
must transfer one of claims to another court if it finds that the claim is within 
exclusive competence of that court. §§ 31, 34 KCPA. After requirements of 
joinder of claims are found to be met, the court determines whether each 
claim, standing alone, complies with procedural requisites. The court is to 
dismiss those claims that it finds do not comply and is to proceed with those 
that do.  
Joinder of Parties (소의 주관적 병합) 
 
There are several procedural devices by which the court allows parties 
or nonparties to litigate together.296
 
 For reasons similar to those discussed 
with respect to the German system, joinder of parties does not lead to 
strategic issues the way it does in the United States. 
Fees Due on Filing 
 
Plaintiffs must pay upon filing of complaints a “stamp fee.” The fee is 
determined by the amount in controversy. It starts at 5% for an amount in 
controversy of less than ₩10 million and, as a percentage, declines from 
there. In this case Roh would be required to pay ₩342,500. If plaintiff 
prevails, plaintiff receives the fee back and defendant will be responsible for 
paying it. 
 
4. Handling Complaints 
 
Procedural permissibility. In Korea, as in Germany, the court reviews 
the complaint for procedural permissibility before serving it on defendant. 
Where the case is before a three-judge panel, the presiding judge is 
                                                 
293 § 253 KCPA. 
294 See LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM,  supra note 99, at 189-191. 
295 § 141 KCPA. 
296 LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 185-189. 
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responsible for the examination.297 The judge makes sure that the complaint 
meets procedural prerequisites (소송요건, sosong yokeon) as to form, party 
competence (당사자능력, dangsaja nuing’ryuk), procedural capacity 
(소송능력, sosong nuing’ryuk) and subject matter jurisdiction. If the judge 
finds the complaint defective, the judge is to provide plaintiff an opportunity 
to make necessary corrections. For example, if plaintiff provides an incorrect 
address, and the judge detects it, the judge will direct plaintiff to correct the 
mistake within a reasonable time. If plaintiff does not or cannot make the 
correction timely, the judge is to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs may 
appeal dismissal orders immediately.298
Substantive soundness. Unlike in Germany, in Korea the judge does 
not review the complaint for substantive soundness. The judge does confirm 
that the complaint states the gist and the grounds for the complaint. While 
the judge does not evaluate those, if the judge considers the claims made 
legally groundless, the judge is to follow the procedures just outlined and is 
to direct plaintiff to revise the complaint. 
  
While Korean complaints need not be substantiated, when plaintiffs 
refer in complaints to documentary evidence and fail to include those 
documents with their complaints, judges may and usually do direct parties to 
submit them.299
 
 
Service of the Complaint 
 
If the judge determines that the complaint satisfies these requirements, the 
judge will direct the court clerk to serve the complaint on defendants.300
 
   
 
COMPLAINT 
 
Case Claim for repayment of a loan 
 
 
Plaintiff Mary Roh 
        100 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul  
 
Plaintiff’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Harry Hahn 
        111 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul 
 
Defendant John Doh, Jr. 
        300 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan 
 
                                                 
297 254(1) KCPA. 
298 § 254(3) KCPA. LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, 
at 131-134. 
299 § 254(4) KCPA. 
300 7 J. KOREAN L., supra note 236, at 135-136, reprint at 12; LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL 
TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, at 135-139. 
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Defendant’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Betty Bahn 
        313 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan  
 
 
   TENOR OF CLAIMS 
 
1. Defendant shall pay plaintiff ₩7,500,000 and default charge at a rate of 20% per 
annum from next date of service of this complaint copy to the date of full payment. 
 
2. Defendant shall be liable to all of litigation expenses. 
 
3. Paragraph 1 can be executed provisionally. 
 
The above tenor of claims is sought for judgment. 
 
RATIONALE OF CLAIMS 
      
1. Plaintiff transferred ₩7,500,000 to the account of DohSon Honda LLC run by 
Defendant on April 16, 2011 and Defendant promised to repay the said 
amount of money to plaintiff by August 15, 2011. 
 
2. However, arguing that Plaintiff gifted Defendant with the said money, 
Defendant refused to repay it to Plaintiff even after August 15, 2011. 
 
3. Hence, Plaintiff institutes this action to seek from Defendant the payment of 
₩7,500,000 and default charge at a rate of 20% per annum from next date of 
service of the complaint copy to the date of full payment. 
 
Dated: November 15, 2011 
 
 
Responding to the Complaint 
 
Acquiesce. Acquiescing is largely the same as in Germany and in the 
United States. The party who has brought the lawsuit will want to have the costs 
previously paid to the court.  
Default. Korean law does not permit a clerk to enter a default judgment 
against a defendant who fails to appear. While the court is not required to 
hold an oral hearing for a defendant who fails to answer, it must review the 
plaintiff’s complaint for soundness to determine that the complaint sets forth 
the existence of all facts necessary to uphold a legal claim and does not itself 
set out facts that would suffice to fulfill affirmative defenses that would 
negate the claim. The failure to answer is deemed an admission of the facts 
asserted in the complaint. Notwithstanding the default, the defendant may 
appeal that judgment.301
Answer. The defendant contests the complaint by filing an answer with 
the court. The answer may raise procedural and substantive defenses. In the 
case of procedural defenses, the judge may order the plaintiff to cure the 
  
                                                 
301 See 7 J. KOREAN L., supra note 236, at 127, reprint at 17. 
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deficiencies, dismiss the complaint, or continue proceedings on the matter 
generally and as part of those proceedings determine whether the procedural 
defense is not well founded. 
Until the 2002 Reform defendants were not required to respond to 
complaints. Many did not. Those that did, did so with simple denials that did 
not give any substantiation. Now defendants are required to respond within 
30 days from the date when a copy of complaint was served to the 
defendant.302 If they fail to do so, the facts on which claims of the plaintiff 
are based are deemed admitted and the judge may enter judgment without a 
hearing.303 In their answers defendants must specifically respond both to the 
gist of and to the ground for the claim raised in the plaintiffs’ complaints.304 
Judges are authorized to permit court clerks to urge defendant to substantiate 
their answers.305
Directions for Further Proceedings 
  
 
Until the amendments of 2002 subsequent proceedings were written. 
Since 2002 oral preliminary proceedings such as occur in Germany are 
preferred.306
 
 This change was undertaken in reliance on the German model. 
                                                 
302 § 256 KCPA. 
303 § 257 KCPA. See Moon-Hyuck Ho, Zur Reform des koreanischen Zivilprozessrechts im Jahr 
2002, RECHTSREFORM UND DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA IM VERGLEICH 87, 89 (Thomas 
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304 Korean Civil Procedure Rule § 65(1). (The Rules are promulgated by the Supreme Court and 
complement the KCPA.) 
305 See Korea Civil Procedure Rule 65(2). 
306 See Kwon, Korea: Bridging the gap, supra note 73, at 179; Kwon, Litigating in Korea, 7 J. 
KOREAN L., supra note 236, at 127-128, reprint at 17-18. 
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C H A P T E R  6 
 
P R O C E S S 
T H E  R I G H T  T O  B E  H E A R D 
 
 
 
Contemporary Korean Court Proceeding 
 
The civil action has commenced. Mary Roh has filed a complaint; John 
Doh, Jr. has interposed a defense. They have reached the critical point in 
their lawsuit when by “the course of the law of the land,” they are to be 
heard in the cause before the court. 
In this chapter we examine “process.” Process occurs in the period after 
a lawsuit is commenced by party pleading and before it is concluded in 
judicial judgment. Process is the legal consideration of material facts and of 
applicable law. If parties dispute which facts are true, or which are material, 
process provides them opportunity to persuade the court which are material 
and to present proof to the court of which are true. If parties disagree with 
which law governs their dispute, or interpret law differently, process 
provides them opportunity to express their views on governing law.  
At the conclusion of process, the court applies the determined law to the 
facts found to produce the characteristic product of civil litigation: a decision 
according to law of the parties’ rights and duties. That decision is known as a 
judgment and is the subject of Chapter 7. 
In this chapter, after an introduction of process generally and of the 
centrality of the right to be heard to process, we discuss process in each of 
our countries specifically and how process might unfold in the case of Roh v. 
Doh. In our discussion we consider two remarkable differences between 
process in the United States, on the one hand, and process in Germany and 
Korea, on the other hand. In the United States, process is bifurcated into two 
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distinct and consecutive stages, pre-trial and trial. In the pretrial phase, 
mostly through what is called discovery, the parties’ lawyers independent of 
the court, but with the authority of the court, investigate the facts of the case. 
In the second phase, trial, the parties’ lawyers present their findings to the 
court for determination. Not until that second phase do parties usually 
discuss the case with the court. Until then parties are not heard by the court 
on the facts of the case. 
In Germany and Korea, where process is continuous, there is no court-
sanctioned private investigation of the case. There is no taking of testimony 
out of the presence of the court, except such testimony as the court may 
direct be taken by another court at a distance. In American terms, there is no 
discovery. The parties may investigate beforehand, but then they do so 
without authority of the court and without the court’s power to compel 
testimony of uncooperative witnesses. While there is no discovery in 
German and Korean law, there is in the continuous court proceeding constant 
opportunity for parties and their lawyers to discuss with the court facts to be 
found, law to be determined and eventual application of law to those facts. 
Below, after giving an overview of American discovery, we discuss 
three perspectives on pretrial discovery: contemporary, non-American and 
that of the drafters. For many Americans today, civil litigation without 
discovery is unthinkable. For many non-Americans,  American discovery is 
unthinkable when unrelated to material facts in dispute. For the drafters, 
discovery has become something different than what they had in mind. 
 
The Right to be Heard 
 
The right to be heard is fundamental to fair process. It means that one is 
fully informed about the proceeding, that one may give one’s views on legal 
and factual questions, and that one’s views are taken into account before the 
court reaches its decision.  
In the United States the due process guarantees of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution “include a right to be heard and 
to offer testimony.”307
In Germany the constitution (Basic Law, Grundgesetz) explicitly 
guarantees a right to be heard: “In the courts everyone is entitled to a hearing 
in accordance with the law.” Article 103(1). 
  
In Korea, the right to be heard is a fundamental tenet of constitutional 
law. Article 27(1) of the Korean constitution guarantees a right to be heard; 
although stated in terms of criminal process it is recognized to be of general 
applicability.308
 
 
                                                 
307 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987).  
308 See generally Jibong Lim, Korean Constitutional Court and the due process clause, in 
LITIGATION IN KOREA, supra note  236, at 160. 
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Determining Law and Finding Facts 
 
Process prepares the way for judgment. It clarifies for the matter in 
controversy the issues in dispute between the parties. It identifies facts 
material to the parties’ claims of right and duty. It provides opportunity to 
dispute which facts are material and which are true. It determines the law to 
be applied. It provides opportunity to dispute the meaning of that law. By 
identifying material facts and determining the law to be applied, it structures 
the case and makes it ripe for decision.  
Thanks to the pervasive presence of Hollywood movies and American 
television productions, the American public and much of the world identifies 
civil court process with trial. Yet trial is only one part of American civil 
process and a vanishing part at that. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
address these two stages in separate subdivisions: Title V, “Disclosures and 
Discovery,” and Title VI, “Trials.” Contemporary American trials, when 
they happen, provide parties with opportunity to present to courts results of 
their pretrial investigations and to produce a picture of their theory of the 
case. In most American cases pretrial is all the process there is; there is no 
trial. 
Court proceedings in Germany and Korea are not bifurcated. There is no 
trial. There is no single event where parties present to courts their theory of 
the case. There are structured proceedings in which judges determine 
whether facts exist that fulfill the elements of a legal rule. We do not use the 
term “trial” to describe German or Korean court processes. We title this 
chapter “Process” instead of “Trial” not only to be inclusive of all three 
systems, but to remind American readers that in the great majority of 
American cases trials are not held. 
 
Day in Court or Inquisition  
 
In the United States, among the public, the right to be heard is known as 
the right to one’s “day in court.”309
The opposite of the day-in-court in American popular perception is the 
inquisition. The greatest of Anglo-American legal historians, Frederic 
William Maitland, relates that in the twelfth century Pope Innocent III 
introduced the new procedure of the inquisition to combat heresy. The 
inquisition procedure had three characteristics: “The judge proceeds ex 
 The right to a day in court is one of the 
most firmly rooted, long-standing, and widely-held ideals in American law. 
A day in court is one’s chance to present one’s argument in court. One gets 
“to tell it to the judge,” i.e., “talk to someone who can do something about 
your problems.” It is a right to be heard, but it is more than that. It prefers 
oral testimony in open court, subject to cross-examination, to other forms of 
proof. 
                                                 
309 E.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 at 51 (1987). 
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officio either of his own motion, or on the suggestion of a promoter …; he 
collects testimony against the suspect, testimony which the suspect does not 
hear; it is put in writing.”310
One unfortunate aspect of contemporary discussions of comparative 
civil procedure is that American scholars often call civil law systems of civil 
procedure “inquisitorial, even as they acknowledge that such descriptions are 
misleading. As we discuss in this chapter, German and Korean systems of 
civil procedure are not inquisitorial. German and Korean judges do not 
investigate anything ex officio. They are strictly limited by submissions of 
the parties. Judges cannot consider matters not raised by parties and cannot 
take evidence not proposed by parties. Judges do not collect testimony in 
private, but only in open hearings, in the presence of the parties, of the 
parties’ lawyers and of the interested public. Proceedings are oral. The 
parties themselves, and not just their lawyers, address the court directly and 
participate personally in the proceedings. The substance of testimony, but 
not the testimony itself, is put in writing. There are no verbatim transcripts 
such as are usual in the United States. 
 Under the procedure of the inquisition, the 
suspect may never be heard by the judge. 
It is ironic that American scholars describe civil law process as 
inquisitorial, for not only is process in Germany and Korea not inquisitorial, 
present-day American process better fits Maitland’s definition of the 
inquisition. As we will discuss, the bifurcation of discovery and trial has led 
to a world in which trial has vanished and in which American litigants 
almost never get to “tell it to the judge” or to a jury. Trial, its advocates say, 
is dead.311 Instead of trial American parties are subjected to discovery by the 
other side. In discovery, as in the inquisition, the investigator, i.e., the other 
side’s lawyer, proceeds ex officio, either of his or her own motion, or on the 
suggestion of a promoter (i.e., his or her client). He or she collects testimony 
in private—usually in the lawyer’s private conference room, without the 
public present, which often the party against whom the evidence is collected 
does not hear. Finally that testimony is put in writing verbatin for use later. 
No judge is present. In most cases the only “hearing” American parties ever 
get is from lawyers in the case.312 Parties to American litigation do not 
expect a kind of Spanish Inquisition.313
                                                 
310 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 657 (2nd ed., 1899). 
 But that is what they get, while their 
311 See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009). 
312 See, e.g., Mark Wolf, The purpose-driven interrogatory response, TRIAL, vol. 44, no. 12, 48 
at 49 (Dec. 2008). 
313 MONTY PYTHON, THE SPANISH INQUISITION SKETCH (Flying Circus, Series 2, Episode 2, 
first broadcast Sept. 22, 1970), transcript at http://www.montypython.net/scripts/spanish.php.
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counterparts in Germany and Korea get the adversarial procedure that 
Americans have long valued.314
 
 
 
A. United States 
 
The vanishing trial may be the most important issue facing 
our civil justice system today. 
 
Patricia Lee Refo, Chair, Section of Litigation, American 
Bar Association (2004)315
 
  
Trial is understood to determine material issues of disputed facts in 
order to permit courts to apply law to facts to determine rights and resolve 
disputes.316
Mary Roh has less than a two percent chance of getting a trial. Although 
trial by jury is said to be the “backbone of the American justice system” and 
the “hallmark of [American] participatory democracy,” it is, as Professor 
John H. Langbein acidly, but accurately, observes, “a goner.”
 As expectations of trials have moved beyond these relatively 
modest ambitions, the number of trials has declined dramatically. 
317 Even 
insiders acknowledge that “more trials are held on TV than in the 
courtroom.” They see that “the trial has vanished as a means to resolve 
disputes.”318
We cannot stress this point enough: while trial, in particular trial by jury, 
is the model for American legal procedures, while it is what Americans think 
of when they think of legal process, and while it is what American films 
present to the world as justice, it is a rare bird nearing extinction. To 
characterize the American system as a jury trial system is wrong. More 
accurate is to say that the American system is a process with a remote 
possibility of trial of any kind. 
 
                                                 
314 Cf., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 41 (2004) (Scalia, J., for the Court: “The 
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inquisitorial body), and no other disposition is conceivable.”) 
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Allow us to bring home the point: trials hardly ever happen. New 
judicial clerks (interns) are told: “A few actions eventually wind their way 
through the lengthy process of dispositive motions and settlement conference 
to reach trial.”319 Experienced judges acknowledge: “The vast majority of 
cases do not go to trial.”320 A proposal for reinvigorating the American 
litigation system sets a goal that every litigator “takes at least one case to 
trial every five years.”321
The numbers are clear. In the year ending September 30, 2009, a typical 
year, 276,397 civil cases were filed in the federal court system. Of all the 
cases pending that year there were only 3,154 trials aimed at final judgments. 
Of these, 2,138 were jury trials and 1,026 were non jury trials. In addition, 
there were 2,146 contested hearings in matters not aimed at final judgments. 
Even counting those contested hearings as “trials,” not even one case in fifty 
got a “day in court.” In the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, that is, in the court of Roh v. Doh, in 2009 there were only thirty 
civil trials.  The thousand federal judges of first instance averaged only three 
civil trials a year each (two jury and one non-jury).
 Read that again: one case in every five years for a 
professional litigator. And that is the goal. An “experienced” litigator may 
have thirty trials in his or her career. There are actors who have made more 
trial movies than some “trial lawyers” have had trials.  
322
State courts were no more productive of trials. We do not have numbers 
for bench trials, but the number of jury trials is not impressive. A study 
conducted by the National Center for State Courts and the State Justice 
Institute estimated that in 2006 all American state courts combined—in a 
country of 300 million people—conducted 45,459 civil jury trials (30.6% of 
148,558 jury trials of all kinds).
 
323
To put these numbers in perspective, we look to the courts in Bavaria. 
Bavaria is just one German state of sixteen; it has a population of 12½ 
million people, i.e., about one twenty-fourth of the population of the United 
States and about double the population of Maryland. Its first instance courts 
of general jurisdiction are the Landgerichte; their jurisdiction in civil matters 
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begins at €5,000. In 2008 there were 59,192 new civil cases were filed. That 
year the Landgerichte concluded 53,231 cases. In other words, the Bavarian 
courts alone concluded more civil cases than all American courts together 
conducted civil jury trials. The Bavarian Landgerichte as courts of first 
instance held 50,827 hearings, of which 13,854 included the taking of 
evidence. In the concluded cases, the courts issued contested judgments in 
14,261 cases, i.e., 23.9 % of cases (not the 2% typical in America). Another 
16,943 cases ended in court-supervised settlements (28.4%). The balance of 
cases concluded with other forms of decisions, with default judgments, 
transfers to other courts, and other dispositions.324
American judges realize that, since the vast majority of cases do not go 
to trial, they cannot rely on trials to provide litigants with “a feeling of 
respect, voice and inclusion. Their impressions of judges and our justice 
system—for better or worse—largely will be formed by their participation in 
… calendar calls, and other settings, not trials.”
  
325
Cost. Trial has vanished for several reasons. One reason is cost. Even a 
modest trial in a simple case, exclusive of comparable costs of pretrial, can 
cost each side $20,000. Less modest trials in more complicated cases can 
cost many times that amount. Since in the American system each side pays 
its own lawyers, any recovery a plaintiff recoups is reduced substantially; 
any victory a defendant wins is potentially pyrrhic.  
  
Risk. Another reason that trials have vanished is risk. When stakes are 
large enough—perhaps several hundred thousand dollars or more—while 
expense may be tolerable, the risk may not be. The final decision, whether 
by jury or by judge, is not well predictable, either of who wins or of 
remedies awarded. Even the strongest of cases has can be lost by a misstep 
in production or presentation. It is comparable to taking a chance in the 
lottery. Moreover, the risk is not that of parties alone. Lawyers fear for their 
reputations should they lose one of these rare battles. As one insider 
observes: “And ever present is the thought … if I shoot craps, my 
rep[utation] is mud and the client bids me and the many years of profitable 
billing adios. Instead of a big time rep[utation], accolades, and a corner 
office, I’m a shrub, earning a living, never trusted with another big one.”326
Inaccuracy. Yet a third reason trials have vanished is lack of accuracy. 
At trial there is always the possibility of the unexpected: the witness who 
says too much, or says too little, or does not appear; the facts that previously 
were unknown that surface only at trial; the new legal theory that suddenly 
finds acceptance; the lawyer, party or witness with whom jurors finds 
sympathy or spite; and so on. In the American form of trial, if the 
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unexpected arises, often little can be done: the case must be resolved by 
jurors as soon as possible, with as few adjournments as feasible. Fear of the 
unexpected created discovery and nurtured is gigantic growth. 
In place of trial, pre-trial discovery prevails. As we shall see, however, 
discovery does not provide parties a day-in-court. Discovery is a private 
affair where the parties’ lawyers have little to do with the judge and the 
parties even less. In discovery parties are subject to inquisition-like 
procedures.  
 
1. Pretrial Process 
 
The pretrial phase consists of pretrial conferences, discovery and pretrial 
motions. Today, discovery, when it occurs, dominates. As we discuss below, 
that was not the intention of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. They had in mind a process having greater resemblance to civil 
law process 
Since in today’s American scene discovery dominates, we address 
discovery first and give it the greatest attention among pretrial devices. We 
examine it at length in order to give readers an idea of just how extensive it 
can be. 
 
a. Discovery 
 
Pretrial discovery, or negotiation in its shadow, is the reality of 
American civil procedure. In pretrial discovery lawyers for the parties gather 
facts of the case. In theory—but rarely in practice—they later present those 
facts to a court at trial. Lawyers conduct discovery independent of the court 
yet with the power of the court to compel participation; they examine not 
only parties to the lawsuit, but third parties as well.  
Discovery permits lawyers to “fish” for new grounds to hold defendants 
liable. It helps them develop legal theories of the case. It does not limit them 
to legal syllogisms. It allows them to conduct a practically unbounded 
inquisition free of court control.  
Some comparativists see discovery as part of American legal culture, 
but in historical terms, it is a recent innovation. Only two generations ago, it 
was not a routine feature of American litigation. Pretrial discovery was the 
most notable innovation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938; it 
was a striking and imaginative departure from tradition. Before 1938 there 
had been only limited, special purpose, usually issue-focused discovery, 
available only in some states.327
                                                 
327 See GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932). 
 When adopted nationwide, no one imagined 
its present day scope. Discovery was to complement and supplement trial, 
but not to substitute for it. 
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Today discovery is routine and trial is exceptional. In a day of “notice 
pleading” and of “vanishing trials,” in many cases discovery is American 
litigation. Very few cases end in judgments after trial; more cases end in 
what are called “summary judgments” (more on this below) after some 
discovery has taken place. Many cases—perhaps the majority—have some 
form of discovery. In the federal system, all cases are subject to mandatory 
pre-trial disclosure. While the extent of discovery is a matter of debate, cases 
conducted without discovery settle in the shadow of discovery.  
Scope of Discovery. Discovery as practiced today gives parties license 
to explore facts that underlie or are merely tangentially related to their 
dispute. In practice, in the absence of meaningful judicial supervision, 
parties inquire into affairs far removed from the matter in controversy. 
According to the American College of Trial Lawyers Report, discovery is 
“limitless.”328 The Federal Rules authorize discovery of all matter “that is 
relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”329
The restriction to matters that are “relevant to any party’s claims or 
defenses” limits little, when claims and defenses are ill-defined in pleadings 
(see Chapter 5). Moreover, lawyers easily get around that modest limitation 
by stating multiple claims or by joining multiple defendants. Little in the law 
discourages them from adding claims or parties or even imagining new legal 
claims. The law allows lawyers to assert claims not presently recognized in 
law so long as they have a “non frivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”
 “Relevant information,” 
according to the rule, “need not be admissible at trial, if the discovery 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.” Moreover, for good cause and upon application, the court may 
dispense with even the limp limitation of discovery to claims and defenses 
and “order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the action.”(Emphasis added.) 
330
Little is safe from discovery. The only matters not subject to discovery 
are: confidential communications between client and lawyer; certain 
materials prepared for use at trial; and electronically stored information “not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”
  
331
Supervision of Discovery. Discovery was designed to take place 
without direct judicial supervision. Lawyers take depositions of witnesses, 
 Culling these 
materials and approving their exclusion from otherwise permitted discovery 
can be a major expense in itself. One of the few ways in which judges are 
involved in discovery is to review those exclusions. In other words, judges 
decide not what parties must disclose, but what they are allowed not to 
disclose. It is a privacy advocate’s nightmare.  
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including depositions of third party witnesses, examine documents, and 
exchange interrogatories all out of the physical presence of judges and 
without prior court approval. Although lawyers enjoy the power of the state 
to compel participation, the state takes no notice of what lawyers do in its 
name until someone formally complains to the court. 
Discovery rules anticipate a minimum of court supervision. While they 
permit court intervention, they do not require it and, in practice, direct 
judicial conduct of discovery almost never occurs. The usual judicial role in 
pretrial discovery is to approve party plans, to determine deadlines, and to 
decide occasional disputes about conduct of discovery. Lawyers, not judges, 
decide which witnesses to call and which information to demand. The 
judicial role is that of a keeper of the calendar.  
Strategic Uses of Discovery. Professor Sunderland, the drafter of the 
discovery rules, envisioned that pretrial discovery would eliminate issues for 
trial. So if an applicable rule had six elements, discovery might make clear 
that there was no material dispute between the parties on all but two 
elements. Discovery would, he hoped, facilitate party agreement before trial 
on which issues remained for determination at trial. He envisioned that 
summary judgment motion might resolve other issues before trial.  
The focus of discovery has not turned out as Sunderland expected. 
While trial lawyers do use discovery to clarify issues at trial, most also use it 
to develop their “theory of the case” or to develop new theories and to reach 
other strategic and tactical objectives.  
Discovery Supports Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is a 
judicial determination, that with respect to specific issues or with respect to 
the case as a whole, there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and 
that the court may give judgment as a matter of law. Litigating lawyers use 
discovery to support summary judgment motions. When they do, they use 
discovery in the way Sunderland intended. We discuss summary judgment 
below under pretrial motions.  
Sunderland hoped that summary judgment would eliminate issues of all 
sorts; today summary judgments serve principally to eliminate very weak 
cases, or at least, very weak legal claims (i.e., parts of cases). In these cases 
discovery may be able to establish that there are “no material issues subject 
to genuine factual dispute.” But this is a high bar that moving parties can 
vault over in few cases. Why? First, American procedure permits parties to 
characterize their claims legally in a great variety of ways. Second, most 
lawsuits turn on different understandings and evaluations of fact. Summary 
judgment in many cases fails, or is not usable, because a competent lawyer 
can conjure up an issue of material fact.  
Discovery Supports Case Theory Development. A common use of 
discovery is to assist lawyers in developing a theory of the case. A case 
theory is a thematic story that lawyers write for jurors (and judges and the 
press) to relate to. It includes the facts that form the elements of a cause of 
action, but the cause of action lies in the background. The theory of the case 
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makes the parties’ story comprehensible to non-lawyers; it puts the parties’ 
claims on a footing laymen can understand. It is considered the organizing 
principle for all that the trial lawyer does. 
Lawyers conduct discovery to prepare to present their parties’ versions 
of disputed events. It is as if each party is writing its own screenplay for a 
trial production. Discovery is the necessary background research for the 
screenplay. At trial, should a trial occur, each side produces the screenplay 
that its lawyers have written with help of discovery. Discovery used in this 
way is deliberately duplicative: first gather evidence in discovery, then 
present at trial the most favorable evidence collected.  
Discovery helps lawyers determine which among several different 
conceivable case theories is likely to be the strongest. It permits probing the 
basis, strengths and weaknesses of the opposing side’s case theories.  
As lawyers became accustomed to sweeping discovery, they adapted it 
as a tool to develop case theories and to press process into previously 
unreached regions. Now discovery is said to aid in private regulation of “the 
social and economic fabric of the country.”332 For lawyers who see 
themselves as engaged in private regulation, discovery is an end in itself. It 
is divorced from specific claims. They demand that adversaries not object to 
discovery, but should facilitate mutual knowledge of all facts. 333
Case Theory as Substitute for Legal Syllogism. The “theory of the 
case” has come to substitute for the syllogistic order of historic forms of 
common law and code (fact) pleading. While no rule requires parties to 
develop a theory of the case, practical needs of lawyers impel them to do so. 
An American trial is “really a struggle between … opposing stories.”
 
334  
According to Justice Antonin Scalia: “By and large I think it does work to 
have each side take the best shot at presenting the truth in favor of that side’s 
case and let the jury decide between the two.”335
Tactical Uses of Discovery. Lawyers have a variety of tactical uses for 
discovery, some envisioned by the drafters of the discovery rules and some 
not. Uses include: 
 
• establishing material facts that fulfill elements of one or more legal 
claims asserted by their clients (the main original basis for 
discovery); 
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• narrowing the issues in dispute between the parties to facilitate 
conducting trials and to promote settlements without trials; 
• “pinning down,” that is getting parties and witnesses to commit to 
particular positions and, in some instances, to admit particular facts;  
• evaluating and even undermining (“impeaching”) the credibility of 
witnesses; 
• perpetuating evidence, that is recording evidence that may not be 
available at trial; 
• influencing the other side to settle the case by demonstrating one’s 
own resolve or by requiring it to disclose sensitive information that 
it would rather not disclose (this is considered ethical); and, 
• grinding weaker opponents into submission by imposing on them 
burdens they cannot meet (this is considered unethical, but is not 
uncommon). 
 
Freedom to shape discovery bestows on lawyers opportunities to pursue 
procedural advantages that seem to some misuse. To win time, they order 
unnecessary depositions or drag out necessary ones. To exert force on 
financially weak parties, they direct burdensome discovery methods. The 
opposing side must ordinarily carry those costs, because there is no routine 
fee-shifting. The opposing party incurs aggravation, distraction and loss of 
time that is never recompensed.  
Freedom to shape discovery empowers lawyers to render some claims 
worthless. A judgment for $10,000 is worse than worthless if accompanied 
by discovery costs of $10,000. Some lawyers conduct discovery less for 
party advantage and more for lawyer fees.   
Discovery has many ends other than finding facts to fulfill legal rules. 
Arguments of opposing counsel are fought in discovery. Witnesses are 
questioned and documents examined in order to coach out admissions or to 
find documents which support one's own point of view. The dream goal is an 
oral or written admission of the entire case for one side (“smoking gun”) or 
at least important parts. Much time is wasted searching for such admissions.  
Lawyers use discovery to give shape to the case and to secure the 
general outlines of their theory of the case. They try to pin potential 
witnesses down. If a witness in a deposition in discovery says “A”, it is very 
hard for the witness to say “B” later, including at trial. “Mr. Witness, are you 
lying now, or were you lying then?” the inquiring lawyer will ask. In 
deposition the testimony of witnesses is recorded word-for-word. The 
lawyers write a “record” in this procedure, that in certain cases can later be 
presented to the judge or that the lawyers can read to jurors. Faced with fatal  
risks, only foolish lawyers fail to prepare witnesses for interrogation. 
Lawyers drill witnesses on wording of answers; they remind them to answer 
only exactly what is asked. They conduct practice interrogations recorded for 
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review. Such preparation strikes foreign observers as strange; in many 
systems it is  
unethical.336
 
  
b. Discovery Procedures 
 
Required Initial Disclosure. All parties, without awaiting a discovery 
request, must provide to all other parties: (1) names and contact information 
of any persons likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing 
party may use to support its claims or defenses; (2) a copy or description of 
all documents, electronically stored information and tangible things that it 
has in its possession which it may use to support its claims or defenses; (3) a 
computation of damages claimed by the party; and (4) a copy of any 
insurance agreement that may provide coverage in the matter.337
Planning discovery. The parties are required to confer “as soon as 
practicable” to attempt in good faith to agree on a “discovery plan.” The 
discovery plan must state parties’ views and proposals on six matters of how 
they anticipate conducting discovery.
 This 
required initial disclosure is a relatively new innovation. It is considered 
separate technically from discovery. It was hoped that it would expedite 
cases; it does not seem to have worked out that way.  
338
After the parties, really their lawyers, have met on the discovery plan 
and submitted it to the court, the judge determines deadlines to complete 
discovery. From that moment the parties’ lawyers individually order—often 
after prior consultation with other parties’ lawyers—discovery. They can 
order the discovery of other parties to the lawsuit and even of third parties 
not participating in the lawsuit, provided that they comply with the rules 
governing discovery. For most forms of discovery, persons subject to 
discovery “requests” must comply, unless they seek from the judge a 
“protective order.” Lawyers are cautioned not to run to the judge with minor 
disagreements regarding discovery. 
 While the Federal Rules authorize 
judges to be “managerial,” that is, to adopt an involved approach to lawsuits, 
most judges are not managerial in most of their lawsuits. Reports to the 
contrary are exaggerated.  
The central role of the lawyers in discovery is reminiscent of the central 
roles the lawyers had in special pleading in the nineteenth century. Then the 
adversary lawyers through pleading agreed on the issue to be resolved by the 
court. Today, discovery follows that same model. Different from those days, 
however, is  lawyers have the power of the court to compel testimony.  
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c. Means of Discovery 
 
There are four principal means of discovery: 
 
(1) oral testimony (Rule 30 depositions by Oral Examination);  
(2) viewing (for parties, Rule 34 Producing Documents, Electronically 
Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering Onto Land, 
for Inspection and Other Purposes; for parties and non-parties, Rule 
30(b)(2) Producing Documents as part of Rule 30 Depositions by 
Oral Examination);  
(3) written responses (for all persons, Rule 31 Depositions by Written 
Questions; for parties only, Rule 33 Interrogatories to Parties and 
Rule 36 Requests for Admissions); and 
(4) physical examination of persons who are parties (Rule 35 Physical 
and Mental Examinations).  
 
Once the parties’ lawyers have conferred on a discovery plan under Rule 
26(f), each may commence his or her own discovery. Neither has to wait on 
the other.339
 
 There are few limitations in discovery. One limitation is that a 
person cannot twice be subjected to deposition by oral examination. 
Limitations can be overcome by agreement or by permission of the court. 
How to  sequence discovery is a matter of each individual lawyer’s 
preferences. Usually lawyers start by sending written interrogatories and 
document requests to the opposing party to obtain basic information, 
continue with evaluating those documents, and finally move on to the more 
interactive forms of discovery, namely taking deposition testimony on oral 
examination, first of opposing parties, then of third-party witnesses and 
finally of experts. In the case of written interrogatories to parties and of 
document requests, some courts provide standard forms that are 
presumptively proper.  
(i) Written Interrogatories to Parties  
 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each party may require the 
other party to respond to up to twenty-five written interrogatories; with 
permission of the court, each may demand more.340
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 The other party must 
answer each question in writing and under oath unless he or she objects to it. 
While as American discovery methods go, this is a relatively inexpensive 
means of discovery, its usefulness is limited, since the other party’s lawyer 
prepares the answers and usually assure that the answers are not very 
helpful.  
340 FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
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The Local Rules of the United States District Court for Maryland 
provide standard form interrogatories. They allow plaintiffs to ask, inter alia: 
 
         
        STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify any persons or entities whom 
Defendant contends are persons needed for just adjudication within the meaning of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, but who have not been named by Plaintiff.  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all persons who are likely to have 
personal knowledge of any fact alleged in the complaint or in your answer to the 
complaint, and state the subject matter of the personal knowledge possessed by each 
such person.  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If you have knowledge of any person 
carrying on an insurance business that might be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment that might be entered in this action or to indemnify or reimburse the payments 
made to satisfy the judgment, identify that person and state the applicable policy limits 
of any insurance agreement under which the person might be liable.  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the facts concerning the matters 
alleged in [paragraph ____ of your Complaint] [paragraph ____ of your Answer to the 
Complaint] [your affirmative defense no. ___].  
        STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If you contend that __________, state 
the facts concerning such contention. 
 
 
Standard Interrogatory No. 5 is designed to determine whether 
defendant will claim that there is any other party that must be joined in the 
action. Here, such a party might be DohSon Honda LLC (if not named 
originally), or John Doh, Sr., or Doh Honda Distributing Co. Standard 
Interrogatory No. 6 serves to identify individuals with knowledge of the 
case. Its utility is somewhat limited if the plaintiff has served a minimal 
complaint that alleges few facts. This catch-all search for possible witnesses, 
however, should preclude the possibility that either party presents a surprise 
witness at the last moment, since the obligation to disclose continues even 
after the dates of the demand and of the other party’s response.341
Roh’s lawyer Hahn could build on Standard Interrogatories 10 and 11 to 
develop aspects of the case that on the facts stated are uncertain. In 
particular, he could try to elicit from John Doh, Jr. information regarding 
Doh, Jr.’s original request of Roh for money. What was the nature of the 
business reversals? Since Hahn knows that Doh, Jr. is claiming the money as 
a gift, he should inquire not only about what Doh, Jr. said when Roh 
promised the money, but also about business dealings that Doh, Jr. was 
having at that time. Hahn might also want to inquire into the knowledge and 
 Standard 
Interrogatory No. 7 helps the demanding party negotiate a settlement with a 
clear idea of how much money is available. Standard Interrogatories 10 and 
11 are to be the bases for interrogatories that help the demanding party better 
understand the case, plan that party’s further discovery and build that party’s 
theory of the case. 
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involvement of DohSon Honda LLC and of John Doh, Sr. in the transfer of 
the money. Since Hahn might also inquire into the involvement of Doh, Sr. 
in the business of DohSon Honda LLC to determine if there is a basis for 
holding him, as a limited liability owner of the company, personally liable 
for its debts. Hahn is largely free in when and how he poses the 
interrogatories so long as he remains within the allotted number (25).. 
Already here one sees the strategic and tactical possibilities that 
discovery creates. If Hahn has named either DohSon Honda LLC or John 
Doh, Sr. as defendants, he has greater opportunities to take discovery 
directly from them. He also, by taking discovery directly from them, brings 
to their attention—and their interest—the lawsuit. The additional cost to 
Hahn and to his client is not high. Even if Hahn has not brought in DohSon 
Honda LLC or John Doh, Sr. as parties, by including them in the scope of his 
discovery demands, he generates additional work for John Doh, Jr.’s lawyer 
and additional expense for John Doh, Jr. While those may be the nefarious 
purposes for which Hahn widens discovery, they are not so obvious as to 
appear abusive. The broad scope that discovery allows is broad enough to 
allow him to inquire into these issues. 
John Doh, Jr.—and, if they are parties, DohSon Honda, LLC and John 
Doh, Sr.—do not have to take these attacks lying down. They can 
counterattack with interrogatories and other discovery of their own. The 
Court has its own standard interrogatories for them to use: 
 
 
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify all persons who are likely to 
have personal knowledge of any fact alleged in the complaint, and state the subject 
matter of the personal knowledge possessed by each such person.  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all persons who have a 
subrogation interest in any claim set forth in the complaint, and state the basis and 
extent of such interest.  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Itemize and show how you calculate any 
damages claimed by you in this action, whether economic, non-economic, punitive or 
other.  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the facts concerning the matters 
alleged in [paragraph ____ of your Complaint] [paragraph ____ of your Answer to the 
Complaint] [your affirmative defense no. ___].  
STANDARD INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If you contend that __________, state 
the facts concerning such contention. 
 
 
These standard interrogatories mirror those allowed plaintiffs. Standard 
Interrogatory No. 3, which concerns damages, substitutes for No. 7 
concerning insurance coverage. 
Recall that John Doh, Jr. is enraged at his former fiancé, Rosa Roh. He 
is looking for ways to get revenge. If there is any claim that he has against 
Mary Roh that includes Rosa, he might bring it as a permissive joinder, that 
is, a claim unrelated to Mary Roh’s claim against him. Perhaps he gave Rosa 
a ring, which she has not returned, but that might be in Mary Roh’s 
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possession. Even if there is no such claim that might involve both of them, 
he would like to entangle Rosa in this suit to the extent possible to make her 
miserable. While John Doh, Jr.’s lawyer might, to some extent resist those 
efforts, such resistance is by no means sure. Depending upon how facts turn 
out, such resistance may not even be required by ethical rules. 
In formulating defense strategies for John Doh, Jr., his lawyer will look 
for anything that might support the assertion that the money paid was a gift. 
To that end, he might pose questions related to past gifts made by Mary Roh. 
He might ask her about the relationship between her daughter Rosa and John 
Doh, Jr. and about their pending marriage. He could inquire into the tax 
returns of Roh, because federal law requires that givers of gifts pay a gift tax 
on gifts above a certain amount ($13,000 in 2009). As with her adversary, 
there is little that encourages Doh’s lawyer to moderate her demands and 
much that pushes her to make discovery painful.  
Interrogatories to parties often are just the salvo in what can become a 
discovery war.  
 
(ii) Requests for Documents  
 
Each party may require the other party to make available for copying 
any document, electronically stored information, or other tangible thing, if 
the information or object sought is not privileged and is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense.342 Information sought need not be admissible at 
trial to be relevant, so long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
discovery of admissible evidence.343 The party must specify the type of 
documents sought, but does not have to identify the precise documents. This 
is an example of the infamous “fishing expedition” permitted by American 
civil procedure344
Such discovery is routine rather than rare in American litigation. Parties 
in the United States often try to discover in their opponents’ warehouses a 
single document that could clinch their case against the other. They look for 
what is known as the “smoking gun.” That rarely do they find the smoking 
gun does not daunt them in seeking for it. Even in days before electronic 
discovery parties might demand production of hundreds of thousands of 
pages of documents found even in foreign countries all in vain searches for  
a smoking gun.  
 and prohibited by the German Ausforschungsbeweisverbot 
(prohibition of investigative evidence). 
The Court’s own Standard Requests for Production of Documents allow 
Hahn to demand of John Doh, Jr., and of any other party to the suit 
(remember DohSon Honda, LLC or John Doh, Sr. might be parties): 
 
                                                 
342 FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
343 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
344 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1945). 
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Standard Requests for Production of Documents 
1. All documents referred to in your Answers to Interrogatories.  
2. All statements [made in a writing signed by the party or made orally and 
recorded or transcribed verbatim] which were previously made by this party and any of 
its present or former directors, officers, or employees, concerning the action or its 
subject matter.  
3. All documents (including, but not limited to, correspondence, notes, 
memoranda, and journal entries) which relate to, describe, summarize, or memorialize 
any communication between you and [Name], or anyone known or believed by you to 
have been acting under the authority of [Name], concerning the occurrence.  
4. … [relating to expert witnesses]  
5. All contracts or agreements entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant 
concerning the occurrence or transaction.  
6. All documents concerning your claim for damages or the methods used to 
calculate such alleged damages.  
7. All documents concerning any release, settlement, or other agreement, formal 
or informal, pursuant to which the liability of any person or any entity for damage arising 
out of the occurrence which is the subject matter of this lawsuit has been limited, 
reduced, or released in any manner. This request includes all agreements by one party 
or person to indemnify another party or person for claims asserted in this litigation.  
8. All insurance policies under which a person carrying on an insurance business 
might be liable to pay to you or on your behalf all or part of the damages sought in this 
action.  
9. All documents received from or provided to any other party to this action since 
the filing of the Complaint, whether provided informally or in response to a formal 
request. All documents referred to in the Complaint and other pleadings …. 
 
 
The default rule of American discovery is disclosure. The lawyer for one 
party demands disclosure and the lawyer for the other party must comply, 
unless he or she has a valid objection. Valid objections are few. That 
disclosure is burdensome is not a valid objection; disclosure must be unduly 
burdensome to sustain an objection. Rarely is it.345 If part of a request is 
objectionable, the objecting lawyer “must specify objection to part of the 
request and permit inspection of the rest.”346 While courts have wide 
authority to direct and limit discovery through “protective orders,” they do 
not use that authority to routinely supervise discovery, but only 
exceptionally on motion of a party.347
While lawyers may issue wide-reaching requests for discovery with 
little fear of court intervention, that busy judges have little interest in 
deciding discovery motions sometimes is productive of less disclosure rather 
than more. Unscrupulous lawyers realize that they need not fully comply 
with discovery orders if judges are not likely to favorably receive motions to 
 In Germany or in Korea, before one 
must turn one’s private papers over to the other side, a judge must issue an 
affirmative order; in the United States, to prevent a private paper from being 
turned over requires a court-issued protective order.  
                                                 
345 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
346 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C). 
347 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
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compel discovery. The result is that the lawyers determine fairness of 
process. 
 Only three types of documents are exempt from discovery without 
protective orders: confidential communications between lawyer and client 
(“attorney-client privilege documents”), certain trial preparation materials 
(“attorney work product”), and “electronically stored information ... not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”348
 
 Culling attorney-
client privileged and work product  documents from larger files can be 
problematic and costly. Typically, as provided in the Maryland Standard 
Requests, parties claiming exemption must assert the claim on document-by-
document basis. We reproduce the instruction in its entirety to demonstrate 
the demands of American discovery: 
2. Whenever in this Request you are asked to identify or produce a document 
which is deemed by you to be properly withheld from production for inspection or 
copying:  
A.  If you are withholding the document under claim of privilege 
(including, but not limited to, the work product doctrine), please provide the information 
set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) and Discovery Guideline 9(c)(ii)(b), including the 
type of document, the general subject matter of the document, the date of the 
document, and such other information as is sufficient to identify the document, 
including, where appropriate, the author, addressee, custodian, and any other recipient 
of the document, and where not apparent, the relationship of the author, addressee, 
custodian, and any other recipient to each other, in a manner that, without revealing the 
information claimed to be protected, will enable this party to assess the applicability of 
the privilege or protection claimed by you;  
B.  If you are withholding the document for any reason other than an 
objection that it is beyond the scope of discovery or that a request is unduly 
burdensome, identify as to each document and, in addition to the information requested 
in ¶2.A, above, please state the reason for withholding the document.  
3. When a document contains both privileged and non-privileged material, the 
non-privileged material must be disclosed to the fullest extent possible without thereby 
disclosing the privileged material. If a privilege is asserted with regard to part of the 
material contained in a document, the party claiming the privilege must clearly indicate 
the portions as to which the privilege is claimed. When a document has been redacted 
or altered in any fashion, identify as to each document the reason for the redaction or 
alteration, the date of the redaction or alteration, and the person performing the 
redaction or alteration. Any redaction must be clearly visible on the redacted document.  
4. It is intended that this Request will not solicit any material protected either by 
the attorney/client privilege or by the work product doctrine which was created by, or 
developed by, counsel for the responding party after the date on which this litigation 
was commenced. If any Request is susceptible of a construction which calls for the 
production of such material, that material need not be provided and no privilege log 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) or Discovery Guideline 9(a) will be required as to 
such material.  
5. If production of any requested document(s) is objected to on the grounds that 
production is unduly burdensome, describe the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery.  
 
                                                 
348 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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In a modest case such as Roh v. Doh, document discovery might eat up 
only a dozen hours. In a larger case, months of lawyers’ time and millions of 
dollars in fees can be devoured. But with document discovery, sometimes 
the battle has just been begun.   
 
(iii) Depositions  
 
Each party may take the sworn testimony upon oral examination 
(“deposition”) of any person, including that of someone who is not a party to 
the lawsuit. The party’s lawyer, without prior approval of the court, has 
authority to compel attendance through an order known as a subpoena.349
Lawyers use depositions to develop their theory of the case, to evaluate 
potential witnesses and to pin down the testimony of witnesses. If later a 
witness says something different—say at a trial—the lawyer can “impeach” 
that later testimony by bringing out the prior testimony.  
 A 
person who fails to comply with a subpoena is subject to sanction including 
fine and imprisonment. This is so easily said in describing procedures in the 
United States, and for Americans so easily read, that we remind American 
readers how remarkable this authority is: a private lawyer, without judicial 
approval, may compel attendance of a person in a private matter under threat 
of fine and imprisonment by the state! 
Lawyers usually hold depositions in their own offices or, when in 
distant cities, in offices of colleagues. It is extraordinary for a judge to 
participate in a deposition. Usually depositions are held before persons 
authorized or appointed to “administer oaths.”350
That depositions often are long is a practical consequence of American 
procedures. To spare all persons inconvenience, the Federal Rules provide 
that no witness may be deposed a second time without permission of the 
court.
 Typically that is a private 
person, called a “court reporter.” The court reporter, however, only records 
or transcribes verbatim the testimony of the witness; the court reporter does 
not question the witness or resolve any aspect of the testimony. Objections to 
questions are usually stated on the record and the witness is then instructed 
to answer leaving to later resolution whether the information disclosed can 
be used at trial. The party requesting the deposition bears the cost of its 
recording; each party, however, pays for his or her own copies of transcripts 
of the testimony. Typically that charge is several dollars a page. Ordinarily 
each side orders its own copy.  
351
                                                 
349 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1). 
 That compels lawyers to use this possibly unique opportunity to ask 
all questions that might conceivably be material in the case. That that will 
include many questions not in the end relevant to decision follows from the 
350 FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a). 
351 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
160   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
interdependent nature we have already discussed of finding facts, 
determining law and applying law to facts.  
Depositions require substantial preparation and significant post-
deposition review. Lawyers are advised to prepare “their” witnesses 
beforehand. Typically that preparation should be at least as long as the 
deposition itself. Lawyers are advised to prepare by having mock depositions 
first. After a deposition is over lawyers may engage assistants to digest the 
transcripts of testimony.  
All of these preparations make depositions expensive, particularly when 
lawyers journey to distant cities to participate in them. American lawyers do 
not generally delegate taking testimony to other lawyers in distant cities. 
Thus, even in pedestrian cases where only a few depositions are taken—say 
only three, one from each party and one from one witness—and the matters 
concerned are not complicated, one can expect twenty hours of lawyers’ time 
(on each side), which when one adds travel time, accommodations, court 
reporter fees, transcripts fees, fees for assistant time in digesting, produce 
deposition expenses approaching or surpassing $10,000 for each side. In 
high value cases, these numbers are many times that. 
Today the Federal Rules recognize the burdens that depositions may 
impose on parties. They therefore limit the number of depositions that may 
be taken. Since limits are not proportionate to the amount in controversy, but 
are numerical on a case basis, they do not protect parties in pedestrian cases 
such as Roh v. Doh. In the cost of pedestrian cases they are practically 
pathetic: each party, without court permission, may take no more than ten 
depositions. Each deposition may last no longer than one day of seven hours. 
That means, without court approval, the two parties in Roh v. Doh are 
limited to 140 hours each in actual deposition time. With a like period of 
time for preparation, they are limited to 280 hours on each side, or a total of 
560 hours. At a modest charge of $300 per hour for lawyer time, the limit is 
then $168,000: better than double the amount in controversy. And the 
estimated maximum does not count the ancillary costs recording, 
transcribing and digesting the testimony. Of course, that is only the 
maximum allowed, and is not likely to be reached in a case like Roh v. Doh. 
Yet a lawyer determined to run up costs could do it in such case to the 
destruction of the other side’s claim. To make matters worse for the expense 
conscious party, with court permission, the lawyers can take as many 
depositions as the court is prepared to allow.  
 
(iv) Expert Testimony352
 
  
                                                 
352 See, generally, EXPERT WITNESS HANDBOOK, Oct. 2008 issue of TRIAL, J. AM. ASS’N FOR 
JUSTICE, vol. 44, no. 10 (Oct. 2008); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Dirty Little Secrets of Expert 
Testimony, LITIGATION, vol. 33, no. 2, 47 (Winter 2007).. 
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We have kept Roh v. Doh simple and do not see in it an opportunity to 
have the testimony of an expert. Experts are commonly used in civil 
litigation particularly in larger cases. They are less common in the ordinary 
cases that are the focus of this book. How they are used varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
In the scholarly discussion of comparative procedure, the role of experts 
looms large.353 Perhaps this is because scholars pay more attention to the 
“big“ cases, where experts are usual, than to ordinary cases, where experts 
are uncommon. Perhaps it is because differences in how experts are chosen 
and used are used are so great. It is said that explanation of American 
practices to non-Americans causes “amazement... bordering on disbelief.”354 
Here we offer only a thumbnail description of differences. Elsewhere we 
have discussed differences in detail.355
In Germany and in Korea, experts are appointed by the court and are 
neutral. The costs of experts are born, as are other court costs, by losers. 
Ordinarily there is only one expert for one topic in a case. The expert is the 
expert for the court and not for one party or for another. The expert acts as a 
neutral interpreter of facts.  
  
In the United States, usually each side picks, pays and presents its own 
experts. The experts are practically advocates for their sides. Typically they 
conference with the lawyers who chose them before they testify in 
depositions or trials. Lawyers choose experts known to present their parties’ 
views. While American judges have long had authority to appoint experts for 
the court, rarely do they exercise that authority. 
 
d. Discovery in Roh v. Doh 
 
In Chapter 3 our hypothetical Mary Roh met for the first time with her 
lawyer Hahn. She has now returned to review the complaint that he has 
drafted and to ask what is next. 
 
Roh: OK. The complaint looks fine, counselor. So tell me, how long this is all going to 
take? 
 
Hahn: That’s hard to say. Most cases settle; they can be very short indeed. If we are 
lucky, Doh will give in without putting in an answer. Nationwide, in the federal system, 
the median time from filing to disposition is less than nine months. If, on the other hand, 
Doh wants to drag this out, or if he just wants a trial, it could be a lot longer. 
 
Roh: How much longer? How long would it take to go through trial? 
 
                                                 
353 See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 37.    
354 Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 32, at 835, 
355 James R. Maxeiner, The Expert in U.S. and German Patent Litigation, 1991 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW [IIC] 595, published in German as 
Der Sachverständige in Patentrechtsstreitigkeiten in den USA und Deutschland, GRUR INT. 1991, 85. 
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Hahn: If we were to file in the Eastern District of Virginia, not that long: maybe only ten 
months. There they have what’s called the “rocket docket.” But in Maryland or in the 
District of Columbia, you are looking at two years. We might get by with a bit less, since 
this is a fairly simple case. But we have to do Maryland or D.C. We couldn’t really think 
about Virginia, because we don’t have a good case for personal jurisdiction there.356
 
 
Roh: So what’s coming? What do I have to look forward to?357
 
  
[Discovery Plan] 
 
Hahn: Even for a case as straight-forward as this, we will create a discovery plan. We 
do that in all cases. It’s a kind of roadmap for collecting the evidence that we will need 
to prove the elements of your case at trial. A discovery plan keeps us focused as we 
move toward trial. It helps us set priorities in spending legal fees getting ready for trial.  
 
Roh: So will Doh’s lawyer agree to that? 
 
Hahn: The plan that I am talking about is just for us. It doesn’t limit Doh’s lawyer in any 
way. All of this discovery is pretty much up to the parties. We can’t predict, for example, 
how many depositions Doh’s lawyer will want and how long they will take. We are 
required to confer with Doh’s lawyer to plan for discovery. In a case such as ours, that’s 
likely not to mean much more than we agree on a deadline when all discovery has to 
be completed. We can push for six months hete. 
 
Roh: Is there no limit on the extent of discovery? 
 
Hahn: Oh, no. Of course there is a limit. Each side can’t take more than ten depositions 
without court permission. Each deposition can’t last more than one seven hour day. 
 
Roh: Hmm, each side, ten depositions at seven hours each @ $300 an hour, that’s 
already $21,000! 
 
Hahn: In this case, we are not likely to have more than three or four depositions. And I 
doubt that any will come close to lasting seven hours. 
 
Roh:  What are our discovery options? 
 
Hahn: There are five types, but to save time, let me talk now only about the three that 
we are sure to use: written questions (they’re technically   “written interrogatories.” ), 
document demands and depositions.  
 
[Written Interrogatories and Document Demands] 
 
Hahn: We use written interrogatories in part, to get information that will help our case, 
but we principally use them to get leads for witnesses and information that we may not 
                                                 
356 The timings given are based on Table C-5/ U.S. District Courts—Media Time Intervals From 
Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of disposition, During 
the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2009, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR JAMES C. DUFF, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statist
ics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/C05Sep09.pdf 
357 For a similar and fuller dialogue, which contributed to this one, see KEN MOSCARET, 
MYLAWCOACH, TIPS FOR UNDERSTANDING - AND NEGOTIATING WITH – YOUR ATTORNEY, 
www.mylawcoach.com (2008). 
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know about and to find out which witnesses and information the other side, here Doh, 
plans to use to support its case. That way we won’t be surprised at trial, if he produces 
a witness who claims to have been present when the loan was made, or says that you 
later said to the witness that the money was gift. 
 
Hahn: I will write the interrogatories, but both to save you money and to make sure that 
Doh’s lawyer doesn’t object to what we ask, I will start from a form set that the court 
provides. I am not allowed to ask more than twenty-five questions. But in a straight-
forward case like this, that will be enough..  
 
Roh: I suppose that Doh will send us interrogatories too? 
 
Hahn: You can be sure of that. But we will have thirty days to answer them. You will 
have to do the answering. It’s quite serious business: It’s as if you were in court. You 
will have to swear that your answers are true, like you were a witness in court. A false 
answer theoretically could land you in jail for perjury.. 
 
Roh: Wow. I have to answer them myself? 
 
Hahn: Not alone. I am allowed to help iin a few ways. Doh’s lawyer will send the 
questons to me and not to you. I will look them over, While there are not many grounds 
for you to refuse to answer, I will object to those questions that are out-of-bounds. Then 
I will send them on to you.  
 
Roh: What will I do with them?  
 
Hahn: If you haven’t done so already, you will need to find anything that you have, 
such as e-mails, letters, hard drives, CDs, flash drives, Blackberries, that relate in any 
way to your claims in this case. Some of the questions are sure to ask for that 
information. You will need it anyway to make sure that in answering the questions, you 
do not inadvertently say something different than what the records say. So once you 
find the records, you will need to review them all.   
Roh: That doesn’t sound too bad. I don’t think that we exchanged more than an email 
or two. I probably deleted them anyway. Basically, we had a conversation where he 
asked for the money and then another conversation where I demanded the money 
back since he hadn’t repaid as he told me he would. 
 
Hahn: Not so fast. Doh is likely to ask you for any information you have about the 
claim.  
 
Roh: Didn’t I just tell you everything? What else is there? 
 
Hahn: Basically you are going to have turn over anything you have that relates to Doh, 
not just to this deal. His lawyer is likely to say, since you are claiming, if this is not a 
loan, it was a conditional gift, their side needs to know all about your daughter’s 
engagement with Doh. Did any of your emails talk about that? Do you do face-book? 
Do you twitter? Doh’s lawyer will want it all. And just because you think you deleted a 
message, does not mean that it’s not still on your hard drive.  
 
Hahn: This is very important: don’t delete anything. That would get us into terrible 
trouble. 
 
Roh: Now I’m nervous. I’ve got to look through all this private stuff and turn it over to 
Doh? And I’ve got to be sure my answers are all OK? 
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Hahn. Yes. If there is something really sensitive, we could ask the judge for what is 
called a “protective order,” either to avoid having to turn it over altogether or at least to 
limit it to being viewed by Doh’s lawyer.  
 
Hahn: As for worrying about getting your answers right, don’t. I will go over them with 
you before we turn them over to the other side.  
 
Roh: And that’s just one of the discovery options. What were the others? 
 
Hahn: Document demands and depositions.  In this case, since it is straight-forward, 
we may serve our document demands with our written interrogatories. Once we have 
the answers to the questions and get the documents, we will know better whether we 
will need to get documents from anyone else and which people, if any, besides  Doh 
we will need for depositions. 
 
Roh:  Documents from other people? Like whom?  
 
Hahn: Maybe from the bank.. Maybe from his dad. Maybe from their company, DohSon 
Honda LLC.  We can make third parties turn over documents. 
 
Roh: I suppose you have to ask the judge to order that?. 
 
Hahn: Not really. We have to get a subpoena from the clerk of the court, but we get 
that in blank and fill it in ourselves. 
 
[Depositions] 
 
Roh: So we are now up to depositions?  We have been talking about depositions, but I 
am not sure what they are. Do we go to court for them? Does the judge ask witnesses 
questions?   
 
Hahn: No. You’re right in one sense: it is a formal questioning and answering. It’s like 
being in court, in that you have to answer truthfully subject to penalties for perjury. But 
depositions hardly ever take place in court or with a judge present. Usually, they take 
place in a conference room in the office of the lawyer who asks for the deposition. So, 
here, when your deposition is taken—and it almost surely will be—it would be in the 
office of Doh’s lawyer in Maryland.  
 
Roh: So whom will we depose? 
 
Hahn: Certainly we will depose Doh. If Doh’s answers identify no other witnesses, we 
won’t need other depositions. If they do identify other witnesses, however, we probably 
will want to take their testimony in depositions before trial.  
 
Hahn: If there is a third party, say Doh’s dad, your old friend John Doh, Sr., he can 
bring a lawyer if he wants.   
 
Roh: So depositions are public?  
 
Hahn. No. While a witness can always bring a lawyer, and a party, like you or Doh, can 
always attend, with or without a lawyer, that’s about it. Anyone else would have to know 
beforehand. In a case like this, the only people likely to be in attendance are the 
lawyers for both sides, the witness and the court reporter. 
 
Roh: The court reporter? Who is that? 
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Hahn: In theory, an officer of the court who presides over the deposition. In practice, 
the court reporter is there to take down, verbatim, every word the witness or the 
lawyers speak in the deposition. Court reporters prepare transcripts (for which they 
charge handsomely) that are then given to the witness for review, correction and 
approval. 
 
Roh: So what happens at a deposition?  
 
Hahn: If I am the one taking it, I get to ask the witness a lot of question. The witness 
pretty much has rto answer them all. The witness is sworn, like in court, and has to 
answer truthfully.  
 
Roh: What is the purpose of a deposition?  
 
Hahn: There are two main purposes. On the one hand, I want to know what the 
witness will say at trial and which documents the other side will use. That way, I won’t 
be surprised. On the other hand, once we know what we all plan to say, we may be 
able to agree on what happened and settle the case, or at least see where we 
disagree, so we can focus the trial on those issues.  
 
Roh: What will Doh’s lawyer do when you are asking questions?  
 
Hahn: Not much. Some lawyers say not more than “twiddling their thumbs.”358
 
 Doh’s 
lawyer’s principal role will be preparing Doh for the deposition. At the deposition, the 
lawyer pretty much has to let me ask my questions. The lawyer can object, but Doh will 
have to go ahead and answer.  
Roh: So why would Doh’s lawyer bother to come to a deposition of their witness? 
 
Hahn: Principally to get an idea how that witness would look in testifying at trial. Also to 
make sure the witness does not slip up in answering questions. 
 
Roh: Ok. They will take my deposition. What should I expect? 
 
Hahn: I will prepare you beforehand. We will need to meet for half day to do that. It 
might be less time than that; it might be more. We will review any documents that they 
require you to bring. I will also go to the deposition with you—to keep them honest—
and I will object to any improper questions.  
 
Roh: Can you give me a preview of the preparation? 
 
Hahn: We will go into that at length. But there are three key points that I will stress over 
and over again: (1) always tell the truth; (2) do not volunteer anything, and (3) always 
listen carefully to the question and pause before answering it. For example, if Doh’s 
lawyer asks you, “do you know what time it is?”  Answer, “yes, I know what time it is.”  
Do not volunteer that it is two o’clock. Listen for the trick or misleading question. If you 
are unsure what a question means, ask to have it explained. 
 
Roh: I suppose you will charge for the time in preparation? 
 
Hahn: Yes. 
 
                                                 
358 George A. Hovanec, Jr. & David S. Wachen, Preparing Fact Witnesses For Deposition, THE 
PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, 7 (July 2005). 
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Roh:  Ok. I am beginning to understand all this pre-trial discovery.. So when do I get 
my day in court to tell it to the judge,. 
 
Hahn: Not until the trial, if there is one. 
 
e. Discovery’s Flaws 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that discovery has serious 
flaws not only for efficiency, but for accuracy, fair hearing and access as 
well. Some critics see those flaws as fatal.359
Discovery’s extent is determined by the other party. Each party 
determines for itself how much discovery to demand. There is a well-noted 
asymmetry: the party that demands the discovery does not bear most of the 
costs of compliance. There is little incentive for parties to forego discovery.  
 While these flaws were partly 
recognized in 1938 when the rules were introduced, the magnitude of their 
effect has increased in time as inventors created copiers and emails and as 
lawyers invented new uses for discovery beyond those planned by its 
inventors. Here are some flaws that critics note: 
Discovery is duplicative. If trial does occur, discovery is wasteful: 
witnesses testify twice, once in discovery and once at trial. That inefficiency 
might not be fatal were applying law simple and were use of discovery 
occasional. But applying law is rarely simple and use of discovery is routine. 
Discovery multiplies issues geometrically. While the purpose of 
discovery was to help narrow issues at trial, the reality is that it multiplies 
their numbers in the process as a whole. Our discussions of pleading in 
Chapter 5 and of law applying in Germany in Chapter 7 show that the 
process of law applying is a back-and-forth one where one ranges from law 
to facts and back again, as applicable law and facts being found are 
compared one with another in preparation for an eventual subsumption of the 
found facts under the governing law. American discovery denies this reality. 
It compels lawyers pretrial to investigate all possible facts on all possible 
legal theories. That could work only if from the outset there were only one 
possible legal theory with but one class of facts that would fulfill a claim. 
That was the assumption of common law pleading which in practice was 
proven unworkable. Seventy years of experience with party-managed 
discovery proves it unworkable.  
Discovery broadens its reach to address the back-and-forth problem 
of law-applying. The bifurcated system pushes lawyers to conduct such 
discovery. To prepare for the concentrated trial, they prepare for all possible 
issues. Since complaint and answer rarely substantially reduce issues before 
discovery commences, the facts that need to be proven are not yet known. 
Accordingly, requirements for discovery potentially are enormous. Lawyers 
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seek to clarify all of the elements of all of the causes of action that might 
govern. For example: a plaintiff raises four different claims. Each claim 
contains five different elements. Already without reference to defenses or 
supporting facts the lawyers have some twenty points to clarify in order to 
prepare for trial. While resolution of one issue might dispose of all four 
claims, ordinarily there is no way to achieve that resolution until all issues 
have been discovered.  
Discovery is extended by indeterminate law. Discovery would be 
difficult enough were it certain which laws applied and what they mean, but 
that is not the case in the United States. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook said it 
well: “Legal uncertainty is the godfather of discovery abuse.” All too many 
American rules, Easterbrook observes, “make everything relevant and 
nothing dispositive.” “Lawyers cannot limit their search for information in 
discovery, because they do not know what they are looking for. They do not 
know when to stop, because they never know when they have enough.” 360
Discovery is disputatious instead of cooperative. The ideal of 
discovery is cooperation: the parties with a minimum of judicial supervision 
exchange information and evidence cooperatively. The ideal conflicts with 
the adversarial reality of Anglo-American litigation.
 
Discovery of this sort is not theoretical: it is a daily occurrence.  
361 Many American 
litigators practice the famous aphorism of English law reformer Lord 
Brougham: “an advocate in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person 
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means 
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst 
them, to himself, is his first and only duty.”362
Discovery rewards lawyers for using it. Nor is it hard for some 
litigators to reconcile themselves to zealous advocacy. They are paid on the 
basis of hours spent on a matter. The more they discover, the more they are 
paid. It is not surprising that brief testimony of witnesses such as is common 
in Germany or Korea, is unusual in American discovery. Whereas in 
Germany or Korea often half an hour or even less may be all that is allotted 
for a witness’s testimony, in the United States one figures testimony in terms 
of half-a-day or days. 
 Clients want to win. Where 
they cannot win, many prefer delay to defeat.  
 
2. Four Perspectives on Pretrial Discovery 
 
Discovery looms large in differences among our legal systems. As much 
as any feature of American civil procedure it accounts for conflict between 
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the United States and the rest of the world. Because of its importance, we 
address four comments to pretrial discovery. First, we explain why American 
law professors find it difficult to imagine a system of civil procedure without 
pretrial discovery. Second, we discuss why many non-American jurists feel 
little need to borrow American-style discovery for their own systems. Third, 
we note that the historic perspective of drafters and proponents of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 which did not include changes in 
American process practices as actually occurred. Fourth, we observe that the 
drafters complemented their proposals for discovery with pretrial 
conferences and pretrial motions for summary judgment possibly with civil 
law alternatives in mind. 
 
a. Contemporary American Perspective on Discovery 
 
Some American law professors find absence of pretrial discovery in 
foreign procedural systems such as in the German and Korean disconcerting. 
Professor Stephen N. Subrin speaks for many when he says: “We do not 
think that judges would ferret out negative aspects of our opponent’s case 
and positive information to prove our own claims or defenses with the same 
motivation and intensity that self-interest propels.” He acknowledges, 
however, that the career judges one finds outside the United States might be 
more reliable in this task than would be their politically-appointed or elected 
American counterparts. 363
Professor Subrin and Professor Margaret Y.K. Woo observe elsewhere 
how discovery “helps to ensure that even less powerful litigants lacking 
initial information can commence suit and obtain the necessary proof in 
support of their case. This is especially necessary in cases in which it is an 
impoverished individual litigant who is suing a corporate defendant that 
controls much of the relevant information.”
  
364 They acknowledge, however, 
that perhaps such discovery is necessary only where “civil litigation serves 
an expansive public function in regulating the social and economic fabric of 
the country” and may not be required in legal systems that serve “mainly to 
resolve individual disputes.”365
In discussing American views of discovery, we remind readers that 
while many American jurists—mainly trial lawyers and law school 
professors—fervently support contemporary American discovery, many 
other Americans—jurists and non-jurists—do not. The American legal 
community does not speak unison on this issue. Many Americans, within 
and without the legal community, oppose the practically unbounded 
development of discovery that has developed since discovery was introduced 
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in 1938. On the other hand, even Americans who oppose broad discovery, 
are likely to wonder how non-American systems can get along without at 
least some discovery to avoid surprise and to disclose material evidence held 
by the other side.  
 
b. Non-American Perspective on Discovery 
 
Few jurists from civil law systems feel that absence of American-style 
discovery is detrimental. Many regard American discovery as anathema and 
its absence in their systems as virtue.366 That one non-American jurist has 
proposed in a thorough and well-argued study to adopt or at least to adapt 
American discovery to civil law systems is remarkable for its possible 
uniqueness.367
Why do civil law jurists fear broad discovery and not lament absence of 
even narrow discovery from their systems? Let us offer you our views:
 Others, such as our co-author Professor Lee, are interested in 
learning from American experiences in fact-finding to inform their own 
country’s practices of fact-finding, but do not seek adoption of American 
discovery.   
368
They see broad discovery as destructive of the rule of law. Civil law 
jurists fear broad American discovery for the same reasons that many 
Americans do: it is a private inquisition. Professor Rolf A. Stürner, who is 
too polite to use the term, speaks for many non-American jurists when he 
describes American discovery with attributes reminiscent of the historic 
inquisition: 
 
 
[T]he pretrial discovery process is left almost entirely to the lawyers 
and provides very broad possibilities for discovery without 
requiring a substantial and specified complaint or defense; parties 
and third parties have an almost unlimited duty to co-operate in 
pretrial discovery proceedings by means of answering 
interrogatories and depositions, production of documents and things 
and entry upon land; failure to comply with any such order will be 
sanctioned as contempt of court and causes procedural 
disadvantages.369
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As we have seen the principal purpose of civil procedure is 
determination of rights and duties among private parties according to law. 
Civil procedure serves, as Professors Subrin and Woo remark, mainly to 
resolve individual disputes. For most of the world, its purpose is not to 
provide procedures to investigate as yet undiscovered violations of rights or 
to create new rights and duties. The former, investigation. is for the public 
executive under rule of law control, while the latter, legislation (i.e., creation 
of new rights), is for the legislature under political control. Neither control is 
present in private litigation. Such use of civil procedure when not merely 
incidental to dispute resolution conflicts with conceptions of the rule of law. 
Only in the United States does one find a substantial constituency for 
broader purposes of civil procedure. 
They see better ways to accomplish narrow goals of discovery. The 
original uses of discovery were to avoid surprise at trial and to give one side 
access to evidence held by the other.  
Surprise. In the German and Korean systems surprise is not a major  
issue. Any problems of surprise are not so serious as to warrant an extensive 
and expensive discovery system. The German system in most cases by its 
ordinary working precludes surprise: the parties, in their pleadings, must  
identify the evidence on which they plan to rely; the judge, before taking 
evidence, must issue a formal decision stating the evidence to be taken and 
which disputed facts if concerns. § 359 ZPO. The Korean system has the 
latter but not the former requirement. In both systems, should surprise arise 
in the course evidence taking, judges are obligated by their duty of 
elucidation to provide the other side opportunity to deal with the surprise. 
They may take a measure so simple as to adjourn the proceedings for a few 
days or a few weeks. 
Evidence held by others. That evidence necessary to one party’s case 
may be held by another party who has no interest in disclosing it, is a 
common problem in procedural systems. Jurists in Germany and Korea have 
long recognized it as such. Few, if any, however, consider it such a serious 
problem as to warrant intrusive American discovery. They see the problem 
as an exceptional one that can be better dealt with in other ways. 
In many cases there is no material, undisclosed evidence. It is a truism 
of litigation the world over that many cases are determined by how one 
views facts as much as by which facts one sees. An American, Thomas A. 
Mauet, makes the point: “Litigation outcomes are usually decided according 
to which party’s version of disputed events the fact finder accepts as true.”370
In cases where there might be material, undisclosed evidence, there are 
ways less intrusive and less expensive than American style discovery to 
address the problem. These include:  
  
1. Better rule drafting. How rules are drafted can make discovery 
unnecessary. A common use for discovery in the United States is to 
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determine the state of mind of a party, i.e., did a party act intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently. This is a subjective element; by 
recasting a rule in objective terms, resort to evidence held by the other party 
may no longer be needed.371
2. Shifting the burden of proof. In civil lawsuits, ordinarily plaintiffs 
have the burden of producing all the evidence necessary to establish their 
claims of right. Should they require evidence held by the other party, if there 
is no change in the ordinary rules, they will lose because the other side 
refuses to disclose. Long an approach to dealing with this evidentiary 
problem is to shift the burden of proof. A classic example is product liability 
law in the European Union.  
  
3. Requiring production as substantiation. Even without formally 
shifting the burden of proof, judges in Germany and Korea can rely on the 
duties of elucidation of judges and parties and on their own duties as judges 
of evidence practically to force disclosure. Once one party establishes a point 
prima facie, when the other side seeks to rebut it, the judge insists on that 
party producing all evidence relevant to the question. The judge may have to 
probe to find out what evidence exists, but having determined that it does 
exist, if the opposing side fails to produce it, draw negative conclusions.372
      4. Enhance judicial authority to compel disclosure. In 2002 the German 
Code of Civil Procedure was amended to give judges authority to require 
plaintiffs, defendants and third parties to produce documents which either 
plaintiff or defendant refers to. § 142 ZPO. Similarly, in Korea parties are 
under an obligation to produce documents quoted in lawsuits. § 343 (1)1.
  
373
 
 
In part thanks to the international brouhaha over American discovery, in both 
Germany and Korea today there is some discovery that did not exist before. 
c. Historic American Perspective on Discovery 
 
The Intended Purpose of Discovery. Americans owe modern day 
discovery to dissatisfaction with the efficacy of framing fact issues for trial 
under common law and code pleading.  In both systems parties would appear 
at trial uncertain of which issues they would have to meet; they might be 
“ambushed” by the opposing party with some new issue or some 
unanticipated witness. Recall that American pleadings have never required 
parties to identify witnesses or other evidence. There was a felt need for 
“some additional device or devices for the clarification of issues and for the 
elimination of fake claims.”374
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Professor Sunderland, the drafter of the original discovery provisions of 
the Federal Rules, believed that “[m]uch of the delay in the preparation of a 
case, most of the lost effort in the course of the trial, and a large part of the 
uncertainty in the outcome, result[ed] from the want of information on the 
part of litigants and their counsel as to the real nature of the respective 
claims and the facts upon which they rest[ed].”375
We have found nothing in the historic record that suggests that Professor 
Sunderland, or any of his colleagues, intended for discovery to displace trials 
or for lawsuits to go beyond the historic purpose of determining private 
rights to resolve disputes.  
 Sunderland envisioned 
that through discovery the parties would develop facts sufficient to permit 
summary judgment motions to dispose of cases—both strong and fake—
where there were no genuine issues of disputed material fact and otherwise 
to facilitate clarifying issues for trial.  
Sunderland saw pretrial proceedings as complementing and not as 
undercutting trials. Pretrial was to be the salvation of “elaborate and 
expensive” trial proceedings. It would withdraw issues from the trial agenda 
where historic pleading had failed. Sunderland saw the weakness of pleading 
in failure to test factual allegations of the parties. The parties could assert or 
deny whatever they chose. Discovery would test those allegations. Discovery 
would indicate the “real points in controversy, in spite of pleadings which 
confuse or mislead.”376 It would assure litigants their day in court in a trial 
following discovery.377
Discovery as originally adopted was directed to disputed issues of 
material fact and not to development of new claims. Until 1946, document 
discovery was limited to things “which constitute or contain evidence 
material to any matter involved in the action” and then only upon a showing 
of good cause.
  
378 Depositions were of matters relating to the claims or 
defenses of the parties.379 Rule 27, which allowed for discovery prior to 
commencing the action, was not appropriate to enable one to draw a 
complaint.380
 
 In other words, discovery was to be directed to material 
matters in dispute and not to development of new theories of recovery. 
d. Civil law methods as utopian ideal for American pretrial? 
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While an extensive survey of the historic record is beyond the bound of 
this book, we think it worthwhile to point out that the vision of Clark and 
Sunderland may have been closer to civil law approaches than is generally 
supposed. While their vision reduced the role of pleading, it did not abandon 
applying law to fact. Pretrial conferences and motions for summary 
judgment were to substitute. 
Both Clark and Sunderland saw framing issues as an important part of 
procedure. Clark wrote of a choice between civil and common law methods. 
The civil law method, he commented, is the simpler: “direct questioning of 
the parties by the … judge;” the Anglo-American system was otherwise: 
“development of the issues by the parties themselves by written statements 
in advance of direct hearing of the parties. He endorsed moving American 
procedure in the civil law direction: “[w]e tend towards the civil law system; 
we shall probably not reach it for many generations, if at all.”381
Sunderland envisioned that pretrial conferences and motions for 
summary judgement would take over much of the work in framing issues. In 
one proposal in Michigan made with Sunderland’s participation, the goal 
was “the virtual elimination of pleadings, substituting a pretrial conference 
as a means of determining the issue involved in the case.”
  
382 Backers of 
pretrial conferences saw in them “greater potential for serving the public 
good” than any of the other new developments.383
Sunderland saw a role for judges in framing issues in the new pretrial 
conferences. On the eve of implementation of the 1938 Rules he wrote: 
“there is no reason the court should not itself take a hand in the investigation, 
supplementing the proceedings and the discovery which the parties have 
obtained, by direct interrogation of counsel or parties in the presence of each 
other, with a view to eliminating issues through admissions or through the 
withdrawal of allegations or denials, or by obtaining the consent of the 
parties to the limitation or simplification of proof.”
 
384
Summary judgment, reformers hoped, would make the system 
“efficient” by clearing out baseless claims.
  
385 They saw summary judgment 
as a device to reach “speedy disposition of many cases” where there was “no 
real cause of action or defense.” 386
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Had these devices been used as Sunderland and Clark had hoped, 
American civil procedure might look a lot different today. Sunderland 
recognized that he needed the support of judges to make these devices work. 
When asked why he had not made pretrial conferences mandatory, he 
replied—to laughter: “There is no use in making it mandatory because 
nothing will be accomplished without the sympathetic interest of the judge, 
and you can’t force him to be sympathetic.”387
There is irony that neither pretrial conferences nor motions for summary 
judgment received sympathetic interest. When Clark introduced his federal rules 
to the American Bar Association, he recalled the “cold, not to say inhuman, 
treatment” which the Field Code received from New York judges. 
  
388
 
 
3. Pretrial Conferences 
 
When the federal rules were adopted, it was hoped that pretrial 
conferences would have considerable value in simplifying issues, guiding the 
course of the trial, and in doing much “to eliminate the ‘sporting’ approach 
to the lawsuit by securing the cooperation of the court and opposing counsel 
for the more efficient disposition of cases.”389
A pretrial conference today is an informal meeting of the judge with the 
lawyers for the parties. The parties themselves are not normally present and 
their appearance cannot usually be compelled. Pretrial conferences are 
ordinarily held either shortly after pleadings are exchanged or just prior to 
trial. In the former case, they mostly concern timing of discovery; in the 
latter they work to schedule pretrial motions and to prepare for trial. 
 The concept of the pretrial 
conference was new to their decade: it was based on experiences from the 
early 1930s in principal drafter Sunderland’s home state of Michigan. Until 
then the prevailing theory had been—following common law pleading ideals 
and as continued with code pleading—that lawyers for the parties prepared 
the trial without judicial involvement. While discovery is used more 
frequently than the drafters of the Federal Rules expected, pretrial 
conferences and summary judgments motions are used less frequently than 
they expected. These two devices were to guide courts towards deciding 
issues and to limit discover. In this subsection we address what pretrial 
conferences have turned out to be. In the following subsection we consider 
motions for summary judgment. 
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Whether there is a pretrial conference in any given case is in the 
discretion of the judge. Rule 16 authorizes, but does not compel judges to 
conduct pretrial conferences. This means that practice in any one case is 
dependent upon the judge assigned to that case. Practices vary widely in 
frequency and substance. The training and organization of American judges, 
moreover, is not especially conducive to development of common practices. 
Today the most common use of pretrial conferences seems to be 
scheduling or debating discovery. Judges discuss with the parties the dates 
by which discovery must be concluded, or one party accuses the other of not 
following the rules in some aspect of discovery. Amendments to Rule 16 
since 1938 explicitly assign a scheduling function to judges: now judges 
must issue scheduling orders setting specific deadlines for joining other 
parties, amending pleadings, completing discovery and filing motions.390
Another use for pretrial conferences is promotion of settlements. In 
some cases judges uses pretrial conferences to persuade parties to settle.  
 
The conference itself, however, remains optional. 
Use of pretrial conferences to simplify issues—the principal purpose in 
the minds of the drafters—has not attained the importance that they had 
hoped for. That use seems a distant third. 
The lack of importance of pretrial conferences is demonstrated by the 
low level of attention they receive in manuals devoted to pretrial litigation. 
Some authors omit the topic altogether; others who address the topic, tack it 
on at the end of the book out of a feeling of obligation rather than out of 
conviction that this “ill-defined” institution has importance. They ask: how 
could a manual on pretrial litigation omit something called a “pretrial 
conference”? They counsel: “Obviously, it is a good idea to attend a pretrial 
conference if the court schedules one.”391
Some judges use pretrial conferences vigorously in order to move cases 
along. Depending on the judge, they may encourage faster discovery, issue 
simplification or settlement, or all three. Vigorous use is known—sometimes 
pejoratively—as “managerial judging.” Critics of managerial judging worry 
that judges in their zeal to move cases along may deny parties their right to 
be heard or may do them injustice. Scholars sometimes, incorrectly, compare 
managerial judging to civil law judging. The goal of managerial judging is 
conclusion of the dispute; the goal of civil law judging is likewise conclusion 
of disputes but with the important difference, as we shall see in Chapter 7: 
conclusions based in application of law to facts. 
  
In the absence of effective pretrial conferences, American civil process 
relies, as it always has, on lawyers working out among themselves the 
material issues in dispute for trial. That it is not an entirely illusory hope; it 
does happen in some cases. Typically in cases of successful lawyer issue 
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framing, lawyers for both sides are competent and confident and their clients 
are content to get from the court decisions according to law. Those lawyers 
identify and focus on true issues; they limit trial to those issues and, as a 
result, may shorten trial substantially, from say a week to a half day. 
America’s law reformers had lawyers such as these in mind when they have 
invested lawyers with issue-simplification. Were men angels, perhaps their 
systems would have worked. But in the real world of American litigation, 
lawyers do not learn to simplify issues. They are trained “to think that every 
issue should be contested, every witness attacked, and every opponent 
destroyed.”392
 
  
4. Motions for Summary Judgment  
 
Another feature of pretrial process is the motion for summary judgment. 
Originally, it was conceived of as an issue simplification measure; today it is 
more commonly used as a way to dispose of legally unfounded suits. As with 
pretrial conferences, and most of modern day pretrial as routine measures, it 
is an innovation of the first part of the twentieth century. Unlike pretrial 
conferences and extensive discovery, it was in wide-spread use before 
adoption of the Federal Rules.  
A summary judgment is a form of judgment without jury. Since it does 
not involve a trial, it does not include the same kind of findings of fact or 
conclusions of law discussed in Chapter 7. Rather, it determines specific 
issues of law or fact. As originally envisioned for the Federal Rules it was as 
much tool to supplement pleading as a judgment of the case. 
A party is entitled to summary judgment, either on the whole case or on 
a specific issue, if it can “show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”393
Motions for summary judgment are reminiscent of common law 
pleading: plaintiffs seeking summary judgment assert that they have alleged 
all elements of a particular legal claim, that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact about any of those elements, and that on these facts, they are 
entitled to judgment. In other words, the law is clear, the facts are clear, and 
applying the law to these facts produces the decision sought.  
 The other side defeats the motion by showing that there is a 
“genuine issue of material fact.”  
Either side may make a motion for summary judgment. Parties oppose 
motions for summary judgment by raising a legal issue, a factual issue or an 
issue of applying law to facts. In a testimony to the uncertainty of American 
law, defendants are counseled against making summary judgment motions 
for fear that judicial denial of their motions will educate plaintiffs on what 
they need to show.  
                                                 
392 Elliott Wilcox, Sifting the Issues with Stipulations, TRIAL, vol. 44, no. 7, p. 39 (2008). 
393 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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Motions for summary judgment differ from common law pleading in 
two important respects: unlike in common law pleading, parties opposing 
summary judgment motions are not limited to challenging one point of law 
or fact. They may raise as many challenges as they like. Second, motions for 
summary judgment may involve proof of facts. In addition to the pleadings 
each side may submit supporting affidavits (i.e., sworn statwements based on 
personal knowledge), which may be supplemented by depositions and 
answers and answers to interrogatories.394 In determining summary judgment 
motions, judges decide without hearing parties or witnesses but by 
examining pleadings and by “interrogating the attorneys.”395
Summary judgment, reformers hoped, would make the system efficient 
by clearing out baseless claims.
 Again we see a 
lost opportunity to give parties a day in court: the proceedings are usually 
written and without involvement of the parties themselves. 
396
Their hopes were dashed. At first, summary judgments were rarely 
granted, because the standard that the reformers set was was interpretted 
restrictively. Now that standards have relaxed, summary judgment is under 
attack for denying parties their day in court and their right to jury trial.  
  
That summary judgment—even after standards have been relaxed—is 
used only occasionaly, is not surprising. The rule requires that moving 
parties show that there is no “genuine issue of material fact.” Since nothing 
compels litigants to admit facts, motions for summary judgment are difficult 
to win when opposed by opponents determined to show that the is an issue. 
The rule provides scant support in facilitating assistance in that the 
obligation to respond that it imposes requires only setting out “specific facts 
showing a genuine issue for trial.”397 Even mediocre lawyers in all but the 
simplest of cases ought to be able to raise an issue of disputed fact. Before 
the 1980s, parties seeking summary judgment found it almost impossible to 
meet the standard. In the mid-1980s the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of 
cases that taken together are seen to invigorate the procedure. Even as 
reinvigorated however, summary judgment can only deal with claims largely 
lacking in merit and cannot deal with claims requiring complex application 
of law to facts.398
Summary judgment does deprive losing parties of their day in court. 
While they still are heard, they are heard only in the motion papers and 
affidavits they are allowed to submit; judges decide, without ever personally 
hearing parties or taking testimony of witnesses, that parties’ claims are 
 That limited use is said to deprive parties of the right to be 
heard in a trial by jury.  
                                                 
394 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
395 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(1). 
396 See Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 536 
(1925); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 56  (advisory committee’s note to original rule). 
397 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). 
398 See Jonathan T. Molat, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 45 
(2003). 
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without merit.399
In denying parties a day in court, summary judgment procedure also 
denies trial by jury. The justification is that the right to trial by jury extends 
only to trial of issues of fact; where summary judgment is granted, the court 
finds that there is no genuine issue of fact. Proponents of jury trial contend 
that even that decision is outside the authority of judges and is reserved to 
juries.
  
400
 
  
 
5. Trial 
 
Had we published this book a century ago, we would have devoted the 
American portion of Chapter 6 entirely to trials. Since then, practitioner 
guides to trials have been replaced by guides to pre-trial, and student texts 
have practically eliminated coverage of trials.401 Now that trials are rare, we 
limit our discussion to some major points. That Americans organize court 
procedures around events that hardly ever happen is odd. That they do 
demonstrates the iconic nature of trial.402
There are two principal types of trials: trials with juries and trials 
without juries (“bench trials”). In jury trials, as we discuss in Chapter 7, 
juries decide issues of fact, while judges preside over the trial and decide 
issues of law. In bench trials, i.e., non-jury trials, judges do it all.  
   
The jury trial model dominates law-applying by civil judicial process. 
There can be no bench trial if the parties do not waive jury trial. There can be 
no summary judgment if there are facts for jurors to determine. Even when 
parties apply the law to themselves by settling cases, they do so based on 
their beliefs as to what jurors would decide.  
Trial, from summoning of jurors at its beginning to delivering the 
jurors’ verdict at its end, offers unscupulous lawyers ample opportunities to 
distort the truth.403
                                                 
399 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," 
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 982 (2003). 
  
400 See Suja A. Thomas, Symposium: The Unconstitutionality of Summary Judgment: A Status 
Report, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1613 (2008). 
401 See, e.g., KEVIN CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 88-112 (2nd ed., 2009) (24 
pages out of 478 pages); ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 51, at 188 (noting the 
book gives “little attention” to trial and appeal); JOHN B. OAKLEY & VIKRAM D. AMAR, 
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A GUIDE TO CIVIL ADJUDICATION IN U.S. COURTS 184-188 
(2009) (five pages out of 288; noting “a very brief overview” is sufficient for their guide). 
402 Accord, ROBERT W. TOBIN, CREATING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE UNFINISHED REFORM 
212 (National Center for State Courts, 1999). 
403 Cf. WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIAL 
HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT (1999). The 
problems of the criminal trial are similar if more severe. 
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T he J ury 
  
A common law jury is a group of lay persons engaged to decide criminal 
or civil cases. The jury is an institution of mythological proportions in the 
legal lore of the United States. While other common law countries have 
abandoned juries in civil cases and make sparing use of them in criminal 
cases, American adoration of the institution of the jury is stronger now than 
ever, even as actual use of juries is rarer than ever.404
Americans value trial by jury, not because juries efficiently effectuate 
law, but because juries invest the law with the people. A former President of 
the American Bar Association praises juries as “democracy of the people and 
for the people, as envisioned by the founders of this country.”
 
405 American 
jurists do not deceive themselves: they see efficiency costs. Jury advocates 
believe that benefits that juries provide for other value compensate for lost 
efficiency. In criminal justice, that value is protection of individuals against 
the state. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the United States Supreme 
Court, contrasted the jury-model with an efficiency model of the civil law: 
“There is not one shred of doubt … about the Framers' paradigm for criminal 
justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-
law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority 
between judge and jury.”406 In civil justice the value of the jury is 
amelioration of harsh law. Justice, later Chief Justice Rehnquist, observed 
that the founders who advocated right to civil jury trial were “not animated 
by a belief that use of juries would lead to more efficient judicial 
administration; [they] believed that a jury would reach a result that a judge 
either could or would not reach.”407
 
  
Right to Trial by Jury in Civil Cases 
 
The founders of the United States embedded in the nation’s fundamental 
rights a right to jury trial not only in criminal cases, but in civil cases as well. 
Article VII of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution provides 
that “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
                                                 
404 In the last third of the 19th century the institution of the jury was subjected to strong criticism. 
See, e.g., MARK TWAIN (SAMUEL L. CLEMENS), ROUGHING IT, FULLY ILLUSTRATED BY 
EMINENT ARTISTS Chap. XLIIII, 343 (1892, first published 1872) (“The jury system puts a ban 
upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury. It is a 
shame that we must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a thousand years 
ago.”)   
405 Robert J. Grey, Jr., Foreword, NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE 
VERDICT 10 (2007). 
406 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004). 
407 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-344 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.” Article 5 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Maryland preserves 
the common law right of jury trial generally. Article 23 provides specifically 
for civil proceedings that “The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in 
civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the 
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, shall be inviolably 
preserved.” There are similar provisions in other state constitutions.  
The right to jury trial may be waived. If neither party requests 
(“demands”) a jury, trial proceeds by judge alone.408 The Maryland 
Constitution explicitly provides that the parties may submit any issue to trial 
by the court without the aid of jury.409
The constitutional right is written in the language of eighteenth century 
pleading: “fact” or “issues of fact.” The 1848 and 1938 reformers could have 
used the scope of right to trial by jury to restrict jury decisions to specific 
issues of fact (e.g., was it defendant who kicked plaintiff). They did not. 
Instead of limiting juries, their handiwork tended to extend jury power and 
authority. For example, while Rule 38 allows a party to specify an issue or 
issues for jury trial, it provides that if the party fails to specify an issue, than 
there is to be a jury trial of all issues.  
  
American enthusiasm for jury trial is not unbounded. Long have 
American jurists recognized that giving all cases jury trials “would 
unavoidably render the dispatch of litigation perfectly impracticable ….”410 
Long have American judges refused to extend the constitutional right to jury 
trial beyond its historic scope of actions at law, i.e., cases brougtht in courts 
of law. When courts of equity were merged with courts of law—a process 
that began before 1848 and continued as late as 1984 in Maryland—judges 
restricted the constitutional right to actions at law. Already then jurists  
foresaw that maintaining the distincton would create “much delay and 
litigation.”411
Use of juries has expanded beyond historic limits. Merger of courts of 
law and of equity led to “equity conquering common law.” Juries decide 
today where formerly courts of equity without juries would have decided. 
Equity pleading and proceedures, created for courts without juries, are now 
routine in all courts.
  
412
                                                 
408 FED. R. CIV. P. 38, 39(b). 
 Contemporary American law reformers should bear 
409 Art. IV, sect. 8(a). CONST. MD.  
410 Samuel Smith Nicholas, Chapter XVIII. 1849. Law and Constitutional Reform. Jury System., 
in 1 S.S. NICHOLAS, CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS LEGAL AND POLITICAL 361, 362 (1863). 
411 Id. With respect to Maryland, see Richard W. Bourne & John Lynch, Jr., Merger of Law and 
Equity Under the Revised Maryland Rules: Does It Threaten Trial by Jury? 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 
1 (1984); Charles A. Rees, Preserved or Pickled? The Right to Trial by Jury After the Merger of 
Law and Equity in Maryland, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 301 (1997). 
412 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
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in mind that contemporary customs are not constitutionally compelled. The 
constitution right requires only that juries find facts; it does not require that 
they apply law.413
 
  
Jury Selection (voir dire) 
 
Unlike judges, jurors in America are not on stand-by in the courthouse 
waiting for parties to bring lawsuits to them for decision. Citizens are called 
to serve as jurors to decide specific cases in which one or the other of the 
parties has requested a jury trial. When a jury is constituted for a particular 
case, that case is then held immediately in one proceeding concentrated on 
successive days one after another with as few breaks as possible.  
That jurors are selected to serve only for particular cases rather than 
being on call and that they serve only in concentrated periods is a 
continuation of practices that developed when communications were limited 
and transportation difficult. That it continues today is a consequence of 
inertia and of the compelled nature of jury service: involuntary jurors want to 
complete their service as quickly as possible. In other countries, where there 
are analogues to juries in lay judges, laymen are elected for terms and do 
intermittent duty as the needs of cases require. For example, the German 
system uses lay judges in certain commercial cases and generally in serious 
criminal ones. These lay judges are on standby;414 they serve five year 
terms.415
Choosing jurors for a particular case takes place in a specific stage of 
trial practice known as “voir dire” (“to hear them say”). Court personnel rely 
on lists of adults in the community to select randomly people for possible 
jury service. Since there is no registration of residence requirement in the 
United States, lists typically used are lists of registered voters or licensed 
drivers. This can skew demographic representation and is sometimes 
objected to.  
 Their service is voluntary. 
In the course of voir dire potential jurors are questioned to determine 
their suitability for jury duty. The questioning is not directed toward finding 
jurors most suited to decide cases, but to weed out potential jurors who 
might be biased against one party or another. Where there is a clear conflict 
of interest, the judge may of his or her own motion “strike” that potential 
juror for “cause” and most certainly will strike such a potential juror upon 
motion of a party. In other cases, however, where there is no clear conflict of 
interest and no explicit bias, a party may challenge a juror only if the party 
exercises one of a limited number of “preemptory” challenges. A preemptory 
challenge permits a party to strike a potential juror for no stated reason at all. 
                                                 
413 Cf. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14545) (Story, 
J., on circuit). 
414 § 105 GVG. 
415 § 108 GVG. 
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Use of preemptory challenges based on grounds that violate equal protection 
law (e.g., race discrimination), is prohibited in criminal cases.416
Voir dire practices among the states and even within the federal court 
system vary in how extensive questioning of potential jurors is and in how 
questioning is shared among lawyers and judges. In some courts, lawyers, 
out of presence of judges, interrogate jurors. Jurors subject to lawyers’ 
questioning sometimes feel that they are on trial. In other courts, lawyers ask 
questions, but in the presence of judges. In still other courts, judges take the 
lead in asking questions and permit lawyers to inquire only after the judges 
are done. In some courts, questioners interrogate potential jurors 
individually; in others, they ask questions only of panels of potential jurors.  
  
Jury selection can play a major role in civil as well as in criminal cases. 
It can become a “tug-of-war” between lawyers.417 Yet the trend seems to be 
toward more expansive rather than more limited voir dire. Opponents of 
limited voir dire fear that asking only a few questions may cause lawyers to 
miss potential bias.418 The less limited voir dire is, however, the greater is 
the possibility of using it for purposes for which it is not intended. Trial 
lawyers readily acknowledge that they conduct voir dire not only to identify 
potential jurors who are biased against their clients, but to find potential 
jurors who might be biased for their clients and to begin to persuade 
eventual jurors to decide for them and for their clients.419 To help them do 
this, trial lawyers engage consultants to identify those people who as jurors 
might be likely to decide for their clients.420 Even opponents of limited voir 
dire ask: “can a good attorney stack the jury?” They answer: “yes.”421
The search for unbiased jurors can become a race to the bottom. Judge 
Seymour D. Thompson, who was one of America’s first jury trial experts, 
acerbically compared the Swedish jury—”composed of men of the highest 
probity, chosen by the electors for a term of years,” with the American 
jury—”composed of men who are selected for the purpose of a single trial … 
twelve dolts, selected because they are ignorant of the facts of the case about 
to be tried, no matter how notorious .…” 
  
422
 
 
Costs of Voir Dire 
 
                                                 
416 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).  
417 Gregory E. Mize & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Toward a better voir dire process, TRIAL, Vol. 
44, No. 3, March 2008. 
418 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 405, at 91. 
419 See Chris O’Brian, Connecting with prospective jurors, TRIAL, Vol. 43, No. 10, October 
2007. 
420 See AMY J. POSEY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, TRIAL CONSULTING (2005). 
421 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 405, at 99-100. 
422 1 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL v (1888). 
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Voir dire imposes considerable costs on individual cases, on the civil 
justice system as a whole, and on individual jurors. One study concludes that 
nationwide, in civil and criminal cases, jury selection on average requires 
between 2.3 and 3.8 hours.423
Besides the time lawyers spend on the project, judges and potential 
jurors also participate. To obtain a jury of six, a court may summon twenty, 
fifty or more potential jurors. In celebrated cases, the court may summon 
hundreds of potential jurors.
 While that might not sound like a great deal of 
time, it is a tax on every ordinary case that contemplates a jury trial. If jury 
selection takes only three hours in court, that suggests that lawyers for both 
sides will together devote ten to twenty hours to the process, or the 
equivalent of several thousands of dollars. Lawyers commonly spend an 
hour outside court for every hour they spend inside the courtroom To get full 
value of voir dire, lawyers are advised not to do it alone, but to include a 
colleague.  
424
Why does the American legal system devote such resources to ferreting 
out biased jurors? Are Americans by nature more biased than their 
counterparts abroad? No. Americans are not especially biased, but as we 
shall see, American juries are only loosely controlled by law so deciding 
who decides the case can be outcome determinative. 
 Even in ordinary cases, resource 
commitments may be high. In a relatively routine tort claim against the 
police department, close to one hundred potential jurors might be 
summoned. They might spend the better part of a day awaiting questioning 
by a staff of ten lawyers, court personnel and the judge. All-in-all, perhaps 
nine hundred hours could be devoted to selecting jurors for that one case. 
That is one person working full time for half a year! 
Trial  
 
The contemporary American trial is structured to permit each side to tell 
its story; the judge is passive. In a nutshell, this is the sequence: the lawyers 
for the parties begin their clienets cases with opening statements. Ín the 
opening statements the lawyers tell the court, i.e., the judge and the jurors, if 
this a jury trial, what they plan to prove to justify finding for their clients. 
The lawyers set out a legal theory of the case, a factual theory and a theme. 
Following the opening statments, first the plaintiff’s lawyer, then the 
defendant’s lawyer, presents witnesses. After the presenting party questions 
a witness, the opposing party is permitted to ask questions (“cross-
examination). After both sides’ lawyers have presented their cases, they 
make closing statements. The legal theory is only a part of the more 
important larger theme: “the moral-political claim the case makes on the 
jury’s sensibilities.” The judge then instructs jurors in the law and sends the 
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out to decide the case. If trial is before a judge alone, the judge retires to 
reach his or her decision. 
Trial—in the two percent of cases where they occur—is where parties, 
through their lawyers, finally get their day-in-court. At long last their 
lawyers offer to the court the proof of their claims of right. Finally, they get 
to have their lawyers present their view of how law applies to facts in their 
case. Yet even in this end stage parties do not get to explain to the court why 
they are complaining.   
 
Taking Evidence 
 
Lawyer Control of Testimony Taking. Lawyers for parties shape 
trials. They determine the order of witnesses. They place the questions. Once 
one side finishes with “its” witness, the other side “cross-examines” the 
witness. In the view of the trial bar, judges should be silent. They should 
accept repetition rather than restrict lawyers in presenting and questioning 
witnesses. Think of Hollywood trial movies. Taking evidence is all part of a 
play. Justice Scalia reminds us that play is “a very good word for what the 
common law, adversary trial” is.425
Just as good play directors coach their actors before performances, so 
too do good trial lawyers coach their witnesses before trials. Just as good 
directors guide their players with scripts, good lawyers write scripts to guide 
their actors. Both good directors and good lawyers remind their subjects to 
avoid rote memorization. Good lawyers advise their witnesses to use their 
own words and to use their scripts only as guides. Lawyers want their 
witnesses to give the impression that their testimony comes completely from 
their own recollection, even if the truth sometimes is otherwise. 
  
Cross-examination. To counteract coaching American civil procedure 
offers the celebrated institution of cross-examination. Once cross-
examination was said to be the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth.”426
One practitioner’s rule of cross-examination is that the cross-examining 
lawyer should not ask a question that the lawyer does not know the answer to 
beforehand. The lawyer should not be surprised by the answer of a witness. 
Another practitioner’s rule is that the lawyer should pose only leading 
questions. A leading question suggests its answer: e.g., “Mr. Witness, you 
 As trial has vanished, so too has cross-examination: 
no trial—no cross. Hollywood can preserve its memory, but not its role.  
Even in its heyday, however, cross-examination was often more a 
steamroller that flattened truth than an engine that uncovered it. 
                                                 
425 TRUTH ON TRIAL, 8 ANNENBERG ETHICS IN AMERICA at 54th minute (Columbia University 
Seminars on Media and Society, 1989, ISBN 0-89776-526-5) 
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work for the post office, don’t you?” The lawyer should not give the witness 
opportunity to explain. The goal of cross-examination is “control” of the 
witness’s testimony. Sought is nothing less than the “successful debilitation” 
of the witness, or as colloquially put by one author, “cracking the egg.” 427
American cross-examination when it occurs can be brutal. Then its 
focus likely is not a material point in dispute between the parties, but witness 
credibility. American lawyers are advised to “set up” and “destroy” 
witnesses. A basic technique to attack witness credibility is to confront the 
witness with inconsistent statements. One litigator counsels: “Prior 
inconsistencies, like rare coins, are not easily found. They must be 
discovered or created.” They are discovered by searching the record closely: 
by examining everything relevant that the witness has ever said. Prior 
inconsistencies are created in discovery and at trial. In discovery, lawyers get 
opposing witnesses to commit themselves to positions that they may later 
contradict or retract. Lawyers prolong depositions and repeat questions to 
encourage inconsistent statements. At trial, lawyers “lead” witnesses to 
desired answers. They cut witnesses off rather than allow narrative answers. 
They surprise witnesses to generate conflict. They look for weakness. With 
one incorrect statement, they can impeach a witness who testified correctly 
to ten facts.  
 
Law of Evidence. Another expensive feature of American trials which 
contributes to their expense and impending disappearance is the American 
law of evidence. It has no exact counterpart in modern German or Korean 
law. The American law precludes parties from offering certain evidence even 
though material to disputed issues of fact. It bars the evidence, usually 
because the evidence is thought unreliable or prejudicial. The best-known 
example of precluded evidence is hearsay. Hearsay evidence is evidence of 
an out-of-court statement which is offered in court to prove the truth of the 
content. In our case, a witness might testify that she overheard Mary Roh 
telling her daughter Rosa that the money she gave John Doh, Jr. was a gift. 
The statement is hearsay and falls under the hearsay rule. It is admissible 
only because it falls under an exception to the rule (here, an admission of a 
party.) 
The law of evidence controls juries. In bench trials, where there is no 
jury, some judges do not apply evidence law strictly. They allow lawyers to 
offer most any evidence, and then give it the value that they believe it should 
have. Their practice is closer to the practice in Germany of free evaluation of 
evidence.  
 
Jury Manipulation 
 
                                                 
427 Hayes, Cracking the Egg: Cross-Examining the Expert in a Patent Case, 25 TRIAL, No. 6, 56 
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Trials generally permit of many “dirty tricks.” Trials by jury are all the 
more subject to deception. Above all criminal trials—where sanctions can be 
severe—admit of and sometimes approve of defeating truth.428
 
 Since trials 
are such unusual occurrences today, we do not detail how they permit 
defeating truth, any more than we dwelt on how discovery, today’s 
institution of choice can frustrate truth and justice. In this book aim to 
describe how processes unfold when conducted properly. 
Jury Instruction and Jury Decision 
 
After the lawyers have presented their clients’ witnesses and concluded 
their closing statements, the judge directs the jurors in the law and in its 
application. That is, the judge orally instructs the jurors about the elements 
of applicable legal rules.  
The parties’ lawyers commonly propose the instructions. The judges 
choose between their proposals piecemeal and amend and add to them as 
they see fit. Before judges give instructions they must inform the parties’ 
lawyers of the substance of instructions and must provide them with 
opportunity to object.429
Instructing juries is not interactive; judges read instructions and jurors 
listen. Should jurors have questions during the course of their deliberations, 
they can submit these to the judges. Typically judges read back what they 
read originally. Proposals to improve jury application of law to facts have 
been modest. Even seemingly minor reform measures, such as giving jurors 
printed copies of instructions, instructing them at the beginning rather than 
the end of the trial in substantive law, allowing them to take notes during 
trial, and allowing them to ask questions of witness, encounter stiff 
opposition. 
 Drafters often rely on books of standard 
instructions. Some of these books have official or semi-official status. Judges 
read the selected instructions to jurors. While judges realize that jurors often 
do not understand instructions, the law presumes conclusively that they do.  
Americans take the present form of jury instruction for granted. They 
little discuss what courts do not do to help jurors decide. For examples, at the 
outset of cases, before party lawyers present their theories of the case, judges 
rarely instruct jurors in what the law requires. They leave that insgtruction to 
the end of the case, when both sides have had their say. At trial begin, and 
along the way, judges tell jurors no more than the barest essentials of how 
cases are conducted. During trial, they do not guide jurors in picking out 
from conflicting testimony factual elements necessary to applying law to the 
cases at hand. As witnesses testify, rarely do judges comment to jurors on 
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credibility of witnesses. Even at trial end, judges’ instruct jurors only on the 
bloodless bones of the law: the abstract legal rules. Above all they do not do, 
as English courts do and as American courts once did, comment on the 
alleged facts presented by the parties.430
 
 After jurors deliberate, they return 
and deliver verdict. We discuss verdicts in Chapter 7. 
B. Germany 
 
In the courts everyone is entitled to a hearing in 
accordance with the law. 
 
Art. 103(1) Basic Law [Constitution]  
of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) 
 
Much as Hollywood has given the world its picture of American 
procedure, American law professors have given Americans a similarly 
misleading picture of German civil procedure. The typical American view of 
civil law civil procedure is an inaccurate comic-book caricature. For 
example, Justice Antonin Scalia sees as the only alternative to the adversary 
system an “inquisitorial system.”431 American scholars, notwithstanding 
Continental lawyers’ “vehement objections,” still adopt “inquisitorial” as a 
“convenient shorthand” for civil law civil proceedings and see in them “an 
official inquiry.”432 Their picture is that of the “subsumption automat” or of 
the slot machine justice of colorful critiques of a century ago. Some see in 
the civil law judge almost a government toady who single-mindedly, lacking 
a “creative role,” applies the law without “asking whether a syllogistic result 
produces the kind of result the rule contemplates.”433 “Their image is that of 
a civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative 
functions.”434
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(2009); Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent 
Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 233-239 (2000). 
 They see a “core of professionally trained and closely 
supervised” judges who maintain “tight control over the business of fact 
431 TRUTH ON TRIAL, 8 ANNENBERG ETHICS IN AMERICA at 54th minute (Columbia University 
Seminars on Media and Society, 1989, ISBN 0-89776-526-5) 
http://www.learner.org/resources/series81.html?pop=yes&pid=198. See also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-48 (2004). 
432 Oscar G. Chase, American ‘Exceptionalism’ and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 277, 283 (2002); SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 211, at 143. 
433 Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's Advantage Over the Civil 
Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87, 97, 103 (1998). 
434 JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 37 (3rd ed. 2007). 
Accord, RICHARD A POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 133 (2008); VICKI C. JACKSON& MARK V. 
TUSHNET, DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160 (2002) (quoting 
Merryman). 
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presentation” thus eliminating volatility and unpredictability, but at the 
“expense of other values.”435
The comic book picture of the civil law judge as grand inquisitor 
mindlessly applying rigid rules without attention to equities of individual 
cases is wrong. In the German civil justice systems, in each individual case 
the judge decides whether to apply precise statutory provisions or to rely on 
one of the “general clauses” of the Civil Code or other laws that authorizes 
taking into account equitable considerations not directly covered by statutory 
rule.
  
436
Rather than permit judges or administrators to depart ad hoc from legal 
rules, the German ideal is to write rules that provide for valuing by judges or 
administrators in individual cases. Well-written rules give rule-appliers 
opportunities to take into account individual circumstances. They have 
escape clauses that permit foregoing their application where application 
would be inappropriate; they have general clauses that permit applying rules 
to cases that otherwise might escape application. Writing escape clauses and 
general clauses that are consistent with the rule of law is part of the 
legislator’s art.  
  
Article 20 of the German constitution (Basic Law) commands equitable 
application of statutes. Its section 3 provides that the judiciary is bound in all 
it does by “statute and justice” (Gesetz und Recht). In every case judges are 
to be alert for a possible unjust applications of statutes. 
 
1. The Nature of German Civil Process: Judgment as Goal of Process 
 
The goal of German civil process is a judicial judgment. That goal keeps the 
process focused on application of existing legal rules to facts in the instant case. 
At the end of the process, what legitimates the outcome is a rational judgment 
more than presentations in court. The individual elements required by statute to 
establish a legal claim are the “spectacles” through which judges view cases. 
What can be seen through the spectacles matters; everything else is irrelevant.437
Thus German civil process is not a drama in which lawyers write scripts, 
produce plays and play roles. It is not a battle in which lawyers as champions 
 
Freed from entertaining party presentation of competing stories, judges focus on 
material points in dispute to find just those facts necessary for decision. From 
beginning to end of process, rules of procedure direct parties and court to finding 
facts necessary to fulfilling requirements of applicable rules. 
                                                 
435 Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 
17-18 (1997). 
436 Ernst Fraenkel, The Labor Courts in the German Judicial System, in FRIEDA WUNDERLICH, 
GERMAN LABOR COURTS (1946), reprinted in ERNST FRAENKEL, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN, 
vol. 3, NEUAUFBAU DER DEMOKRATIE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA 360 (Gerhard Gühler, ed., 
1999). 
437 JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, DIE KONSTITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES, STUDIEN ZUM VERHÄLTNIS 
VON TATSACHENFESTSTELLUNG UND RECHTSANWENDUNG 22, 23-24 (1965). 
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compete against each other and judges watch for dirty tricks. On the other 
hand, neither is it a government investigation into peoples’ lives. It is not 
inquisitorial. 
We cannot stress this point enough. Many American academics persist 
in believing that the only alternative to the adversary system that they know 
is an inquisitorial system of their imagination where judges conduct inquests 
for the state and lawsuits become “pretext[s] for the realization of state 
policy.”438
In German civil justice the state has no interest in whether plaintiff or 
defendant wins the case. The state is interested that the party who wins the 
case, whether it is plaintiff or defendant, is the party who, according to law 
and justice, has the superior claim of right. When that is the case, peace is 
maintained in society. Parties can work with one another faithfully according 
to law secure in the knowledge, that should one party fail to follow the law, 
the party can go to court for protection. Already a century ago some 
Americans recognized these truths about civil law proceedings.
 That judges have more active roles in how proceedings are 
conducted does not turn judges into inquisitors or lawsuits into inquisitions.   
439
Contemporary German civil process is cooperative. It facilitates 
reaching judgments quickly and cheaply based on substantive truth and law. 
It is an explicit rejection of some process that predated the 1877 Code of 
Civil Procedure, which had been based, like American process still is, on a 
kind of “battle-between-the-parties” model.
  
440 In German process, parties 
present to the court facts of the matter in controversy. The court structures 
the dispute according to law in order to reach its own legal judgment or to 
help parties to reach their own settlement. The Roman law maxim applies: 
“da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius”—give me the facts, and I will give you the 
[resulting] right.441
German process is itself not subject to strict formal rules in order to 
permit judges efficiently to determine whether a party, usually plaintiff, has 
proven facts sufficient to authorize the court to order legal remedies. Judges 
do not choose between two subjective presentations of one factual event—as 
an American court might—but determine whether elements of a legal rule 
are objectively fulfilled. 
  
In German civil process judges are strictly limited by the matter in 
controversy to materials presented by parties. They can do no more than 
                                                 
438 See, e.g., FRANKLIN STREIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 
211 (1994). 
439 See, e.g., Axel Teisen, Continental and Common Law Procedure Contrasted—An Interesting 
Side-Light on Reform in Pleading and Practice, 74 CENTRAL L.J. 22, 45-47 (1912). 
440 See C.H. van Rhee, Introduction in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 12 (C.H. 
van Rhee, ed., 2005). 
441 Cf. P. Oberhammer & T. Domej, [Powers of the Judge] Germany, Switzerland and Austria, 
in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 295. 
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pronounce legal rights applicable to the controversy.442
In structuring lawsuits German judges identify legally material facts in 
dispute. American lawyers recognize this activity as issue narrowing. It is for 
them an activity largely the province of lawyers and not of judges. German 
judges clarify more than just issues; they clarify what parties want. American 
lawyers know no direct counterpart in formal process, but may recognize this 
as an activity that they engage in when negotiating settlements. No one 
knows better which facts the parties dispute and what the parties want than 
the parties themselves. Accordingly German civil process involves parties in 
lawsuits—it gives them voice—from the very first formal proceeding.  
 They have no 
authority to investigate. It is wrong to characterize German civil process as 
investigative or inquisitorial.  
Judges work with parties to clarify those matters that are in dispute and 
to separate them from those matters that are not in dispute. It can take 90% 
of the time of the judge in the case just to find out from many inconsistent 
statements what it is that the parties really want to say, what they are 
contending, and what they think the case is really about.443
That German judges work with parties does not turn judges  into 
inquisitors or convert private lawsuits into state-sponsored inquests. 
Throughout the process judges take pains to give parties opportunity to take 
positions on all material matters (Recht auf rechtliches Gehör—right to be 
heard). There are no surprise decisions. 
  
To be sure, German lawsuits are not football matches between two 
opposing sides. They are not battles of champions. German judges do not 
preside passively over football matches to count points and to make sure that 
neither party plays dirty. That German judges are not passive does not make 
German proceedings any less competitive.  
For readers drawn to common law sports analogies, we offer one for the 
civil law. A football match is only one of many kinds of competitive sports 
contests. While American civil proceedings are likened to football matches 
and American judges to passive football referees, we liken German civil 
proceedings to athletics contests, such as high jump, where referees direct 
contestants in their competition. The high jump is no less an adversary 
contest because referees check contestants in for the competition, change the 
order or location of events, direct contestants where to practice, tell them 
what they must do, show them where they are to begin their jumps, signal 
when they may begin, measure how high they have jumped, consider all 
available evidence to reach a fair determination that contestants have—
                                                 
442 See, e.g., HARRIET WEBER, VERGLEICH, SCHLICHTUNG, MEDIATION IN DEUTSCHLAND, 
REFERAT FÜR DIE GEMEINSAME TAGUNG FÜR RICHTERINNEN UND RICHTER SOWIE 
STAATSANWÄLTINEN UND STAATSANWÄLTE AUS ÖSTERREICH, BAYERN UND DER SCHWEIZ 10 
(2007). 
443 See Oskar Hartwieg, The Art of Framing the Case under English and German Rules of 
Pleading, in OSKAR HARTWIEG, TATSACHEN- UND NORMARBEIT IM RECHTSVERGLEICH: 
AUSGEWÄHLTE AUFSÄTZE 77, 86 (2003). 
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within the rules—cleared the bar, check all final measurements, measure and 
raise the crossbar, inform contestants when they have failed to correctly clear 
the high bar set, and determine whether they should have another chance to 
clear the bar.444
 
  
2. The Process in Outline 
 
As we have seen, after reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the court 
serves it on the defendant. At that time the court directs the parties either to 
appear for a preliminary hearing (früher erster Termin, “early first 
hearing”)445 or to engage in a further written preliminary proceeding.446 In 
the ideal case, following these preliminary proceedings, the court determines 
the case in a single, comprehensive, “concentrated” principal hearing 
(Haupttermin).447
Preceding the main hearing, or preceding the preliminary hearing if the 
court holds one, the court ordinarily confers with the parties on a possible 
settlement of the case.
 Insofar as this occurs, it assumes that parties have been 
able to develop all necessary factual information beforehand.  
448 If settlement discussions fail, the court proceeds to 
the main or preliminary hearing as the case may be. In the event that the 
court conducts a preliminary hearing, it is not required to hold a subsequent 
main hearing, but may accomplish the two together.449 In the main hearing 
the court introduces the matter in dispute. Then the lawyers for the parties 
state what they are seeking. Usually plaintiff’s lawyer refers to the complaint 
and reiterates the specific relief requested there. Typically defendant’s 
lawyer refers to the answer and requests dismissal of the complaint. The 
court then discusses the case with the lawyers and hears the parties 
themselves. There is no prescribed order to these proceedings.450
The goal of the preliminary hearing—or of written preliminary 
proceedings—is to identify the probably applicable legal rules, their 
constituent elements, and which facts material to their application are in 
dispute. Legal historians may note similarities to the oral pleadings of the 
early common law when pleadings were oral. Determination of which rules 
might be applicable is tentative. While the court is to direct attention of the 
 Following 
these discussions, ideally the court proceeds in that same hearing to take 
such evidence as may be necessary to establish or defeat the requests of the 
parties. In fact, evidence taking often is deferred to a subsequent hearing or 
is not ever needed. 
                                                 
444 See USA TRACK & FIELD, 2009 COMPETITION RULES, Rules 125-127, 142, 148, 180-182. 
445 § 275 ZPO. 
446 § 276 ZPO. 
447 § 272(1) ZPO. 
448 § 278(2) ZPO. 
449 HEINZ THOMAS, HANS PUTZO, KLAUS REICHOLD & RAINER HÜßTEGE, ZIVILPROZESS-
ORDNUNG § 272 margin no. 3, at 448 (29th ed. 2008). 
450 See HANS-JOACHIM MUSIELAK, MEIN RECHT VOR GERICHT 46-48 (1995). 
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parties first to the factual elements of those rules most likely applicable, the 
parties are not precluded from returning to those rules not first considered 
should it appear later that they are relevant.451
In the preliminary hearing the court calls attention of the parties to those 
facts material to possibly applicable rules on which the parties do not agree. 
The court asks the party bearing the burden of proof for that element to 
present the necessary proof. The court may also alert the other side that at 
some point that, if the proposing party presents what it needs to, the burden 
of proof may shift to it. No longer will it be sufficient to challenge the 
proponent’s proof, but it will be necessary to bring its own affirmative 
evidence. A classic example is product liability.
 
452
Process continues as a cooperative rather than combative undertaking to 
refine the points in dispute through finding points of common ground on 
which the parties can agree and to locate those points on which they 
disagree. Only when facts are found to be material and in dispute does the 
court—on party application—order taking of evidence; separate direction for 
each item of evidence and for each witness is required. In German civil 
process taking of evidence is secondary; hearing of parties is primary. It is to 
the parties in person—and not to their lawyers—that the court directs its first 
attention, either in the early hearing just discussed or in a main hearing to 
which we now turn.
 Once a plaintiff makes 
certain showings, then it is up to the defendant to bring forward evidence 
that rebuts that showing. This is one way the German system avoids resort to 
discovery. 
453
 
  
3. The Oral Hearing and the Right to be Heard 
 
The main hearing is obligatory and oral.454 It is the crucial core of German 
civil procedure.455
                                                 
451 Cf. § 282 ZPO (Rechtszeitigkeit des Vorbringens). 
 The Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties to conduct 
their case orally before the court. The parties begin the oral hearing by 
addressing their requests for relief to the court. They are to present their positions 
on the legal controversy with respect to both fact and law. While they may refer 
to documents, they are not to read from them. Parties, even when represented by 
452 Andrew Hammel, Review [of McClurg et al., Practical Global Tort Litigation], 56 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 226, 227 (2008). (“Germany has a specific products-liability statute, but German 
courts still mainly apply doctrines developed in a line of precedent started with the Fowl Pest 
decision of 1968. BGH Decision of Nov. 26 1968, BGHZ 51, 91. The Fowl Pest line of cases, 
which interprets the language of the famous Section 823(1) of the German Civil Code, 
technically requires the plaintiff to prove negligence. However, liability is presumed once a 
defect is proven, subject to the manufacturer's rebuttal by careful documentation of its quality-
control and "product observation.”) 
453 HARRIETT WEBER, at 12. 
454 §§ 128, 272 ZPO. 
455 THOMAS-PUTZO-REICHHOLD § 272 margin no. 1, at 447 (“Kernstück”). 
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counsel, are allowed—and sometimes required—to address the court.456
Before the 1877 Code of Civil Procedure in some German states civil 
proceedings were written. The Code of Civil Procedure prefers oral over written 
proceedings. It reflects a decision that the oral proceedings better facilitate 
factual clarification and case structuring. A list of benefits of oral proceedings 
includes:  
 The 
court is not permitted to rest its decision in the case on matters not addressed in 
an oral hearing. 
1. Truth-finding. Oral proceedings permit a better and immediate 
impression of the presentations of the parties and of the testimony of 
witnesses and experts. The court can, and frequently does require personal 
appearance of the parties; parties cannot delegate that responsibility to their 
lawyers. 
2. Process expedition. By bringing the parties together for discussions 
of the case and for testimony of witnesses a faster clarification of facts and 
law is possible than is the case in purely written proceedings. 
3. “Equality of Arms” (Waffengleicheit). Particularly in the lowest 
court, where parties may not be represented by counsel, oral hearings even 
the playing field. In all cases, however, the immediacy of the oral 
discussions and the active participation of the judge makes possible 
downgrading the importance of differing levels of presentation and 
promotes basing decision more on the merits of the case. 
4. Dispute resolution. In oral hearings judges facilitate settlement by 
structuring the matters in dispute. Structuring the case helps the parties reach 
a settlement of the case more expeditiously and more closely aligned with 
their legal rights. The parties can see which rules will determine the decision 
and which facts are essential. Some judges consider structuring one of their 
most important judicial duties. The judge is to promote settlement at all 
times during the case. Should promotion of settlement conflict with the 
judicial rule, the judge may refer the parties to another judge for settlement 
negotiations as such.457
5. Public resolution. The public can attend and observe oral hearings. 
The public cannot do that when proceedings are written.
  
458
 
 
Hearing of the Parties (die Parteianhörung) 
 
Most features of German civil procedure have their counterparts in 
American civil procedure; while those counterparts may have different foci or 
function somewhat differently, parallels are nonetheless clearly recognizable. 
The German Parteianhörung, the hearing of the parties, on the other hand, has 
no counterpart in American civil procedure. In the hearing of the parties, the 
                                                 
456 § 128 ZPO. 
457 § 278(1)+(5) ZPO. 
458 MANFRED WOLF, GERICHTLICHES VERFAHRENSRECHT 155 (1978). 
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judge discusses the case directly with the parties and their lawyers. These 
discussions are not evidentiary. They do not constitute taking testimony of the 
parties. The judge clarifies the contentions of the parties and draws out the 
material issues in dispute between them. In short, the judge does what historic 
common law pleadings were, supposed to do: to ascertain the subject for 
decision.  
German civil procedure distinguishes between hearing parties and taking 
their testimony for purposes of proof. The former is a requirement and feature of 
every case; the latter is exceptional and usually occurs only if no other evidence 
is available. The choice of words in German conveys the difference: the verb 
anhören, as in Parteianhörung, means to listen; the verb vernehmen, as in 
Parteivernehmung, means to examine. The physical setting in which the two 
take place likewise demonstrates the difference. In hearing parties, parties sit 
with their lawyers and discuss the case in free interchanges with judge and 
lawyers. In taking of party testimony, on the other hand, parties are called to the 
witness chair, seated between the two sides, instructed in their obligation to tell 
the truth, may be sworn and are questioned formally by judge and lawyers.  
A hearing of the parties personally is not mandatory; it may take place 
through lawyers for parties. The Code provides, however, that the court should 
on its own motion direct personal appearance of parties whenever personal 
participation is likely to assist in clarification of facts. Even in that case, 
however, if a party is at a great distance from the courthouse or there is some 
other important reason not to presume a party’s personal appearance, the court 
should refrain from such an order.459
German civil procedure puts the hearing of the parties at the beginning of 
the first oral hearing—right after their lawyers summarize their claims. The idea 
is that the persons best informed about the facts of the case are, as a rule, the 
parties themselves. And it is the facts of the case that are the focus of court 
proceedings.
 
460
Surprising as is it for readers from non-common law jurisdictions, at no time 
do parties routinely in American civil procedure ever meet together with the 
judge or jurors to discuss the case. While American civil procedure zealously 
safeguards a right to a day-in-court, that right secures only formal presentation of 
the parties’ case at trial or in written submissions of their lawyers to the court. 
Both types of presentation have all the spontaneity and interaction of a scripted 
press release. Moreover, most factual disputes must await resolution at trial; only 
if there is no genuine issue of fact is there even possibility of “short-circuiting” 
the cumbersome pretrial discovery.
  
461
                                                 
459  § 141(1) ZPO. 
 Today, since trials have vanished, in the 
460 Hans Dieter Lange, Parteianhörung und Parteivernehmung, 2002 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 476. 
461 See JONATHAN B. WILSON, OUT OF BALANCE: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE 
AMERICAN LITIGATION SYSTEM 31 (2005). 
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vast of majority of cases, parties never get to tell anyone other than their lawyers, 
or their adversaries’ lawyers their side of the case. 
In German civil justice hearing the parties at the outset of the case serves 
important functions. These include: clarification of factual assertions of parties; 
involvement of parties in process, thus allowing them to “blow off steam and 
promoting their acceptance of the outcome; and facilitation of settlements. 
Clarification of factual assertions is the most important of these. With 
parties present, the judge can learn directly whether parties understand what 
lawyers are saying on their behalf. From parties—the persons most likely to have 
first-hand knowledge—the judge can garner a fuller understanding of fact 
contentions. From the parties the judge understand can receive correction.  
Discussions with lawyers alone lack the same opportunities for immediate 
correction and supplementation. Lawyers for the parties may give a one-sided 
version of facts in the case. Removing the lawyer filter reduces opportunities for 
manipulation of proceedings and raises the standing of process in public 
perception. 462
Discussions with parties can lead to a broadening of the field of factual 
consideration. There may be more to the case than is apparent on the surface of 
the pleadings. Here, judges must be careful that they do not cross the line and 
consider matters that the parties have not placed before the court. German civil 
procedure does not accept civil judges conducting investigations ex officio.
 
463
Beginning judges receive formal classroom instruction and training from 
their colleagues in how best to hear parties. Different judges have different styles 
in hearing parties. Most adjust their approaches to needs of individual cases. Best 
practice avoids questions that focus on eliciting short, specific answers to 
questions directly raising elements of the legal claim; best practice encourages 
witnesses to state their testimony in unstructured narrative answers, i.e. free 
statements of the case. Best practice, however, requires care that parties not be 
allowed to wander too far from the subject of the lawsuit and thus squandering 
everyone’s time.
  
464
To Americans accustomed to formal exchanges between judge and counsel, 
the hearing of the parties to clarify issues is remarkable. By American standards, 
these hearings are intensely interactive, comparatively cooperative, and 
informal.
  
465
                                                 
462 Lange, supra note 
 These discussions are neither American-style discovery nor 
American-style trial. Their focus is on identifying material issues of fact that are 
actually in dispute between the parties; it is not on uncovering unknown facts or 
on proving known ones or on possible presentation of a narration later. The judge 
probes potential claims and facts needed to support the claims. In essence, the 
460, at 477-478. 
463 Lange, supra note 460, at 479. 
464 Lange, supra note 460, at 479. 
465 See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 256-259 (2004) 
(describing them at length). 
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judge turns to the party and the party’s lawyer concerned and asks: “Now on this 
issue are you seriously going to dispute the fact?” 
 
The Obligation to Elucidate Facts Truthfully (§ 138 ZPO) 
 
When the judge turns to the parties with a question whether they intend to 
dispute an asserted fact, they are not allowed to respond: so let the other side 
prove it. Parties are not permitted the deft avoidance possible in response to 
American written requests to admit. Section 138 ZPO imposes on parties a duty 
of cooperation in clarifying the issues in the case. Section 138(1) ZPO requires 
parties to give declarations concerning facts completely and truthfully; section 
138(2) ZPO requires that they state their positions with respect to facts asserted 
by the opponent.  
Section 138(3) ZPO provides that an asserted fact is to be treated as 
admitted if the other party is silent and fails to contest it. Section 138(4) ZPO 
provides that only in limited circumstances does a declaration of lack of 
knowledge serve to put a matter in dispute. Moreover, section 138(2) ZPO is 
interpreted to require that a mere denial of fact is not sufficient to put a fact in 
dispute. A party in most cases must explicitly contest the fact asserted, and if the 
fact asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the party must 
substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it. Thus, if in the course 
of the hearing or already in pleadings, one party admits a fact asserted by the 
other, there is no need to prove the fact. In relatively short order the judge can 
inform the parties of the applicable legal rules and get their agreement on which 
matters of fact are material to those rules and are in dispute.  
 
The Right to be Heard (Recht auf rechtliches Gehör)  
 
Clarification of which disputed facts are material presupposes that court and 
parties have a good idea what the applicable legal rule is and what its elements 
are. Section 139(2) ZPO recognizes this when it requires that the court call to the 
parties’ attention any legal rule that it intends to apply. 
Modern American and German civil process share an aversion to 
surprises. The guiding principle of American process is: no surprises at trial, 
no surprise witnesses and no surprise testimony.466
                                                 
466 David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What 
Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L. J. 683, 713 (2006). 
The golden rule of German process is: surprise decisions are forbidden. Helmut Rüßmann, 
Grundregeln der Relationstechnik, 
 Surprises undercut the 
right to a fair hearing. How the two systems go about preventing surprises 
helps understand differences between them. The American rule is directed to 
lawyers and to surprise at trial. Parties have panoramic discovery so that they 
may know all that there is to know about the case. If they fail to take 
http://ruessmann.jura.uni-
sb.de/zpo2004/Vorlesung/relationstechnik.htm. 
197   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
advantage of this opportunity, they have only themselves to blame for 
resulting surprises. If they fail to appreciate the significance of information 
that they uncover, or fail to present that information to the court, the fault is 
all theirs. If unthinking a plaintiff fails to present evidence on an element 
material to the claim, the court on motion of the defendant will dismiss the 
case halfway through trial for failure to prove a prima facie case without ever 
giving plaintiff an opportunity to make up the oversight. 
The German rule of § 139 ZPO, on the other hand, is directed to judges. 
It fulfills the right to be heard guaranteed by the German constitution. The 
rule requires that the court decide no material and disputed issue without first 
giving each side an opportunity to address that issue. If a plaintiff overlooks 
an element of claim, it is the judge’s duty to call that issue to the party’s 
attention; if the judge fails in that duty, the forgetful party has ground for 
appeal. The American practice of dismissing the case without giving 
opportunity to address the overlooked issue violates fundamental human 
rights guarantees. Civil justice is a process designed through a fair 
proceeding to reach a materially just result. Allowing one party to win 
because of the oversight of the other makes process a game and, might we 
say, civil justice “uncivilized”? 
 
Judge’s Duty of Elucidation (§ 139 ZPO)  
 
Section 139 ZPO is said to be the Magna Carta of German civil 
procedure.467
Authority for judges facilitating party presentations of their cases 
predates the 1877 Code. Over time that authority, which once might be little 
exercised in judges’ discretion, has been transformed to a duty
 It requires that judges discuss all aspects of cases with the 
parties thoroughly. It eliminates surprises more completely than discovery 
and does so without discovery’s costs in time and money. Section 139(2) 
ZPO requires that the judge call to a party’s attention and give the party an 
opportunity to comment on any non-trivial issue that the party has apparently 
overlooked or has considered insignificant. The same applies where the 
judge’s understanding of a point of fact or law differs from the 
understanding of a party.  
468 that 
sometimes is seen as nearly absolute.469
                                                 
467 Ekkehart Reinelt, § 139 ZPO – Die richterliche Prozessförderungspflicht in der Praxis, 
BAYERISCHER ANWALTBRIEF 1 (Nov, 2007) at 
 In its current formulation section 
http://www.anwaltbrief.de/Bayern/Artikel/2007-
11_Paragraph_139_ZPO_Richterliche_Prozessfoerderungspflicht.html (citing 
(Baumbach/Lauterbach 65. Auflage 2007, Rd.-Nr. 1). ) 
468 See EGBERT PETERS, RICHTERLICHE HINWEISPFLICHTEN UND BEWEISINITIATIVEN IM 
ZIVILPROZEß (1983) (the book’s topic is the development of the requirement largely since 
1877). 
469 See Ekkehard Schumann, Die absolute Pflicht zum richterlichen Hinweis, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR DIETER LEIPOLD ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG l75 (Rolf Stürner et al., eds., 2009). 
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139 imposes on the court the duty to clarify with the parties’ the intended 
basis for decision before deciding. The section reads in English translation: 
 
(1) The court is to discuss with the parties the relevant facts and 
issues in dispute from a factual and legal perspective to the extent 
reasonable and to raise questions. It is to cause the parties timely 
and completely to declare their positions concerning all material 
facts, especially to supplement insufficient references to the 
relevant facts, to designate the means of proof, and to set forth 
claims based on the facts asserted. 
 
(2) The court may base its decision on a claim, other than a 
minor or auxiliary claim, on a point of fact or law which a party has 
apparently overlooked or considered insignificant only if the court 
has called the parties’ attention to the point and given opportunity 
for comment on it. The same provision applies if the court’s 
understanding of a point of fact or law differs from the 
understanding of both parties. 
 
(3) The court is to call attention to the court’s inclinations 
which exist with respect to those points which may be noticed on 
the court’s own motion. 
 
(4) [Guidance470
 
] according to this requirement [is] to be 
communicated and documented in the record as early as possible. 
Their rendition can be proven only through the content of the 
record. Only evidence of forgery of the record can be received to 
contradict its contents. 
(5) If a party is not prepared to respond immediately to a 
judicial request for clarification the court on the motion of the party 
may set a time limit for further clarification by written argument.471
 
  
Judges are to give guidance as early as need becomes apparent and whenever 
they think that it might be helpful. Judges have freedom in how and when 
they give guidance. They may give it in writing before hearings or orally 
during hearings. In either case, judges are to include in the case protocol a 
writing recording the guidance, if given orally, or the guidance itself, if 
                                                 
470 In original translation “hints and feedback.” 
471 Section 139 ZPO, as translated in PETER MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL 
JUSTICE 167-168 (2004). 
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given in writing. Judges are to serve the written record of the guidance on 
the lawyers.472
Many judges give guidance frequently, while others do not. Frequency 
of use is largely a matter of judges’ personal styles. Judges who prefer oral 
hearings often prefer oral guidance in order to intensify collaboration in the 
hearings. Other judges prefer to give guidance before hearings in order better 
to structure hearings. Lawyers need not await judicial interventions, but may 
at any time ask judges for guidance.
  
473
While guidance has long been possible, originally it was not mandatory. 
It first became mandatory in those courts where parties appeared without 
lawyers. Today it is mandatory in all courts. The duty safeguards each 
party’s right to a fair hearing. It protects the party from choice of a bad 
lawyer or of a good lawyer having a bad day. At first blush it seems 
superfluous when parties are represented by professionals. Can’t lawyers be 
expected to know the elements of cases? Surely they can, but not all lawyers 
are good lawyers and even good lawyers may not be able to anticipate the 
direction of judges’ thought processes. Resolution of cases should not 
depend upon which party is able, either through money, knowledge or luck, 
to hire the better lawyer.
  
474
The obligation of judges to discuss cases fully with parties does not turn 
judges into inquisitors. It does not authorize judges to investigate cases. 
Parties still control whether cases continues and what evidence courts take. 
Judges are to be neutral facilitators for both parties.
 
475
  
 
4. Taking of Proof  
 
The court’s discussion of facts can obviate need to take evidence in whole or 
in part. Should a party, in course of proceedings, oral or written, admit a fact 
asserted by the other, there is no longer need to take proof of it. Should a party 
assert a fact, if the other party remains silent, that party is deemed to have 
admitted it.476 The latter party’s denial ordinarily is not sufficient to put it in 
dispute and to require taking proof.477
                                                 
472 This is also necessary to avoided unfounded appeals, since there no verbatim transcript of 
proceedings is made in Germany as is the practice in the United States 
 The statute is interpreted to require that a 
473 See, e.g., MCCLURG et al, supra note XXX, at 62-63. 
474 ROLF STÜRNER, DIE RICHTERLICHE AUFKLÄRUNG IM ZIVILPROZEß 19 (1983). Common 
wisdom in common law countries is to the contrary. See, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia, in “Ethics 
in America: 8. Truth on Trial,” recorded February 13, 1988 (Public Broadcasting System, 1989) 
at http://www.learner.org/resources/series81.html?pop=yes&pid=198 [53:30] (“The only 
alternative [to the adversary system] is to go to the inquisitorial system and have an 
investigating judge. And then you are going to win or lose depending on how good a judge you 
happen to have gotten. At least when you pick your lawyer, you know that if he’s bad, it’s your 
fault.”) 
475 STÜRNER, DIE RICHTERLICHE AUFKLÄRUNG, supra note 474, at 14-18. 
476 § 138(3) ZPO. 
477 § 138(4) ZPO. 
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party must explicitly contest a fact asserted to put it in dispute and, if the fact 
asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the party must 
substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it.478
When it comes to taking testimony of witnesses, German civil justice is just-
in-time justice. Judges take proof only on party request and only after a judge so 
orders. 
 Thanks to such 
structuring, many cases conclude without oral testimony of witnesses. This may 
be true of well more than half of all cases filed.  
479
Where witness testimony is taken, framing issues helps focus and expedite 
testimony that is taken. Judges are to order taking proof only when necessary to 
convince them of the truth or untruth of particular facts that are disputed by 
parties and that are material to their decision. Judges are not to take proof of 
undisputed facts, facts generally known to them, facts presumed by statute to be 
true until the contrary is proven, favorable facts established by the other party’s 
submissions, disputed material facts established by undisputed facts, disputed 
facts the truth of which the judge is convinced of without taking evidence, and 
facts not necessary for the judgment (e.g., two alternatives for granting relief are 
allowed and one is already acknowledged).  
 
Judicial control of proof-taking promotes efficiency and protects privacy of 
parties and non-parties alike. Process takes proof only when relevant to material 
disputed facts. Parties to the lawsuit and non-parties as well are spared 
unnecessary but expensive intrusions.  
Judicial control of proof-taking does not prevent parties from insisting on 
taking evidence that believe is relevant to deciding material issues in dispute. 
Many German judges of first instance courts believe that a sure route to reversal 
on appeal is rejection without strong justification of application to take evidence. 
Such refusals count as a violation of the judicial duty of elucidation under ZPO § 
139. 
 
Witness Testimony  
 
American lawyers can recoil at the idea that parties’ lawyers do not take the 
lead in questioning witnesses. How are they to present their most persuasive 
case? But in German process, judges are not looking to be persuaded to a 
subjective position. Rather they need to know for their application of law, 
whether a particular witness has information that supports or undermines their 
objective determination whether a material fact in dispute needed to fulfill an 
element of a legal rule is true or not. 
The format of witness testimony is intended to facilitate objective 
determination of fact by courts. In Germany, unlike in the United States, parties 
are not to coach witness beforehand. Judges and lawyers are to meet witnesses 
                                                 
478 See § 138(2) ZPO. 
479 See generally John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 824 (1985). 
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for the first time in court. German judges believe, as American lawyers do too, 
that information obtained at first questioning from witnesses is more likely to be 
accurate.480
 
 Again in Germany, and unlike in the United States, witnesses are not 
to be asked leading questions that suggest answers, but are to be given open-
ended questions. Finally, in Germany, and unlike in the United States, judges are 
to direct witnesses toward material facts that are in dispute and are not to sit 
silently while witnesses discussing other matters not relevant to determination of 
the case.  
Party Testimony 
 
German civil process, as we have seen, historically has preferred hearing 
parties as disputants stating their positions, rather than as witnesses testifying on 
material disputed facts. The Code of Civil Procedure has intricate procedures that 
govern taking party testimony. It brings them together in a special section: Title 
10, Proof Through Party Testimony.481 While the historic preference remains, for 
decades restrictions on party testimony to disputed matters of fact have been 
relaxing. One factor contributing to this breakdown is increasing recognition that 
often only parties know facts crucial to determination of lawsuits. Fairness 
requires that both sides have opportunity to present testimony on material 
disputed points, even when for one side, only party testimony is available. 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, although directed to other 
nations’ proceedings, have accelerated this development.482
 
 As a result, in 
Germany today, party testimony is no longer rare but routine.  
Deferred Issue Decision-making  
 
Case structuring and issue framing are powerful tools for efficient conduct 
of civil justice, without the injustices of common-law single-issue pleading, 
because German judges defer final decisions of individual aspects of cases until 
they decide the case as a whole. German judges decide finally no issues before 
their time. The critical moment in a German lawsuit is how law applies to facts 
as of the date of the last oral hearing. German parties do not have to commit 
irrevocably early in the lawsuit to a single theory of the case or to as single 
governing rule. While judges are authorized to reject evidence for being offered 
too late, and often do that, their enthusiasm for such expediting measures is 
tempered by their ever-present § 139 ZPO duty of elucidation that guarantees 
parties their constitutional right to be heard.  
                                                 
480 Cf. THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 19 (7th ed. 2008). 
481 §§ 445-455 ZPO. 
482 See PETER MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 291-293 (2004) (noting the 
decision in Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands, 18 EHHR 213 (1994); P. Oberhamer & T, 
Domej, [Party Interrogation as Evidence]: Germany, Switzerland and Austria, in EUROPEAN 
TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (C.H. van Rhee, ed., 2005). 
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While German judges do not finally determine issues until the last oral 
hearing, along the way, they decide many issues tentatively. For example, 
where one party has produced credible evidence that establishes a particular 
fact required to apply a particular rule, and the other party has neither 
impeached that evidence nor offered an alternative, the court may tentatively 
take the element as having been proven. Consequently, it is not unusual for 
lawyers to ask judges “how the court sees the case for the time being.” It is 
proper for judges to let parties know where their cases are going. These 
judicial comments are known as “process-directing court comments” 
(prozessleitende richterliche Hinweise). They help lawyers assess chances of 
winning and costs of continuing.483 German civil justice thus works toward 
eliminating surprise from process; courts are not to let parties overlook 
matters material to their decisions.484
German civil justice works to sequence issue deciding in a manner that is 
both efficient and just. Often applicable legal rules cannot be read directly from 
statute. Instead, it may be necessary to search statutes for rules, compare rule to 
facts, to revisit statutes in light of facts, and to examine facts again in light of 
rules. This process of going back and forth was identified in the first part of the 
twentieth century and has since assumed a place in the description of law 
application in Germany.
  
485 It means that in German proceedings the legal norm 
as the basis of the claim can emerge for the first time late in the process.486 It is 
what American lawyers do to develop their “theory of the case.” 487
 
 
Fostering Settlement 
 
At every stage of proceedings German judges are obligated to foster 
settlement of the case or parts of it.488
In Germany the process of preparing cases for applying law to facts 
promotes settlement. As process proceeds, courts are structuring them for 
eventual decision. Judges, as they clarify cases, inform parties which claims 
are stronger and which are weaker; they identify the proof needed. Judges, in 
helping parties see how their cases are likely to be decided, must do so 
 As in the United States, whether a case 
settles is dependent upon particular interests and concerns of parties.  
                                                 
483 See ANDREW J, MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU, & LUIS EDUARDO SPROVIERI, PRACTICAL 
GLOBAL TORT LITIGATION: UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND ARGENTINA at 62-63 (2007). 
484 § 139(2) ZPO. 
485 See OSKAR HARTWIEG & H.A. HESSE, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG IM ZIVILPROZEß: EIN 
STUDIENBUCH ÜBER METHODE, RECHTSGEFÜHL UND ROUTINE IN GUTACHTEN NUND URTEIL at 
78-79 (1981) („Die Lehre vom Pendelblick”). 
486 Dieter Stauder with David Llewellyn, Oskar Hartwieg’s Thoughts on the English Legal 
System, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM 
R. CORNISH (D. Vaver and L. Bently  2004) 47, 51.  
487 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MANUET, PRETRIAL 21 (7th ed. 2008) (“This process, going back and 
forth between investigating the facts and researching the law, is ongoing and is how you will 
develop your ‘theory of the case’ ….”). 
488 § 278(1) ZPO. 
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without undermining parties’ confidence in judicial impartiality.489
 
 How 
strongly judges signal to parties the direction of likely resolution in any 
given case is a matter of style of individual judges as well as their 
assessment of how such signaling would contribute to conclusion of the case 
(both in speed and justice). Explicit signaling undercuts confidence in 
impartiality; it can be counterproductive of settlement. While clear signaling 
of probable loss sends a powerful message to potential losers to settle, it also 
encourages likely winners not to settle. That message is reinforced by the fee 
structure, which in the case of settlement, means not only that both parties 
must now bear their own lawyer’s fees, they must now pay their lawyers an 
additional settlement fee.  
5. Process in Roh v. Doh 
 
Roh and Doh control which matters the court considers, through their 
pleadings, and which evidence it takes, through their applications, but the 
court has charge of the process and determines when it considers which 
matters. German court proceedings are less rigid than are their American 
counterparts:  there is no certain sequence of events. Contacts among judge, 
parties and lawyers are less formal. They may contact each other without all 
parties being present. In Germany information about case and parties can be 
more freely exchanged than in the United States where there is greater 
concern that one party speaking with the judge out of presence of the other 
might compromise the judge’s impartiality. (Such suspect conduct is called 
ex parte communication.)  
In Chapter 3 Mary Roh met for the first time with her lawyer Hahn. She 
has now returned to review the complaint that he has drafted and to ask what 
is next. 
 
Roh: OK. The complaint looks fine, counselor. So tell me, how long this is all going to 
take?  
 
Hahn: The timing is pretty predictable: I would be surprised if it lasted as long as six 
months; it might be done in three.  
 
Roh: Oh. You think Doh will give in? 
 
Hahn: No. But the case is a simple one. It’s basically your word against Doh’s word. I 
can’t imagine a judge in Munich letting it sit on his or her desk for more than three 
months. So the judge needs to hear both sides. The judge will have our complaint 
served and should schedule an early first hearing with thirty days. If it turns out that 
Doh has no witnesses to name, the judge might even finish it that day. 
 
Roh: Do I have to go to the hearing?  
 
                                                 
489 See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 482, at 490.. 
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Hahn: If you lived in Munich, in case like this, you probably would. In this case, since 
Berlin is pretty far from Munich, the judge might not require that you come. If you want 
the case ended fast, though, you should go. If the judge orders you to go, that’s 
probably a sign that the judge thinks the case might be handled all in one hearing. If 
that is so, I am inclined to go with you; otherwise we might engage a lawyer in Munich 
to cover the hearing for me. Do you have a preference? If I go, we can  get those costs 
back. 
 
Roh: If we get a local lawyer, won’t we have  to pay that lawyer something? After we 
have done that, will I really save much? 
 
Hahn: It still would probably be a bit cheaper for you. A couple of hundred Euros. 
 
Roh: I guess we can decide that when we see what the judge orders. So what should I 
expect at the first hearing? 
 
Hahn: When you get to the court, there will be places for you to sit outside the 
courtroom. You may see Doh there. There might be other people. The case is public, 
so anybody can come in to watch what happens. It’s not too likely that anyone else will 
be there besides you and me, Doh and probably a lawyer for Doh. We will be told 
beforehand and can confirm from the schedule posted just when and how long the 
hearing will be. I would guess it will probably be an hour. If it is any longer than that, 
that will be another sign that the judge wants to handle this all in one hearing. 
 
Roh: What will it look like there? I have never been in a lawsuit before. 
 
Hahn: It’s pretty relaxed. It’s not at all like what you may have seen in American 
movies. We will be called into the courtroom by an announcement. The judge will enter; 
we will stand as the judge enters. The judge will sit at a fairly simple table, not elevated 
above the rest of the room, or if elevated, only slightly. The Munich court has only a 
handful of the old ceremonial courtrooms with the fancy judge’s bench like you see in 
U.S. films and the popular court shows. In front of the judge’s table there will be a table 
for our side and a table for Doh’s side. In the vicinity there will be a chair for a possible 
witness. Behind us will be a couple of rows of chairs for the public. The judge and the 
lawyers will be in robes. The lawyer for Doh may be pulling the robe on just as we 
come in. The judge may have on blue jeans under the robe. But the judge will be sure 
to have on a white tie. 
 
Roh: So what happens next?  
 
Hahn: The judge will call our matter and make sure that everyone summoned is 
present. The judge will ask any witnesses to step outside into the hall. 
 
Hahn: The judge will then discuss the case with all of us. The judge will first state the 
basic nature of the case  That means here, that you are asking for €60,000 Euros back 
on a loan or on a conditional gift.. Remember that the judge has already read our 
complaint.  The judge may speak directly to you or to Doh and ask you questions about 
the case. If you want to ask the judge a question, and the judge is not speaking with 
you, then tell me and I will ask the judge to let you ask. 
 
Roh: What is the judge looking for? What is the judge going to ask me about?  
 
Hahn: Basically, the judge wants to know what it is that you want from the court. The 
judge will be looking to understand not only what you want, but will discuss with us the 
possible legal grounds why you think you are entitled to the money. The judge will be 
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looking to understand how we plan to prove your claim for the money. The judge will 
turn to Doh and Doh’s lawyer to see why they think you are not entitled the money. 
 
Roh: So the judge is already deciding the case? 
 
Hahn: No. What the judge is doing is trying to find out what the court needs to decide 
this case and what is available to help. The judge will also be interested in whether 
there were any witnesses to your conversation with Doh when he asked for the money.. 
The judge will probe to figure out what you and Doh agree happened and about what 
you disagree. For example, for the judgment, the court needs to determine that you in 
fact paid Doh €60,000. Probably that can be handled perfunctorily. But suppose Doh 
claims the money was never paid. Or suppose Doh says that all that money went to 
DohSon Honda LLC and did not benefit him at all. Then the judge would have found a 
material issue of fact in dispute between the two parties that the court will have to 
decide.  
 
Roh: OK. 
 
Hahn: In the course of all this, the judge will speak freely with the lawyers and their 
clients. They will speak nearly as freely with the judge. When one of us makes an 
assertion that might be debated, the judge might turn to you or to Doh and say, you 
don’t disagree with that, do you? If the judge does that, you must answer truthfully. But 
I will let you know if I have a problem with your answering such a question. 
 
Roh: Good. 
 
Hahn: All of this should not take more than ten or twenty minutes. At the end of the 
discussion, the judge will ask the lawyers to state their formal requests. We will say, 
that our request is that the court order Doh to pay you the €60,000 plus interest. Doh 
will say that our complaint be dismissed and that we pay costs.  
 
Roh: I see. 
 
Hahn: We will then be given an opportunity to state the gist of our cases. I will make 
our presentation as full or as brief as seems appropriate in light of what the judge has 
already done up to that point. Were the judge to ask us to make formal applications 
before the judge discusses the case with us—and many judges do it that way—then I 
might be inclined to state the case with more particularity. Even still, however, I will 
make free reference to our complaint. 
 
Roh: OK 
 
Hahn: Insofar as Doh says anything in his answer or in the hearing with which we do 
not agree, we need to be sure—at least if what he says is material tin the case—to 
state what it is that we disagree. 
 
Roh: Why is that? What does that mean? 
 
Hahn:  The judge will take as true anything that we do not dispute. The judge is looking 
for what we lawyers call, all the elements of your claim. That’s why I said, if it’s 
material, we need to take issue if the statement is untrue. Moreover, it is not sufficient 
for us to say that we disagree. We must state why we disagree. We are supposed to 
provide a factual basis for disagreement if there is one that we could be expected to 
know. 
 
Roh: So what’s the point of all this? 
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Hahn: At the end, the judge should have a pretty good idea which rules apply to this 
case and which facts need to be proven to establish our claim to €60,000. The judge is 
likely to turn to me and say, “how counselor, do you plan to prove that?” After all, you 
weren’t at the Rob—Doh meeting; indeed no one besides the parties was there. 
 
Roh: And how to you answer? 
 
Hahn: I will answer,  I plan to prove the loan through the testimony of my client, Mary 
Roh, as witness. I would like to request that you make a formal proof decision 
(Beweisbeschluß) that the court take her testimony as witness. I will then state the legal 
grounds for your testifying as a witness. 
 
Roh: Hold on. Haven’t I just been telling me all about the case? 
 
Hahn: Not as a witness. It used to be that we hardly ever allowed parties to testify as 
witnesses. They were heard only as parties. Their statements could not constitute 
proof. No, in cases like these, where there are no other witnesses, we permit parties to 
testify. But then you will testify from the witness chair in front of the court, you may 
sworn, and in general everything will be like a witness testifying. You won’t speak from 
our table.  
 
Roh: So does the judge grant the request? 
 
Hahn: These days, in all likelihood. Although the judge will not do so until the judge 
gives Doh and Doh’s lawyer a chance to disagree. But the judge then will likely grant 
the request. Doh’s lawyer will probably place a similar request to take the testimony of 
Doh. The judge will grant that request, too, 
 
Roh: So will I have to testify then? 
 
Hahn: It could be. If time is available, it may well be. But if either Doh or I have a 
problem with that, we probably will arrange for testimony in a couple of weeks.  
 
Roh: Would you please describe for me what that would be like? 
 
Hahn: The judge will call you to the witness chair. He will explain to you that you must 
tell the truth. You won’t be able to talk with me while you are testifying. The formality 
will be greater than in the hearing.  
 
Hahn: The judge will start by asking you open-ended questions. You can answer freely. 
If you are not going in the direction the judge is interested in, the judge may ask a more 
focused question. Again, however, the judge is expecting that you answer fully and not 
with mere yes or no answers. In any case, do not answer just with a nod of your head. 
Once you have given your answers, the judge is likely to ask some pointed questions 
about the moment in which you and Doh agreed on the money exchange. The judge 
will be looking for anything that might specifically establish this as a loan or conditional 
gift. The judge also will be looking to see whether what you say that might establish 
that should be believed. 
 
Roh: So, I don’t have to worry about cross-examination from Doh’s lawyer like I see in 
the krimis? 
 
Hahn: Well, there is no American-style cross-examination, although we do have the 
term in German now (Kreuzverhör), but what we have is not much like what you see in 
television, at least most of the time. Doh’s lawyer and I both will be given a chance to 
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ask questions. But if the judge has done a good job, the judge will have already asked 
most important ones. 
 
Roh: Good. 
 
Hahn: As you go along in answering, do not be surprised if the judge from time to time 
speaks into a dictating machine what your answers are. Unlike in the United States, 
there is no one taking down word-for-word what you say. The judge is putting down the 
gist of what you testify. From time-to-time, the judge is likely to ask you to repeat what 
you said to make sure that the judge gets it right. 
 
 
After this meeting Hahn files the complaint. The court reviews the 
complaint, serves it, and sets a date for an early first hearing and receives 
defendant Doh’s answer. 
Roh v. Doh is not a complex case. The judge would try to resolve it in a 
single hearing. In this case, where so much depends on creditability, the 
judge  would order the parties to appear personally.490
  
 
Pre-hearing Settlement Conference  
 
Prior to the first oral hearing, whether preliminary or main hearing, 
ordinarily there must be a settlement discussion.491
Sometimes, even before the oral hearing, there are informal contacts 
through the court about settlement. Perhaps, after the hearing date has been 
set, one of the lawyers telephones the judge to change the date. The judge 
might use this opportunity to talk settlement. The judge might ask: “do the 
lawyers think that the parties want to settle? Is that a realistic hope? Are 
there obstacles to settlement?” 
 Usually it takes place at 
the first meeting of court and parties.  
Informal conversations such as these give judges opportunity to learn 
information that may not be in the pleadings. For example, in this case, the 
judge might find out that John Doh, Sr. was wiped out in the financial crisis 
and that as result, DohSon Honda was sold and John Doh, Jr. lost his job. 
Doh may not have the money to pay back to Mary Roh. The judge might 
learn that Roh herself needs cash quickly.  The judge could find out that 
formerly flourishing relations between the Roh and Doh businesses have 
come to an end, so that she need not concern herself with them in resolving 
the dispute. For judges to learn the actual effect of the proceedings and of 
their resolution on the parties helps judges better organize and conduct 
process. It is not considered improper. 
If the parties do not reach a settlement through such informal contacts, 
the judge is required to raise settlement at the early first hearing. The 
                                                 
490 See § 273(2) No. 3, § 278(2) ZPO. 
491 § 278(2) ZPO. 
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discussion of settlement need not be clearly separated from the conduct of 
the early first hearing itself, but may be folded into it. 
 
Early First Hearing 
 
When parties and their lawyers arrive for the hearing, the judge will 
greet them and formally note their appearance in the record of the 
proceedings. Many judges lay great weight on developing a good rapport 
with the parties themselves. In well conducted proceedings, parties 
participate personally as much as through their lawyers; it is they who will 
decide whether to reach settlement, or to take the case to court judgment and 
possibly to one or two appeals. 
At the outset of the hearing the judge will try to put the participants at 
ease. The judge will move directly to the possibility of settlement. The judge 
will speak with the parties positively that the process gives them a great 
chance, with the help of the court and each other, to put an end to the dispute 
in short order. The judge will make clear at the beginning, however, that 
under some circumstances the process could drag out a long time. 
After that introduction, the judge will summarize the facts and the 
dispute and in just a few words give the material positions, observations and 
arguments of the parties to the lawsuit, which the parties already know from 
their respective filings. In Roh v. Doh the hearing would proceed along the 
following lines to say: 
 
“It is the position of the plaintiff, Mary Roh, that she 
demands repayment of a loan in the amount of €60,000, 
while it is the position of the defendant, John Doh, Jr., that 
the plaintiff gave him the money as a gift.” 
 
The judge will then point out, that the process is concerned with clearing 
up the question: “gift or loan,” and possibly, if a gift is found, whether 
plaintiff has effectively revoked the gift. Since only one of the different 
versions can be correct, in the end, the judge will counsel, the decision 
comes down to which of the parties better convinces the court of its version 
by producing evidence  that court sees as plausible and trustworthy. 
The judge might at this point give formal guidance to the parties and 
protocol it in the record.  Possibly, the judge might have given guidance 
already before the hearing, in which case it would look as follows and would 
be included in the record 
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The judge would then, if necessary, ask the parties and their lawyers, 
whether they want to add anything to the facts as they have stated them. The 
judge will note in the record any additions.  
The judge will remind Roh and Doh that a judicial decision of their case 
must be completely for one of them and completely against the other. Either 
the transaction was a loan, or it was not; either it was a gift that was 
conditioned, or it was a gift that was not conditioned. The judge will tell Roh 
and Doh that they can avoid the risk of a total loss by reaching an amicable 
settlement.  
The judge will ask them, first plaintiff Roh, then defendant Doh, 
whether each in principle could imagine an amicable settlement. If one of 
them is open to settlement, the judge will welcome that and note it in the 
record of the proceedings; if either rejects the idea of a settlement at this 
early stage, the judge will ask why. 
The judge has great freedom in carrying through the hearing. An 
experienced judge will allow the course of settlement talks to be determined 
by what Roh and Doh say, what they wish, which reservations and what 
criticisms they have. At this stage the judge has many opportunities to keep 
the conversation with the parties and their lawyers on track toward 
settlement, to overcome difficulties and to encourage them bring make their 
own proposals for settlement. If neither party puts forward a proposal, the 
judge might formally make one. That judge will include that proposal as 
further formal guidance that would accent the all-or-nothing nature that the 
judge’s legal decision necessarily would have.  
At this point, the judge might remind Roh and Doh of personal matters 
not material to legal issues, e.g., their families’ long and still continuing 
In the Matter of Roh v. Doh 
 
Memorandum pursuant to § 273(1) Code of Civil Procedure 
 
In preparation for the hearing to be held ......... 2011, the Court pursuant to § 273(1) 
Code of Civil Procedure advises: 
 
1. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the allocation of funds was a loan 
under § 488 of the Civil Code; the defendant does not have to prove that its legal 
basis was that of a gift under §§ 516 ff. of the Civil Code. 
 
2. Should the Court not find the plaintiff’s evidence to be fully convincing does not 
mean that the plaintiff must lose the case. In that event the Court, accepting 
defendant’s position that the payment was a gift, must review whether the plaintiff 
is allowed under § 530(1) of the Civil Code to revoke the gift on the ground of gross 
ingratitude.  
 
Signed 
 
Jakob Jung 
Judge of the Landgericht  
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relationship through sickness, injuries, set-backs and successes. Even if the 
judge is unable to reach settlement in these discussions, the judge will gain a 
information that helps evaluate the parties and judge the entire dispute. If the 
settlement talk fails, because Roh and Doh are too far from each other in 
their ideas of settlement, the judge must note that in the record of the case.  
As part of structuring the case for decision or settlement, the judge may 
focus the attention of the parties on the contract claim for repayment of loan 
rather than the claim for restitution of a gift. As the judge clarifies the legal 
and factual situation, which material facts are in dispute—legal or factual—
will become clearer. As which material facts are in dispute become clearer, 
settlement may be facilitated, for the criteria that determine the outcome will 
become more apparent.  
 
Hearing and Evidence Taking When Settlement Fails  
 
This is one case where the parties almost surely will be witnesses 
despite the usual reticence to rely on party testimony. In Roh v. Doh either 
party might call the other as witness.  If they do not, this is the exceptional 
case where the judge can himself call a witness not nominated by the parties. 
It is available only to call parties and only if necessary to convince the judge 
of the truth or falsity of a material disputed fact.492
The judge will make a formal evidentiary decision (Beweisbeschluß) ex 
officio to take the testimony of parties under the special authority provided in 
order to be able to reach a conviction of the truth or falsity of the fact to be 
proven (loan or gift, possibly also, whether gross ingratitude of the defendant 
justifies revocation of a gift).  
 
Before taking testimony party testimony, the judge will admonish each 
party to tell the truth and instruct the party that in his or her testimony he or 
she, like a witness, is under obligation to tell the truth, that he or she can be 
required to give an oath, and that he or she is subject to punishment if he or 
she intentionally or even negligently tells an untruth. 
Experience teaches that every party, when formally testifying, at first 
does not deviate from his or her own position (stated in the pleadings and 
other filings). That makes it is the task of the judge to address peculiarities of 
facts and ask parties about them. Here, for example, why should the asserted 
conversation have taken place at the holiday party of the Honda dealers, why 
were there no witnesses to the conversation, why was there no receipt, why 
was there nothing in writing and no agreement about interest, why did Roh 
demand repayment only after her daughter broke off the engagement with 
Doh, what concrete use was Doh to make of the €60,000, and what use did 
he actually make of the money? The parties’ lawyers are permitted to ask 
follow-up questions. 
                                                 
492 § 448 ZPO. 
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The judge is required to note the substance of the testimony of the 
parties in the record of the proceedings. Unlike in American proceeding, 
there is no verbatim transcript made.  
The judge must also decide in a formal decision whether the testifying 
party is to be sworn or be unsworn. 
After taking the evidence, the lawyers must be given opportunity to take 
a position on the testimony. They can give their views, which witness on the 
basis of which circumstances the court should believe. 
At this point the judge might, even if the judge has formed an opinion of 
the truth, again attempt to reach settlement. Then Roh and Doh will still not 
know and will be able only to guess how the judge would decide the case. At 
every stage of the proceeding the judge is require to work toward an 
amicable settlement.493
The judge will tell Roh and Doh that if the case does end in judgment, it 
will not necessarily be over. They should think about what the future of the 
case is likely to be.  The loser in the first instance will probably—in view of 
the large amount of money in dispute—seek a review of the case through 
appeal on law and facts (Berufung) to the Court of Appeals 
(Oberlandesgericht). The loser in that appeal might take a further appeal on 
legal grounds (Revision) to the Federal Supreme Court. That means that the 
dispute could still continue long into the future, the process through the 
different levels of appeal would on account of the high amount in dispute 
create significant costs, which the loser in the last appeal would have to pay 
for the consideration of the case by all of the courts.
 The judge will again remind them, that since for each 
party the dispute can end only in victory or defeat, they should think again 
about settlement while they still control the case. 
494
Should there still be no settlement with mutual concessions to end the 
dispute, the judge would ask the lawyers for their requests. If they request no 
further taking of evidence, the judge would adjourn the hearing briefly, to 
think about the judgment and its formal justification, reconvene the hearing, 
and announce the judgment. The judge would have five weeks to write the 
formal judgment and justification and serve it on the lawyers. 
 The final resolution 
of the dispute would thus remain for the moment uncertain. Notwithstanding 
Roh’s daughter breaking off her engagement with the younger Doh—the 
background of the dispute—Roh and Doh well remain tied together until the 
lawsuit is finally concluded. This certainly is not a satisfactory solution for 
them.  
 
 
C. Korea 
 
                                                 
493 § 278(1) ZPO. 
494 §§ 91, 97 ZPO. 
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However just and impartial decisions judges delivers, 
Korean public does not shed suspicions, if the decision 
making process takes place from the place where their 
observation cannot reach: the office of judges. Seeing is 
believing. They want to see the whole process of decision 
making without any obstacles. That place is courtrooms. 
 
Judge Tae-hoon Kang et al. (2008)495
 
  
1. The Nature of Korean Civil Process 
  
Korean civil procedure is an indirect transplant of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1877 and is typical of civil law systems generally: it has 
nothing that common lawyers think of as a trial.496
In the first decade of the twenty-first century Korea amended its civil 
procedure. The differences were dramatic enough that Korean judges speak 
of the “New Model” and contrast it with the “Old Model.” Changes needed 
in existing law were sufficiently substantial to make adoption of the New 
Model by no means certain. To overcome any conflict issue of New and Old, 
the Korean National Assembly amended the Korean Civil Procedure Act. 
The principal goal of the New Model is enhancement of public faith in the 
judiciary and in court proceedings and increased transparency in 
decisionmaking. Development of the New Model began at the instigation of 
the Supreme Court of Korea already in 1995; it implementation was not 
completed until 2006. The New Model does not adopt American-style 
discovery or otherwise follow American procedure. In direction it follows 
contemporary German civil procedure. 
 There is no single event 
where lawyers for parties present to the court their theory of the case. 
Instead, there are structured proceedings within which a court determines 
whether plaintiffs’ assertions of fact satisfy requirements of a legal rule. 
Over time and place the exact form of proceedings varies: contemporary 
Korean proceedings are identical neither to their German relatives nor to 
their Korean antecedents..  
Earlier reforms of the Old Model. Earlier attempts at reform of the 
Old Model focused on delay rather than on decision making. Much as recent 
American attempts at reform did, the earlier Korean attempt fought delay 
through use of deadlines without working to improve decision making. 
Today the deficiency of the Old Model is seen to have been less delay and 
more excessive division of proceedings into endless separate, short, 
                                                 
495 Judges Tae-hoon Kang, Seong-soo Kim, Yoon-sun Chang, Dong-jin Song, Yon-kyung Lee 
and Eun-kyung Cho, Future of Civil Procedure, The First Judicial Symposium in English, 1 J. 
KOREAN JUDICATURE 732, 739 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008). 
496 See Tae-hoon Kang et al., Future of Civil Procedure, The First Judicial Symposium in 
English, 1 J. KOREAN JUDICATURE 732, 736 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008). 
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repetitive sessions. This splintering of proceedings produced delay and, 
worse, made decision making inaccurate and opaque.497 Proceedings piled 
on proceedings with little indication of their direction, until at the end of all 
proceedings, the presiding judge might say: “We will review the whole 
document without any omission, then decide this case with care.” This delay 
in consideration raised suspicion of improper evaluation. It made judging 
into a black box, out of which came an unpredictable outcome.498
The New Model. The solution of the New Model is “concentration” of 
proceedings. By concentrating proceedings, not into one single event as in an 
American trial, but into fewer, more focused sessions, parties can participate 
better in proceedings and follow better the course of the courts’ 
decisionmaking. The Korean reform parallels the important 1976 reform in 
German civil procedure.
 
499 While the New Model may not have been based 
directly on the 1976 German reform, its implementation looked to practices 
in Germany.500
Two key features of the New Model in addition to concentration are: 
 From the standpoint of this book, the reforms of the New 
Model of Korean procedure in the twenty-first century parallel reforms of 
German civil procedure in the twentieth.  
• Greater use of oral proceedings and less reliance on written 
proceedings; 
• Greater party participation through increased interaction 
directly between court and parties and among the parties 
themselves. 
Oral Proceedings in the New Model. The New Model is to increase 
transparency of decisionmaking. The new model promotes transparency by 
permitting parties to see where proceedings are going and to predict their 
outcome. The idea behind the New Model is: “Seeing is believing. [The 
public wants] to see the whole process of decision making without any 
obstacles. That place is [the] courtroom.”501 Its motto is “the enhancement of 
public faith in the judiciary through substantial court proceedings.”502
Judge Hyun Seok Kim, Presiding Judge of the District Court of Busan, 
has well made the case for the New Model. His explanation is a sound 
platform for renewal and reform of civil procedure the world over. He states 
the benefits of oral proceedings: 
  
                                                 
497 See Moon-Hyuck Ho, Zur Reform des koreanischen Zivilprozessrechts im Jahr 2002, in 
RECHTSREFORM IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA IM VERGLEICH 87, 89 (Thomas Würtenberger, 
ed., 2006). On the reliance of the previous reform on deadlines, see Woo Yea Hwang, Efforts to 
Expedite Judicial Process in Korea, 18 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 174 m 175-176 (1990). 
498 Judges Tae-hoon Kang et al., Future of Civil Procedure, The First Judicial Symposium in 
English, 1 J. KOREAN JUDICATURE 732, 737 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008). 
499 Moon, Zur Reform, supra  note 497, at 87. 
500 Kim, Oral Proceedings, supra note 290, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 60 n. 17, reprint at 38 n. 17 
(citing works in Korean on German oral proceedings). 
501 Kang et al., supra  note 498, at 739. 
502 Kim, Oral Proceedings, supra  note 290, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 58, reprint at 37. 
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[1] Maximizing court communication. … the proceedings 
give the judges and the parties (attorneys) a chance to cast direct 
questions about ambiguous or doubtful assertions and testimonies 
on the spot, xo that they can even unearth the underlying causes, 
motives or other unrevealed circumstances of dispute. 
[2] Accurate understanding of complex litigation. Through 
oral proceedings, a judge or panel can comprehend even the most 
complex litigation which involves too many technical terminologies 
that would otherwise be incomprehensible (just by reading the brief, 
for example), but by oral explanation from parties and other people 
concerned it is understandable. 
[3] Helping the judge to make the correct decision.  … 
Because the judge is able to figure out the overall intentions of the 
parties, he or she can appropriately evaluate the witnesses’ 
testimonies and appreciate the parties’ and witnesses’ manners 
through the oral proceedings. 
[4] Providing sufficient chances to making statements—the 
Court as a listener.  … [T]he parties can persuade the judges by 
making persuasive arguments and presenting compelling evidence; 
… the parties can reveal their real intentions and situations. A judge 
should create an atmosphere where active communications and 
arguments, rather than plain statements, can be made. A judge 
should be a serious listener also. 
[5] Helping parties to understand court procedure—the 
Court as explainer. [T]he court can present and explain its opinion 
and reasoning to the parties so that the parties can directly figure 
out towards which direction the court procedure is going. “Court as 
an explainer,” which is one of the core aspects of oral proceedings, 
can enhance public trust in the judiciary. 
[6] Fostering parties’ alternative dispute resolution. … oral 
proceedings itself can be the most effective tool to find a way to 
resolve disputes in ways that the parties exactly want, since a 
reasonable alternative dispute resolution can be reached not by just 
waiting for the parties’ reconciliation, but also by exploring 
common understandings through oral exchanges. 
[7] Improving foreseeability of case-outcome. [J]udges 
would make their decisions relying on the finding from oral 
proceedings and the parties would be able to predict what the results 
of trial will be like. This means that the distrust on the court’s 
decision could be minimized, since the parties will not argue that 
they were not given enough chances for contentions or that they 
were unable to foresee the reasons, when they lose their cases.  
[8] Enhancing effectiveness of case management. Oral 
proceedings help the judge to do his or her work more easily and 
effectively, since they can remove meritless contentions from 
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considerations and have the judge to concentrate on the remaining 
substantial factors when making decision. So, it becomes much 
easier to comprehend the case in detail and to set up a reasoning to 
make a decision. … 
[9] Implementing public disclosure. Oral proceedings is the 
only way to accomplish public disclosure. ….503
Party Participation in the New Model. Because of the heavy 
incidence of pro se representation, party participation was never a stranger to 
Korean civil procedure, but it was not an especially welcomed guest. The 
Old Model discouraged judges from interacting directly with parties, for fear 
that interaction might produce or suggest prejudice. The New Model, on the 
other hand, encourages interaction between judges and parties and among 
parties, even when those parties are represented by lawyers. Professor Moon 
observes the expected benefits of increased party participation:  
 
(1) The clarification of the factual situation goes more quickly 
through discussions with the parties than with the lawyers, since the 
parties know the factual situation better. 
(2) The case can be more quickly and effectively settled with 
the parties. The fact that the judge has immediately heard the 
parties, diminishes the hostility of the parties. 
(3) After having been heard immediately by the judge, the 
parties usually satisfied with the resolution of the dispute, and 
indeed, independent of whether they have won.504
We turn now to details of how the New Model works. 
 
 
2. The Process in Outline 
 
Even before the New Model process in Korea was similar to process in 
Germany and particularly similar to older German process. Now it is closer 
still, particularly to contemporary German process. After reviewing the 
plaintiff’s complaint, the court serves it on the defendant. At that time the 
court directs the parties either to appear for a preliminary hearing,505 or to 
engage in further written preliminary proceedings.506 While the New Model 
does not require parties to substantiate their pleadings, as the German code 
does, in preparation for the preliminary hearing, it requires defendants to 
answer plaintiffs’ complaints with particularity. The Old Model had 
permitted them to reply with a simple general denial.507
 
  
                                                 
503 Kim, Oral Proceedings, supra note 290, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 75-77, reprint at 45-46 [emphasis 
in original]. 
504 Moon, Zur Reform, supra note 497, at 90. 
505 § 282 KCPA. 
506 § 281 KCPA. 
507 Moon, Zur Reform, supra note 497, at 89. 
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Preliminary Hearing 
 
Until the New Model was implemented in 2006, the preliminary hearing 
was neglected in practice.508 Now it is preferred in principle.509 At this 
preliminary hearing, as in its German counterpart, the judge discusses the 
case with the parties and with their lawyers, if represented, to simplify and 
sharpen issues. The New Model looks to the presiding judge to make the 
proceedings effective.510
The goal of the preliminary hearing—or of the written preliminary 
proceedings—is to identify applicable legal rules, their constituent elements, 
and which facts material to their application are in dispute. The 
determination of which rules might be applicable is tentative. While the 
court is to direct attention of parties first to factual elements of rules most 
likely applicable, the parties are not precluded from returning to those rules 
should it appear later that they are relevant.  
  
In the preliminary hearing the court calls attention of the parties to 
material facts on which the parties do not agree. The court asks the party 
bearing the burden of proof for that element to present necessary proof. The 
court may also alert the other side that at some point, that if the proposing 
party presents what it needs to, the burden of proof may shift to it. No longer 
will it be sufficient to challenge the proponent’s proof, but it will be essential 
to bring forth its own affirmative evidence.   
 
Main Hearing (변론절차) 
 
In the ideal case, following a preliminary hearing, the court determines 
the case in a single, comprehensive, concentrated main hearing. Insofar as 
this occurs, it assumes that the parties have been able to develop all the 
necessary factual information beforehand. In practice, however, the court 
does not always hold a preliminary hearing to get the whole picture of the 
case. Moreover, in the event that the court conducts a preliminary hearing, it 
is not required to hold a subsequent main hearing, but may accomplish the 
two together. 
In the moments immediately preceding the main hearing, or 
immediately preceding the preliminary hearing if the court holds one, the 
court ordinarily confers with the parties on a possible settlement of the 
case.511
In the main hearing the judge introduces the matter in dispute and the 
lawyers for the parties, or the parties themselves if proceeding pro se, state 
 If settlement discussions fail, the court proceeds to the main or 
preliminary hearing as the case may be.  
                                                 
508 Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 128, reprint at 17. 
509 Kim, Oral Proceedings, supra note 290, 7 J. KOREAN L at 61, reprint at 39. 
510 Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 129, reprint at 19. 
511 See Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 128, reprint at 19. 
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what they are seeking in the proceedings. Usually plaintiff’s lawyer refers to 
his or her complaint and reiterates the specific relief requested there. 
Typically defendant’s lawyer refers to the answer and requests dismissal of 
the complaint. The court then discusses the case generally with the lawyers 
and hears the parties themselves. There is no prescribed order to these 
proceedings. Following these discussions, ideally the court proceeds in that 
same hearing to take evidence as may be necessary to establish or defeat the 
requests of the parties. Often evidence taking is deferred to subsequent 
hearings. 
 
Duty to Cooperate in Good Faith 
 
From the preliminary hearing on through the lawsuit process is intended 
to be cooperative rather than combative. Process is designed so that the 
court, with cooperation of the parties, first frames the issues in dispute by 
finding points of common ground on which the parties agree and by 
identifying those points on which they disagree, and then proceeds to hear 
the parties and take evidence on those material facts in dispute.512
 
 Section 1 
of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes on the parties a duty to cooperate in 
good faith. 
Duty to Elucidate (석명의무) (§§ 136, 137, 140 KCPA) 
  
In the legal process plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. That means, if 
plaintiffs fail to prove facts that fulfill the legal rules on which they rely, 
they lose. Defendants are not allowed, however, to lie back and say, “so 
prove it.” They are subject to a duty of elucidation. They may be required by 
the presiding judge, acting on his or her own motion, or at the request of 
another party, to clarify the case.513
The duty of elucidation also serves to eliminate surprise decisions. If the 
presiding judge believes that a party has overlooked a legal matter, the judge 
is required to give that party an opportunity to state an opinion on it. 
  
The duty of elucidation also serves purposes similar to American 
discovery to deal with situations in which evidence is, in large part, in the 
hands of a party to an action. Its application is not limited to such cases as 
environmental cases, product liability cases, and medical malpractice cases, 
which may be generated in industrialized modern societies. The scope of its 
application is wider than the area where “zone of risk” theory, “probability” 
theory, and “prima facie evidence” theory are applicable. 
The duty to elucidate may be imposed on the party who does not bear 
the burden of proof after its prerequisites are found in the following order: 
(1) The party who bears the burden of proof can explain the existence of 
                                                 
512 Cf. Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 128, reprint at 19. 
513 § 136(1) and (3) KCPA. 
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reasonable foundation of his or her allegation. (2) Without that party’s fault, 
he or she cannot prove the existence and scope of his legal right from the 
viewpoint of an average person. (3) The opposing party is expected or is able 
easily to provide information about them for the party who bears the burden 
of proof. (4) If the three foregoing requirements are met, the party bearing 
the burden of proof has a right to demand information from the opposing 
party. The right is derived from section 1(2) Code of Civil Procedure which 
prescribes that “The concerned parties and participants of litigation shall 
perform the litigation sincerely and faithfully.” Should the opposing party 
refuse to give the information to the party who bears the burden to prove it 
despite the latter’s demand for it, the court determines whether it considers 
the latter’s allegation to be true, depending on several factors such as the 
former’s blameworthiness and importance of the information.514
 
  
Taking of Proof  
 
The oral hearing of the parties—and not witness testimony—is at the 
heart of the New Model of Korean civil process just as it is in German 
process. It is to be to the parties, above all when proceedings are pro se, to 
whom the court is to direct it first attention. Only when facts are found to be 
material and in dispute does the court—on party application—order the 
taking of evidence, including the testimony of witnesses.  
With the move to the New Model, the significance of evidence taking has 
diminished in practice.515 Only when facts are found to be material and in 
dispute does the court—on party application—order the taking of evidence, 
including the testimony of witnesses. The application is to state the facts that the 
evidence is to prove.516
In principle the lawyer for the party calling a witness is the first to examine 
the witness. Then follows the lawyer of the other party.
  
517 After conclusion of 
examination by the parties’ lawyers, it is the turn of the court.518 This reverses 
the order of German process. This general rule notwithstanding, the presiding 
judge has latitude to structure the examination differently: at any time the 
presiding judge may examine the witness;519  may restrict questioning which is 
redundant or irrelevant;520 and, after consulting with the parties, may alter the 
order of examination.521
That parties and not the court have first responsibility for questioning 
witnesses follows American practice and departs from the German. It is the 
  
                                                 
514 See LEE, IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM, supra note 99, 173-174. 
515 Cf., Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 130-131, reprint at 20. 
516 § 289 KCPA. 
517 § 327(1) KCPA. 
518 § 327(2) KCPA. 
519 § 327(3) KCPA. 
520 § 327(5) KCPA. 
521 § 327(4) KCPA. 
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single most important continuing consequence of American influence on Korean 
civil procedure. Yet with all the latitude allowed judges under the law,522
In Roh v. Doh, the case is likely to proceed rather in the way described in 
Germany. After hearing both parties, the court should be in a position to make a 
judgment. The court will announce the judgment. It will be required to provide 
the judgment in writing within several weeks time. We discuss judgments in 
Chapter 7.  
 and in 
view of the high incidence of per se representation, party examination of 
witnesses in Korean civil procedure is distant from American procedure; in cases 
where judges make full use of their opportunities for intervention, questioning of 
witnesses lies closer to German practice. 
                                                 
522 § 289 KCPA. 
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C H A P T E R  7 
 
J U D G M E N T S,  A P P E A L S  A N D  O U T C O M E S:  
D E C I S I O N S  A C C O R D I N G  T O  L A W  
 
 
 
 
 
Payment of Compensation 
13th Century German Codex523
 
 
Mary Roh has reached the end of the process. She and John Doh, Jr. are 
in the courtroom for the last session. They hope that this will be their last day 
in court together. They can and should expect a decision that day. The case 
was not difficult. The judge has no special ground to delay decision; a jury, 
if there is one, should not take much time to decide their case.  
If it is in the United States, and if there is a jury, Roh and Doh will 
fidget as the judge instructs jurors in their duties. The jurors will retire; Roh 
and Doh will perspire. They will pace about the courthouse until the jurors 
return. That is not likely to be in much less than an hour. Even jurors that 
have made up their minds before leaving the courtroom, do not want to 
return too soon. They want to show that they have deliberated carefully. 
Since there is no way to demonstrate that in writing, they allow time for 
deliberation to suggest it.  
                                                 
523 HEIDELBERGER SACHSENSPIEGEL (13th c.) reprinted in FRANZ HEINEMANN, DIE RICHTER 
UND DIE RECHTSGELEHRTEN: JUSTIZ IN FRÜHEREN ZEITEN, Illustration 36 („Überreichung des 
Sühnegeldes an den mit einer Herrenkrone geschmückten schöffenbarfreien Mann“) (1900).  
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If it is in Germany or in Korea, the judge should announce the decision 
from the bench that day. German and Korean judges may have ready a draft 
of the reasons that they will give; if they do, they may read from it. If they 
are not ready with written reasons, they are required to summarize the basis 
for their decisions orally and provide written reasons later. § 311(3) ZPO 
(within three weeks); § 207(1) KCPA (within two or four weeks according to 
case complexity). 
Depending upon which facts the court finds, which law it determines 
governs, and how it applies that law to those facts, the court’s judgment will 
either acknowledge Roh’s rights or deny Doh’s liability. If the judgment 
acknowledges Roh’s rights, it will order a remedy, e.g., Doh must pay Roh a 
certain amount of money. The judgment is to be, in words of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, “according to the law of the Land.” If the judgment is 
not according to law, Roh and Doh do not have to accept it. They may take 
the court’s decision to a higher court for review and revision, that is, they 
may take an appeal to an appellate court. 
 
A. Judgments and Appeals Generally 
  
When we speak of a decision according to law, we mean a judgment 
that applies law to facts correctly. A judgment reached by tossing a coin, if 
provided for by law, would be a decision made by legal process, but it would 
not be a decision according to law. 
The law referred to, the “law of the land,” is the state’s substantive law, 
i.e., the general laws that bind all members of the community equally. A 
decision according to law is correct when it correctly determines applicable 
law, correctly finds material facts, and correctly applies that law to those 
facts. 
Correct application of law to facts is what Roh and Doh, Jr. are told to 
expect. It is what rational members of the public want from their civil justice 
system. It is not peculiar to particular systems of civil justice. Even jurists 
who see civil procedure as controlled by culture grant that. For example, 
Professor Oscar G. Chase observes: “[a]ll modern systems of adjudication 
depend on the application of a legal rule to a set of facts.” Professor Chase 
explains: it is the “model that we present to the public [of] our legal system. 
We tell them that the results of court proceedings are dictated by the 
application of law to facts ….”524
In this chapter we examine how courts of first instance in our three 
systems apply law to facts in judgments and how appellate courts review the 
work of courts of first instance both for accuracy in judgment and for 
 Belief in that model impels people to abide 
by law. 
                                                 
524 Oscar G. Chase, Reflections on Civil Procedure Reform in the United States: What has been 
Learned? What has been Accomplished?, in THE REFORMS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 163, 165 (Nicolò Trockner & Vicenzo Varano, eds., 2005). 
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fairness in process. Our consideration of appeal is concise and directed to 
our hypothetical case.525
We begin by addressing general issues of judgments and appeals. We 
then examine each system seriatim to consider how that system treats both 
judgments and appeals in order to reach decisions according to law. 
  
 
1. Judgments 
 
23.  Decision and Reasoned Explanation 
 
23.1 Upon completion of the parties’ presentations the 
court should promptly give judgment set forth or 
recorded in writing. The judgment should specify 
the remedy awarded and, if a monetary award, its 
amount. 
 
23.2  The judgment should be accompanied by a 
reasoned explanation of the essential factual, 
legal, and evidentiary basis of the decision. 
 
Principle 23, ALI/UNIDROIT  
PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,  
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND UNIDROIT(2004) 
 
Giving Reasons (“Justifications”) 
 
A judgment is a determination by a court of a dispute between two 
parties. A few words suffice to resolve the dispute: “the Court finds that Roh 
recover from Doh a stated sum of money” or “the Court finds Doh owes Roh 
nothing.” Dispute resolution does not require that courts give reasons for 
their decisions. We refer to giving reasons as providing a justification. 
Giving reasons has many benefits for a legal system; not giving reasons has 
many detriments. Above all, a justification provides legal process with 
transparency and makes decisions predictable. 
Justifications have three main audiences: the judges who write them, the 
parties who are subject to them, and the appellate judges who review them.  
Justifications work to assure that decisions are based on objective 
application of law to facts. Judges who write justifications are forced to 
provide coherent arguments for their decisions. Parties subject to justified 
judgments are given reasons why decisions are reached and a basis to 
challenge those decisions. Appellate judges are given grounds to review 
                                                 
525 We consider only appeals of final judgments after trial and not other appeals, e.g., American 
interlocutory appeals, American appeals after decision of terminal motions, German 
Beschwerde. 
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decisions of lower courts for determinations of law, findings of fact and 
applications of law to facts.  
All three of our systems require that judges give reasons for their 
decisions. German and Korean judges must state the “grounds” of their 
decisions. American judges must “find facts specially” and state conclusions 
of law separately, which in effect is much the same.526
When American courts decide cases with jurors, they are not required to 
justify their judgments. Jury decisions are among the most prominent 
decisions rendered without giving reasons. In Taxquet v. Belgium, no. 
926/05, of January 13, 2009, a panel of the European Court of Human Rights 
held that lack of a written justification in a Belgian criminal case violated the 
right of an accused to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Counsel of 
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. The Court held that a criminal verdict was not sufficiently 
justified when the jurors did not explain their decision in detail but only 
responded to yes/no questions posed by the judge.  
  
In German and Korean civil justice systems justification is an essential 
element of the right to be heard. In the American system it is not an essential 
part of a day-in-court. American scholars accept without criticism absence of 
such a requirement. They assert that in some cases justifications make 
decisions worse. They conduct cost-benefit analyses to determine when 
justifications are desirable and when not.527
 
 To jurists familiar with 
justifications, such arguments ring of rationalization. They conveniently 
leave current jury practice undisturbed. 
Predictability of Civil Justice 
 
Justifications make process and results of process predictable. Justified 
judgments validate their predictability. 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, civil justice systems implement 
substantive law. Certainty of application of law affects whether and how 
people follow law. If application of law is uncertain, some people may 
choose not to follow law, because they doubt that it will apply to them. 
Others may be unable to follow law, because of they are not sure what it 
requires.528
 
 Civil justice systems are certain when they predictably and 
correctly apply law to facts. 
Why Predictability Matters 
 
                                                 
526 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). 
527 See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition and the Nature of the Judicial 
Function, 96 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1283, 1285 (2008). 
528 See generally Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 44. 
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Predictability matters because modern civil justice systems affect civil 
society more through cases that they do not decide than they do through 
cases that they do decide. Predictability of civil lawsuits is particularly 
important for civil law, because parties choose to sue. For every case that is 
brought, many more potential cases are not brought. Cases are not brought 
because potential plaintiffs, based on predictions of what would happen were 
the cases brought, decide to abandon their claims or to find other ways to 
pursue their goals (e.g., self-help, informal complaint and agreement). 
Potential defendants, when confronted with claims from potential plaintiffs, 
based on their predictions of process, choose to settle rather than to contest 
those claims. Even when parties do begin process, predictability remains 
important. Many cases brought are settled after they are brought but before 
process is concluded in final judgments. They too are settled or abandoned 
based on parties’ expectations of how they would be decided were they to go 
to judgment.  
In all three of our systems, most disputes are resolved without lawsuits 
and most lawsuits are concluded without judgments. Parties in all three 
decide whether to begin lawsuits based on their assessments of how courts 
are likely to handle their disputes. What this means is that in practice, in 
most cases, application of law to facts takes place before lawyers are 
consulted or in lawyers’ offices in discussions between lawyers and their 
clients before lawsuits are brought. 
 
The Calculus of Practical Predictability  
 
Parties contemplating lawsuits have their own calculus of practical 
predictability. While the aspiration of all of our legal systems is decisions of 
lawsuits on their merits, decisions whether to sue are not determined by 
merits alone. Parties care how decisions affect them practically. Their 
calculus of practical predictability is pinned to how decisions affect their 
individual situations and is colored by considerations besides merits alone. 
A settlement takes two parties. In an ideal world, the applicable law, the 
true facts and the correct application of law to facts are all clear. In that 
world, the parties are under no external constraints and apply the law to 
themselves without court intervention. Of course, we do not live in a perfect 
world. Even when all elements of applying law to facts are clear and 
undisputed, one party may be unwilling or unable to comply with law. Such 
a party may choose not to comply until faced with imminent compulsory 
application of law, or until given a discount on paying the claim, or until 
faced with new expenses. That delay in satisfying a claim may harm the 
party in right. 
We discuss three aspects of practical predictability: predictability of 
outcome, predictability of grounds for decision and predictability of process 
costs. 
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Outcomes. When one thinks of lawsuit predictability, one thinks of 
liability. Was it predictable which party would win and which would lose? 
Could one have foreseen that the court would decide that plaintiff had legal 
right? Quickly, one realizes, however, that liability is only part of the 
calculus of prediction of practical outcome . What does it mean to win? Did 
the court, in holding for plaintiff, award plaintiff a few cents or a great deal 
of money? Which outcomes should one have foreseen? What are the 
collateral   consequences of the court’s holding, for example, good or bad 
publicity, adverse impact on future dealings with this customer or with 
customers in general?  
Reasons. Predicting outcomes is not all that there is to lawsuit 
predictability. Why did the court decide as it did? One needs to know that, if 
one is to take an appeal. One needs to know that, if one is to adjust one’s 
conduct in the future to comport with the decision. For outside observers, the 
reasons for decisions often are the most important part of predictability. 
Outsiders want to know what they should do in conducting their affairs. 
Process costs. Outcome and reasons leave uncounted the transaction 
costs of lawsuits. Lawyers must be paid; courts require their costs. Who 
bears these expenses materially affects process risks. Besides immediate 
expenses lawsuits involve other costs for parties. Resources and energy 
committed to lawsuits cannot be used elsewhere. While lawsuits are pending, 
credit may be impaired and other matters delayed. Process costs and risks 
often determine whether lawsuits are brought without regard to the 
underlying merits of the claims. 
 
Practical Predictability and Settlements 
 
Although issues of predictability are similar in our three systems, they 
play out differently in how cases are settled. Exactly how differently is not 
known. Information about resolutions of disputes, both before lawsuits are 
brought and after cases are commenced, is not available.529
                                                 
529 See Clermont, Litigation Realities, supra note 
 What we do 
know about all three of our systems is that once cases are commenced, far 
fewer American cases conclude in judgments than do German or Korean 
cases. In the American federal system, the number of cases concluding in 
judgments is a little above 1% (about 3300 out of 267,000 cases). In the 
Bavarian system, it is about 28% (about 14,000 out of 50,000). Appreciating 
and explaining these disparate numbers could fill volumes. In an 
introductory book, we could not possibly do the topic justice. Yet, in a book 
designed to give practical knowledge of the realities of litigation, we cannot 
ignore it. In a discussion of the promises of the open courts clause, we need 
pay it mind. We offer here three observations that may help appreciate and 
explain this phenomenon, but for which we make no claim of accuracy. 
529, at 1953. 
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Expenses of litigation. The expenses of litigation are much higher in 
the United States than they are in Germany or Korea. In America they may 
equal or exceed amounts in dispute; in Germany and in Korea they are 
usually kept proportionate to the matter in controversy. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, expenses in the United States are borne separately by each party; 
in Germany and Korea almost all are paid by losers. The American practice 
means that “as soon as disputants enter the litigation process, they are clear 
losers. … [B]y bringing lawyers into the mix … the parties consign 
themselves to being worse off.” Under such a regime, the question is not, 
why do cases settle?, but why do they get litigated?530
Risks of litigation. The risks of exorbitant judgments are higher in the 
United States than in Germany or in Korea. American substantive law 
frequently permits higher awards. American procedure entrusts those awards 
to lay jurors, who may in effect make new law that is unavailable to 
professional judges, or who may be more generous than professional judges 
charged with maintaining equal justice under law. The American practice of 
no indemnity for lawyers’ fees promotes making exorbitant demands to fund 
expensive litigation while imposing no penalty (in greater risk of loss) for 
asserting them. Since litigation is voluntary, even a slight risk of an 
exorbitant judgment is enough to brow-beat risk averse parties into 
settlement. The risk of exorbitant awards in the United States is sufficiently 
serious to have spawned a new type of legal professional, the trial consultant, 
a new organization for trial consultants, the American Society of Trial 
Consultants, a new journal, The Jury Expert, and new work products, e.g., 
focus groups, mock trials and valuation studies.
 In Germany and 
Korea, where losers pay, parties dispute so long as their belief in a favorable 
judgment exceed their aversion to risk of loss.  
531
Settlement as norm. Settlement has dominated American civil justice 
for so long that it is now dubbed the “modal civil case outcome.” “[I]n the 
usual course, settlement is our system of justice.”
 
532 The system depends on 
“parties finding alternatives to using the system.”533 In this world “reformers 
are constantly seeking ways,” Professor Clermont writes, to get cases to 
leave the system by “abandonment, concession or privately negotiated 
settlement or by … arbitration, mediation [or] conciliation.”534 Adding more 
judges to decide more cases is thought would only encourage more 
litigation.535
                                                 
530 Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?,” 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1265-1266 (2002). 
 The equivalent for health care reform would be to hope more 
531 See AMY J. POSEY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, TRIAL CONSULTING (2005). 
532 Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We 
Care?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 111, 112 (2009). 
533 Clermont, Litigation Realities, supra note 529, at 1952 [emphasis in original]. 
534 Id. 
535 Id. at 1947. 
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people die or at least treat themselves at home without ever going to a 
physician or entering a hospital. 
Today’s reality of settlement instead of trial demands new measures. 
American lawyers, in a way typical of their admired flexibility, are 
responding with a new form of professional firm: the “settlement mill.” 
These are “high-volume personal injury law practices that aggressively 
advertise and mass produce the resolution of claims, typically with little 
client interaction and without initiating lawsuits, much less taking claims to 
trial.”536
Readers may find pressing people to private dispute resolution a 
repugnant step backward in time. Should society not just as well renounce 
public schooling and public transit? Were not schooling and transit once 
limited to the wealthy? Readers may ask, what are the consequences of 
dispensing with public dispute resolution? If there is no longer a viable 
public option providing neutral application of law to facts, what is left of the 
rule of law? Will there be a return to a state of “liberty without law,” where, 
as a popular nineteenth century American secondary school text book 
described it, “a strong man might use a weak one as he pleased, or the 
cunning man might cheat or circumvent another, and thus take away his life 
or property, or make him the slave of his pleasures.”
 The world looks to the United States as leader in what is called 
alternative dispute resolution. One day the world will realize the United 
States has more need for alternatives because it’s judicial system works 
poorly for many cases. 
537 Pressing people to 
private dispute resolution is renunciation of the open courts promises of 
decisions according to law. It is a poor apology for a dysfunctional civil 
justice system. Yet it is one that has been made in the past. Indeed, it is 
asserted that throughout much of American history potential suitors were 
told that “litigation is something pernicious that ought to be discouraged.”538
In this world readers may wonder, what is the purpose of courts? It is 
not to apply existing law to facts to decide cases, but to create law so that 
parties can apply the newly found or created law to themselves. A 100% 
settlement rate would not work: “the system must adjudicate some cases in 
order to pronounce the law.”
  
539
                                                 
536 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009). 
 According to a model originating in what is 
called the law-and-economics school, the American civil justice system 
gives parties an opportunity to test the law (motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim) and an opportunity to test the facts (discovery). After that 
testing, parties should resolve their issues themselves. They will go to trial 
only if they are mistaken in their evaluations of the tests or their claims are 
not governed by existing law. Americans, in this view, have “designed a 
537 S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING 
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY. FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS 26 (4th ed., 1844). 
538 Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical and 
Ideological Perspective, Paper presented to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, October 2009, at 1. 
539 Clermont, Litigation Realities, supra note 529, at 1952. 
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pretty good system for letting all but the foolish and the trailblazers resolve 
their disputes prior to trial.”540
  
  
2. Appeals Generally 
 
Losing parties in lawsuits are not a happy lot. Most feel that the court of 
first instance got it wrong: it found facts falsely, determined law incorrectly 
or applied law to facts erroneously. Appeals permit losing parties to ask 
another court to take a second look at the case and to get right what the first 
court—in the losing party’s view—got wrong. 
While appeals are of intense interest to losing parties, they are not 
essential to dispute resolution. Indeed, were dispute resolution the only goal 
of civil justice systems, appeals might be dispensed with. Necessarily they 
increase costs and, at least in short run, undermine efficiency. Yet appeals 
are normal features of civil justice systems because, in the long run, they 
contribute to making legal systems work better. System benefits of appeals 
include: 
 
• Encouraging voluntary participation of parties in lawsuits.  
Parties know that courts make mistakes; they more readily 
participate in first instance proceedings and accept results of 
those proceedings when they know that mistakes can be 
corrected.  
 
• Encouraging self-directed judicial quality control. 
Judges know that they make mistakes; they more fully and 
fairly hear all parties and more carefully craft their decisions 
when they know that their actions are subject to criticism and 
correction. 
 
• Fostering consistent implementation of procedural rules and 
consistent interpretation of substantive rules among all courts. 
Rules, both procedural and substantive, sometimes require 
interpretation for application. When all first instance courts are 
subject to supervision by one higher court, their actions are 
more easily kept consistent, thus promoting both predictability 
and equal protection under law. 
 
• Filling gaps in law through occasional judicial lawmaking. 
Disputes occasionally raise issues not governed by existing law 
that require finding new law in the course of law applying. 
When one appellate court has responsibility for that law 
                                                 
540 See Issacharoff, supra note 530, at 1274-1275. 
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finding, all lower courts can more easily conform their 
decisions to that one court’s law, thus promoting predictability, 
equal protection and legitimacy of decisions. 
 
• Encouraging voluntary compliance with law generally. 
People abide by law, in part, because they believe that law will 
be applied to all correctly and equally. They more readily abide 
by law when appellate courts oversee correct and equal law 
application. 
 
The first two of these benefits are individual case-oriented; the last three are 
system-directed.541
While appeals are common, they are not all of the same type. Some 
appeals review entire cases; others consider only specific mistakes. The 
former address all aspects of decisions below and ask, was that decision 
right. The latter review only whether the court below made specific errors; 
did the court make a mistake. Some appeals consider whether lower courts 
correctly found facts; other appeals review only whether lower courts 
properly followed all legal rules. Typically courts that review findings of fact 
may themselves take proof, while those that only correct errors in following 
legal rules do not. 
 Appeals contribute mightily to legal certainty and 
realization of the rule of law. 
Appeals thus differ in the attention that they give to individual-case and 
system values. While this different emphasis is not necessarily a feature of 
judicial hierarchy, it is easily observed there. Commonly systems of civil 
justice have three levels of courts: courts of first instance, intermediate 
courts of appeal, and courts of final appeal. All three of our systems do. As 
one moves up the hierarchy of courts, the main mission of the court shifts 
from the case before it to system values.  
In courts of first instance in all three of our systems, the main mission is 
decision of the case before it correctly. Courts of first instance take rules of 
law governing the case as givens. Their job is to find facts, determine which 
law is applicable and apply that law to the facts correctly. To find those 
facts, they may take proof offered by the parties. The courts have 
responsibility for the whole case. Their proceedings address all possibly 
applicable legal rules and take account of all elements of those rules.  
In courts of final appeal in all three of our systems, the main mission is 
not decision of the individual case, but determination of legal system issues. 
Courts of final appeal usually take as givens facts of the instant case as found 
by lower courts. Their job is to decide specific issues of rule application and 
interpretation that the case has raised and to evaluate the probable impact of 
decision of those issues for the legal system as whole. Ordinarily courts of 
final appeal do not, indeed sometimes may not, take further proof. The 
                                                 
541 See generally ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3-4 (1941). 
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courts do not have responsibility for the whole case, but only for decision of 
those specific issues.  
In intermediate appellate courts, the main mission varies among our 
three systems. Here the feature common to all is exposure to pressures of 
these competing missions. Are the intermediate appellate courts to function 
more like courts of first instance or more like courts of final appeal? Are 
they to review the whole case below and worry about its outcome, or are 
they to limit review to correction of errors made below? Are they to review 
findings of fact and possibly revise them, even by taking new proof, or are 
they to limit their examination to issues of law? While there are few 
absolutes, as a general matter, intermediate American appellate courts, 
especially those of the federal system, lean in the direction of the system-
focus of courts of final appeal, while German and Korean intermediate 
appellate courts tend toward the individual-case focus of courts of first 
instance.  
It is important to keep the different missions of the different courts 
distinct. Critics of judicial styles commonly confuse civil law decisions of 
courts of first instance with opinions of common law courts of final appeal. 
Such comparisons are misleading. Courts of final appeals consider only 
specific legal issues and the effect on the legal system of the resolutions they 
adopt. Courts of first instance find all facts necessary to fulfill all elements of 
all legal norms in the cases before them.542
 
  
B. United States 
 
We discuss in this section judgments after trials and then appeals from 
those judgments.  
The United States has two principal forms of judgment. The one that 
follows a bench trial mirrors German and Korean judgments. The other, 
which follows a jury trial, is completely different from German and Korean 
judgments. All forms of judgment, at least in conventional wisdom, pursue 
the same goals of the open courts clause: accurate finding of facts and 
application of law to reach decisions according to law.  
We saw in Chapter 6 that summary judgment is a kind of American 
judgment. It occurs without trial, that is, without court findings of fact. 
Summary judgments are used most when facts are no longer in dispute. They 
can also be used where one party asserts that there is no material issue of fact 
in genuine dispute; use in such cases can be controversial. Ordinarily 
summary judgments do not require justifications.543
                                                 
542 See “Table Comparison of the Formal Elements of a Decision and an Opinion,” in JOYCE J. 
GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 37 (5th ed. 2007). 
 We do not consider 
them further here. 
543 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(3). 
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Appeals occur in more cases than in the few cases that go to trial. Some 
appeals review summary judgment decisions. Others reexamine decisions of 
preliminary motions that result in ending the litigation, such as dismissals for 
lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a legal claim for relief. Others 
review decisions granting or denying interim relief before trial, i.e., granting 
or denying temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. 
We begin with judgments of American courts of first instance after 
bench trials, continue with judgments after jury trials, and conclude with 
appeals of both types of judgments. 
 
1. Judgments  
 
An American judgment is an official recording of a court’s decision. It 
determines rights of parties in a lawsuit. It consists of a caption that 
identifies the parties and the lawsuit and a statement of the decision made 
and the relief ordered.544
While an American judgment, formally defined, does not include 
reasoning of the court, in the case of a judgment after bench trial, the 
judgment is accompanied by a separate statement of reasons (“findings of 
fact” and “conclusions of law”). In the case of a judgment following a jury 
trial, there is no additional statement. For convenience, we refer to an 
American judgment accompanied by a decision as a “justified judgment.” In 
contrast, we refer to a judgment unaccompanied by a decision, i.e., a 
judgment on a jury verdict, as an “unjustified judgment.” 
 Unlike German and Korean judgments, an 
American judgment does not include reasoning of the court. It thus 
corresponds to the Rubrum and the Tenor of German and Korean judgments. 
The judgment is where American courts of first instance apply law to facts 
of the case. 
Since parties themselves determine which kind of trial they have, they 
also control which kind of judgment they receive. The rule is that a party 
who has a right to jury trial, is entitled to and will receive one, provided that 
the party acts timely. The right is absolute: the judge must direct a jury trial. 
If, however, neither party timely requests a jury trial, trial is by judge alone. 
In most private law matters seeking money damages parties have a right to 
jury trial. The demand must be made at the very outset of the lawsuit. Even 
if both parties do not have a right to jury trial, the judge may order one if 
both parties agree.545
 
  
Justified Judgments (Judgments after Bench Trials) 
 
                                                 
544 See GEORGE, supra note 542, at 39-44.  
545 See FED. R. CIV. P. 38, 39. 
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In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and 
state its conclusions of law separately. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) 
 
Following bench trials judges are required to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.546
The ideal type of an American justified judgment is similar to the ideal 
types of its German and Korean counterparts. The American decision is to 
include five parts: (1) the nature of the action; (2) the facts; (3) the issues; (4) 
the law and reasoning; and (5) the disposition. It is to be written in plain 
language and should be the most condensed version of the relevant facts and 
law possible. It should decide no more than is necessary to dispose of the 
case. It should set forth only material facts. It should state facts in the past 
tense and law in the present.
 These findings of fact and conclusions of law together 
constitute the decision of the court. The decision of the court justifies the 
legal correctness of the court’s judgment. The decision determines law, finds 
facts and applies law to facts. The judgment, together with the decision, 
corresponds to what in German and Korean civil procedure is simply called a 
judgment.  
547
Findings of fact. A finding of fact is a declaration of an ultimate or 
material fact that determines rights of the parties. If there is a stipulation or 
admission of facts, no finding is necessary. A finding of fact should be made 
on each material issue of the legal claim, since each is necessary to 
determination of the rights of the parties. A finding of fact is drawn or 
inferred from the evidence presented, including agreed, stipulated and 
admitted facts, and is deemed essential to an understanding of the case or to 
a determination of the rights of the parties. A finding of fact made from 
disputed evidence requires evaluation of competing versions of fact.
  
548
Conclusions of law. Conclusions of law are reached by judges using 
deductive reasoning that subjects material facts found to applicable law. A 
conclusion of law is a statement of the law to be applied to the specific facts 
in the specific case; it carries with it some form of legal consequence. 
Conclusions of law taken together determine rights and duties of parties.  
  
An American justified judgment, like its German and Korean 
counterparts, carries through the syllogistic application of law to facts. The 
process, contrary to widely held misconceptions, is not easy. Judge Joyce J. 
George, well describes what it requires: 
 
                                                 
546 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) 
547 See GEORGE, supra note 542, at 161-184. 
548 GEORGE, supra note 542, at 209-220. 
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Using this method the judge is forced to reason a step at a 
time and to support each finding. This must be done before 
moving on to the next step. Such an approach disposes of all 
immaterial and insignificant matters that can clutter judicial 
[reasoning]. Not all the facts involved in a case are necessary 
either to a decision or to the law. Only those facts that could be 
applied to the law are necessary. The step-by-step approach 
compels a straight-line thought to a single acceptable decision 
…. 
This step-by-step process is tedious. It requires the author 
to select pertinent facts and to discard unimportant facts. Then 
he must select the law to be applied to the chosen facts. The 
labor, however, is well worth the time. After this process, the 
judicial writing can be made to ring with clarity. Then no one 
will be able to misunderstand the author’s thought process; it 
will be apparent.549
 
 
American justified judgments among themselves are less 
consistent in form and style than are their German and Korean 
counterparts. That is not surprising: they are rare rather than routine. 
Writing judicial decisions is not an everyday task for American judges 
the way it is for German and Korean judges. While all German and 
Korean judges receive extensive training in writing judgments, few 
American judges do. While German and Korean judges write a dozen or 
more judgments in a year, American judges may write only one or two.   
 Unjustified Judgments (Judgments After Jury Trials) 
 
… the clerk must, without awaiting the court’s direction, 
promptly prepare, sign, and enter the judgment when: 
 
(A) the jury returns a general verdict; 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b)(1) 
 
Judgment after jury trial is different from judgment after bench trial. The 
jurors’ verdict tells no story. It does not state the facts the jurors found, the 
law they applied or the legal reasoning they relied on. It is, as both Judge 
Jerome Frank and Professor Sunderland said, “as inscrutable and essentially 
mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi.” 
550
                                                 
549 GEORGE, supra note 
 The judgment after jury trial states names of parties and jurors’ 
542, at 25-26 [emphasis added].  
550 Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2nd Cir. 1948). See Edson R. 
Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920) 
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determination of parties’ rights (e.g., we find for the plaintiff in the amount 
of $75,000) and no more. The clerk of the court, without the judge’s review, 
enters the verdict as the judgment of the court.  
 
2. Judgment in Roh v. Doh 
 
A judgment on a general verdict in Roh v. Doh might look as follows:  
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Mary Roh,  
 
                 Plaintiff 
 
               v. 
 
John Doh, Jr.  
 
                 Defendant 
 
 
 
 
     
 No. ________________ 
 
      Civil Action 
 
 
JUDGMENT ON A JURY VERDICT 
 
   This action was tried by a jury with Judge Jung presiding, and the jury has rendered a 
verdict.  
 
   It is ordered that the plaintiff Mary Roh recover from the defendant John Doh, Jr. the 
amount of $75,000, with prejudgment interest at the rate of __ %, post-judgment interest 
at the rate of __%, along with costs.  
 
Date:  September 15, 2013  
______________________________ 
Clerk of Court 
 
 
There is no formal mechanism for jurors to disclose or for parties to 
learn the reasons why jurors decided as they did. While judges may and, at 
the request of a party must, ask jurors individually whether they join in the 
verdict (“poll” the jury), there is no provision, let alone requirement, that 
jurors reveal their reasons.551 That there is great interest in those reasons is 
shown by multiple media interviews and juror-written books that follow jury 
verdicts in high-profile cases.552
                                                 
551 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) (providing for polling in criminal cases). 
 Talking informally with individual jurors 
after the judge has formally dismissed them is the only way to learn their 
reasons. 
552 See Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of 
Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REV. 465 (1997). 
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3. Jury Decisions According to Law 
 
Although jurors do not give reasons for their decisions, jurors are 
expected to decide objectively and according to law. Judges instruct them 
that “[i]t is your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them to 
the facts as you determine them ….”553
Jurors are not required to give reasons for their decisions because they 
are thought not capable of doing so. In colonial times, many jurors were not 
literate. Even today, many are not well educated. They are not are not 
selected for their skills, as their German lay counterparts are, but as 
representatives of all of society including the less well-educated. Even jurors 
that are well-educated are rarely trained in law. To expect lay jurors, without 
help to apply law, to facts as experts would, is unrealistic. Yet we are aware 
of no extended discussion of providing jurors with legal assistants much as 
Swiss courts provide legally-untrained judges with “court-writers” 
(Gerichtsschreiber).  
 Jurors are to find all facts necessary 
to fulfill all elements of applicable legal rules.  
Judges are conscious of the duty of jurors to decide according to law. 
They want jurors to decide according to law. Once jurors return a verdict, 
there is not much that judges can do to change it. Their authority is limited 
by the seventh amendment of the federal constitution and by similar 
guarantees in state constitutions. The former mandates that “no fact tried by 
jury shall be otherwise reexamined … than according to the rules of the 
common law.” Consistent with that mandate, judges have developed ways to 
promote decisions according to law in compliance with the open courts’ 
clauses. We discuss four: 
 
(a) instructing jurors in finding facts and applying law (jury 
instructions);  
(a) focusing jurors on fact findings (special verdicts, jury 
interrogatories, separate trials);  
(a) restraining jurors from verdicts against law (judgments as of law 
and new trials); and  
(a) telling jurors what judges think of evidence presented (commenting 
on evidence). 
 
(a) Instructing jurors in finding facts and applying law (“jury 
instructions”) 
  
Jury instructions are a tribute to Americans’ devotion to the open courts’ 
promise of decisions according to law as well as a demonstration of their 
                                                 
553 Instruction 71-2 Role of the Court, 4-71 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 71.01 
(2009). 
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boundless faith in the potential of their fellow men. What could be more 
noble than to hope that common men could learn to decide like lawyers after 
a few minutes of instruction when potential lawyers are required to study for 
three years before they are even allowed to take the examination to permit 
them to practice as lawyers?  
Judges are to give jurors formal instructions in every case. Toward the 
close of the taking of proof parties propose instructions that they want the 
judge to give. The judge decides which instructions to use, informs parties of 
that choice and gives them opportunity to object.554
At the end of the parties’ presentations and just before jurors exit the 
courtroom to deliberate, judges read formal written instructions lecture-style. 
There is no interaction: judges do not probe jurors for understanding of 
instructions and jurors are not invited to ask questions. Judges take from a 
few minutes to a few hours to read the instructions. Jurors, who had been 
sitting passively listening to court proceedings for hours or days, sit 
passively to take in all that the judge reads to them. The result is what one 
might expect: jurors nod off into sleep as judges “drone on.”
  
555
Judges typically begin their instructions telling jurors of their duties and 
advising them how to conduct deliberations, continue on to general legal 
issues of method such as burden of proof, and drill down to elements of 
claims made in the case. Judges tell jurors that they must find all elements of 
a claim in order to decide for plaintiff. While practices vary, judges usually 
give instructions orally. Some also give jurors written copies of instructions.  
  
Jury instructions did not spring from some reform commission. They 
grew out of the practice of judges commenting on evidence and telling jurors 
which facts they had to find in order to hold for plaintiffs (see b below). 
While judicial comments on evidence focus on facts, jury instructions are 
directed to law and its application. They were unnecessary so long as jurors 
only found facts and did not apply law to facts. The first major work devoted 
to jury instructions was not published until 1881, that is, after the reforms of 
mid-century had increased jury involvement in law applying.556
Although judges introduced jury instructions to help untrained laymen 
apply law, today “jury instructions are written and presented in a manner that 
defy comprehension to those untrained in the law.”
 
557
                                                 
554 See FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
 This happened 
because jury instructions became subjects for appeals. Appellate judges 
parsed instructions to jurors to determine whether the judge accurately stated 
the law. Trial court judges responded by using the very language of the 
law—whether the text of statutes or words of the appellate court—to instruct 
jurors. That placated appellate judges, but perplexed lay jurors. At this point, 
555 See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 449, 496-497 (2006)(citing examples). 
556 See FREDERICK SACKETT, INSTRUCTIONS AND REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE 
COURT TO THE JURY IN JURY TRIALS (1881). 
557 Marder, supra note 555 at 451. 
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however, appellate judges lost site that the goal of jury instructions is to help 
jurors apply law to facts. Today they acknowledge that instructions to jurors 
may be “polysyllabic mystification,” but conclusively presume that jurors 
understand the mysteries. 558
The American approach to helping jurors apply law is not the only 
possible one or even the one that comes first to mind. There are other ways 
that judges might help jurors find facts and apply law. Courts might train 
jurors to act as judges on a regular basis. Judges might sit with jurors as 
consultants and facilitators when jurors decide; when jurors have questions, 
judges could answer them. The present American approach is a one shot 
lecture on law just before jurors decide. It’s the legal process equivalent of 
an air traffic controller talking down a passenger in charge of a pilotless 
plane: “here’s what you need to know about aerodynamics, here’s how the 
controls of your plane work, we wish you good luck and please report back 
once you’ve landed with the results—over-and-out!” Why do Americans do 
it this way? We suspect because the present way required no formal 
institutional change; individual judges acting alone has only to modify 
instructions that they were already giving.  
 
 
(b) Focusing jurors on finding facts  
 
If jurors only find facts, they need not be skilled at or instructed in 
applying law. Special pleading at common law kept jurors focused on fact 
finding and distant from determining law applying. There are several 
different approaches available to judges today that work in much the same 
way as did special pleading.  
Special verdicts. In special verdicts judges instruct jurors to make a 
“special written finding upon each issue of fact.”559 Judges take the facts as 
found by jurors, apply law to those facts and enter judgment. The drafters of 
the Field Code recognized that their new approach had jurors applying law 
more often than under common special pleading. They recommended that 
judges use special verdicts.560 Today law reformers again recommend greater 
use of special verdicts in order to improve rationality of jury trials and to 
restore law-applying to judges as much as possible.561
Special verdicts on written questions (jury interrogatories). Closely 
related to special verdicts are jury verdicts on written questions, also called 
jury interrogatories. Here, judges submit to jurors, along with forms for a 
general verdict, “written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the 
  
                                                 
558 Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993).  
559 FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a). 
560 NEW YORK REPORT, FIRST REPORT OF THE PRACTICE COMMISSION (Feb. 29, 1848) at 273-
274, extensively excerpted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF 
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884). 
561 See Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—The 
Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 58 (1990). 
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decision of which is necessary to a verdict.”562
Separate trials of issues. Judges are not required to consider all issues 
that a case raises in a single trial before a single jury. “For convenience, to 
avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a 
separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, cross claims, 
counterclaims, or third party claims.”
 If jurors return answers to the 
interrogatories that are consistent with each other, and with the general 
verdict, the judge enters judgment on that verdict. If, however, jurors return 
answers that are inconsistent with the general verdict, the judge may enter 
judgment consistent with the answers, may return the case for further 
consideration by the jurors, or may order a new trial. If the answers are 
inconsistent with each other, the judge may not enter a judgment, but must 
either return the case to the jury for further deliberation or order a new trial. 
In effect, the written answers serve as a rudimentary justification of the jury 
verdict. 
563 This rule permits judges to separate 
out one issue from another to avoid making one finding dependent on the 
other. It finds greatest use in separating out issues of liability from damages, 
but could be used elsewhere as well. It has, however, found little application 
in such other uses.564
Despite their promises of improved accuracy, special verdicts, written 
jury interrogatories and separate trials are little used tools. There is no 
requirement that courts use any of them routinely or at all. Most judges use 
them infrequently. Neither lawyers nor judges like them much. Lawyers 
would rather that juries be freed to “do justice” than be constrained or guided 
by law. Judges fear complexity from creating special verdicts and 
complications in dealing with them when rendered. 
 Because special verdicts take law-applying away from 
juries, they are anathema to proponents of an extra-legal function for juries. 
565
 
 
Restraining jurors from deciding contrary to law  
 
American judges have no general authority to revise erroneous decisions 
of jurors. Judges may think jurors have decided in error, but in the usual 
case, they are not free to override the jurors’ verdict and hold what they 
consider correct. Nevertheless, judges have asserted in civil cases authority 
to overrrule verdicts that are completely unfounded in law or evidence. This 
is less a measure to maintain accuracy than a “a safeguard against irrational 
behavior” on the part of jurors. It only “patrols the extreme outer limits of 
rationality on the [jurors’] dominion.”566
                                                 
562 FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b). 
  
563 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
564 See Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000). 
565 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
at § 7.23 at 457 (5th ed. 2000); CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE supra note 565, at 99. 
566 CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 565, at 98, 96. 
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This irrationality control exists in three forms: (1) motion for judgment 
as a matter of law (made before jurors decide and formerly called a motion 
for directed verdict); (2) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 
(made after jurors have decided and formerly called a motion notwith-
standing the verdict); and (3) motion for a new trial.  
Judgment as a matter of law. Rule 51(a) allows a court, once a party 
has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial, to grant a motion for 
judgment on a claim or defense “if the court finds that a reasonable jury 
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on 
that issue.” The standard for granting the motion is high. The court must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Unlike 
in state courts, the court is to give the non-moving party an opportunity to 
cure the defect. While the text of the Rule does not require a motion, practice 
usually does. The Rule allows the court without motion to “resolve the 
issue.”  
Renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Rule 51(b) permits 
a party to renew a Rule 51(a) motion up to ten days after trial if the court 
denied the first motion. The standard for granting a Rule 51(b) motion is the 
same as for Rule 51(a). Judges often prefer to delay decision of a Rule 51(a) 
motion and decide the issue as a Rule 51(b) motion. This way, if jurors 
decide the way the judge thinks they should, the judge will not have to 
decide at all, both sparing judges’ time and preserving citizen involvement in 
the case. 
Motion for New Trial. Rule 59(a) permits a court to grant a motion for 
new trial on some or all issues “for any reason for which a new trial has 
heretofore been granted …”. This rule that incorporates common law 
practice without naming the reasons is used mostly in the following 
situations: verdict against the weight of the evidence, verdict in amount 
awarded is excessive or inadequate, newly discovered evidence and 
improper conduct affecting counsel, court or jury. The standard for granting 
a new trial is lower than for granting judgment as a matter of law. It should 
be granted if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. While the 
judge should not substitute the judge’s view of the case for the jury, but only 
if the judge is clearly convinced that the jurors were in error. The judge need 
not, however, find the jurors’ verdict to have been irrational.567
 
 Granting a 
new trial is, however, extremely costly. It requires redoing the whole 
proceedings. 
(d) Telling jurors what judges think of evidence (commenting on 
evidence.)  
 
In the nineteenth century American judges routinely commented on the 
evidence offered by both parties before submitting cases to jurors. 
                                                 
567 See CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 565, at 101. 
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Sometimes judges stated how they thought jurors should find facts based on 
that evidence. The practice was and still is common in England, but is rare in 
the United States today.568 Professor John Henry Wigmore, the icon of 
evidence law, wrote that abandoning the common law practice of 
commenting did “more than any other one thing to impair the general 
efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of justice.”569 Professor Sunderland 
thought that “no single reform would have so wide-reaching and wholesome 
effect in promoting the efficiency of courts and improving the quality of 
justice.”570 The practice is little used today because in the nineteenth century 
American lawyers successfully fought it as an unwanted interference with 
their efforts to persuade jurors.571
 
  
4. Neglect of Syllogisms in American Law 
 
     Legal syllogisms make civil justice possible. They enable bringing 
objective law and subjective fact together to determine parties’ rights and 
resolve their disputes according to law in particular cases. Consistently 
applied syllogisms promote equal protection under law. They provide 
guidance to subjects of the rules. Syllogisms contribute to constraining 
decision makers, parties and third parties. They make the rule of law 
possible.  
     Syllogisms are the basis of applying rules in Germany, Korea and the 
United States. But American jurists are ambivalent toward this centerpiece 
of legal systems.  
     Academics, judges and practitioners do not like syllogisms because 
syllogisms control legal decisions. Syllogisms limit the power of courts—
judges or jurors, often at the urging of practitioners or academics—to decide 
cases the way they would like to decide them. If they could, a good number 
of them would vote syllogisms out of the system.  
     Opponents of syllogisms rarely challenge syllogisms’ place in law 
directly. Almost none criticize syllogisms as constraints on their own 
freedom of action. Instead they offer up competing values which they 
contend should routinely override syllogisms: doing justice in individual 
cases, controlling government, and fostering democratic participation in 
government. That these values are important, no reasonable proponent of 
syllogisms would deny. That these values require routine rejection of 
                                                 
568 See LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY supra note 430, at 431-433.   
569 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 504-505 (3rd ed., 1940), cited after LANGBEIN ET AL., 
HISTORY, supra  note 430 at 433. 
570 Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 316 
(1914). 
571 See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 233-239 (2000). 
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syllogisms or that they cannot be achieved with syllogisms—indeed better 
achieved with syllogisms—are other issues. 
Few opponents of syllogisms appreciate fully and act consistently upon 
the consequences of their opposition. If society eschews general laws 
syllogistically applied, but relies for dispute resolution on sensibilities of 
individual decision makers, then it is imperative that society give citizens 
adequate opportunities for such individualization. The American jury is 
hailed for the opportunities that it provides for individualization of justice, 
control of authority, and participation of citizens in government. These 
values are ill-achieved in abstract generality; they find realization in specific 
application in particular cases. Yet the American civil justice system 
provides a forum for only a small percentage of all disputes and gives only 
one-in-a-hundred of those actually brought a jury trial.   
Syllogisms will not disappear in the United States. Litigating lawyers 
may wish to disavow them, but the public will not. Without syllogisms the 
public and their counseling lawyers could not apply rules to themselves. The 
public rightly expects judges to apply law and not to make law; it rightly 
rejects runaway verdicts. 
Proponents of syllogisms, on the other hand, also should appreciate the 
consequences of their proposition. If society is to rely on general laws 
syllogistically applied, those laws had better be good ones. Syllogisms are 
formulated abstractly to apply generally. Their general application makes 
imperative technical simplicity in application and substantive justice in 
results. They should be sufficiently sophisticated to allow for exceptions. 
That American statutes often fall short of these goals is not reasonably 
deniable. 
Attitudes toward syllogisms crystallize in views of the role of judges 
and, especially, in the role of the jury: is the jury a fact-finding body that is 
to follow the law or is it an institution that is to serve broader social purposes 
that is authorized to depart from law? We address here four persistent points 
of American process that we believe would be better considered were 
syllogisms not neglected, but respected. 
 
“Are juries really that bad?”  
 
That is the question that Professor Clermont deftly uses to summarize 
one long-standing debate that contrasts jury decisions with judges’ 
decisions.572 The stereotypical view of a “biased and incompetent jury 
system” is, Professor Clermont says, “elitist.”573
                                                 
572 CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 
 He, and many others, 
conclude that juries really are not that bad. They rely on empirical studies 
first done in the 1950s and since reproduced, that in samples measured, in 
565, at 89 (2nd ed. 2009). 
573 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realties Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1919, 1964.(2009). 
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about four-out-of-five cases, lay jurors reach the same decision on liability as 
would professional judges.  
         We have trouble with the characterization of 80% agreement as 
felicitous. That might be tolerable in criminal cases where participation is 
involuntary and where the consequence of disagreement is leniency, but we 
think that it is inadequate in civil matters, where participation is voluntary 
and where parties are as interested in the extent of liability as in the fact of it. 
We also have trouble with using agreement between judges and jurors as the 
measure of quality. What matters is whether judges’ or jurors’ decisions are 
according to law. It is no comfort to the public or to the righteous litigant if 
judge and jury agree on the wrong decision or never decide at all. 
     Even if jurors’ verdicts matched judges’ judgments one hundred percent 
of the time on liability and one hundred percent of the time on the principal 
amount awarded, they still would be deficient compared to the latter. Jury 
verdicts would still be unjustified. They would not demonstrate that jurors 
systematically found facts and accurately applied law. Verdicts would not 
tell parties why they were wrong to litigate and not to settle. They would not 
inform parties, or interested other persons, how to comport their conduct 
with the law’s requirements. They would not permit appellate review for 
accuracy. In short, so long as jury verdicts are unjustified, they are 
inadequate.  
Syllogisms are not simple. It is not elitist to think that jurors need help 
in applying law to facts. Today, it is no longer out of contemplation that 
jurors might give reasons.574
 
 It is misguided, on the other hand, to believe 
that jurors should rely on receiving that help from lawyers for the parties 
rather than from judges inclined to help jurors carry through subsumption of 
facts under law. 
 “Theory of the Case—Wrecker of Law.”  
 
That is how, one century ago, one perceptive lawyer characterized 
the theory of the case, the salvation for subsumption then being newly 
offered by trial lawyers. Today, theory of the case is ubiquitous. It is the way 
that is supposed to help jurors—and judges—understand lawsuits. A guide 
published by the American Bar Association for lay readers states: “The trial 
is a formal hearing at which both sides present their theory of the case 
….”575
                                                 
574 See, e.g., See Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict 
Interviews of Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 527-537 (1997). 
 A guide published by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy for 
professional readers captures the concept well in its first sentence: “At its 
575 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
THE COURTROOM 139 (2007). 
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most basic form, a trial is nothing more than the presentation of each side’s 
version of a dispute.”576
     What is so bad about the theory of the case? It denies the syllogism. 
Edward D’Arcy criticized the theory of the case for allowing “parties to 
become involved in controversies not embraced within the issue.”
  
577
 
 We add 
that it forces passive decision makers, be they judges or jurors, to choose 
between competing presentations. It makes judgments, which should be 
objective applications of law to facts, into awards for the better story. The 
American poet laureate Robert Frost is said to have cracked: “A jury consists 
of twelve persons chosen to decide who has the better lawyer.” The ABA 
Guide maintains that syllogisms remain: “The plaintiff will have to prove 
each necessary element of his or her cause of action ….”). The reality, 
however, is often they disappear. 
“Jury Nullification—Law versus Anarchy”  
 
Nowhere is rejection of syllogisms clearer than in the practice of jury 
nullification. Jury nullification claims for lay jurors authority to decide 
against law. In a democratic state such uncontrolled power to decide against 
law contravenes the rule of law. That jurors have that power in criminal 
cases has long been conceded; verdicts of acquittal are not reviewable. 
Verdicts in civil cases are, however, reviewable to the limited extent that 
they are manifestly against law. That jurors do not and should not have that 
authority to decide against law has been consistently maintained. Judge 
Lawrence W. Crispo stated the question succinctly: “Law versus 
Anarchy.”578
     The power of juries to decide against law is said to be one of the greatest 
benefits of juries. Juries are said to be the citizen’s protection against 
arbitrary government power. The argument, based on America’s colonial 
heritage of juries protecting colonists against the English crown, is 
anachronistic. Professor Sunderland countered it already in 1914: 
 In a democratic state such uncontrolled power to decide against 
law contravenes the rule of law. 
 
[T]imes have changed and the government itself is now 
under the absolute control of the people. The judges, if 
appointed, are selected by agents of the people, and if 
elected are selected by the people directly. The need for 
the jury as a political weapon of defense has been steadily 
                                                 
576 D. SHANE READ, WINNING AT TRIAL 1 (2007). 
577 Edward D’Arcy, “Theory of the Case”–Wrecker of Law, 70 CENTRAL L.J. 294, 311, 402 and 
455, at 295 (1910). 
578 Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification—Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. LA L. REV. 1 
(1997). 
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diminishing for a hundred years, until now [1914] the jury 
must find some other justification for its continuance.579
 
  
Sunderland’s argument is all the more persuasive when addressed to court 
resolution of private disputes where dangers of arbitrary uses of government 
power are minimal. Yet jury nullification is resilient; it has outlived 
Professor Sunderland. It remains an ever present issue in discussion of the 
role of the jury.580
 
  
Managerial Judging: “Are We Getting Civil-ized?”  
 
     The historic role of the American judge is passive; lawyers lead process. 
Reform proposals in recent decades call upon judges to be active. The report 
of the American College of Trial Lawyers Report, for example, urges judges 
to “have a more active role at the beginning of the case in designing the 
scope of discovery and the timing and direction of the case all the way to 
trial.”581
     Critics worry that managerial judging puts clearing dockets ahead of 
declaring rights. They see it threatening the impartiality of judges by 
involving them directly in case settlement. Many discern in it “some version 
of the continental or inquisitorial model.”
 Active involvement is dubbed “managerial judging.” It has had only 
limited success.  
582 Professor Thomas T. Rowe, Jr. 
asks: “Are We Getting Civil-ized?” He keenly concludes that American 
judges, when it comes to dealing with facts, are not moving in the direction 
of what he calls “inquisitorial fact-finding.”583
Managerial judging is not a step toward German syllogistic law 
applying. It is a giant leap in the opposite direction. Managerial judging is 
about “litigation control,” “case management,” and “docket control.”
 
584
                                                 
579 Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 305 
(1914). It is also an argument against a professional career judiciary. See, e.g., Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (Scalia, J., for the Court: “Ultimately, our decision 
cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of 
criminal justice. One can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by 
leaving justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly 
those following civil-law traditions, take just that course. There is not one shred of doubt, 
however, about the Framers' paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of 
administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by 
strict division of authority between judge and jury.”) 
 It is 
580 See generally, CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 
(1998). 
581 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 2. 
582 E.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 445 (1982). 
583 Thomas T. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and the Extent of 
Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 203, 210 (2007). 
584 See, e.g., COURT DELAY REDUCTION COMMITTEE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL 
JUDGES, LITIGATION CONTROL: THE TRIAL JUDGE’S KEY TO AVOIDING DELAY (American Bar 
Association, 1995). 
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not about clarifying what are the material issues in dispute between the 
parties, deciding those issues under law and justifying decisions in 
judgments. Professor Rowe, without referring to subsumption, links the 
decisive change to the 1983 revision of Rule 12 providing for pretrial 
conferences. The title changed. Before 1983 Rule 16 was headed, “Pre-Trial 
Procedure: Formulating Issues.” Now the title is different: “Pretrial 
Conferences; Scheduling, Management.”585
German judges, too, are under pressure to clear dockets. Statutes, 
justification and appeals, as we shall see, protect judges, to some extent 
against those pressures. German judges put applying law ahead of docket 
clearing. When involvement of judges in settlement discussions became 
substantial, the Bavarian Ministry of Justice created a new institution: the 
settlement judge. The settlement judge heads off the possibility of partiality 
that troubles critics of managerial justice.
  
586
 
  
3. Appeals 
 
In the United States the first appeal is of right. That means that a party 
disappointed by a decision of the court of first instance need not make any 
special showing to obtain review by the next level court. Free review from 
the first instance decision is offered, because the purpose of the review is to 
correct mistakes of the court of first instance. In a few less populous states, 
that first review is the last possible, since those states have no intermediate 
appellate court, but only one appellate court of last resort. In most states, 
however, and in the federal system, a further review to a court of last resort 
is possible when certain conditions are met. The purpose of that final review 
is not the correction of error in the case at hand, but safeguarding the 
integrity of the legal system as whole. That review usually requires 
permission of one or the other of the courts to determine whether the case 
presents an issue requiring appellate supervision, such as the court bellow 
decided contrary to law or in conflict with other courts. 
Filing fees for appeals from the United States District Court to the Court 
of Appeals are modest: in 2010 the charge was $450 without regard to the 
amount in controversy. Additional costs, however, can be substantial. These 
might be printing the record or obtaining a bond to protect the interests of the 
party opposing the appeal during the course of the appeal. The costs of legal 
representation on appeal are borne by each party without regard to whether 
the party who appeals is successful. An important question for every appeal 
is whether it suspends the implementation of the first instance decision. 
 
                                                 
585 Id. at 195. 
586 See, e.g., Harriett Weber, Referat: für die gemeinsame Tagung für Richterinnen und Richter 
sowie Staatsanwältinnen und Staatsanwälte aus Österreich, Bayern und der Schweiz, November 
2009. 
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Nature of Appellate Reviews 
 
In American systems appellate review—both first and second—rests on 
appealing parties identifying specific errors of law made by lower courts and 
asking appellate courts to correct those errors. Appellate courts in the United 
States do not review cases in their entirety to determine that they were as 
whole correctly decided and reached correct decisions, i.e., that the court of 
first instance correctly found facts, properly determined law, and correctly 
applied law to facts.  
Legal and practical obstacles stand in the way of full review. In 
American systems, fact finding is reserved to jurors. The Seventh 
Amendment of the Constitution limits appellate review of facts found to 
reviews allowed by the eighteenth century common law. In effect all that 
appellate court are allowed to do is to examine the record to see whether 
there is some evidence from which jurors might have concluded that a 
material fact had been proven. 
The form of jury verdicts is a practical obstacle to review of the fact 
findings of jurors. Since general verdicts state only a result, but no findings 
of fact or conclusions of law, and give no reasoning, appellate courts cannot 
review decisions closely. The higher court cannot know which facts the 
jurors found to be true, how jurors understood law, or how jurors applied law 
to facts found. All that appellate courts can do is to read laboriously through 
trial records (recorded verbatim) to see whether were at least arguable bases 
for the verdicts challenged.  
While these limitations need not apply to reviews of judgments from 
bench trials, appellate practice is based on expectation of review of jury 
verdicts. Appellate courts do not, for example, themselves hear witnesses or 
otherwise take evidence; they only review records of trials below. 
Consequently practice in review of bench judgments is not as different from 
review of jury verdicts as law would permit.  
As result, even in the first review, appellate courts confine their review 
to issues of law and do not revise findings of fact. They determine issues 
such as whether courts below properly conducted proceedings, properly 
instructed juries or correctly decided motions that disposed of or could have 
disposed of cases based on undisputed facts. They review records to see if 
there was some evidence on which jurors might have based their decision, 
but do not inquire whether lower court decided cases correctly.587
American lawyers rarely recognize the high costs that this restricted 
review imposes. In the days before computers and photocopiers, parties  
would expensively have the entire trial transcript set in type and printed. To 
this day, they still provide to the court copies of any part of the verbatim 
record potentially applicable for appellate judges painstakingly to read 
  
                                                 
587 See Mirjan Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 
YALE L.J. 480, 515 (1975).  
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through. Yet restricted review means that appellate courts usually cannot 
themselves correct errors, but must return cases to lower courts for furthe 
proceedings, including sometimes completely new trials. 
 
Courts of Law Resort and Redundancy of American Appeals 
 
In most American states and in the federal system, although parties are 
denied even one review of factual findings, they get two reviews of legal 
determinations. American lawyers rarely ask why there are two levels of 
appellate review on law, since neither instance can correct factual findings of 
the court of first instance or review a case as a whole. The unintended 
consequence of a system of intermediate appellate courts is the phenomenon 
of double appeals. Two level of appellate courts for law leads to two appeals. 
If at first you lose your appeal, appeal again! It is a system from which only 
lawyers profit. 
The possibility of a second appeal in Roh v. Doh is low because the case 
is in the federal system. In the federal system, a second appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court is theoretically possible for questions of federal law, 
including of federal constitutional law, but practically extraordinary. Since 
Roh v. Doh is based on state law, no further appeal would be possible.  
 
C. Germany 
 
The judgment shall include: … 6. The grounds for 
decision. … The grounds for decision shall contain a short 
summary of the bases on which the decision in factual and 
legal respects rests. 
 
§ 313 Code of Civil Procedure 
 
1. Judgments 
 
“A German judgment is supposed to appear as an act of an impartial as 
well as impersonal public authority furnishing the official and objective 
interpretation rather than personalized opinions of the individual deciding 
justices. . . . The typical German judgment . . . strives after the ideal of 
deductive reasoning.”588
                                                 
588 Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION 
TO GERMAN LAW 1, 26-27 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2nd ed., 2005). 
 It is designed to assure that the parties understand 
the grounds for the court’s decision. Ideally the judgment will convince the 
party who loses the lawsuit that that loss is the correct outcome. At a 
minimum, the judgment should persuade the loser that the process was 
rational. Parties affected by the judgment should be enabled to reproduce the 
grounds for the decision. They should recognize that rational argumentation, 
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not arbitrariness, determined the judgment. In this way, the parties are 
fundamental rights under the German constitution (Basic Law, Grundgesetz) 
are fulfilled: the right under Article 3 to equal treatment under law and the 
right under Article 103(1) to be heard.589
Not only do judgments inform parties, they control judges. Judges who 
subsume facts of cases under applicable rules incorrectly are subject to being 
corrected on appeal. They demonstrate through their judgments their 
understanding—or lack of understanding—of the contentions of losing 
parties. They display, through the impersonal, even colorless, style of their 
judgments, their neutrality. In theory judges should be fungible.
  
590
 
 
Elements of a Judgment 
 
A judgment consists of a caption (Rubrum) that identifies the parties and 
the lawsuit; a statement of the decision made and the relief ordered (Tenor or 
Urteilsformel), which should be a sufficient direction to court personnel for 
enforcement of the judgment; the findings of fact (Tatbestand); and the 
grounds for the decision (Entscheidungsgründe), referred to here as the 
justification. 
The Tatbestand, as it appears in a judgment, is a short statement of the 
parties’ legal claims and assertions of fact. The Code of Civil Procedure 
provides: “In the Tatbestand the asserted claims and the supporting and 
defending materials should be concisely presented only in their material 
content with particular reference to the subject applications. For details of 
the subject and of the matters in dispute, reference should be made to 
pleadings, minutes and other documents.”591
                                                 
589 See generally, James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 
114 PENN STATE L. REV. 469 (2009).  
 From the Tatbestand it should 
be possible to discern quickly who is seeking what, from whom, on what 
ground, and to determine which matters are in dispute and which are not. 
The Tatbestand serves as a public record of the oral hearings. It should 
include: the subject matter of the lawsuit, a sketch of the facts detailed only 
insofar as necessary to establish clearly the subject of the lawsuit, the 
590 The judgment is central to German civil justice. It contributes both to accuracy of judgments 
and to fairness of process. It is a rule of law control of judges’ actions and a quality control of 
their decisions. German legal science gives the duty of justification and judgments close 
attention. See, e.g., JÜRGEN BRÜGGEMANN, DIE RICHTERLICHE BEGRÜNDUNGSPFLICHT: 
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE MINDESTANDFORDERUNGEN AN DIE BEGRÜNDUNG GERICHTLICHER 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN (1971); DELF BUCHWALD, DER BEGRIFF DER RATIONALEN JURISTISCHEN 
BEGRÜNDUNG: ZUR THEORIE DER JURIDISCHEN VERNUNFT (1990); ANUSHEH RAFI, KRITERIEN 
FÜR EIN GUTES URTEIL (2004). German legal education gives the skill of writing judgments 
center stage in the first of the two year mandatory internship that follows university legal 
education. Highly trained judges teach all prospective lawyers how to write judgments. See, e.g., 
WINFRIED SCHUSCHKE, BERICHT, GUTACHETEN UND URTEIL 34th ed. (2008) (1st ed. by 
Hermann Daubenspeck, 1884); CHRISTIAN BALZER, DAS URTEIL IM ZIVILPROZESS: 
URTEILSFINDUNG UND URTEILSABFASSUNG IN DER TATSACHENINSTANZ (2nd ed., 2007). 
591 § 313(II) ZPO. 
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evidence offered by the parties, the applications of the parties, relevant 
history of the lawsuit, and specific references to the file. It should not 
include: facts not necessary to the decision of the case, party statements 
made in the proceedings that are no longer relevant, legal arguments of the 
parties, statements of the law, nor normative evaluations of the facts. Silence 
in the Tatbestand is understood to prove that no position was taken on the 
point. 
The justification furnishes the legal basis for the relief ordered or other 
resolution of the case. Matters not relevant to the decision made or the relief 
ordered do not belong in the justification. The justification is to evaluate and 
subsume the concrete facts of the Tatbestand under the abstract elements of 
the applicable rule. The Code of Civil Procedure provides: “The justification 
contains a short summary of the consideration on which the decision in 
factual and legal respects rests.”592
A statement of the result and the claims for relief; 
 In the normal case it should include the 
following: 
A statement that the complaint states a cause of action (is schlüssig); 
A statement that the claim is permissible, i.e., satisfies the prerequisites 
for a lawsuit (e.g., the court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction) (is 
zulässig); 
A statement of the facts that satisfy the abstract elements of the 
applicable rule; 
A statement justifying the factual findings necessary for application of 
the law; and 
A statement of which facts are undisputed and which are disputed and 
an evaluation of the evidence and resolution of the issue with respect to 
disputed facts relevant to the decision. 
 
2. Justification: Applying Law to Facts 
 
The justification applies law to facts. It determines the facts of the 
Tatbestand and subsumes them under the abstract elements of the applicable 
rules. The process of applying law to facts is not a mechanical act of 
mindless processing, but a mindful act of creative evaluation. 
The justification follows a format that in clarity and brevity facilitates 
understanding. It begins by stating the result of the lawsuit and by 
identifying the determinative legal rule. It confirms or denies that the 
plaintiff’s claim is permissible under procedural law and well-founded in 
substantive law. For example, a typical justification might begin: “The 
plaintiff’s action is in all respects permissible and well-founded. Pursuant to 
§ 488 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Civil Code the plaintiff has a right 
                                                 
592 § 313(III) ZPO. 
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arising from the loan agreement of April 15, 2011 to repayment of the loan 
of €60,000.” 
The justification then proceeds to address systematically the applicable 
rule, its elements and, if the judgment denies plaintiff’s claims, all rules that 
might support any of the claims. For each element of the rule, insofar as 
necessary, the justification clarifies the legal definition of the element as it 
relates to the particular case. Here the justification may interpret the 
applicable statute, but only to the extent directly relevant to determining 
whether the facts in the present case fulfill the elements of the statutory 
norm. Abstract discussions of law have no place.  
The justification then tells the factual story of the case. It focuses on 
those facts material to decision of the case. Immaterial facts have no place in 
the justification except as is necessary to understand the court’s decision. 
The justification starts from undisputed facts. Where facts are disputed, the 
justification evaluates the evidence that leads the court to decide as it does. 
The justification does not discuss burden of proof other than with respect to 
material facts in dispute. Once the justification has clarified material and 
disputed facts, it subsumes those facts under the identified and clarified rule. 
 
Duty of Justification Fulfilled in the Judgment 
 
The German judgment fulfills the duty of the German judge to justify 
the judge’s judgment. The general requirement of German law that a 
decision to apply government power must be individually justified is 
especially pronounced in judicial proceedings. Unjustified judgments 
threaten the rule-of-law state; justified judgments tie the implementation of 
the law in the individual case to the statute. They establish that application of 
the law is an impartial application of the general rule to the specific case. A 
deductive justification is thought essential to fulfillment of legal certainty.  
The duty of justification is intended to enhance the quality of legal 
decisions. In the first instance, it provides a foundation to review the 
decision made. Just the knowledge that such a review is possible impels 
decision makers to self-control. It requires them to base their decisions, or at 
least the justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons (e.g., statutory 
requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g., bias or prejudice). It pushes 
them toward more careful handling of materials of decision, of fact finding 
and of law determining and applying. Particularly compared to American 
judges, who oversees proceedings as much as reach decisions, the duty of 
justification imposes on decision makers the responsibility for outcomes of 
procedure. Justification re not required, however, if both parties relinquish 
their rights to appeal or if an appeal would not be permitted. 593
 
 
3. Judgment in Roh v. Doh and Assuring Open Courts Accuracy 
                                                 
593 § 313a(1) ZPO. 
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 Below we provide a judgment such as might be entered in Roh v. Doh. 
Notice in particular how it provides transparency to decision thus promoting 
decision accuracy. 
 
Mary Roh v. John Doh, Jr. 
_____________________________________________________ 
File No.: 
 
Entered May 10, 2012 
 
 
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
In the lawsuit 
 
Mary Roh, Bismarkstraße 11, 10400 Berlin 
 
Represented by Harry Hahn, Esq. 
        
 
-against- 
 
 
John Doh, Jr., Kaiserplatz 11, 84471 Munich 
 
Represented by Betty Bahn, Esq. 
         
 
For Repayment of a Loan 
 
The 22nd Civil Chamber of the District Court Munich I, by District Judge Jung as single 
judge, based on the oral hearing held April 30, 2012 issues the following: 
 
Final Judgment: 
 
I. The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff € 60.000 and interest 
of 5 % above Prime Rate from August 16, 2011. 
 
II. The Defendant bears the costs of the action.  
 
III. The judgment is provisionally enforceable upon posting of a bond 
of 120 % of the amount enforced. 
 
Tatbestand 
 
The parties dispute the repayment of money in the amount of € 60.000. 
 
Plaintiff and Defendant are independent merchants in the automotive section. Each of 
them is a franchised Honda automobile dealer. Defendant’s father has been a close 
friend of Plaintiff since they went to college together, and is the regional distributor for 
Honda, who supplies the dealerships of both Defendant and Plaintiff. Defendant had 
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been engaged to marry the Plaintiff’s daughter, but they broke up last summer. 
 
On April 16, 2011 Plaintiff transferred €60.000 to Defendant’s company’s account with 
the Deutsche Bank, Munich. This amount has not been repaid to Plaintiff. 
 
Plaintiff’s position is that she transferred the money to Defendant as a loan. Defendant 
has not complied with his obligation under the loan agreement to repay the money no 
later than August 16, 2011. Defendant’s position to the contrary is that the disputed 
amount was a gift of Plaintiff.  Repayment by Defendant, let alone at a specific time, 
was not agreed. 
 
Plaintiff moves the Court, 
 
 to order Defendant to pay €60,000 and interest since August 16, 2011, in the 
amount of  5 % above Prime rate. 
 
Defendant moves the Court, 
 
 to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. 
 
Defendant contests having made a loan agreement with Plaintiff. Rather it is that 
Plaintiff rather gave him a gift. Presumably with her transfer of money Plaintiff wanted 
to contribute to strengthening the relationship between Defendant and her daughter 
and thereby further an eventual union of the families of two friends. A common future of 
her daughter with Defendant, however, is now out of the question, since the daughter 
has ended the relationship with Plaintiff. He was not at fault and therefore is in no way 
obligated to pay the money back. 
 
The Court took proof on the basis of its decision of August 15, 2011 by taking unsworn 
testimony of both Defendant and Plaintiff as witnesses. Reference will be made to the 
conclusions of the evidence-taking. 
 
For further supplementation of the facts and of the dispute, reference is made to the 
pleadings and their exhibits.  
 
Grounds for Decision 
 
The complaint is permissible and is in all respects justified. Under § 488(1) second 
sentence of the Civil Code [BGB] Plaintiff has a claim against Defendant for repayment 
of the loan in the amount of €60,000 pursuant to the loan agreement of April 15, 2011. 
It is not disputed between the parties that Plaintiff transferred this amount to 
Defendant’s company on April 16, 2011 and that the Defendant has not paid this 
amount back to Plaintiff. 
 
1. 
On April 15, 2011 at the traditional spring party of the regional Honda distributor the 
parties orally concluded a loan agreement on the basis of which Plaintiff was obligated 
to place at Defendant’s disposal €60,000 as loan and Defendant was obligated on his 
part to pay the loan back to Plaintiff no later than August 15, 2011.  
 
Based on the oral hearing the Court is convinced that Plaintiff placed this money at the 
disposal of Defendant only on the basis of the loan agreement. 
 
The Court heard and examined Defendant and Plaintiff each formally as parties 
regarding the controverted conversation at the referenced spring party. The Court saw 
itself as bound to do so, because Plaintiff, who bears both the burden of presentation 
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and the burden of proof of the asserted claim for loan repayment, under applicable 
rules of proof, could meet that burden only through examination of the party opponent, 
the Defendant (§ 445(1) Code of Civil Procedure). Defendant did not consent to 
Plaintiff’s application to her examination as the party bearing the burden of proof (§ 447 
Code of Civil Procedure). 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized (e.g., its decision reported at NJW-RR 
2006, 61ff. with further citations), that in such situations where a party to a confidential 
conversation has no witnesses, the party must be given opportunity to introduce into 
the proceedings her personal view of the conversation. 
 
The parties in their examinations in the oral hearing orally confirmed their previously 
stated positions. The evaluation of the proof of the party examinations (§ 453(1) 1 Code 
of Civil Procedure) persuaded the Court that Plaintiff made her payment of €60,000 to 
Defendant exclusively on the basis of the loan agreement with Defendant.  
 
Under § 286 Code of Civil Procedure, which governs judicial free evaluation of 
evidence, an assertion is proven, if the court is convinced of its truth, without thereby 
setting requirements that can not be met. The basis of the evaluation is the entire 
content of the hearing, all submissions, conduct, omissions, and personal impressions 
of the participants in the process of taking proof. 
 
It was plain to the Court that Defendant could not give a sound ground to explain why 
Plaintiff would have given him a gift of such a large amount. It is undisputed that the 
transfer of the money was to the corporate account of Defendant’s company. This 
circumstance appears at least—in the absence of an further explanation, as is here the 
case—to speak directly against the assumption of a gift. It must mean that the money 
was also to benefit the business of Defendant’s company. The debits and credits of a 
company’s bank account have special meaning for the company, above all under 
accounting standards and in tax law. It would not be understandable, if a purely private 
gift to the owner of a company would land in its corporate account, with all of the 
substantial commercial and tax consequences that would have. The way the matter 
was carried out, i.e., by transfer to the company account, speaks forcefully for 
characterizing the payment as a loan. 
 
What is more is that Defendant could not give a plausible ground for a gift. This is a 
matter of a substantial amount of money. If Plaintiff really had in mind doing something 
for the common future of Defendant and her daughter, obviously she would have told 
her daughter Rosa about it, which undisputedly did not happen. If one assumes a gift, it 
is not apparent why Plaintiff would wanted to support only Defendant unilaterally and 
not also her daughter. 
 
It was plain to the Court that Defendant, both in the hearing and in his testimony, was 
unable to give precise details, but was able only to speak in general and conclusory 
terms. In his statements he often failed to distinguish between descriptions of fact and 
his evaluation of them. In sum, Defendant could not convince the Court that the 
disputed amount was a gift of Plaintiff.  
 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, both in her statements and in the personal impression she 
presented, convinced the Court that the complaint’s version of the case corresponds to 
truth. Plaintiff testified that at the relevant time there was not the slightest ground for 
her to give Defendant such a large amount of money. It was substantial to her. Rather, 
at the spring party Defendant told her of his unexpected financial difficulty, that it arose 
from the failure of an important customer to pay, and that it was completely 
unexpected. Defendant implored her emphatically to loan him the money. Sure he 
could have asked his father for the money at any time. Sure he could get short-term 
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money in a number of other ways. But he wanted absolutely wanted to avoid, that this 
sudden, but transitory financial difficulty, might disturb his father, who had placed great 
trust in him. The money  (€60,000) he would pay back as quickly as possible, and at 
the latest, August 15, 2011. Defendant further said that he was asking her—the 
Plaintiff—above all, because she had great trust in him.  
 
In her declarations Plaintiff was clear and open. She freely acknowledged that she was 
angry with Defendant, because he presented the matter otherwise and because  he 
had broken his promise to pay the money back. She was, however, able to detail the 
entire course of events and to present them understandably. Her entire presentation of 
the matter was believable and she herself was credible in her testimony. Based on the 
personal impression of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conceive that Plaintiff, either out 
of disappointment with Defendant or out of her disappointed expectations, could have 
testified to untruths. 
 
Defendant is therefore adjudged to pay back to Plaintiff the amount of the loan. 
 
 
2. 
The promised amount is, as sought, to bear interest. The Defendant has been in 
default in repayment since August 16, 2011 (§ 286 (1) 2 Civil Code). The amount of 
interest follows from  § 288 (1) 1 Civil Code. 
 
3.  
The decision on costs is based on § 91(1) Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
4. 
The claim for provisional enforcement is based on § 709 first sentence Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
 
Jakob Jung 
Judge Landgericht 
 
 
 
At about 1500 words (one word for every forty Euros in dispute) the 
justification is neither long nor short for cases of this magnitude. We have 
tried to create in this translation the style of a typical German judgment. 
This judgment is an example of how German judgments are crafted to 
use clear, declarative sentences to explain why judges decide as they do. The 
judgment states first the differing contentions of the parties. It identifies the 
applicable law. It considers the proof to see whether it fulfills the elements of 
the applicable rules. It explains why the judge chose to believe one witness 
and not another. 
Such a judgment may not be literature, but it is a clear statement 
showing the path that the court followed to reach the decision that it did. 
Should one or the other parties challenge the outcome, they will not be 
reduced to arguing generalities. While they may argue that the court made 
particular procedural errors (most commonly, failure to fulfill a duty of 
elucidation), they will be able—indeed, they may be required—to point to 
how those errors adversely affected the court’s substantive adjudication. 
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Such judgments are given in the majority of concluded cases. German 
judges write dozens of such judgments each year. They can do that because, 
as we saw in Chapter 3, they are trained to do it.  
Writing good prose is not enough. While it is hard to imagine an 
untrained American juror writing such a judgment, it is not easy to imagine a 
well-trained American professional writing one either. American lawyers 
focus on case theory rather than on thought process. A judgment states the 
thought process used by the judge in the case. The judgment details the 
judge’s route to decision; it states why at each point along the way, the judge 
went down one path rather than another. An American theory of the case 
presentation does not ordinarily permit departures from presented paths. Yet, 
that is exactly what the law may sometimes require. 
 
Living with the case and doing it justice: the judge as facilitator and guide, 
not as manager or inquisitor.  
 
A German judgment is possible because the judge who decides the case 
has lived with it from its filing. Living with the case is an explicit 
requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure.594
As Americans ponder how more active judges might function without 
undermining their system’s commitment to party presentation and judicial 
neutrality, they should consider how German judges live with their cases and 
do them justice: they guide cases toward resolution according to law. Let us 
recall our discussion throughout this book of how German judges decide 
cases.  
 The judge writing the opinion 
must have participated in the hearings, i.e. beigewohnt haben, which 
translates literally as “have lived with” the hearings.  
German judges are not the inquisitors that Americans, unfamiliar with 
German practices, believe them to be. German judges have no personal or 
governmental interest in how they decide cases before them. Their interest is 
that they decide according to right and statute to further the overall societal 
interest in the rule of law and peace. Recall our discussion in Chapter 6 
above. 
Nor are German judges the managers that critics of American 
managerial litigation fear their judges may become. They are not driven 
single-mindedly, as legal ethics expert Professor Stephen Gillers said of 
American judges, to “Wind up this dispute, let’s go on to the next 
dispute.”595
                                                 
594 § 309 ZPO. 
 German judges do not rely on deadlines divorced from case 
issues to expedite resolution of disputes; they do not demand that parties 
complete preparation or presentation of case theories within artificially set 
595 TRUTH ON TRIAL, 8 ANNENBERG ETHICS IN AMERICA at 55th minute (Columbia University 
Seminars on Media and Society, 1989, ISBN 0-89776-526-5) 
http://www.learner.org/resources/series81.html?pop=yes&pid=198. 
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timelines. What they do is insist on is that parties substantiate assertions that 
particular facts do or do not fulfill elements of legal claims.  
German judges could not be the managerial judges that American jurists 
rightly fear. The twin duties under which they work—of justifying their 
decisions after elucidating their cases—do not permit it. While German 
judges are under pressure to decide cases, they cannot decide and bury old 
cases. They must find facts that establish legal bases for their decisions. If 
they do not put those facts down in their judgments, appellate courts will 
reverse them. If they decide without hearing all sides adequately on a 
material point in dispute, appellate courts will themselves review that 
element or return the case to them.  
German judges function not as inquisitors or managers, but as guides 
and facilitators of decisions according to law. Statutory law tells them where 
they must guide their cases, while the duty of justification tells them how to 
facilitate the trip and demands that they document that they have properly 
completed it.  
Look back on our discussions of pleading and process. Recall how 
German judges act: 
Pleadings: German judges review every case filed for compliance with 
procedural and substantive prerequisites. They review all cases, not just 
those parties object to, before they serve complaints. They determine 
affirmatively, albeit preliminarily, that jurisdiction exists and that actions are 
timely brought.  If lacking, they give guidance. Jurisdictional rules are 
straight-forward and permit expeditious application. They are not complex 
and convoluted the way many corresponding American rules are. German 
judges, before serving complaints, determine that complaints state plausible 
grounds for relief. That is also not time consuming, because rules of 
substantive law are codified: recognizing possible legal grounds for relief is 
easy in most cases. Moreover, rules of procedure require that plaintiffs 
substantiate claims for relief, not just with wishful assertions of facts, but 
with offers of proof.  
To American plaintiffs’ lawyers the world of German pleading universe 
might sound a hell and to defense lawyers a heaven (or at least a safe haven), 
but that is not so. Plaintiffs whose pleadings fail one or the other test are not 
summarily dispatched from the courthouse; judges may ask them to make up 
deficiencies. In other words, judges guide plaintiffs to right paths. Only if 
plaintiffs are then unable to make necessary claims, do judges dismiss 
complaints. Such dismissals are in everyone’s interest. They avoid 
squandering court and plaintiffs’ time in useless litigation. They protect 
privacy of potential defendants who are never served. They may spare 
plaintiffs, who would most surely wind up on the losing side, the obligation 
of reimbursing the side-not-served for its lawyers’ fees. 
Preliminary hearings. Beginning with review of complaints, German 
judges work to facilitate conclusion of the cases according to law. It is their 
responsibility, as participants knowledgeable in law, to identify possibly 
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applicable legal rules. As facilitators they discuss cases directly with parties 
and not just with lawyers of the parties. In these hearings judges seek, as 
they did with pleadings, not to evict parties with weak cases from the 
courthouse, but to facilitate court resolutions of cases on the merits. Judges 
are looking for the material issues in dispute, for these are the only issues 
that they need consider. 
Proof taking. Only after they have identified conceivably applicable 
legal rules and determined which elements of those rules are material and in 
dispute between the parties, do German judges turn to proof taking. Parties 
are responsible for identifying proof. The parties are not, however, allowed 
to impose on the other side the burdens of American-style discovery. They 
cannot force participation. German judges facilitate taking proof of facts that 
are material elements in dispute. They do not, however, allow parties to 
inquire into matters not relevant to material elements in dispute. Again 
German judges are guides and facilitators, for they help identify what parties 
must prove. Where a party’s proof proves infirm, they do not exclude the 
party or the parties’ claims from proceedings. What they do do is to postpone 
further consideration pending production of necessary proof. Should a party 
uncover the proof, if the judge has not decided that case already, the party 
can return to court. 
No surprises. German judges guide process to facilitate cooperation of 
judges and all parties in determining whether facts exist that establish or 
deny application of applicable legal rules. When courts and parties cooperate 
in determining whether elements of legal claims are fulfilled, there are few 
surprises. Decisions according to law require that judges give all parties 
opportunity to be heard on all material issues in dispute. 
 
5. Appeals 
 
In Germany, as in the United States and in Korea, the first appeal, is as 
of right. For very small matters (below €600), appeal requires approval of 
the court.596
The 2002 reform of German civil procedure introduced a completely 
“new conception” of the first appeal. Previously, the first appeal anticipated 
a trial de novo; virtually everything was done anew. Appeals were very 
common. The formal parliamentary explanation for the reform bill rejected 
this long-used approach both as uneconomical and as not required by the rule 
of law. According to the explanation, the function of review now is “to 
review the judgment of the first instance for its application of the substantive 
law as well as the correctness and completeness of the determinations 
reached and to correct any mistakes.” Under the new law, the appellate court 
is required to accept factual findings of the court of first instance “insofar as 
there is no clear indication of doubt of the correctness or completeness of the 
  
                                                 
596 § 511 ZPO. 
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fact determinations material to the decision and therefore indication for a 
new fact determination.” If there is such doubt, however, the court, as 
before, may take new testimony and find new facts. 
Whether the reform will change the scope of review materially remains 
to be seen, but most commentators think that it will not. What remains the 
same after the reform is the appellate court’s responsibility for the material 
correctness of final judgments. The appellate court is not to search for errors 
by courts below, but is to insure that judgments in their entireties are correct 
and, when they are not, to correct the judgments. Now, rather than conduct 
the proceedings of the case itself anew as the previously did, appellate courts 
are to review trial court’ factual findings for correctness and to apply the law 
to the facts as found. By focusing on how the trial court applied the law, 
reforms are intended to enhance legal certainty. In any case, other aspects of 
the reform seek to enhance legal certainty by helping cases conclude sooner. 
Appellate courts are required to review all appeals when initially filed. They 
are to dismiss, ex officio, appeals that appear to have no chance of success or 
raise no legal issue of fundamental importance.  
Although the 2002 reform sought to diminish the incidence of appeals, 
the percentage of cases appealed remains high. Fees for appeals are base on 
the amount in dispute. As with court costs generally, they are taxed to the 
losing party.  
 
D. Korea 
 
A written judgment shall contain … 4. the grounds for 
decision. 
 
Art. 208(1) Civil Practice Act597
 
  
1. Judgments 
 
In form Korean judgments parallel their German counterparts. They 
begin with identification of the parties and the lawsuit and with a statement 
of the decision and of the relief ordered. They then give a short statement of 
the parties’ legal claims and of their assertions of fact. Finally, they conclude 
with a justification of the decision which applies the law to the facts.598
The justification of Korean law is in essence similar to its German 
counterpart. One substantial difference is that Korean court judgments are 
restricted to giving judgment on the legal claims that the parties asserted.
  
599
                                                 
597 The language is the same as in the original 1877 German Code of Civil Procedure, = § 274(1) 
CPO (1877). 
  
598 § 208(1) KCPA. See Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. KOREAN L. at 134-135, 
reprint at 22-24. 
599 Id.  
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Korean Judgment in Roh v. Doh 
 
Mary Roh against John Doh, Jr.  
____________________________________________________  
 
Judgment Announced by Seoul Central District Court May 10, 2012 
 
Case Number:  
 
 
Plaintiff Mary Roh 
        100 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul  
 
Plaintiff’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Harry Hahn 
        111 Heukseok Street, Dongjak-Gu, Seoul 
 
Defendant John Doh, Jr. 
        300 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan 
 
Defendant’s Procedural Representative Lawyer Betty Bahn 
        313 Haewoondae Street, Haewoondae-Gu, Pusan  
 
Date of Final Hearing April 30, 2012 
 
 
[Main Text of Final judgment] 
 
I order that: 
 
I. The Defendant pay to the Plaintiff ₩75 million plus 5% annual interest rate of 
the said amount since August 15, 2011 until May 10, 2012 [date of 
formal entry of judgment], and 20% annual rate of the said amount from 
the next day of the date when the decision was rendered until the day 
when Defendant fully pays back to Plaintiff the amount awarded.  
II. Defendant bears the costs of the dispute. 
III. The above is subject to provisional execution.  
 
[Gist of Plaintiff’s Claim]  
 
Identical to the main text of final judgment 
 
 
[Grounds] 
 
1. Basic Facts  
 
The plaintiff and the defendant are each working as independent merchants in 
the automotive industry. Each of them are Honda dealers. The father of 
Defendant is a longtime and close friend of Plaintiff. Defendant’s father is 
regional distributor for Honda automobiles. Defendant was engaged to be 
married this upcoming June to the daughter of Plaintiff; she unilaterally broke of 
the engagement in June of last year. 
 
At the traditional spring party of Honda dealers held last year Plaintiff and 
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Defendant met. The parties disagreed about what was said between them at 
the party, but they agree that the next day Defendant transferred ₩75 million to 
the account of DohSon Honda LLC, in which Defendant was the manager-
owner. On April 16, 2011 the amount mentioned above was transferred from 
the plaintiff to DohSon Honda LLC’s bank account at Pusan Bank in Pusan. 
.  
September 7, 2011 Plaintiff asked Defendant to repay the loan which had been 
due at the latest, August 15, 2011. However, Defendant refused to repay the 
money, contending that he did not enter into a loan agreement with Plaintiff 
and it was a gift to him. As a result, Plaintiff instituted the instant suit against 
Defendant before the court. 
 
On basis of Proofs No. 1 to 3, I found that there was a loan agreement 
between Plaintiff and Defendant on April 15, 2011. 
 
[Proof] Proofs No. 1, No. 2. And No. 3 Attached.  
 
2. Parties’ Arguments and Court’s Holdings 
 
(1) Parties’ Arguments 
 
1) Plaintiff’s Argument 
 
Plaintiff is of the opinion that she transferred ₩75 million to Defendant as a loan. Plaintiff 
argues that Defendant was obligated to repay the loan by August 15, 2011 and failed to 
do so. Hence, Plaintiff claims Defendant should pay to Plaintiff ₩75 million plus 5% 
annual interest rate of the said amount since August 16, 2011, until May 10, 2012 and 
20% annual rate of said amount from the next day of the date when the decision was 
formally entered to the day when Defendant has fully paid this judgment.  
 
 
2) Defendant’s Arguments 
 
Defendant argues that the amount mentioned above was a gift for him and does not 
need to be paid back to Plaintiff. Thus Defendant contends that the instant lawsuit 
should be dismissed. 
  
(2) Court’s Holding 
 
It is not disputed that the plaintiff paid ₩75 million on April 16, 2011 to the 
company owned by Defendant and that Defendant has not paid the money 
back to Plaintiff within its due date. 
 
The parties entered into an oral loan agreement on April 15, 2011 at the 
annual spring party of the regional Honda Automobile dealers’ association, 
under which Plaintiff was obliged to lend ₩75 million to Defendant and, in turn, 
Defendant was obliged to pay the money back to the plaintiff no later than 
August 15, 2011.  
 
At the hearing, the Court was convinced that Plaintiff transferred the money to 
Defendant’s company only on the basis of the loan agreement between the 
parties. 
 
The Court has examined both parties as witnesses in accordance with Article 
293 of Korean Civil Procedure Act [KCPA].  
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In addition, the court noticed that the defendant could not name a really good 
reason as to why the plaintiff gave that amount of money to the defendant for 
a gift. It is undisputed that the transfer of payment to the DohSon Honda 
LLC's business account was made by Plaintiff. This situation seems to mean 
that the money should benefit the operation of DohSon Honda LLC. Hence, 
the money cannot be a purely private gift for Defendant only on the basis of 
the fact that he is the owner of the company. 
 
Another factor is that the defendant could not present the Court a really 
plausible reason for a gift. The amount the plaintiff transfer to the defendant’s 
company is significant and high. Overall, the defendant fails to prove that the 
disputed amount was a gift for the defendant. Thus, the court believes the 
plaintiff's version of the truth.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Thus, the defendant has obligation to pay to the plaintiff ₩75 million plus 5% annual 
interest rate 600
  
 of the said amount pursuant to the Korean Civil Code since August 
16, 2011, until May 10, 2012, and 20% annual rate of the said amount pursuant to 
the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (sosong 
chokjin deong e kwanhan teokre beop), from the next day of the date when the 
decision was rendered to the date when the Defendant has fully paid this judgment. 
Thus, by affirming the plaintiff’s claim, the court holds the judgment mentioned on the 
main text of the final judgment. 
 
Jacob Jung 
Court Judge 
 
3.  Appeals (상소) 
 
In Korea, as in the United States and in Germany, the first appeal (항소) 
is of right.  
In Korea, as in Germany but contrary to the United States, the second 
instance courts review not only issues of law but also factual issues. Hence, 
appellants can submit additional evidence before the second instance courts. 
This arrangement encourages plaintiffs and defendants alike to forego 
lawyers in the first instance proceedings and appear pro se. They figure that 
if they lose in the first instance, they can appeal to the second and, in effect, 
have a new proceeding. They anticipate, what usually is the case, that they 
will invest more resources in the second instance than they did in the first. 
The fee schedule discourages appeals, even though the costs imposed 
are eventually taxed to the losing party. The fees through the courts increase 
regularly. As we saw in Chapter 5, the fee in the court of first instance in 0.5 
% of the amount in controversy. In the second instance, it rises to 1%, and in 
the third and final instance, to 1 ½ % of the amount in controversy. 
 
                                                 
600 Article 379 of Korean Civil Code. 
263   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
E.  Roh v. Doh: Comparative Outcomes 
 
We do not want to make the mistake that many make and confuse legal 
decisions for actual outcomes. Diffeent systems may reach the same legal 
conclusion, yet from the perspective of the parties, produce very different 
outcomes. That is the case in Roh v. Doh. 
Deciders in all three systems—be they judges or jurors—are likely to 
reach the same decision in our hypothetical case based on how they assess 
the parties’ credibility. The outcomes in the three systems, however, will be 
different even if the legal conclusions are the same.  
 
1. Can Roh lose while winning? 
 
If the case goes to final judgment, if Roh wins, in the United States, she 
will be lucky to recover one-half of her claim; in Germany or Korea, she will 
recover nearly all of her money. If Doh wins, in the United States, he will be 
lucky to have spent less than one third the value of his legal right for his 
victory; in Germany or in Korea, he will have lost little of it. The following 
tables show that: 
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Roh Wins 
 
If plaintiff Roh wins, she recovers: 
 
 U.S. 
Contingent   
U.S. 
Hourly  
Germany 
 
Korea 
 
Award $ 75,000 $ 75,000 € 60,000 ₩75,000,000 
Less lawyer’s initiation fee free free [729]601 4,250,000  
Less lawyer’s process fee  25,000  30,000 loser pays 1,050,000 
Less lawyer’s expenses ca. 5,000 ca. 5,000 included included 
Less court costs loser pays  loser pays loser pays loser pays 
Less fast payment discount ca. 5,000 ca. 5,000 none none 
Outcome-Roh recovers $ 40,000 $ 35,000 € 60,000 ₩70,700,000 
NET RECOVERY % of claim 53.3  % 46.7 %  100.0% 94.3% 
 
While defendant Doh pays: 
 
  U.S. Germany Korea 
Award  $ 75,000 € 60,000 ₩ 75,000,000 
Plus lawyers’ initiation fees  free [729]602 4,250,000  
Plus lawyers’ process fees   30,000 5,614 9,300,000 
Plus lawyer’s expenses  ca. 5,000 no charge no charge 
Plus court costs  ca. 2,500 1,668 342,500 
Less fast payment discount   ca. 5,000 none none 
Outcome-Doh pays  $ 107,500 € 67,272  ₩ 88,892,500 
NET PAYMENT % of claim  143 % 112 % 119 % 
 
For these tables, we assume: (1) for the United States, a contingent fee of 33⅓ % or an hourly fee 
of  $30,000 (100 hours @ $300 or a mix with more hours, some at a lower charge), with Doh’s 
lawyer charging the same amount as Roh’s lawyer; (2) for Korea, Doh’s lawyer charges the same 
Roh as set out in Chapter 3. The hour calculation for the United States is artificial and includes trial 
time. Just how many hours will be required lies in the hands of the lawyers for the parties. 
Depending upon how they choose to conduct the case, they can raise or lower the estimate 
dramatically.  
 
 
If Roh wins, in the American system, she will be lucky to recover half of 
her claim. Because the German and Korean systems have variations of loser-
pays for costs, a winning Roh in those systems gets back most of her money. 
In Germany, she gets back all of it. She is held harmless. In Korea, however, 
Roh will not be held completely harmless. The lawsuit will cost her a little 
more than 5%. 
                                                 
601 Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee. 
602 Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee. 
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The absence of a loser-pay system in the United States and the 
significance for plaintiff of contingent fee representation are especially plain 
when plaintiff Roh loses and defendant Doh wins. Then there is no 
recovered principal to fund legal fees: 
 
Doh Wins. 
 
If plaintiff Roh loses, she pays out (not necessarily to Doh): 
 
 U.S. if 
contingent 
U.S. if 
hourly 
Germany 
 
Korea 
 
Award $ 0 $ 0 € 0 ₩ 0 
Plus lawyer’s initiation fee free free [729]603 4,250,000  
Plus lawyers’ process fees free 30,000 5,614 9,300,000 
Plus lawyer’s expenses ca. 5,000 ca. 5,000 included included 
Plus court costs ca. 2,500 ca. 2,500 1,668 342,500 
Less fast payment discount none none none none 
Outcome-Roh pays out $ 7,500 $ 37,500 €7,272 ₩ 13,892,500 
NET PAY OUT % claim 10 % 50 % 12.1 % 18.5 % 
 
While defendant Doh, the putative winner, pays: 
 
  U.S. Germany Korea 
Award  $ 0 € 0 ₩  0 
Plus lawyers’ initiation fees  free [729]604 4,250,000  
Plus lawyers’ process fees  30,000 loser pays 1,150,000 
Plus lawyer’s expenses  ca. 5,000 included included 
Plus court costs  loser pays loser pays loser pays 
Less fast payment discount  none none none 
Outcome-Doh pays  $ 35,000 € 0 ₩  5,400,000 
NET PAY OUT % claim  46.67 % 0 % 7.2 % 
x 
 
When Doh “wins,” he still loses in the American system: his legal fees 
likely will be one-third—possibly even more—of the total value of his legal 
right. In the German system, on the other hand, he emerges from litigation 
unscathed. He does not do quite as well in the Korean system, where he still 
has to pay around 7% of the value of his claim. 
Plaintiff Roh, on the other hand, is a big loser in the American system, 
but only if she pays the hourly rate. She comes off relatively well if she is 
                                                 
603 Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee. 
604 Advance payment on process fee credited to process fee. 
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represented on a contingent fee basis. Then her lawyer loses; Hahn gets no 
fee. She pays around $7000. 
That the winner loses in the United States in a case like Roh v. Doh is 
explained, but only in part, by absence of a loser fee system. The absence 
does not, however, explain all of the pain that parties in American litigation 
suffer. The loser in Roh v. Doh in Germany or in Korea, pays less in process 
costs—which are for two parties—than the winner in the American case 
pays for his or her own lawyer. In the United States, in our case, process 
costs eat up half or more of the value of the right in dispute. The only winner 
is the legal system itself.  It takes the lion’s share of the right in dispute. 
Total legal fees and process costs in the United States are several times what 
they are in Germany or Korea. Combining the tables above demonstrates 
that: 
 
The Claim of the System of Civil Justice 
 
 If plaintiff Roh wins, the civil justice system takes in total: 
 
Roh Wins U.S. if 
contingent   
U.S. if 
hourly  
Germany 
 
Korea 
 
Roh wins less than claim $ 35,000 $ 40,000 € 0 ₩ 4,300,000 
Doh pays more than claim 37,500 37,500 7,272 13,892,500 
Total legal system charges 72,500 77,500 7,272 18,192,500 
Charges as % claim 96.7 % 103 %  12.1 % 24.3 % 
 
If defendant Doh wins, the civil justice system takes in total: 
 
Doh Wins U.S. if 
contingent   
U.S. if 
hourly  
Germany 
 
Korea 
 
Roh pays $ 7,500 $ 37,500 € 7,272 ₩ 13,892,500 
Doh pays  35,000 35,000 0  5,400,000 
Total legal system charges 42,500 72,500 7,272 19,292,500 
Charges as % claim 56.7% 96.7 % 12.1 % 25.7% 
x 
 
Avoiding Legal Fees 
 
In the United States parties can avoid painful legal fees if they agree, 
formally or informally, to do so. Legal fees in the United States are usually a 
product of how much time lawyers spend on cases. Lawsuit filings do not 
automatically create legal fees as they do in Germany and in Korea. There, 
once lawsuits are commenced, fee tables determine charges. There are only 
limited opportunities to avoid legal fees. This fee phenomenon makes for 
greater caution in commencing actions in Germany and Korea and for 
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greater propensity in the United States to file just to see how the other side 
will react. 
We saw already in Chapter 3 that Roh’s lawyer Hahn hoped to keep fees 
low by not bringing in additional parties, such as DohSon Honda, LL.C. or 
John Doh, Sr. Other ways that Roh and Doh could manage to minimize fees 
include: (a) agreeing to arbitration, possibly with a loser pays feature, or 
agreeing to mediation; (b) going to trial without discovery; and (c) settling 
the case, with or without discovery, but without trial. For obvious didactic 
purposes, we did not have our parties do that. 
 
Post-Filing Arbitration 
 
Post filing mediation or arbitration are possibilities in all three of our 
systems. Sometimes they are court sponsored. The Landgericht in Munich 
has developed a program to encourage court-conducted mediation. 
Mediation is a non-binding form of arbitration. The Munich program creates 
special mediation judges, who mediate cases that are transferred to them by 
the ordinary judges otherwise deciding the cases. The program uses special 
mediation judges to avoid having mediation interfere with the functioning of 
adjudication. This avoids the criticism voiced in the United States of 
“managerial judging” (see Chapter 6, above), that judicial involvement in 
mediation compromises judicial neutrality and the main proceedings’ 
adversarial nature.605
 
  
No or Limited Discovery 
 
Many American lawsuits involve little or no discovery. How much 
discovery there is in any case, however, is determined by each party 
individually. There is no formal provision for parties to agree not to conduct 
discovery. That means that even if one party conducts no discovery, the 
other may.  
The hope of originators of pretrial discovery was that parties would use 
it in moderation to focus trial on those issues that are material and that are in 
dispute. That hope is realized in some cases. For pretrial discovery to work 
well in this way, however, it should not itself create costs disproportionate to 
the amount in dispute.  
Once discovery gets going, it can be hard to limit it. If parties are 
minded to go to trial, they want full discovery beforehand. Since few cases 
ever to trial, it is a fairly sure bet that a case without discovery will be a case 
without trial. 
                                                 
605 See generally, HARRIET WEBER, THESEN ZUM ZUSAMMENSPIEL VON RECHT, JUSTIZ UND 
MEDIATION http://www.in-mediation.eu/wp-content/uploads/file/top-
secret/2008_kongress_Weber.pdf. 
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In Germany and in Korea there is likewise no opportunity for the parties 
to forgo evidence taking. In those systems, however, judges already focus on 
material issues in dispute. For lawyers to avoid taking evidence on those 
issues requires that they concede them. 
 
2. Unsettling Settlements 
 
While in all of our systems, the majority of cases filed are concluded without 
formal judgments, that does not mean that settled cases have substantially 
similar outcomes in our three systems. We have not conducted studies 
comparing settlements, but we doubt the proposition that they are similar. 
Cases settle in the shadow of likely outcomes in litigation. Different 
expected outcomes deliver different settlements.  
United States. Process costs are powerful drivers to settlement in the 
United States. Parties who do not want to sacrifice their resources to their 
lawyers, should settle immediately, before spending money on lawyers’ fees. 
Many economically-minded parties, if they fear no collateral consequences, 
if they have no emotional entanglements in a case, and if they are not subject 
to financial constraints, do just that. Many plaintiffs with strong claims hope 
that their lawsuits will bring recalcitrant defendants to their senses without 
need for proceedings beyond their formal complaints. That may have been 
Mary Roh’s hope in this case. 
Immediate settlement comes to mind in the reverse case as well: when 
plaintiff’s claim is so weak that it is unlikely to be successful. It may be 
nothing more than what is called a “nuisance claim.” Here, too, American 
parties may settle. A dollar offered early in settlement is worth five dollars 
offered later. If one can, one settles immediately, even if the case has little 
substance. While it is distasteful to pay tribute when one is in the right, it is 
practical. Unless a case is completely unfounded, thought should always be 
given to a nuisance value offer. Sometimes, one can settle a case for no 
more, or only a little more, than what it would cost to hire a lawyer to put in 
an answer. Here Doh might have offered Roh $5,000. That would give both 
plaintiff and plaintiff’s lawyer some money for little work. 
A nuisance value offer would not likely work in Roh v. Doh. Plaintiff 
has appealing facts; if she presents a reasonable witness, then chances of her 
winning were a trial to happen, are good. Doh, Jr. and his lawyer know that. 
If they are serious about settlement, their strategy might be to put in an 
answer—to demonstrate willingness to contest the claim—then make a non-
trivial settlement offer of say $10,000. An offer then of $10,000 would 
signal willingness to engage in substantive negotiations. It could get 
negotiations going to reach a settlement of $20,000, $30,000 or $40,000. 
Roh would be hard-pressed to refuse an offer of $40,000. After paying her 
lawyer and covering filing fees, on an hourly basis, she might have close to 
half her $75,000 back. Since her lawyer would have done so little work, a 
typical contingent fee agreement, might leave her with close to that much. 
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Parties do not always look at lawsuits as cold economic propositions. In 
our case we have suggested facts that might keep Doh, Jr. from seeking 
settlement. Financially, he may not be able to pay. Emotionally, he is the 
jilted lover who hates the plaintiff’s daughter. Practically, he has a friend 
prepared to litigate below cost. These considerations are independent of the 
parties’ respective claims of right and of the facts and law that undergird 
them.  
Once parties get going with discovery, settlement becomes more 
difficult. While parties will then know more, they will have spent more 
money. They will have invested in the lawsuit. 
In Roh v. Doh discovery is unlikely to focus the parties. The case is 
already straight-forward. Equally or more likely, either party might choose to 
use discovery to create expenses for the other. Either might search for the 
elusive admission of the other that the money was a gift or a loan. To that 
end they might demand documents of each other and notice depositions not 
only of each other, but of third parties as well. Either might use discovery to 
develop a innovative “theory of the case” (e.g., DohSon Honda, LL.C., is the 
appropriate defendant). Little stands in the way of a party who wants to use 
discovery to increase costs of the other. 
Germany. Settlement is less likely in Germany than in the United 
States. Once the lawsuit is underway, there are few process cost incentives to 
cut a deal. In fact, there is a special settlement fee that discourages 
settlement. So long as a party is convinced that he or she will win, there are 
few attractions to taking the case from the judge. Only if the process creates 
external costs or if both parties fear that the judge may decide against them, 
does settlement come onto the table.  
Korea. In Korea, owing to the high incidence of pro se representation, 
settlement may be less likely than in Germany. Costs are less a consideration 
and emotions more. The moderating influence of external counsel is often 
present only on one side or not at all.  
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C H A P T E R  8 
 
C O N C L U S I O N 
 
TEN POINTS FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM 
THAT PROMOTE JUSTICE THAT IS CIVILIZED  
 
 
 
Justice according to law 
 
[I]t is by comparison of our rules and practice with 
those of foreigners, that we become fully sensible of what 
is defective or excellent, and therefore of what is to be 
cherished and upheld, or to be disapproved and abolished 
in our institutions.  
 
Caleb Cushing (1820)  
Later United States Attorney General, declined 
nomination to be Chief Justice of the United States606
 
 
 
There is no country on earth, which has more to gain than 
ours by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence. ...  Let 
us not vainly imagine that we have unlocked and 
exhausted all the stores of juridical wisdom and policy. 
 
Joseph Story 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
Dane Professor of Law, Harvard Law School 
Founder of American Law (1821)607
                                                 
606 The Study of the Civil Law, 11 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. 407, 408 (1820). 
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Civil justice comes from the heart of mankind. It can fulfill expectations 
and it can disappoint them. It can justify hopes and—in the best of cases—it 
can resolve disputes for once and for all. Often it is the last place to which 
people can turn for clarity about what is right.  
Although civil justice is principally concerned with parties’ private 
interests—seen as whole—it has an important social role. That role requires 
that all people, without regard to their individual financial circumstances, 
have access to courts. Civil procedure needs laws that people can 
understand, can follow and can accept. It requires rules that are fair and just, 
and thus are suited to bringing peace among adversaries. All parties, without 
exception, must be able personally to present how matters in dispute affect 
them individually. 
Realizing the right to be heard is the central point of almost every 
lawsuit: realization of the right determines when a case can be quickly, fairly 
and justly resolved. The parties’ true concerns must not be allowed to 
disappear in the fog of courtroom battle or in a haze of legal analysis. 
Lawsuits must be structured for modern, effective dispute resolution, or else 
they will not keep pace with a rapidly changing world. Constant 
improvement is necessary lest civil procedure lose its stabilizing function 
and the trust of those that rely on it.  
 
* * * 
 
By comparing legal systems among each other, one broadens one’s 
perspective. One can consider what works elsewhere better and why. What 
do I not like there? What am I trying to achieve here and what would I need 
to do to achieve it? What would it cost in resources? While tradition is 
important, willingness to consider new approaches is essential. That is life. 
From new experiences come new insights. New knowledge challenges not 
only legislators, but litigants, lawyers and judges. 
It is a public responsibility of legal professionals to maintain minds open 
to other ways. They should not be nationalists defending one nation’s 
practices for no reason other than they are that nation’s practices. We 
compare legal systems not as international pageants to find the most 
beautiful, but to better our own legal systems. Whether this system or that 
system is more elegant, or even whether it more accurate, more fair, more 
efficient, less expensive or more accessible, are secondary to whether we can 
find in the comparison better ways for particular legal systems. 
                                                                                                        
607 Joseph Story, Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their 
Anniversary, on the 4th September 1821, 1 AM. JUR. 1, 29 (1829), reprinted in JOSEPH STORY, 
THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS: LITERARY, CRITICAL, JURIDICAL AND POLITICAL OF JOSEPH 
STORY, NOW FIRST COLLECTED 405, 434-435 (1835) and in 1 JOSEPH STORY, THE 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 235 (1852). 
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Lawyers, judges and legal academics have a special responsibility to 
mind foreign legal developments. They exercise choice for the true 
consumers of law, the public. They decide for others just what kind of legal 
system a country has. The public has limited opportunity to change law and 
legal institutions.  
In almost every other field of organized human activity, failure to mind 
foreign practices can lead to legal liability or lost market share. When a test 
for AIDS was found in France, public health personnel throughout the world 
rushed to implement it. Those who were slow to do so committed 
malpractice. When Japanese manufacturers developed “just in time” 
processes, businesses all over the planet copied the foreign techniques. 
Those who were slow to do so were punished by the market. 
Responsible lawyers, judges and legal academics should pay attention to 
foreign law just as responsible physicians consider cures developed abroad 
or successful businessmen mind foreign products and techniques. Perhaps 
the day will come in America when those who look abroad for legal 
solutions are not shunned, but are celebrated, as they are in Germany and 
Korea. That will happen only when knowledge of foreign law is not thought 
exotic, but essential to understanding America’s own legal system. 
 
*** 
 
We began this book with the observation that our three systems of civil 
justice have a common moral framework. They share the same goals and 
values for civil justice: just decisions, accurate according to law, reached 
speedily by fair and efficient process, with access for all. We noted however, 
that many Americans have lost faith that their civil justice system can ever 
achieve those goals, while most Germans and Koreans have not. The latter 
strive to achieve their goals.  
We have now seen, however, that American methods, the legal 
framework, also are not so distant from German and Korean methods as 
many Americans suppose. Our three systems share similar tasks and similar 
approaches to dealing with those tasks of civil justice. While the means to 
achieve those tasks vary, they have more in common than at variance. 
Variations are more in degree than in kind. Civilized justice is justice 
according to law. In all three systems, civil justice requires bringing law and 
facts together. In all three, law and facts are starting points; in all three 
applying law to facts to decide a case is the ending point.  
Look at the mechanics. Before a court can decide a case, the court must 
know which issues it has to decide. In all three systems the general course is 
similar. Plaintiffs commence actions with complaints, which courts may 
review—in Germany and Korea, which courts must review—for sufficiency. 
Parties, with guidance of the court—with considerably more guidance in 
Germany and Korea than in the United States—determine the issues for 
decision. Before the court decides, it should give all parties opportunity to be 
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heard on all material issues in disputes. Courts are expected to base their 
decisions on syllogistic application of law to facts. Except when juries 
decide with general verdicts, courts are to justify in writing their findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and application of law to fact. When juries decide, 
courts are to provide detailed written instructions, which juries are carefully 
to consider. In all three systems, parties may appeal to have one or more 
higher courts review the decision of first instance for the conformity of the 
decision with law and the consistency of procedures used with normal 
expectations safeguarding the right to be heard. 
Principal differences in the ways of our respective systems lie largely in 
how they share responsibilities for the tasks they undertake. The American 
system entrusts case resolution principally to the unguided cooperation of the 
parties and of the parties’ lawyers; judges keep their distance and are called 
in only at the last moment to decide matters lawyers cannot resolve. The 
German and Korean systems leave the parties in charge of definition and 
disposition of disputes, but provide judges to facilitate the process of 
resolution. German and Korean judges help parties identify material issues 
and present disputed issues for court determination. That guiding function 
does not transform German and Korean judges into the inquisitors that 
common law mythology suggests. German and Korean judges help and not 
hinder hearing of the parties. They do not act in ways inconsistent with 
American process values. What they do from the start is to guide 
proceedings toward reaching decisions according to law. 
In our comparative presentation of the American, German and Korean 
systems we looked at the different ways that each system seeks the best 
possible outcome. We saw similarities and we saw differences in execution, 
but the ways were mostly similar. Often the differences were more in 
emphasis than in substance. From the many ways we have chosen ten to 
highlight where we believe the German and Korean systems have 
advantages. They are not distant from American experiences. Many are 
already practiced in the United States. Some are conventional wisdom, some 
are aspirational, and some are controversial. None is new. Americans can 
emulate these practices without fear of introducing elements foreign to their 
legal traditions. These insights are not exotic. 
We offer these insights as ways for consideration in reform of American 
civil justice. These are insights and not blueprints. We do not believe that 
transplanting is likely or possible even were it desirable. We leave to another 
day and to other proponents specific proposals that might incorporate these 
insights in concrete proposals capable of political adoption.   
 
1) Legal rules seek justice through statutes. 
 
 Chapter 2. Thinking Like a Lawyer. 
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Civil procedure is about applying rules. A system of civil justice can be 
no better than the rules that it applies. Those rules should be just and 
democratically adopted to assure legitimacy. They should be stated 
beforehand in technically well-crafted syllogisms so that they are consistent 
with each other and may be applied by the public to themselves.  
German rules in substance are guided by a social market economy. In 
form they are authoritative statute-based syllogisms. In application they 
coordinate with other rules. Korean rules share many of these advantages, 
although they are newer and Korean legislative techniques remain under 
development. American rules often do not share these benefits. In substance 
they may reflect special interests as much as public interest. In form they 
may fail to be self-applicable. The existence of numerous law-making bodies 
that do not coordinate with each other is productive of inconsistent 
commands.  
Americans know that laws should seek justice. That statutes 
predominate and should predominate is not exotic. Already in 1886 the 
American Bar Association resolved: “The law itself should be reduced, so 
far as its substantive principles are settled, to the form of a statute.”608
  
  
Today Americans live in an age of statutes. They are learning to deal with 
statutes.  
 
2) Civil justice is accessible independent of wealth.  
 
  Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice  
 
Civil justice is not theoretical, but practical. A system of civil justice 
that is unavailable to many people is a failure. In Germany and in Korea 
access to justice is largely assured. In Germany legal aid is granted as of 
right; in Korea, pro se representation is routine. In the United States there is 
no right to civil legal aid; only a small percentage of those in need receive it. 
Pro se representation is more theoretical than routine.  
Americans are now acting on what they have long known: equal justice 
under law requires equal access to justice. Equal access is not exotic. In 
2006, and again in 2010, the American Bar Association, following the words 
of Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., the Association’s President and late Supreme 
Court justice and resolved: “Equal justice under law is not merely a caption 
on the facade of the Supreme Court building, it is perhaps the most inspiring 
ideal of our society. It is one of the ends for which our entire legal system 
exists...it is fundamental that justice should be the same, in substance and 
availability, without regard to economic status.”609
 
 
                                                 
608 REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 74 (1886).  
609 Resolution 104 (Revised), supra note 139, at 1. 
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3) Those in right are not burdened with high litigation expenses.  
 
  Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice 
 
To resolve disputes process determines rights. If process is to make 
those in the right whole, it should assess the costs of process to the losers 
found to be in the wrong (“loser pays”). To keep process fair, reimbursable 
costs must be limited and reasonable. In Germany and in Korea, losers pay 
most of the costs of proceedings. Process costs are low and are proportionate 
to amounts in dispute. Frivolous lawsuits are discouraged and uncommon. In 
the United States, winners in routine cases, i.e., those in the right, must bear 
their own costs. Process costs are high and may exceed amounts in dispute. 
Frivolous lawsuits are a significant problem.  
Americans know this logic of right. It is not exotic. That losers should 
and do pay court costs is unquestioned in the United States. Controversial is 
when losers should pay attorneys’ fees. Sometimes they do. Routinely, they 
used to in some states. As Theodore Sedgwick, the founder of the American 
law of damages wrote: “the losing party should pay all the expenses of the 
litigation; this is a rule of inherent justice.”610
  
 
4) Judges are professionals.  
 
  Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice 
 
Judges should be neutral and responsible to law and justice. Judging is 
not for amateurs. It requires specific skills. Judging should be no more left to 
those not trained for it than surgery should be left to barbers. In Germany 
and in Korea judges are selected on merit and are trained as judges. In the 
United States, on the other hand, judges are selected politically. They are not 
trained as judges before assuming office.  
Americans know about merit selection and about judicial education. 
There is nothing exotic in either. For centuries they have debated the latter 
and in recent years have promoted the former. They know that the taint of 
campaign contributions calls into question whether judges are fair, 
independent and impartial.611
 
  
5) Trusted institutions coordinate civil justice. 
 
  Chapter 3. Lawyers & Legal Systems: Access to Justice 
 
                                                 
610 THEODORE SEDGWICK, HOW SHALL THE LAWYERS BE PAID? OR SOME REMARKS UPON 
TWO ACTS RECENTLY PASSED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE COSTS OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, IN A 
LETTER TO JOHN ANTHON, ESQ. 10 (1840).  
611 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., -- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
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Civil justice is a public good just as are public health and public 
education. It is too precious a commodity to leave in private hands unguided 
by public accountability. Modern society demands of civil justice a quality 
and quantity of systemic performance unattainable without public 
responsibility. Just as public health systems should leave no patient untreated 
and public education systems should leave no child behind uneducated, civil 
justice systems should leave no gaps in law or practice that cause injustice. 
In Germany ministries of justice are responsible for the just administration of 
law. In Korea the Supreme Court is. In the United States, on the other hand, 
no public authority has responsibility for administration of civil justice. 
Government lawyers are lawyers for the government and not trustees of the 
public good. Courts and court administrators are responsible for the 
functioning of their courts but have few responsibilities or capabilities 
beyond those functions. Lawyers and their bar associations focus on their 
interests and those of their clients. They have neither authority nor resources 
to provide for the public interest in civil justice.  
Americans have long sought institutions to guide civil justice. Creation 
of the United States Department of Justice coincided with creation of the 
German Imperial Ministry of Justice in the 1870s.612 The founding of the 
American Law Institute in 1923 is sometimes attributed to a 
contemporaneous article by Justice Cardozo praising European ministries of 
justice.613 The Administrative Office of United States Courts followed in 
1939. In 2007 that bastion of the Common Law, the United Kingdom, 
established a ministry of justice.614
 
  There is nothing exotic in the idea of an 
American office for justice.   
6) Jurisdiction is determined without litigation.  
 
 Chapter 4. The Court: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law  
 
                                                 
612 Compare *** and ***. At about the same time Britain adopted the institution of the 
professional parliamentary draftsman, whose function the German ministry has. American 
jurists were quick to take note and urged comparable practices. See, e.g., Simon Stern, The 
English Methods of Legislation Compared with the American, PENN MONTHLY, May 1879, at 
336; FRANCIS WAYLAND, OPENING ADDRESS ON CERTAIN DEFECTS IN OUR METHODS OF 
MAKING LAWS BEFORE THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AT ITS ANNUAL 
MEETING, SARATOGA SPRINGS 13, 21, 27 (Sept. 5, 1881) (reported at length in N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 1881, at 5). 
613 See Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921) (citing two 
contemporary works by Roscoe Pound); ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 736-37 (1959). The 
creation of the American Law Institute is sometimes attributed to Cardozo’s call. See Kirsten 
David Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of Justice?, 32 SO. ILL. 
L.J. 173 (2007).  
614 In the twentieth century, leaders of the bar observed the benefits of European-style 
ministries of justice. In this millennium the United Kingdom has established its own Ministry of 
Justice. See BRYAN GIBSON, THE NEW MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (2nd ed., 2008). 
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Civil justice, like any public or private service, should be organized to 
facilitate its distribution. Dispute resolution requires designation of which 
court is competent to decide which disputes. Korea, as a unitary country, has 
it easy. Germany and the United States, as federal systems, have it harder. 
Germany, as part of the European Union, has it harder still. In Germany, 
statutes answer questions of jurisdiction and applicable law clearly and 
easily in routine cases. In the United States, it is otherwise. Resources and 
time are squandered in predicting and determining which American court 
should resolve purely American disputes.  
Simple determination of jurisdiction is not exotic. It is not beyond reach. 
America’s founding fathers provided the means to minimize jurisdictional 
litigation: the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1 of the 
United States Constitution. Justice Robert H. Jackson proclaimed that it is 
“the foundation of any hope we may have for a truly national system of 
justice, based on the preservation but better integration of the local 
jurisdictions we have.”615
  
  
7) Parties tell courts about their disputes.  
 
  Chapter 5. Pleading: Structuring the Matter in Controversy 
 
Courts need to be told what parties want them to decide. In Germany 
and in Korea the parties in their pleadings guide courts to material matters in 
dispute by setting out the facts that they wish the court to consider. By law in 
Germany and by practice in Korea they identify evidence to be relied upon 
and by otherwise substantiating claims made. Courts review pleadings for 
sufficiency of the case claimed at the outset of the proceedings. In the United 
States parties in their pleadings give notice of their claims but provide little 
information about the underlying matters and what about those matter is in 
dispute. They do not identify evidence and usually do little to direct courts to 
material matters in dispute. Courts review pleadings only on party request.  
Americans know that courts can not decide if they do not know what to 
decide. That is not exotic. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require only notice pleading, other American systems have required parties 
to tell about the facts. That is not exotic or threatening. The Field Code of 
1848 required that the complaint give “[a] statement of the facts constituting 
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and 
in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know 
what is intended.”616
                                                 
615 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1945). 
 It is what they propose today: “a process that begins to 
616 An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this 
State, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, § 120(2). 
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narrow and focus as soon as a legitimate claim is filed.”617 They are 
returning to the first lesson lawyers learned in the nineteenth century: “In the 
course of administering justice between litigating parties, there are two 
successive objects,—to ascertain the subject for decision, and to decide.”618
 
 
8) Judges work with parties to prepare cases for decisions 
according to law. 
 
  Chapter 6. Process: The Right to Be Heard 
 
Civil justice determines rights; civil procedure should not be contest. 
There should be no surprises. To assure that there are no surprises, civil 
process should let parties know what courts will decide. Courts should tell 
parties which elements of their claims are present, which are missing and 
which are disputed. They should give parties opportunity to be heard on all 
disputed issues. In Germany and in Korea judges have affirmative duties to 
assure that parties are heard. Judges speak with parties early in litigation. In 
the United States, where judges have no comparable duties, parties are not 
always heard on material matters. Judges remain passive. Often they never 
speak with parties. Trials are vanishing. 
For courts to cooperate with parties to frame issues has long been a hope 
of American procedure. As we saw above, the drafters of the federal rules 
had in mind cooperation in issue framing as subject for pretrial conferences 
and not scheduling of discovery. Professor Sunderland wrote that the court 
should take a hand “supplementing the proceedings and the discovery which 
the parties have obtained, by direct interrogation of counsel or parties in the 
presence of each other, with a view to eliminating issues through admissions 
or through the withdrawal of allegations or denials, or by obtaining the 
consent of the parties to the limitation or simplification of proof.”619
 
 
9) Judges oversee taking evidence. 
 
  Chapter 6. Process: The Right to Be Heard 
 
In Germany and in Korea, courts conduct cases. Judges take evidence 
when needed for decision of disputed matters material to claims of right, but 
only then. Judicial oversight assures that evidence taking is within bounds. 
In the United States, lawyers are in charge of process of pre-trial. There is 
little judicial oversight of what lawyers do with the power and under the 
                                                 
617 Kourlis et al, supra note 247, at 246. 
618HENRY STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS  1 (1824). 
619 Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 
215, 218-219 (1937). 
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authority of courts. Lawyers are guided by their interest and by client interest 
and not by justice or law.  
Judicial supervision of evidence taking was not exotic in American 
history. It was called trial. Presence of the judge was, Justice Scalia reminds 
us, what made American justice adversarial and not inquisitorial.620  Until 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 1938, judicial supervision 
of evidence taking was the rule of civil justice. The Supreme Court stated it 
succinctly: “‘the judge is always present at the time of the evidence given in 
it. … This direction and superintendence [is] an essential part of the 
trial.’”621
 
  
10) Courts base their judgments on law and explain them. 
 
  Chapter 7. Judgments, Appeals & Outcomes: Decisions According to Law  
 
Courts should decide disputes according to law. Even children want to 
know why parents decide as they do. Written justifications validate correct 
decisions. They facilitate appellate review of the accuracy of those decisions. 
In Germany and in Korea judges tell parties why they decided as they did. 
Parties know which facts judges found and why. They know which law 
governed and why judges applied it as they did. If parties find fault with how 
judges decided, the justification is the basis for review by a higher court. In 
Germany and Korea that court can supplement or determine anew the first 
court’s decision. In the United States justifications are exceptional. Rarely do 
cases go through trial. Of those that do, jurors’ verdicts have no written 
justifications.  Parties are left to guess why jurors decided as they did. They 
cannot know which facts the jurors found nor how jurors applied law to 
those facts. Appellate courts can only review the record for whether the rules 
of procedure were followed and whether the evidence produced created a 
possible basis for jurors’ decisions. 
Justifications are not exotic in American law. When courts decide cases 
after trials without jurors, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 requires that 
judges provide what amount to in law and practice justified judgments. 
 
* * * 
 
 
                                                 
620 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. at 181 n.2, quoted note 314.    
621 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 14, 16-17 (1899)(quoting respectively Lord Hale, 
History of the Common Law, chapter 12 (5th ed.) and Judge Sprague in United States v. Bags of 
Merchandise 2 Spr. 85, 88 (1863)). 
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 A P P E N DI X  
 
N O T E S  O N  L E G A L  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  U N I T Y  
 
Almost everyone takes the political history of his or her own 
country for granted. We are taught it by our parents, we learn it in 
school, and we experience it in our lives. The political history of 
other countries, we know less well, if at all. What we do know may be 
wrong or over-simplified.  
Systems of civil justice do not live outside their own times. They are 
affected by historic changes. They have their own histories independent of 
political history. Because in this book we refer to these changes, we 
reference them here through a series of tables and notes. We know that the 
civil justice systems that we describe today will be different tomorrow. 
 
 
A. United States 
 
  
 
Out of many, one 
E pluribus unum 
Great Seal of the United States (1782) 
 
United States Time Table 
 
1776 Declaration of Independence;  
Maryland Declaration of Rights 
1787-1791 United States Constitution & Bill of Rights 
1848 Field Code of Civil Procedure in New York; merger of courts 
of law and equity in New York 
1861-1865 National division, North and South: Civil War 
1872 Federal Conformity Act: disunity in civil procedure  
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; unity of civil procedure in all 
federal courts; merger of equity and law rules 
282   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
 
In the United States, political unity was achieved earlier than in 
Germany and in Korea. Thirteen American colonies of Great Britain 
declared their independence on July 4, 1776. They fought a war of 
independence until the British withdrew in 1783. Governed at first under the 
Articles of Confederation, they replaced these with the Constitution of 1789 
and the Bill of Rights of 1791 (i.e., the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution of 1789).  
Political unity came at a price: legal disunity.  The Constitution of 1789 
recognized and perpetuated a non-uniform law of slavery. To abolish that 
non-uniform law of slavery the country fought a bloody Civil War (1861-
1865). While that war led to abolition of slavery, and implicitly to rejection 
of the idea that individual states might have fundamentally different social, 
economic, or political systems, it did not lead to legal unity. 
To this day most American law is made by individual states and local 
governments. While Americans think of this as a necessary feature of 
federalism, Germans know that it is not, for in Germany’s form of 
federalism, national laws govern in most basic areas of law. In the United 
States, national laws remain exceptional; states and local laws are the rule. In 
the United States, although state and local laws are very similar, they are not 
uniform.622
Civil procedure is no different from the rest of American law: mostly it 
is state law, but state rules of civil procedure which are very similar. Most 
state procedural rules are variations on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Here we study the Federal Rules. That American rules vary from state-to-
state, remarkable as it is, is less remarkable to Germans than the existence of 
completely separate systems of state and federal courts. We discuss this 
phenomenon in Chapter 4. In Germany, with one minor exception, courts of 
first instance and courts of first appeal are state courts. Federal courts exist 
only as courts of final appeal to make sure that state courts apply federal law 
correctly.  
  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only in federal courts. Until 
1938 when the Federal Rules came into force, federal courts had separate 
federal rules to apply only for special forms of proceeding (e.g., admiralty 
and equity cases). In most cases, federal courts used state procedural rules. 
Under the so-called Conformity Act of 1872 they applied the procedural 
rules of the states in which they were located. So a federal court sitting in 
Baltimore applied Maryland rules, while a federal court sitting in nearby 
Philadelphia applied Pennsylvania rules. This meant that lawyers in one city 
                                                 
622 See James R. Maxeiner, Uniform Law and its Impact on National Laws Limits and 
Possibilities, U.S. National Report, in 2 MEMOIRS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, GENERAL AND NATIONAL REPORTS OF THE 1ST INTERMEDIATE 
CONGRESS. THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM LAW ON NATIONAL LAW: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES 
(2010). 
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could—at least in theory—count on procedural rules being the same without 
regard to whether they went to the federal or to the state court in their city. 
On the other hand, it meant that lawyers who specialized in matters before 
federal courts had to familiarize themselves with different rules when they 
went to federal court in another state. The Federal Rules of 1938 made 
practice easier for those lawyers who practiced in different cities (mostly 
lawyers for larger interests), but more difficult for lawyers who practiced in 
both state and federal courts in one city (mostly lawyers for smaller 
interests). 
The burden of legal disunity has increased over time. That increase is 
related to the growth of commerce in the nineteenth century. When the 
Constitution was adopted in 1789, coordination of laws of the several states 
was not a major issue. Long-distance travel in 1789 was rare; interstate 
commerce was minor. But within a century, all that had changed; merchants 
carried on trade in every state. Already by the 1830 and 1840s the growing 
economy demanded laws and procedures that were more rational and more 
predictable and more often uniform. With the end of slavery and of the Civil 
War, those issues acquired increased vigor and urgency.  
Throughout the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the 
twentieth century American reformers sought to build a rational legal system 
of systematic statutes that judges might apply syllogistically. They 
championed “codification”—not the mere collection of statutes—but the 
systematic integration of bodies of substantive law. They sought to write 
procedural law that would facilitate rather than undermine application of 
substantive rules to fact. Their efforts, in the case of substantive law, mostly 
failed of adoption; their reforms in procedural law were adopted (the “Field 
Code” and “code pleading”), but did not work as hoped, and led to 
subsequent reforms, which likewise did not work as well as hoped (the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and “notice pleading.”).623
 
 We now discuss 
America’s three attempts at civil procedure that fell short of the goals of the 
open courts clause. 
History of American Civil Procedure—Three Tries for Reform  
 
While the American political system has been stable since the end of the 
Civil War era in 1876, the same is not true of American civil procedure. 
Throughout its more than two hundred year history American civil procedure 
has vacillated from one extreme to another—from formality to flexibility—
in one attempt after another to create a system that might satisfy the 
promises of the open courts clause: accuracy, fairness, access to justice and 
efficiency. All attempts to fulfill those promises have fallen short of the goal. 
From the earliest days popular dissatisfaction with civil justice has been and 
                                                 
623 See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 44, at 530-534. See also Leubsdorf, supra 
note 57, at 53. 
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remains endemic. The classic critique is that of Roscoe Pound at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Bar Association in 1906, The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.624 One hundred years later 
those days look to some Americans as the good old days.625 The history of 
American civil procedure is the story of three cycles of attempted reforms all 
of which fell short of hopes.626
Each cycle brought a new approach to civil procedure. The first try was 
that of “common law pleading.” It came to the United States from England 
in the late eighteenth century; it was brought by the generation that formed 
American law and which included Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor 
James Kent. The second try was “code pleading” of the mid-nineteenth 
century. It started life as the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848, 
which was drafted by the prominent practitioner, David Dudley Field, Jr. 
(the “Field Code”). The third try was “notice pleading” of the mid-twentieth 
century. Its source was the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938, which 
were drafted by two law professors, Charles E. Clark, then Dean of Yale 
Law School, and Edson R. Sunderland of the University of Michigan.  
  
Three times the story is the same. Each cycle begins with belief that the 
new system of procedure can apply law to facts rationally: that it will 
produce decisions according to law. To be sure, there are pessimists, non-
cooperators and even opponents of the new procedure. Soon, however, hopes 
are dashed. Flaws in the conception of the new system and failures of 
individuals to work together to overcome those flaws, result in unsatisfactory 
performance. Process is encumbered by delay, expense and uncertainty. The 
now less-than-new system produces decisions not in accord with either law 
or with justice. Minor fixes are attempted, but system still fails to work well. 
As collective memory of the last cycle fades, agitation for change gains 
strength. Finally, a new reform is adopted.  
The first try in the early nineteenth century put in clear contention the 
issues of form versus flexibility and of decision according to law versus 
decisions ad hoc. It was what Professor Langbein calls a “Struggle for 
Learned Law.”627
                                                 
624 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
ABA REP. 395 (1906), which has been reprinted and commemorated many times. Pound’s 
critique is as compelling today as it was then. See James R. Maxeiner, 1992: High Time For 
American Lawyers to Learn From Europe, or Roscoe Pound’s 1906 Address Revisited, 15 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (1991). 
 Proponents of a formal system recognized that the 
complexity of modern society requires legal rules and legal procedures of 
comparable complexity. Unwritten folk law—common sense lacking legal 
625 JOHN B. OAKLEY & VIKRAM D. AMAR: AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A GUIDE TO CIVIL 
ADJUDICATION IN US COURTS 26 (2009) (“At the outset of the twenty-first century, the 
adversary system of adjudication is not as perfectly realized as it may have been a century 
before.”). 
626 See the bibliographic notes in Appendix II, below. 
627 John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
547, 566 (1993). 
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rules—is inadequate to govern the myriad of transactions among men; men 
need rational rules to guide them by stating rights and duties.  
That first try was successful insofar as reformers did establish a learned 
American law. It fell short, however, in establishing a system that routinely 
fulfilled the promises of the open courts clause. Critics charged that the 
contrary occurred. According to one judge the forms of civil procedure 
became “the fruitful mother of the rankest injustice.”628
When the system faltered, instead of replacing it, the bar first made 
excuses for it. The public expected too much of civil justice.  Better that 
people steer clear of lawsuits altogether. Professor Stephan B. Presser sees 
the idea that litigation is “something pernicious that ought to be 
discouraged” as a recurrent theme in American legal history.
  
629
The United States may now be coming to the end of the third cycle. 
What is different at the end of this cycle, however, is that many American 
lawyers now openly question the values of the open courts clause or at least 
doubt the achievability of those goals. Some wonder whether decisions can 
ever be made accurately, fairly and promptly according to law routinely. The 
authors of the College of Trial Lawyers’ Report seem to be among them for 
they would be content were American procedure to produce “reasonably 
prompt, reasonably efficient, reasonably affordable resolution.
  
630
Other American legal scholars are still more skeptical. Some question 
whether determination of rights is the goal of civil justice and whether 
accuracy should be the appropriate measure of their legal system. These 
scholars emphasize process in civil lawsuits. They maintain that process, and 
participation in it, and not legally accurate determinations of right, is the 
better measure of civil procedure. Their view is tantamount to a return to 
primitive law. 
  
Another group of scholars, who accept supremacy of determination of 
rights over process, nevertheless, are so disappointed by the performance of 
the public system of civil justice, that they see in the public system mostly an 
incentive to encourage parties to find better ways to resolve disputes 
privately, outside the system, through settlement or other extra-system 
                                                 
628 ROBERT WILLIAM WELLS, Observations on the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts of 
Justice of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER ADDRESSED 
TO THE “METROPOLITAN” (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEM. 
REV. 477, 482, 486 (1847). 
629 Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical and 
Ideological Perspective, Paper Presented to the 10th Summit on Legal Reform, at 1 (U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, October 28, 2009), available at Searle Center on Law, 
Regulation, and Economic Growth, 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/uploads/Presser_A_Tale_of_Two_Models.pdf 
(quoting the open courts clause of the  Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780. Id. at 2 n. 
4.). 
630 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 4 [emphasis in 
original]. 
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means, such as arbitration or mediation (“Alternative Dispute Resolution—
ADR”).  
 
 
“Trans-substantive” Civil Procedure  
 
For much of American history American civil procedure has suffered 
from a lack of unity not only among the states, but within courts of 
individual states and within courts of the federal system as well. There were 
separate procedures for what had once been separate courts of “law” and of 
“equity.” The former, legal rules, differed markedly from the latter, equity 
rules.631
American civil procedure scholars characterize this single form of rules 
as “trans-substantive.” They mean that for all civil lawsuits, regardless of the 
substantive law underlying the claims (“case-type”) or the size of the case 
(“case-size”), the same procedural rules should apply. Today federal 
procedure and most state procedures are “trans-substantive.”
 Uncertainties in which procedural rules applied produced much 
injustice. Merger of law and equity was a central element in the reforms that 
culminated in the 1848 New York Civil Procedure Code and in the 1938 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The reformed rules applied to all cases 
whether previously characterized as legal or as equitable. 
632
 
 These trans-
substantive rules infused equitable procedures into many matters formerly 
subject only to legal rules. 
American Civil Justice and Public Law Litigation 
 
 
 
Private actions to recover penalties for the 
government are known as qui tam actions or 
as “whistleblower” lawsuits 
 
The use of equity procedures in the trans-substantive codes permitted 
accommodation of new types of litigation and of larger cases than had been 
previously possible under older legal procedures. Scholars point to antitrust, 
civil rights, consumer protection, products liability and class actions 
                                                 
631 For example, a right to jury trial existed only in the former. 
632 Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An essay on Adjusting 
the “One Size fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U.L. REV. 377, 378 (2010). 
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generally as litigation facilitated by the liberal pleading, joinder and 
discovery rules of the trans-substantive procedure. 633
Some American civil procedure scholars suggest that this trans-
substantive nature of American civil procedure limits the value of 
international insights for American law reform. They suggest that these 
newer uses of civil procedure make American civil procedure fundamentally 
different from foreign procedures. They suggest that incorporation of 
insights drawn from foreign systems difficult and, at best, benign and at 
worst destructive.  
  
American civil procedure scholars see American courts making and 
enforcing public law norms as exceptional. They observe that American civil 
justice engages private parties to enforce and even to make public law norms 
through litigation before independent courts. For example, Professors 
Stephen N. Subrin and Margaret Y.K. Woo of Northeastern University 
School of Law, assert: 
 
 The role of civil litigation in America is somewhat 
different perhaps from its role in other countries, and it 
defines the character of our system. Rather than simply 
seeking courts to resolve private disputes (the conflict 
resolution model) Americans have relied on relatively 
open access to court and private civil litigation to be at the 
heart of a great deal of the enforcement of our public law 
(the behavior modification or social control model). With a 
mistrust of big government and intrusive states, the 
American public has (probably more than most other 
countries) relied on private litigation rather than solely on 
state-controlled litigation or state regulatory agencies to 
enforce our public values.634
 
 
Professor Paul D. Carrington observes similarly: 
 
[D]iscovery is the American alternative to the 
administrative state. We have by means of Rules 26-37, 
and by their analogues in state law, privatized a great deal 
of our law enforcement, especially in fields such as 
antitrust and trade regulation, consumer protection, 
securities regulation, civil rights, and intellectual property. 
Private litigants do in America much of what is done in 
                                                 
633 Id. at 387. 
634 STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGAET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
CONTEXT 37 (2006). 
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other industrial states by public officers working within an 
administrative bureaucracy.635
 
 
Other scholars make a similar distinction in discussing litigation as a 
means of law reform.636 They usually point to the classic example of the 
famous 1954 Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka,637 which overturned the Supreme Court’s earlier approval of racial 
segregation in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Fergusson.638 Since Brown, 
generations of students have gone to law school seeking reform through 
litigation. As amended in 1983 Federal Rule 11 approves law reform through 
litigation, when it excludes from sanctions for frivolous law suits, claims not 
based on existing law, so long as a claim is based on a “nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law.”639 Today, the American Bar Association in a 
layman’s guide to dispute resolution touts changing the law as a benefit of 
America civil procedure.640
The suggestion is that foreign civil justice systems are not relevant to 
American civil justice reform because making and enforcing public law 
through private litigation requires American-style pleading, joinder and 
discovery. Deficiencies in trans-substantive civil procedure must be accepted 
if American civil justice is to fulfill its public law functions. These functions 
are, Professor Carrington says, a part of American culture hardly subject to 
change.
  
641 Changes now, Professor Subrin says, would be “too deep an 
assault on the historic role of civil litigation in our country.”642
We do not accept these arguments. 
 They are 
believed absent in foreign systems. 
First, American scholars overstate the case for American exceptionalism. 
They state their conclusion that foreign systems do not use private litigation 
before independent courts to make and enforce public law norms as truisms 
                                                 
635 Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997). See also PAUL D. 
CARRINGTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE TO ENFORCE TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS? (March 3, 2007). See 
also Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay: Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a 
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005). 
636 See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Litigation Explosion, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LAW IN AMERICA at 189 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, ed., 2008). 
637 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
638 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The NAACP’s first major success was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).  
639 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
640 THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM 117 (2007) (“a lawsuit offers the litigants an opportunity to change 
the law, and to create legal precedents for similar cases that follow.”) 
641 Cf., Paul D. Carrington, Moths to the Light: The Dubious Attractions of American Law, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD GROßFELD ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 129, 141 (Ulrich Hübner & 
Werner Ebke, eds. 1999) (“It would require deep cultural change ....”).  
642 Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Civil Procedure: An Essay on 
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U.L. REV. 377, 397 (2010).   
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without grounding them in observations of specific legal systems. In fact, in 
Germany and in Korea, private litigants bring lawsuits before independent 
courts and play an important role in enforcing social norms such as antitrust, 
civil rights, consumer protection and product liability. American scholars may 
overlook this activity because most of it takes place before specialized courts. 
643
We noted in Chapter 3 that Germany,
   
644 and to a lesser extent, Korea, 
have specialized courts. In Germany they include constitutional courts, 
administrative courts,645 social courts,646 labor courts,647 fiscal courts and a 
patent court. Korea has a constitutional court and administrative courts.648 
Private litigants bring most of the cases before these independent courts.649 
Collectively specialized courts in Germany handle more than 900,000 cases 
a year. That is about three-quarters as many civil cases as the ordinary 
German courts handle (about 1.2 million). It is more than three times as 
many civil cases as the American federal courts (about 275,000) handle.650
                                                 
643 We note that American proponents of the public law argument err in comparing only that 
which goes by the same name. International experiences with treaties that apply to “civil and 
commercial matters” show that common countries tend to deem all that which is not criminal, 
civil, while civil law countries take a narrower view. See DAVID MCCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL MATTERS 25-27, 108-111 (2002). Comparativists avoid 
this problem using what they term “functionalism,” i.e., they look at different institutions that 
carry out the same functions despite their different names. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN 
KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 32-47 (3rd ed., Tony Weir transl., 1998); Ralf 
Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Matthias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2005). 
 
644 For a clear and detailed statement of the different courts and jurisdictions in Germany, see 
WOLFGANG HEYDE, JUSTICE AND THE LAW IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 38-75 
(1994). 
645 See generally Künnecke,  supra note 174; MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE (2nd ed., 2002); Michael Nierhaus, Administrative Law, in 
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 87 (Matthias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll, eds., 2nd ed. 2005); 
Karl-Peter Sommermann, Procedures of Administrative Courts in Germany, in 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL CONTROL BY ADMINISTRATIVE 
COURTS 55 (Speyerer Forschungsberichte No. 180, Heinrich Siedentopf et al, eds. 1998). 
646 See generally, ULRICH WENNER, FRANZ TERDENGE & KAREN KRAUß, GRUNDZÜGE DER 
SOZIALGERICHTSSBARKEIT—STRUKTUREN—KOMPETENZEN—VERFAHREN (3rd ed., 2005). 
647 See generally Manfred Weiss, Labor Law, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 87 (Matthias 
Reimann & Joachim Zekoll, eds., 2nd ed. 2005); 
648 He-Jung Lee, Administrative litigation in Korea: structures and role in judicial review, in 
LITIGATION IN KOREA 175, 176-179 (Kuk Cho, ed., 2010). Korean administrative law has been 
much influenced by German administrative law. See generally JONG HYUN SEOK, DIE 
REZEPTION DES DEUTSCHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTS IN KOREA (1991); RECHTSSCHUTZ GEGEN 
STAATLICHE HOHEITSAKTE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA: DEUTSCH-KOREANISCHES 
SYMPOSIUM (Wolf-Ru ̈diger Schenke und Jong Hyun Seok, eds., 2006). 
649 These courts are comparable to the regular courts; they are not instruments of some 
bureaucratic state. Their judges are independent; their procedures do not vary widely from those 
of the ordinary courts. The same constitutional and statutory guarantees apply to regular and 
specialized courts. See WENNER ET AL., supra note 646, at 21-22. 
650 The German totals come from Bundesamt der Justiz, Geschäftsentwicklung bei Gerichten 
und Staatsanwaltschaften 1999-2008 available at 
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In the United States almost all of these cases would count as civil matters; 
many would be deemed within the class of private enforcement of social 
norms. In Korea, one argument against introduction private attorneys general 
is that presently private parties’ cases before administrative courts 
challenging public decisions serve much the same function as direct actions 
against polluters.651 Despite the small bar, Korea has a cadre of active public 
interest lawyers.652
Moreover, in Germany and Korea, the ordinary courts themselves have an 
important role in social rights enforcement. In Germany through private 
litigation they help enforce antitrust, competition and consumer protection 
law.
  
653
If ever the United States was exceptional is using private litigants before 
independent courts to carry out public law tasks, a 2007 joint German-
Korean symposium suggests a different future; the title says practically 
proclaims it: “Utilization of Private Parties in Fulfillment of Public 
Responsibilities.”
 In law reform and law making, in Germany and in Korea, they have a 
modest role in creating private law and a traffic-conducting role in creating 
public and international law. In the case of the latter, when issues of 
constitutional implicated, the ordinary courts refer questions to constitutional 
courts. There, private parties argue the legal issues before these independent 
courts, where they are resolved and the cases returned to the ordinary courts. In 
Germany, private courts act similarly in matters of European Union law. 
654 Differences that exist are not grounds for ignoring 
foreign experiences, but for studying them for insights into all worlds.655
Were it true that foreign civil justice systems had no role in public law 
making and enforcement that still would not be ground to ignore foreign 
 
                                                                                                        
http://www.bmj.de/files/02e1e8a90216d1f618642cb195ba1eef/4524/2008%20Gerichte%20und
%20Staatsanwaltschaften%20ab%201999.pdf.  
651 Hong Sik Cho, Against the Viability of Private Enforcement: Focusing on Korean 
Environmental Law, 7 J. KOREAN L. 81, 106-107  (2007).  
652 Patricia Goode, From Dissidents to Institution Builders: The Transformation of Public 
Interest Lawyers in South Korea, 4 EAST ASIAN L. REV. 63 (2009); Kwon, Korea: Bridging the 
gap, supra note 73, at 171-172.   
653 See, e.g., JAMES R. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1986), published in German as RECHTSPOLITIK 
UND METHODEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN KARTELLRECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE 
BETRACHTUNG (1986); James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global 
Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109 (2003); JAMES R. MAXEINER & 
PETER SCHOTTHÖFER, ADVERTISING LAW IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (2nd ed., 1999). 
654 DIE EINBEZIEHUNG PRIVATER IN DIE ERFÜLLUNG ÖFFENTLICHER AUFGABEN. VORTRÄGE 
AUF DEM KOREANISCH-DEUTSCHEN SYMPOSIUM ZUM VERWALTUNGSRECHTSVERGLEICH VOM 
13. BIS 15. SEPTEMBER 2007 AM DEUTSCHEN FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHE 
VERWALTUNG SPEYER (Jong Hyun Seok & Jan Ziekow, eds., 2008). 
655 That French courts also use civil procedure to enforce public norms came strikingly home in 
the United States when the American firm Yahoo! Sought American court protection against a 
French civil decree ordering penalties for posting Nazi-related materials on Yahoo!’s internet 
sites. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l'antisemitisme (LICRA), 433 F.3d 
1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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civil justice. One should not assume that such uses are immutable in 
America or that such trans-substantive procedure will be forever present.  
Whether public law uses of civil procedure are a good thing, is 
controversial in the United States. Some Americans object that they take the 
courts out of their accustomed role as applier of law to fact. Professor 
Carrington himself makes this objection.656 Other scholars object that private 
attorneys general are not an effective way to enforce public law657 Still 
others doubt that litigation is effective in bringing about law reform and 
social change.658
Assuming that these uses of civil procedure are desirable does not require 
retention of the trans-substantive model. For three decades Professor Subrin 
himself has questioned whether one form of civil procedure should apply 
without regard to case-type or case-size. Moreover, historically seen, trans-
substantive procedure has not always been the norm for private actions before 
independent courts to enforce public law. So-called qui tam actions, many 
private actions for a public penalty or forfeiture, were not subject to either legal 
or equity rules, but to rules formerly used by courts of admiralty and of the old 
English Court of the Exchequer.
 So long as such public law use is controversial, foreign 
insights remain relevant. 
659
                                                 
656 Carrington, A New Confederacy?, supra note 57, at 938-944. 
 To this day, the federal rules include 
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture 
Actions. Should Americans chose to return to separate rules for public law 
actions, foreign experiences are particularly relevant. 
657 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); JAMES MAXEINER, 
POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(1986) (attributing difficulties in American antitrust enforcement to failure to separate 
determination of policy issues for legal issues). Today’s low level of antirust enforcement may 
be attributed to the backlash engendered by ambitious, but ineffective, private enforcement of 
antitrust law,.   
658 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008). See also W.A. BOGART, COURTS AND COUNTRY: THE LIMITS OF 
LITIGATION AND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE OF CANADA (1994) (with extensive 
references to the United States); DAVID A. SCHULTZ & STEPHEN GOTTLIEB, LEVERAGING THE 
LAW: USING THE COURTS TO EFFECT SOCIAL CHANGE (1998). 
659 See generally James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law: Banished at Last?, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977); RUFUS WAPLES, A TREATISE ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM (1882). 
The hot issue of the day then was not whether civil procedure should apply, but how much of 
criminal procedure should. The most controversial use of such procedures was to punish treason 
in the Civil War. Procedure was anything but trans-substantive. 
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B. Germany  
 
 
 
Unity and justice and freedom 
For the German fatherland! 
 German National Anthem (1841/1952)660
 
 
Germany Time Table 
 
1793-1794 Prussian codes 
1805-1814 French occupation; end of Holy Roman Empire; French 
codes imposed in many German states 
1864-1871 Wars of national unification 
1871 National unification (without Austria); legal unity  
1877 Code of Civil Procedure (CPO now ZPO)  
1933-1945 Nazi dictatorship; rule of law abolished 
1945-1955 Allied occupation 
1949-1990 National division, East and West; legal disunity 
1990 National re-unification; legal unity restored 
 
In 1789 when the American Constitution entered into force and the 
French Revolution began, Germany consisted of hundreds of independent 
principalities associated in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. 
Within those states there was a loose legal unity in both civil law and civil 
procedure under what was called “the common law” based on law of Roman 
origin. That legal unity was shaken already in 1793 and 1794 when one of 
the largest states, Prussia, adopted new and enlightened codes of civil 
procedure and of general law. 
In 1805 France invaded Germany; in 1806 the Holy Roman Empire 
ended. France imposed on those German states that it controlled its own new 
and enlightened codes, including the Civil Code of 1804 (the “Code 
Napoleon” or Code Civil) and the Code of Civil Procedure of 1806 (Code de 
                                                 
660 “Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit/Für das deutsche Vaterland!,” beginning of the third verse of  
August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Lied der Deutschen (1841).  
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Procédure Civil).661
In 1933 the National Socialist (Nazi) party gained power. Within in four 
months it established a dictatorship and abolished the rule of law.  
 Legal disunity in Germany increased. The subsequent 
defeat of Napoleon in 1814 did not lead to unity; those states on which 
Napoleon had imposed the enlightened French codes did not abandon them. 
Legal disunity continued until political unity was achieved in 1871 and even, 
at first, thereafter. But in the following twenty-five years, the German 
legislature adopted codes that achieved legal unity: first the Code of Civil 
Procedure of 1877 (Civilprozeßordnung = CPO, in modern German, 
Zivilprozessordnung = ZPO) and in 1896 the national civil code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch = BGB), which entered into force on January 1, 
1900. 
In the Second World War (1939-1945) the Soviet Union, the British 
Empire and the United States defeated Nazi Germany. Together with France, 
they occupied Germany. In 1949 two German states were created in parts of 
the territory of defeated Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (“West 
Germany”) and the so-called German Democratic Republic (“East 
Germany”). Pre-war Germany east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers (Silesia, 
East Prussia and Pomerania) was transferred to Poland or to the Soviet 
Union in perpetuity. The division continued until 1990, the year after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, when the two German states united.  
West Germany was and Germany today is a democratic, federal, rule-of-
law state; West Germany restored the legal system that existed before the 
Nazi dictatorship. East Germany was an authoritarian, centralized 
Communist state subject to control of the Soviet Union. It kept its population 
from fleeing only by building the infamous Berlin Wall. Instead of the rule 
of law, East Germany had “socialist legality” on the Soviet model. In 1989 
East Germany collapsed; in 1990 West Germany absorbed East Germany as 
five federal states in an enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. Legal unity 
was restored when West German laws were extended to former East 
Germany. 
 
The Social Market Economy 
 
While the new West German state restored the old legal system, it did 
not restore the old political and social order. West Germany adopted a more 
democratic and more social order. That social system was shaped by a group 
known as the neoliberal, Freiburg or ORDO school; it embraced a 
competitive economic system. The neoliberals considered a competitive 
economic system not only more efficient, but also more democratic. They 
emphasized the positive role of the state in maintaining an economy in which 
                                                 
661 See Hanns Prütting, International Sources of German Civil Procedure, in THE RECEPTION 
AND TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY 245, 250 (Masahisa 
Deguchi & Marcel Storme, eds., 2008). 
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the competitive system is maintained by government measures (taxes, 
currency regulation, credit policy, etc.) while at the same time subjecting the 
state fully to rule of law safeguards.  
The social market economy continues today not only as the hallmark of 
united Germany but as the core of a united Europe that largely espouses 
principles of a social market economy. The legal methods by which the 
German legal system has implemented this social market economy have 
renewed relevance. It is a political system that is—in contrast to the 
American—avowedly social. It is a system where all people have health 
insurance and few, at least compared to the United States, are incarcerated. 
 
History of German Civil Procedure—Refining a Good Choice 
 
In contrast to modern American civil procedure, German civil procedure 
has not swung wildly from one extreme to another. Today’s Code of Civil 
Procedure is the direct descendent of the Code of 1877. The procedures of 
1877 worked well. Amendments since 1877 have made process more 
flexible, more efficient and more just, but have not dramatically changed it. 
They reflect—especially since 1949 and the creation of the Federal Republic 
of Germany—a more democratic and more social state than in 1877.662
The Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 was the national consolidation and 
implementation of reforms that occurred in several German states, above all 
in Prussia and in Hannover, beginning in the eighteenth century. The Code 
of 1877 was a rejection for all of Germany of the procedure of the antiquated 
“common law.” Common law procedure had earned for German procedure 
the appellation “inquisitorial” in the Anglo-American world. German 
common law procedure was largely non-oral, non-immediate and secret. 
Oral statements had to be recorded in writing to count. Judges decided cases 
based on written records and without involvement in preparation of cases or 
in hearings. Non-immediacy was thought to safeguard impartiality, since it 
prevented parties from influencing judges improperly. Strict rules of 
evidence determined which evidence judges could consider and how they 
had to evaluate it.
  
663
 
 German civil procedure in the Code of 1877 is marked 
by opposites of common law procedure: it is oral, it is immediate, and it is 
public. It eschews formalism, such as strict rules governing evidence; instead 
it evaluates evidence “freely,” i.e., it gives evidence weight appropriate to 
circumstances.  
 
 
                                                 
662 See generally P. Oberhammer & T. Domej, [Civil Procedure in] Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria (Ca. 1800-2005), in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 103 (C.H. van Rhee, 
ed., 2005).  
663 Id. at 108-109. 
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Nazi Takeover of German Civil Justice 
 
Nazi Logo for Justice (1933-1945) 
 
More than two generations after the end of the Nazi dictatorship, 
American comparativists, when they advocate learning from German civil 
procedure, hear the retort: “Before you go on telling me any more about the 
virtues of German civil procedure, please explain why they had Hitler and 
we did not.”664
Thoughtful people wonder whether the evils of Nazi Germany should 
disqualify the German legal system from consideration as model for other 
systems. They think as follows: however fine German civil justice may be 
today, it failed to foil Nazi crimes. They surmise that the German legal 
system was integral in bringing about Nazi crimes. They fear that whatever 
thinking animated the Nazi system, must have infected German civil justice, 
both before and after the Nazi regime. The argumentation is faulty, as we 
now explain.  
 To younger people, particularly those who know Germany 
today, such views are out-of-touch with reality. The crimes of the Nazis lie 
generations back in history. Still, today and for generations to come, those 
twelve dark years will haunt study of Germany and of German institutions. 
We cannot ignore the question. 
The German legal system was not responsible for the Nazi take-over. 
While the Nazis took care to clothe their take-over in legal terms, might, not 
right, took over.665
The Nazis took over the civil justice system as thoroughly as they took 
over the government. Immediately upon Adolf Hitler’s taking power January 
30, 1933 the Nazi regime began to “coordinate” (gleichschalten) the German 
justice system just as it did all other aspects of public life. It dismissed large 
 Politics, not legality, triumphed. The system that failed 
was the political system; the Nazi party never received a majority in a free 
national election. 
                                                 
664 John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the U.S., 43 AM. J.  COMP. L. 
545, 554 (1995). 
665 See IRENE STRENGEM, MACHTÜBERNAHME 1933—ALLES AUF DEM LEGALEM WEG? (2002). 
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numbers of politically unacceptable judges, prosecutors, professors and 
apprentice jurists from their positions. It suppressed or absorbed professional 
associations and professional publications. It subordinated the states, their 
courts and their ministries to central Nazi authority. It established special 
courts to try political prisoners and special prisons (the first concentration 
camps) to hold them. It demanded loyalty oaths from those judges, 
prosecutors, lawyers and professors that remained in their positions. 
The Nazi “legal system” did not build on German legal traditions or 
grow out of it: the Nazi system rejected German legal traditions. Already in 
March 1934 Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, one of those later executed for 
the 1944 attempted overthrow of the Nazi regime, wrote in a private letter 
that the German jurisprudence that he had learned—founded on “a concept 
of abstract justice and humanity”— had less than fourteen months after the 
take-over only “historical interest;” its “legal methods, put to the test and 
strengthened over centuries,” would need decades to be pulled from the 
ruble.”666 By 1939, Karl Loewenstein, a renowned German-American law 
professor, wrote from an American refuge in the United States in his book 
Hitler’s Germany: “[i]n no other field of human activities” did the Nazis 
“more completely revolutionize” German traditions than in law.667
To speak of a Nazi “system of law” is misleading. Hitler governed 
according to the “leadership principle” (Führerprinzip) and not according to 
statute. If ever there was a government of men and not of laws, the Nazi 
regime was it. Not only did Nazis not build on past law, in the area of civil 
justice, they left no new law. Although they began preparation of a new civil 
code (styled a “People’s Code” Volksgesetzbuch),
  
668 they did not have time 
to complete it. They made no substantial changes in the Code of Civil 
Procedure; changes that took place under their rule had been programmed 
before they came to power or were temporary measures to deal with wartime 
conditions. Rather than change civil justice laws, they relied on convinced 
Nazi judges669 and on formal letters to those less convinced.670
                                                 
666 Letter of 7 March 1934, in GÜNTER BRAKELMANN, HELMUTH JAMES VON MOLTKE 1907-
1945. EINE BIOGRAPHIE 71 (2007), cited following Joachim Rückert, Die NS-Zeit und wir—am 
Beispiel Kreisauer Kreis, in KONTINUITATÄTEN UND ZÄSUREN, RECHTSWISSENSHAFTEN UND 
JUZTIZ IM „DRTTEN REICH“ UND IN DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT, 11, 17 (Eva Schumann, ed., 2008). 
 
667 HITLER’S GERMANY. THE NAZI BACKGROUND TO WAR 92 (1939). Loewenstein was one of a 
number of German refugee jurists who enriched American law. See DER EINFLUß DEUTSCHER 
EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND (Marcus 
Lutter, Ernst C. Stiefel & Michael H. Hoeflich, eds., 1993) (with numerous contributions in 
English, including, John H. Langbein, The Influence of the German Emigrés on American Law: 
The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, at 321).    
668 JUSTUS WILHELM HEDEMANN, HEINRICH LEHMANN & WOLFGANG SIEBEERT, VOLKS-
GESETZBUCH: GRUNDREGELM UND ERLÄUTERUNGEN (1942).  
669 See, e.g., CURT ROTHENBERGER, DER DEUTSCHE RICHTER (1943). 
670 RICHTERBRIEFE: DOKUMENTE ZUR BEEINFLUSSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSPRECHUNG 
1942-1944 (Heinz Boberach, ed., 1975). 
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For the Nazi regime, the civil justice system was largely irrelevant.671 
The regime did not trust even the eviscerated rump of the former system that 
remained.672 To implement its terror, it largely looked elsewhere for more 
trustworthy servants, to the police, to the army, and above all, to its own 
forces, the secret state-police (Gestapo) and the S.S. It carried out its most 
heinous crimes in extermination camps distant outside Germany against 
people it had first rendered stateless.673
Still, there was no shortage of academics—many newly appointed—
willing to clothe the new regime with “legal theory” and able to fill the new 
legal journals with “a colorful mix of irrational fantasies, self-debasing 
declarations of submission, and traditional dogmatic jurisprudence with a 
ready (positivist) acceptance of the new order.”
 
674
When the Allies occupied Germany they immediately repealed many 
Nazi laws. Above all they put out of force public laws: criminal law and 
racial laws. They had no need to change substantially the Code of Civil 
Procedure or most other laws addressing civil justice.  
 Their work testifies to the 
irrelevance of the legal system in those terrible times.  
Since the capitulation of the Nazi regime in 1945 Germans have sought 
to make up for the crimes of the German state (Wiedergutmachung) and to 
come to grips with the nation’s Nazi past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). 
With respect to the latter attempt to understand the past, Germans asked the 
questions that Americans wonder about today: did German legal methods 
contribute to the Nazi takeover? 
                                                 
671 Professor Vivian Curran points out that the Nazi and Vichy regimes nonetheless “maintained 
a mimicry of law, such that Fascist terror was visited upon people in the name of law, pursuant 
to apparently legal mechanisms, channels and structures, and not in an overt shunning or 
repudiation of law.” Vivian Curran, Politicizing the Crime against Humanity: The French 
Example,  78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 688 (2003). 
672 Even while in power, some areas of civil justice remained “virtually untouched.” 
“[A]dherence to the rules could certainly be demanded and implemented, violations of the law 
could be reprimanded, and even a certain measure of legal protection could be preserved.” 
MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA, STUDIES ON LEGAL HISTORY IN NAZI 
GERMANY, 98 (Thomas Dunlap, transl., 1998)(addressing specifically administrative and 
commercial law). 
673 While the justice system was not central in the most abominable crimes, it was complicit in 
others, including in murder of its own members and their families. See, e.g., Ray Brandon, 
„Politische Einstellung: Jude“, Wolfgang Johannes Leppmann, OSTEUROPA, Dec. 2005, 87. 
Wolfgang Leppmann was a legal scholar at the Institut für Ostrecht in Berlin. His father, Dr. 
Friedrich Leppmann, had been psychiatrist for the Moabit investigative prison. His father and 
his uncle, Arthur Leppmann, were leading penologists before the First World War. The regular 
justice system arrested young Wolfgang Leppmann and imprisoned him first, apparently, in the 
very prison where his father had worked before fleeing the country. The justice system charged 
and convicted him of a Nazi-racial crime. It placed him in an ordinary prison. Subsequently the 
prison’s warden learned Leppman was a “full-Jew” and not a “half-Jew” and turned him over to 
the Gestapo, which deported him to Auschwitz in occupied Poland and murdered him there. Id. 
at 97. 
674 STOLLEIS, supra note 672, at 97, 98-99. See also INGO MÜLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE 
COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (Deborah Lucas Schneider, transl. 1991); BERND RÜTHERS, 
ENTARTETES RECHT. RECHTSLEHREN UND KRONJURISTEN IM DRITTEN REICH (1989). 
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In the immediate post-war years the German legal philosopher, Gustav 
Radbruch, asked whether German legal theory prevailing before 1933 (i.e., 
positivism and giving first attention to statutory law) had facilitated the Nazi 
takeover of the legal system.675 While Radbruch had not been compromised, 
those who had been were quick to assert that their acts were justified by 
positivist theory of following Nazi laws. The fault lay with the Nazi 
lawgivers and not with the compromised judges.676 Today, the thesis that 
German positivism led to Nazism is rejected. Fault is found not with the 
legal methodology, but with the ideological beliefs of the jurists who 
remained in office.677
 We do not believe there is reasonable ground not to find insights in German 
law. 
 
                                                 
675 Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht [“Legal Injustice and 
Statute-Superseding Justice,” author’s translation], 1946 SJZ [SÜDDEUTSCHE 
JURISTENZEITUNG] 105, reprinted in 3 GUSTAV RADBRUCH, GESAMTAUSGABE 81 (Arthur 
Kaufmann, ed., 1993), translated in  Gustav Radbruch and the “Positivist Theses,“ in 13 LAW 
AND PHILOSOPHY 313 (1994). See Stanley Paulsen, Radbruch on Unjust Laws: Competing 
Earlier and Later Views, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 489 (1995). 
676 Muller, supra note 674, at 219-231. 
677 Matthias Mahlmann, Judicial Methodology and Fascist and Nazi Law, in DARKER LEGACIES 
OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND 
ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 229-234 (Christian Joeges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, eds., 2003), citing 
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Formalism and Anti-Formalism in French and German Judicial 
Methodology, in THE DARKER LEGACIES, at 205, 221-224. See also MICHAEL STOLLEIS, 
RELUCTANCE TO GLANCE IN THE MIRROW: THE CHANGING FACE OF GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE 
AFTER 1933 AND POST-1945 (2002), reprinted in THE DARKER LEGACIES at 1. 
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C. Korea 
 
 
 
Taegeuk (태극) 
Symbolic depiction of Yin and Yang  
used on Korean National Flag (1882) 
 
Korea Time Table 
 
Before 1876 Kingdom of Jos ŏn (“Land of Morning Calm”) 
1876 Opening of Korea to Japan and the West 
1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War over Korea 
1905-1945 Japanese protectorate, then occupation 
1912 Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, based on German Code of 
Civil Procedure 
1945-1948 Allied occupation 
1948- present National division, North and South, legal disunity 
1950-1953 Civil War (Korean War) 
1960 Civil Procedure Act, based on Japanese Code of Civil 
Procedure 
1987 Constitutional revolution 
2002 Korean Civil Procedure Act Amendment 
2008 Korean Civil Procedure Act Amendment Following the 
Revisions of 2005, 2006, and 2007 
 
For the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century Korea, known 
as the Kingdom of Josŏn (Chosŏn), was closed to the Western world. In 
1876 Japan forced the opening of Korea, which ushered in a thirty-year 
period of western influence on Korean law. Until then, Korean law had been 
based on traditional Korean thought and largely influenced by Confucianism 
from China. For a time among western legal systems, the influence of 
American law was strongest, but incompatibility with Korean social 
conditions led to Korean preference for Continental law, first for French law 
and then for German law. Korea’s first modern court organization act was 
based on the German Court Organization Act [Gerichtsverfassungs] of 1877.  
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At the turn of the twentieth century, Russia and Japan competed 
for hegemony over Korea. In 1905, Japan, following victory in war 
against Russia, asserted control. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea.  
Japanese rule of Korea was harsh and brutal; it was a colonial 
occupation that suppressed Koreans and their culture. It imposed 
Japanese law on Korea. It brought law into disrespect, since law was a 
tool of the occupiers. To this day the occupation burdens relations 
between Korea and Japan. 
In 1945 the United States and the British Empire defeated Japan 
and ended the Second World War. The United States occupied Korea 
south of the 38th parallel of latitude and the Soviet Union, which 
entered the war against Japan only in the last days of the war, 
occupied Korea to the north. The United States military government 
sought to “de-Japanize Korean law by replacing Japanese influences 
with American law, [but] without much success.”678
In 1948 separate states were created in the two occupation areas. 
In 1950 the northern state, occupied by the Soviet Union, invaded the 
southern state, occupied by the United States. War continued until 
1953, when an armistice was reached. The two states remain 
antagonistic. The northern state, the so-called People’s Democratic 
Republic of Korea, is Communist and perhaps the world’s last 
remaining totalitarian state. We give it no attention in this book.  
  
Despite superficial appearance that the two Korean states are an 
Asian analogue to the two German states, that assumption is 
misleading. Not until October 1987—just two years before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in November 1989—could one correctly draw such 
parallels. Unlike West Germany, until 1987 South Korea was not a 
democratic rule-of-law state. One party and one man rule prevailed. 
That came to end in 1987 with a peaceful, constitutional revolution. 
In 1987, for the first time in Korea’s history, a Korean constitution 
was made through democratic procedures. Since then Koreans have 
has successfully worked to make the constitutional revolution a 
reality.679
 
  
Modern and Traditional Korean Law  
 
Korea’s culture is not European. Korean legal scholars have considered 
whether they might recreate a uniquely Korean law inspired by traditional, 
                                                 
678 Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 SO. ILL. 
U.L.J. 71, 72 (1997). 
679 See TOM GINSBURG, THE POLITICS OF LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA, IN LEGAL 
REFORM IN KOREA 1 (Tom Ginsburg, ed., 2004); Chang-rok Kim, Where is the 
Korean Legal System Going?, in LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: ASIAN ALTERNATIVES 
11 (Morigiwa Yastutomo, ed., 1998); DAE-KHU YOON, LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN 
KOREA: DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1987 (2010). 
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Confucian law. The challenge that they face is that traditional Korean law 
and practices existed in a pre-industrial era. Korea has changed dramatically 
through industrialization and political modernization. It is one of the twenty 
largest economies in the world. Coincident with that growth is a tremendous 
upsurge in litigation that bespeaks preferences for dispute resolution 
according to law over more informal methods drawn from the Confucian 
heritage.680 Korean scholars see little future in a return to traditional Korean 
law. They see adoption of such a system as having worse 
consequences than adoption and development of a foreign system. 
They recommend development of the existing system with an eye to 
contemporary needs.681
 
 They are sufficiently satisfied with the job 
that they are doing in adapting those models foreign to Korea to see a 
role for presenting Korean law as a model for other legal systems. For 
example, each year the Korean Supreme Court provides training 
programs in English and other language to more than a hundred 
foreign judges to introduce them to the law and judicial system of 
Korea. 
 
 
 
Civil Procedure—Realizing the 1987 Rule of Law Revolution  
 
Korea did not have an established system of civil procedure of its 
own until 1960. Korea’s independence from China was not recognized 
until 1895 and was followed within ten years by Japanese domination 
that lasted until 1945.  
                                                 
680 See Ahn, Influence, supra note 678, at 84; Kwon, Litigating in Korea, supra note 236, 7 J. 
KOREAN L. at 109, reprint at 1; Wan-Ho Lee, Kurzer Abriß über koreanisches Recht in 
Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD GROßFELD ZUM 65. 
GEBURTSTAG 687 (Ulrich Hübner & Werner F. Ebke, eds. 1999) (summarizing the results of a 
survey published in Korean in 1996 noting changes in attitude between 1965 and 1993). 
681 Moon-Hyuck Ho, Korea und das deutsche Zivilprozeßrecht, in DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEß-
RECHT UND SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN 448, 465-466 (Walther J. 
Habscheid, ed. 1991). 
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The origin of contemporary Korean civil procedure is an indirect 
transplant of German law. In 1912, two years after annexation, Japan 
imposed its Code of Civil Procedure of 1890 on Korea. In system and 
language the Japanese code of 1890 was essentially the German Code 
of Civil Procedure of 1877 and shared its virtues. American 
occupation authorities judged the German-based, Japanese-imposed, 
Korean judicial system positively: “the structure of the judiciary was 
a serious, well-regulated affair, and was administered by competent, 
excellently trained personnel.” 
After liberation, the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, as 
amended in Japan prior to 1945, continued to apply in Korea. Only in 
1960 did Korea adopt its own law, the Civil Procedure Act (referred 
to here as the “KCPA”). Even it, however, is in material content a 
translation of the Japanese code and therefore a descendant of the 
German. Not until the constitutional revolution of 1987 did Korea 
turn in earnest to civil procedure. 
 
Foreign Influences on Contemporary Korean Civil Procedure 
 
Since 1945 three modern foreign legal systems have vied for 
attention in Korea: the Japanese, the American, and the German. The 
Japanese and the American systems made their marks through historic 
occupation and contemporary economic importance; the German 
system has competed through the strength of its ideas and through its 
affinity to the Japanese system without the historical baggage of the 
Japanese occupation.  
Considering that much of Korean law originates in Japanese law, 
the influence of contemporary Japanese law in Korea is modest. 
History and language explain this limited influence. More than two 
generations after the hated occupation ended, looking to Japan for 
legal inspiration, remains sensitive and even disconcerting. Learning 
Japanese, when already one must learn English, is an additional 
burden. Korean and Japanese jurists are as likely to converse in 
English as in Korean or Japanese.  
The influence of the United States on Korea has been and is 
substantial. Koreans say that the U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1948 
“Americanized” Korea.682
The influence of American law has not been as great as American 
influence in general, but it has been pervasive in some areas. Korean 
constitutions imitate the American. Korean courts import American 
constitutional concepts. Korean constitutional law textbooks include U.S. 
  
                                                 
682 Chongko Choi, South and North Korean Law: Comparison and Unification, in 
RECHTSREFORM IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA IM VERGLEICH, 273, 278-279 (Thomas 
Würtenberger, ed., 2006);  
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Supreme Court decisions; Korean scholars write many articles on the U.S. 
Supreme Court and translate others.683
The influence of American law on Korea is intensified by the 
economic might and global cultural dominance of the United States. It 
is magnified by dominance of English in global commerce. English is 
first foreign language for most Korean students. Where the older 
generation might and did study in many countries, the younger 
generation is likely to go to an English-speaking country, and 
especially to the United States.
  
684 Korean bar examiners recognized 
the dominance of English when they made knowledge of English 
mandatory for bar admission and dropped as acceptable alternatives 
knowledge of any other language. The Korean Supreme Court puts 
knowledge of English first in communication between Korean judges 
and the world.685
 
  
Rejection of American and Renewal of German Influence?   
 
In the late twentieth century Korea flirted with American models 
in civil procedure. Attempts to introduce Korean variations of 
American cross-examination and class actions were unsuccessful. 686 
This should not be surprising: some members of the American military 
government in Seoul in the immediate post-war years recognized that 
German law was more compatible with the Korean system than was the 
American.687
For all the cultural influence of the United States in Korea, 
Korean civil procedure owes little to American law. After looking 
closely at American procedure, Korean reformers turned back to 
familiar concepts of German procedure. Notwithstanding dominance 
of the English language, the influence of German civil procedure on 
Korean law remains dominant.
   
688
                                                 
683 Ahn, Influence, supra note 678, at 73, 79. 
 Knowledge of German law is 
common among jurists. For example, eleven of the thirteen members 
of the Special Committee for the Civil Code Amendment formed in 
684 See Sang-Hyun Song, Korean Students in U.S. Law Schools and Foreign Students 
at Seoul National University Law School, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 467 (2000). 
685 See, e.g. Byung-dae Park, Keynote Speech, The First Judicial Symposium in 
English, 1 J. KOREAN JUDICATURE 726 (Supreme Court of Korea, 2008). 
686 Moon-Hyuck Ho, The Reception and Transmission of Civil Procedure Law Experience in 
Korea and Important Points to be Considered, in THE RECEPTION AND TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY, LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL EDUCATIONAL 
ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN PROCEDURAL LAW (Masahisa Deguchi & Marcel 
Storme, eds. 2008). 
687 See Chongko Choi, Western Jurists on Korean Law: A Historical Survey, 2 J. KOREAN L. 
167, 182-184 (2002),   
688 See Gyooho Lee, Is Comparative Law and Economics Viable as a Comparative Approach to 
Korean Civil Procedure?, 5 KOREAN J. L. & ECON. 85, 86-87, 118 (2008).  
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1999 studied law in Germany; only three had studied in the United 
States. Of the eleven who studied in Germany, five had taken doctoral 
degrees there, that is, Dr. jur. law degrees, the equivalent of Ph. D.s 
in law. To put that number into American perspective, perhaps ten 
American-born law professors have done that. 
Korean constitutional law demonstrates the strength of German 
procedural law and legal methods. When Korea embraced American 
constitutional principles in 1987, it adopted forms of constitutional 
adjudication that are closer to German forms than they are to American one. 
In particular, Korea introduced a separate constitutional court.689
In the major revision of 2002 to the Korean Civil Procedure Act, Korea 
returned to the German system for ideas. The Korean reforms of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century reform are reminiscent of earlier German 
reforms in 1924 and 1976 in their emphasis, respectively, on oral hearings 
and on concentrating process.
  
690
Thus today Korea has essentially the German code of civil 
procedure and is updating it to the contemporary version. While 
Korea does not have German practice in every respect, this has little 
to do with Korean national legal culture resisting a foreign culture, 
and everything to do with national institutions that have different 
capabilities (e.g., fewer lawyers and judges than in Germany) and 
with those institutions being slow to follow German reforms.  
  
 
  
                                                 
689 Ahn, Influence, supra note 678, 77, 86. See also Woo-young Rhee, Democratic Legitimacy 
of law and the constitutional adjudication in the Republic of Korea, in LITIGATION IN KOREA 
135 (Kuk Cho, ed., 2010). 
690 See Moon-Hyuck Ho, Zur Reform des koreanischen Zivilprozessrechts im Jahr 2002, in 
RECHTSREFORM IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA IM VERGLEICH, 87 (Thomas Würtenberger, ed., 
2006); Kim, Oral Proceedings, supra note 290, 7 J. KOREAN L at 53, rerprint at 32. 
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B I B L I O G R A P H I C  N O T E S 
 
 
 
 
A. Introductions to Legal and Civil Justice Systems 
B. Critiques of American Civil Justice 
 
A. Introductions to Legal and Civil Justice Systems 
 
We identify here mostly book-length general introductions to our legal 
systems in general and to our civil justice systems in particular. 
 
Introductions to the American Legal System 
 
There are several English-language works written as introductions to the 
American legal system for foreign readers or for American non-lawyer 
readers. They have the benefit that they address the whole system as such, 
while also giving a chapter or more over to civil justice. Recent ones include: 
ALEXANDER DÖRRBECKER, INTRODUCTION TO THE US-AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM FOR GERMAN-SPEAKING LAWYERS AND LAW STUDENTS (2 vols., 2nd 
ed, 2005); JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2000); FUNDAMENTALS OF 
AMERICAN LAW (Alan B. Morrison, ed. 1996); INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES (David S. Clark and Tuğrul Ansay, eds., 2nd ed. 
2002); ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & PETER L. MURRAY, LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2nd ed. 2007). There are similar German-language works. More 
recent ones include: DIETER BLUMENWITZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS ANGLO-
AMERIKANISCHE RECHT: RECHTSQUELLENLEHRE, METHODE DER 
RECHTSFINDUNG, ARBEITEN MIT PRAKTISCHEN RECHTSFÄLLEN (7th ed. 
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2003); PETER HAY, U.S.-AMERIKANISCHES RECHT: EIN STUDIENBUCH (4th 
ed. 2005). Books in Korean include [to be added]. 
 
Introductions to American Civil Justice 
 
A recent English language introduction to American civil procedure for 
foreign readers is JOHN B. OAKLEY & VIKRAM D. AMAR, AMERICAN CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: A GUIDE TO CIVIL ADJUDICATION IN US COURTS (2009). A 
reasonably recent work is GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, 
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION (1993). Of the shorter 
introductions for American law students, one which commends itself for 
readers of this book because its authors place the contemporary American 
system in historical and comparative context is STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & 
MARGARET Y.K. WOO: LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT (2006).  
There are several German language introductions to American civil 
procedure. Relatively recent books include: URIKE BÖHM, AMERIKANISCHES 
ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (2005); PETER HEIDENBERGER, DEUTSCHE PARTEIEN 
VOR AMERIKANISCHEN GERICHTEN (1988); DIETER G. LANGE & STEPHEN F. 
BLACK, DER ZIVILPROZEß IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN: EIN PRAKTISCHER 
LEITFADEN FÜR DEUTSCHE UNTERNEHMEN (1986) (also appeared in English 
privately printed by the authors’ law firm under the title CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GERMAN COMPANIES, 1985); 
ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, PROZESSFÜHRUNG UND –RISIKEN IM DEUTSCH-
AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSVERKEHR (2004); HAIMO SCHACK, 
AMERIKANISCHES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (3rd ed. 2002); WILLIAM 
SCHURTMAN & OTTO L. WALTER, DER AMERIKANISCHE ZIVILPROZEß (1978). 
Of these works, that by Schack is the most academic, while that by Schütze 
is the most provocative. Professor Maxeiner has published an article length 
introduction: James R. Maxeiner, Die Gefahr der Übertragung deutschen 
Rechtsdenkens auf das U.S.-amerikanische Zivilprozeßrechts, RECHT DER 
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 1990, 440. Books in Korean include 
[to be added]. 
 
Introductions to the German Legal System  
 
Since the accession of the United Kingdom to what is now the European 
Union, a number of English language introductions to German law have 
appeared. None, unfortunately, are by Americans. These include: HOWARD 
D. FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LEGAL LANGUAGE (2nd ed. 
1999); NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 
(3rd ed. 2002); INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW (Joachim Zekoll and 
Matthias Reimann, eds., 2nd ed. 2005); GERHARD ROBBERS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW (1998) (this book is also available in 
German). The book edited by Zekoll and Reimann includes an excellent 
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introductory chapter by Reinhard Zimmermann, director of the Max Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Private Law in Hamburg, titled 
Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture. Books in Korean include 
[to be added]. 
 
Introductions to German Civil Justice 
 
English language readers are fortunate to have a comprehensive English 
language introduction to German civil procedure. It is a product of 
collaboration between American and a German experts in civil procedure. 
PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004). Only a 
few years before a shorter work by two German scholars appeared in 
English: HARALD KOCH & FRANK DIEDRICH, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
GERMANY (1998). It is somewhat dated by reforms in 2002. The Zekoll and 
Reimann book just mentioned includes a fine one chapter, fully up-to-date 
introduction by Astrid Stadler and Wolfgang Hau titled The Law of Civil 
Procedure. Several out-dated older works deserve mention for the 
comparative insights they bring. The second volume of E.J. COHN, A 
MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW (2nd ed. 1968) has an excellent chapter on 
German civil justice. Three excellent older articles are: Benjamin Kaplan, 
Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil 
Procedure, Parts I and II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958, 1959), and 
Benjamin J. Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the Comparison of 
Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 409 (1960). Books in Korean include [to be 
added]. 
 
Introductions to the Korean Legal System 
 
There is one such work in German: EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS KOREANISCHE 
RECHT (Korea Legislation Research Institute, 2010). Its coverage of civil 
justice is brief. There is, as yet, no general introduction to the Korean legal 
system in English. The closest that there is, is a guide for foreign 
businessmen. INVESTMENT IN KOREA: GUIDE TO KOREAN LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS (Office of International Legal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, 
1999). 
 
Introductions to Korean Civil Justice 
 
There is no introductory book devoted to Korean civil justice, but the 
book LITIGATION IN KOREA (Kuk Cho, ed., 2010) includes two excellent 
articles on the topic, both originally published in the Journal of Korean Law, 
as well as articles on related matters of criminal and constitutional litigation. 
The two articles and their original publications are: Hyun Seok Kim, Why do 
We Pursue “Oral Proceedings” in Our Legal System?, 7 J. KOREAN L. 51 
(2007); Youngjoon Kwon, Litigating in Korea: A General Overview of the 
308   Civilizing Civil Justice 2010-11-17 
Korean Civil Procedure, 7 J. KOREAN L. 109 (2007). Professor Lee’s book, 
now not entirely up-to-date, helps fill in gaps. GYOOHO LEE, IN SEARCH OF 
THE OPTIMAL TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM: REFLECTIONS ON KOREA’S CIVIL 
PROCEDURE THROUGH INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (J.S.D. 
dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis, 1998), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656205. The guide for businessmen mentioned in 
the previous section, includes a 23 page chapter on dispute settlement. In 
recent years Korean scholars have published many relevant articles in the 
English or German languages. Home to many of these articles is the Journal 
of Korean Law, which is available through Hein Online. We have referenced 
some of these in the text. Finally, there is a large conference volume 
published by the Supreme Court of Korea which has much material in 
English of interest. Also to be noted are two books by Chongko Choi: LAW 
AND JUSTICE IN KOREA, NORTH AND SOUTH (2005) and LAWYERS IN KOREA 
(2008). 
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B. Critiques of American Civil Justice 
 
691
 
 
The Benefit of Going to Law 
 
TWO Beggars travelling along,  
One blind, the other lame,  
Pick’d up an Oyster on the Way,  
To which they both laid claim :  
The Matter rose so high, that they  
Resolv’d to go to Law,  
As often richer Fools have done,  
Who quarrel for a Straw.  
A Lawyer took it strait in hand,  
Who knew his Business was  
To mind nor one nor t’other side,  
But make the best o’ th’ Cause,  
As always in the Law ‘s the Case:  
So he his Judgment gave,  
And Lawyer-like he thus resolv’d  
What each of them should have ;  
Blind Plaintif, lame Defendant, share  
The Friendly Laws impartial Care.  
A Shell for him, a Shell for thee.  
The Middle is the Lawyer’s Fee.  
 
Benjamin Franklin, in  
Poor Richard, 1733. An Almanack. 
 
It is a commonplace to say that the American system of civil justice fails 
to meet public expectations. Many have said that before us. We list many of 
                                                 
691 Illustration by John Tenniel, from LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (AND 
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 76 (1899 ed., 1st ed. 1871). The illustration, of course, was not 
written for the verse.  
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them here in annual chronological order. This list is meant to be an 
extensive, but not an exhaustive list of separate publications mostly calling 
for civil justice reform. With a few deliberate exceptions, it does not list 
publications on criminal justice, publications limited to jury issues, or 
articles. Its listing of bar association reports is only representative; it but 
scratches the surface of reports issued 
 
1789 to 1848 (From the Constitution to the Field Code) 
 
[1799] Of the Defects of the Judiciary, WILLIAM GRIFFITH [attrib.], EUMENES: BEING A 
COLLECTION OF PAPERS, WRITTEN FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXHIBITING SOME OF THE MORE 
PROMINENT ERRORS AND OMISSIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW-JERSEY Nos. XXIX et 
seq. (1799).  
[1802] A NEW ARRANGEMENT OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE, OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND: 
PROPOSED (1802). 
[1803] THOMAS BARTON [attrib.] OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRIAL BY JURY: WITH 
MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS CONCERNING LEGISLATION & JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE 
PROFESSOR OF THE LAW; ... BY AN AMERICAN (1803). 
[1805] JESSE HIGGINS [attrib.], SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES, OR THE REFORMATION OF 
LAWSUITS; AND JUSTICE MADE CHEAP, SPEEDY, AND BROUGHT HOME TO EVERY MAN’S DOOR  
(2nd ed., 1805).  
Did the conventions, by which these principles were established, mean nothing by all 
these fine words? …. For surely no man will pretend that this declaration [of the 
open courts’ clause] has been realized. Id. at 23. 
[1807] WILLIAM DUANE, EXPERIENCE THE TEST OF GOVERNMENT: IN EIGHTEEN ESSAYS 
(1807). 
[1809] REFLECTIONS UPON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA BY A CITIZEN 
(1809). 
[1819] FERRIS PELL, A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL POLICE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW-YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1807, TO THE YEAR 1819 (1819). 
[1822] HENRY DWIGHT SEDGWICK, THE ENGLISH PRACTICE: A STATEMENT, SHOWING SOME 
OF THE EVILS AND ABSURDITIES OF THE PRACTICE OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, AS 
ADOPTED IN SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK … BY A LOVER OF IMPROVEMENT (New York, 1822). 
[1826, 1839] James Kirke Paulding, The Perfection of Reason, in JAMES KIRKE PAULDING, THE 
MERRY TALES OF THE THREE WISE MEN OF GOTHAM (1st ed. 1826, 2nd ed. 1839). 
[1827] HUGH D. EVANS, AN ESSAY ON PLEADING WITH A VIEW TO AN IMPROVED SYSTEM 
(1827). 
[1836] DAVID HENSHAW, AN ADDRESS, DELIVERED BEFORE AN ASSEMBLY OF CITIZENS FROM 
ALL PARTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AT FANEUIL HALL, BOSTON, JULY 4, 1836 (1836). 
[1838] THEODORE SEDGWICK, JR., A STATEMENT OF FACTS IN RELATION TO THE DELAYS AND 
ARREARS OF BUSINESS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, WITH SOME 
SUGGESTIONS FOR A CHANGE IN ITS ORGANIZATION (1838) 
[1839] GUILIAN C. VERPLANCK, SPEECH WHEN IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE IN THE SENATE 
OF NEW-YORK, ON THE SEVERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW 
AND THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM (Albany NY, 1839) 
[1840 TO 1848] David Dudley Field, Jr., various shorter pieces reprinted in SPEECHES, 
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (3 vols., 1884 to 1890). 
[1847] Robert William Wells, Observations on the Pleadings and Practice of the Courts of 
Justice of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER ADDRESSED 
TO THE “METROPOLITAN” (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEM. 
REV. 477, 482, 486 (1847). 
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[1847] Memorial of the Members of the Bar in the City of New-York, Relative to Legal Reform 
1, Doc. No. 48, 2 N.Y. ASSEMBLY DOC. (Feb. 9, 1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS 
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 261 (1884). 
[1848] FIRST REPORT OF THE PRACTICE COMMISSION (Feb. 29, 1848), extensively excerpted in 1 
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 262, 273 
(A.P. Sprague ed., 1884). 
[1848, 1850] WILLIAM RICHARDSON DICKERSON, THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS (pseud.) EXPOSING 
TO THE PUBLIC, FOR THEIR BENEFIT, THE MAL-PRACTICES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
LAW, .... (1st ed. 1848, 2nd ed. 1850). 
 
1849 to 1905 (From the Field Code to Pound’s Address) 
 
[1851, 1879 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS [BENJAMIN R. CURTIS, N.J. LORD & R.A. 
CHAPMAN, COMMISSIONERS) APPOINTED TO REVISE AND REFORM THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), commentary portion reprinted in 2 A 
MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 149-50 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879)  
“[We are] working under what can hardly be called a system of procedure, and 
which every well-informed lawyer condemns ….” Id, at 2. 
[1855, 1871 et al.]SAMUEL TYLER, REPORT ON PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY OF THE 
COMMISSIONERS, APPOINTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, TO REVISE, 
SIMPLIFY AND ABRIDGE THE RULES OF PRACTICE, PLEADINGS, FORMS OF CONVEYANCING, AND 
PROCEEDING OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE (1855) (critical of new code pleading), largely 
reprinted as an introduction to Samuel Tyler, HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1871 TO 1919). 
[1858] McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 524 (1858). 
[1876] G.T. Bispham, Law in America, 1776-1876, 122 N. AM. REV. 154, 185-86 (1876). 
[1879] ARPHAXED LOOMIS, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK SYSTEM OF LAW REFORM IN 
PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS (1879). 
[1882] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS OF A SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE OF NINE, ON THE REMEDY FOR THE DELAYS INCIDENT TO THE DETERMINATION OF 
SUITS IN THE HIGHEST COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH THE DEBATE OF THE 
ASSOCIATION THEREON (1882), reprinted from 5 A.B.A. REPORTS (1882). 
[1885] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, APPOINTED TO 
CONSIDER AND REPORT WHETHER THE PRESENT DELAY AND UNCEDRTAINY IN JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION CAN BE LESSENED, AND IF SO, BY WHAT MEANS WITH THE APPENDIX (1885), 
reprinted in 8 A.B.A. REP. 323 (1885). 
[1886] REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY IN JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION, 9 A.B.A. REP. 325 (1886). 
[1891] ALFRED RUSSELL, AVOIDABLE CAUSES OF DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY IN OUR COURTS: 
THE ANNUAL ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AT ITS MEETING, IN BOSTON, 
AUGUST 27, 1891, reprinted in 25 A.B.A. REP. *** (1891). 
[1995] JOHN FORREST DILLON, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1995). 
[1896] WILLIAM L. PUTNAM, LEGAL REFORM,  ADDRESS ... NASHUA, N.H., FEB. 26, 1896 
(1898). 
[1904] NEW YORK (State), COMMISSION ON LAW'S DELAYS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
LAW'S DELAYS APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR, PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 485 OF THE LAWS OF 
AS SUPPLEMENTED AND AMENDED BY CHAPTER 634 OF THE LAWS OF TRANSMITTED TO THE 
LEGISLATURE, JANUARY 25, 1904 (1904). 
[1905] IRE JEWELL WILSON, PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION: JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY 
(1905). 
 
1906 to 1937 (From Pound’s Address to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)  
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[1906] Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
29 A.B.A. Reports 395 (1906). 
[1908] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SUGGEST REMEDIES AND 
FORMULATE PROPOSED LAWS TO PREVENT DELAY AND UNNECESSARY COST IN LITIGATION 
(1908) – 25 PAGES 
[1908] William Howard Taft, Delays and Defects in the Enforcement of the Law in this Country. 
An address delivered before the Civic Forum, New York City, at Carnegie Hall, April 28, 1908. 
Reprinted in PAUL S. REINSCH, READINGS ON AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT  173 (1911).  
[1908] William Howard Taft, The Administration of Justice—Its Speeding and Cheapening, 21 
REPORTS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 233 (1908). 
[T]he inevitable effect of the delays incident to the machiniery now required in the 
settlement of controversies in judicial tribunals is to oppress and put at disadvantage the 
poor litigant and give advantage to his wealthy opponent.” Id. at 241.  
[1909] William Howard Taft, Address at Orchastra Hall, Chicago , Illinois (September 16, 
1909) in 1 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 191 (1910). 
[T]he situation is now ripe for the appointment of a commission by Congress to take up 
the question of the law’s delays in the federal courts and to report a system which shall not 
only secure quick and cheap justice to the litigants in the Federal courts but shall offer a 
model to the legislatures and courts of the States by the use of which they can themselves 
institute reforms. Id. at 199. 
[1909] ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE NEW YORK PROCEDURE, NOVEMBER 1ST, 
1909 (1909). 
[1910] Edward D’Arcy, “Theory of the Case”—Wrecker of Law, 70 CENT. L.J. 294, 295 
(1910). 
[1910] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SUGGEST 
REMEDIES AND FORMULATE PROPOSED LAWS TO PREVENT DELAY AND UNNECESSARY COST IN 
LITIGATION, reprinted in 35 A.B.A. REP. 614 (1910). 
[1911] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SUGGEST 
REMEDIES AND FORMULATE PROPOSED LAWS TO PREVENT DELAY AND UNNECESSARY COST IN 
LITIGATION  (1911),  reprinted in 36 A.B.A. REP. *** (1911). 
[1911-1916] Elihu Root, Addresses on the Administration of Justice, reprinted in ELIHU ROOT, 
ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 431-532 (Robert Bacon and John Brown Scott, 
eds., 1916). 
[1912] MISSOURI BAR ASSOCIATION. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION AND LEGAL PROCEDURE (1912). 
[1912] REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR [OF OREGON] ... TO MAKE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REVISION OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1912).  
[1912] MOORFIELD STOREY, THE REFORM OF LEGAL PROCEDURE [Storrs Lectures 1911] 
(1912). 
[1913] Thomas W. Shelton, The Reform of Judicial Procedure, 1 VA. L. REV. 89, 90 (1913). 
[1913] WILLIAM C. HOOK, SOME CAUSES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION OF 
LEGAL PROCEDURE, AN ADDRESS .... BEFORE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1913). 
[1913]  Treadmill Justice, in GEORGE W. ALGER, THE OLD LAW AND THE NEW ORDER 61 et 
seq. (1913). 
[1913] JOHN LARKIN THORNDIKE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE TO SUGGEST REMEDIES AND FORMULATE PROPOSED LAWS TO PREVENT DELAY 
AND UNNECESSARY COST IN LITIGATION (1913),  reprinted in 38 A.B.A. REP. *** (1913). 
[1914] SHERMAN L. WHIPPLE, THE IMPAIRMENT OF POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REMARKS AT THE ANNUAL BANQUET OF THE STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT AT NEW LONDON, FEBRUARY 2, 1914 (1914). 
[1914] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SUGGEST 
REMEDIES AND FORMULATE PROPOSED LAWS TO PREVENT DELAY AND UNNECESSARY COST IN 
LITIGATION (1914), reprinted in 39 A.B.A. REP. *** (1914). 
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[1915] Elihu Root, On Ending the Scandal of Law’s Delays, reprinted in ELIHU ROOT, 
ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 177 (Robert Bacon and John Brown Scott, 
eds., 1916). 
[1915] Woodrow W. Wilson, Jackson Day Address at Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, reprinted 
in PRESIDENT WILSON’S STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES, INTRODUCTION BY ALBERT SHAW 80 
(1917). 
I do know that the United States in its judicial procedure is many decades behind every 
other civilized Government in the world, and I say that it is an immediate and an 
imperative call upon us to rectify that, because the speediness of justice, the 
inexpensiveness of justice, the ready access to justice, is the greater part of justice itself. 
Id. at 88. 
[1917] AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, JUSTICE THROUGH 
SIMPLIFIED LEGAL PROCEDURE, 73 THE ANNALS, Sept. 1917 (Carl Kelsey & Henry W. Jessup, 
ed.). 
[1917] FREDERIC DEWITT WELLS, THE MAN IN COURT (1917). 
[1918] THOMAS W. SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS (1918). 
[1919] JOHN D. WORKS, JURIDICAL REFORM: A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND EQUITY SYSTEMS OF PRACTICE, THE ENGLISH 
JUDICATURE ACTS, AND CODES OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THIS COUNTRY, WITH A VIEW TO 
GREATER EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY (1919). 
[1922] William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the United States, Possible and Needed Reforms 
in the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, Address delivered at the annual meeting 
of the American Bar Association in REPORT OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, AUGUST 9, 10 AND 11, 
1922 at 250 (1922). 
[1923] REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION 
FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE (1923). 
[1924] ANDREW ALEXANDER BRUCE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE (1924). 
[1926] HENRY W. TAFT, LAW REFORM: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES BY A PRACTICING LAWYER 
(1926). 
[1934] Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 828 (1924).  
[1934] Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1934). 
[1937] ISIDOR FEINSTEIN [= I.F. Stone], THE COURT DISPOSES (1937). 
 
1937 to 1969 
 
[1939] FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! (1939). 
[1949] JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). 
[1952] WILLIAM SEAGLE, LAW: THE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY (1952). 
[1955] WILLIAM PIERCE ROGERS, “HOW LONG MUST A PERSON WAIT TO HAVE HIS CASE TRIED?”  
(1955). 
[1955] ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM (1955). 
[1956] I.P. CALLISON, COURTS OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE OF JUSTICE IN THE STATE COURTS 
(1956) 
[1958] FANNIE J. KLEIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN LITIGATION: HELD 
AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 16 AND 17, 1958 (1959). 
[1959] HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN JR., & BERNARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE REMEDIES FOR DELAYED JUSTICE (1959). 
[1959] SHELDON D. ELLIOTT, IMPROVING OUR COURTS: COLLECTED STUDIES ON JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION (1959). 
[1959] Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, Foreword, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT 
CONGESTION 7 (1959)  
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Interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today compromising the basic 
legal rights of countless thousands of Americans and, imperceptibly, corroding the 
very foundations of constitutional government in the United States. 
[1959] CLARENCE G. GALSTON, BEHIND THE JUDICIAL CURTAIN (1959). 
[1960] LAGGING JUSTICE (Glen Winters, ed.), ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, vol. 328.  
[1961] A. LEO LEVIN & EDWARD A. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1961). 
[1963] BERNARD BOTEIN & MURRAY A. GORDON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE: CHALLENGE TO 
THE LAW (1963). 
[1964] NEW YORK (State), LEGISLATURE. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
RECOMMENDATIONS RESPECTING COURT DELAY, LAWYERS REGISTRATION, CONDEMNATION 
AND APPROPRIATION (1964). 
 
1970 to 1979 
 
 [1971] MAURICE ROSENBERG, DEVISING PROCEDURES THAT ARE CIVIL TO PROMOTE JUSTICE 
THAT IS CIVILIZED (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, 1971) reprinted in 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 
(1971):  
[F]oreign judges and scholars throng here to study our methods of judicial 
administration. Some might think these pilgrimages akin to visiting a morgue to 
learn health habits. But in my opinion, the visitors are right to make them. In this 
nation we have invested more energy, attention, concern, and resources than has any 
other place on earth in an effort to upgrade judicial administration. That the 
investment has left us far short of perfection is an obvious understatement and a fact 
that is no secret abroad. Id. at 798.  
The pluralistic American system of civil justice remains the wonder of the world of 
judicial administration. It is riddled with archaic rigidities and indefensible 
paradoxes. It is often sluggish and irrational. As an instrument for resolving disputes, 
its greatest redeeming feature is that it stands alongside our system of criminal 
justice, where its warts seem beauty marks by contrast. It will improve; it must. Id. at  
819. 
[1971] LEONARD DOWNIE, JR., JUSTICE DENIED: THE CASE FOR REFORM OF THE COURTS 
(1971). 
[1972] THE WORK OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TRIAL COURT DELAY APPOINTED BY CHIEF 
JUSTICE DONALD R. WRIGHT ON MARCH 26, 1971 TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF TRIAL 
COURT DELAY IN CALIFORNIA, AND BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 1, 1972 (1972). 
[1972] BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY 
YOUNG ADVOCATES (1972). 
[1973] ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: HOW OUR ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF LAW VICTIMIZES 
US AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE (1973). 
[1975] COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE 
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975). 
[1976] THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (Murray L. Schwartz, 
ed., 1976). 
[1977] MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE: TOO MUCH FIGHT? TOO LITTLE TRUTH? 
EQUAL JUSTICE? (1977). 
[1978] THOMAS W, CHURCH, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PRETRIAL DELAY: A 
REVIEW AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978). 
[1978] HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN & BERNARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (2nd ed. 
1978).   
[1979] THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & 
Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
 
1980 to 1989 
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[1980] NOLO PRESS, LEGAL BREAKDOWN: 40 WAYS TO FIX OUR LEGAL SYSTEM: MAKE LAW 
FAIR, AFFORDABLE AND OPEN TO ALL (1980). 
[1980] GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 
(1980). 
[1981] FREE CONGRESS RESEARCH & EDUCATION FOUNDATION A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL 
REFORM (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader, eds., 1981). 
[1981] RAND CORPORATION, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY; A NATIONAL 
INVENTORY (1981). 
[1981] THE FREE CONGRESS RESEARCH AND EDUCATION FOUNDATION, A BLUEPRINT FOR 
JUDICIAL REFORM (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader, eds., 1981). 
[1982] JULIUS BYRON LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS (1982). 
[1983] MALCOLM M FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL: A 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT (1983) 
[1984] AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY (1984). 
[1984] Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, Address, February 12, 1984, 
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, The State of Justice, of the Chief Justice of the 
United States, 70 A.B.A.J. 62 (April 1984).  
Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly 
civilized people. Id. at 66. 
[1984] MOLLY SELVIN, PATRICIA ANNE EBENER, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RAND 
CORPORATION, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE, A HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE LOS 
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1984). 
[1985] LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMANN, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS: WHAT AMERICANS WANT 
FROM THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND WHY (Russell Sage Foundation, 1985) 
[1985] John H. Langbein The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 
(1985). 
[1985] RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). 
[1987] JOHN GOERDT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING COURT DELAY: 
THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 26 URBAN TRIAL COURTS, 1987 (1989). 
[1988] DALE A. SIPES & MARY ELSNER ORAM, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ON 
TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS (1988) 
[1989] PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). 
[1988] DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDITICAL ROULETTE, REPORT ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 
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